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Abstract
One project in the epistemology of mathematics is to find a defensible 
account of what passes for mathematical knowledge. This study 
contributes to this project by examining philosophical theories of 
mathematics governed by certain basic assumptions. Foremost amongst 
these is the “linguistic realism” of the title. Roughly put, this is the view 
that the semantics of mathematical sentences should be taken at face 
value.
Two approaches to mathematics are considered, realist and fictionalist. 
Mathematical realism affirms the existence of mathematical objects, taking 
much of what passes for mathematical knowledge as knowledge of such 
things. It faces the challenge of explaining how such knowledge is 
possible. The main strategies here are to appeal to the faculty of reason, 
to a faculty of intuition or to the faculty of sense perception. Recent 
examples of each strategy are considered and it is argued that the 
prospects for a satisfactory mathematical realism are limited.
Mathematical fictionalism does not affirm the existence of mathematical 
objects, claiming that mathematics is, or should be considered to be, a 
form of pretence. It faces the challenge of explaining how a form of 
pretence can discharge the roles mathematics has in empirical 
applications. Strategies here are to argue that mathematics is an 
eliminable convenience or, acknowledging that this may not be the case, 
that the roles played by mathematics in empirical applications are played 
in similar contexts by acknowledged forms of pretence. It is argued that 
the first strategy is not promising but that there is a version of the second 
that can be defended against objections.
In closing, consequences of the conclusions reached are explored and 
directions for future research indicated.
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1Introduction
Mathematics occupies a central place in our intellectual endeavours. In 
our scientific and technological society, the influence of mathematics is 
everywhere. Mathematics deserves philosophical examination.
This study contributes to the epistemology of mathematics. It addresses 
the question of how we should conceive of what passes for mathematical 
knowledge. To cut down on the available answers, certain basic 
assumptions will be made, one semantic, the other ontological. Within 
these constraints, two contrasting approaches to what passes for 
mathematical knowledge will be distinguished, mathematical realism and 
mathematical fictionalism. Each kind of view faces its epistemological 
challenge. This study addresses whether these challenges can be met.
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1.1 Linguistic realism
What is mathematics about? One might with some plausibility say that 
mathematics is about proving mathematical results, that it is about solving 
mathematical problems, or that it is about mathematical ideas. However, 
in philosophical discussions, there is a strictly semantic use of the word 
“about" which these replies do not address. On this use, to ask what 
mathematics is about is to ask what is the right semantic theory for 
mathematical language.
The most prominent model for semantic theories features in Tarski’s 
writing on truth. It describes how to define truth predicates for formal 
languages by appeal to axioms governing the reference and satisfaction of 
non-logical vocabulary, together with the by now familiar axioms for 
classical logical operators (1933, 1944). Because mathematics can be 
given a strictly formal development, a truth definition of this kind lends 
itself particularly well to the semantic analysis of mathematical language. 
But clearly such a definition ought to be pursued only if the semantic 
notion of truth should be brought to bear on mathematics and if the logical 
vocabulary used in mathematics should be interpreted classically. Due to 
the influence of Wittgenstein (see for example his (1967)) and Brouwer 
(see for example his (1949)), these points are the matter of some debate. 
Nevertheless, we will assume that mathematical language should be 
treated classically and referentially after the fashion of Tarski.
Given this assumption, identifying the right semantic theory for 
mathematics is a matter of identifying the right interpretation for 
mathematical language, given the Tarskian framework. To keep track of 
different approaches to this, it helps to introduce some terminology. Let us 
say that the actual logical form of a mathematical statement is the form 
attributed to it by the semantic theory chosen for the language, whatever 
that theory may be. Let us say that the apparent logical form of a 
mathematical statement is that suggested by interpreting the vocabulary of 
the sentence used to express it by comparison to the vocabulary used in
8
everyday talk about commonplace objects. On the comparison we have in 
mind, logical vocabulary is interpreted in just the same way in the two 
areas of discourse, and mathematical terms are treated as singular terms 
and predicates on a par with those used in talking about everyday objects. 
Thus the apparent logical form of the statement:
Something is both prime and greater than 2
is the logical form of the statement:
Something is both white and larger than John’s ball
that is, an existential generalization of the conjunction of monadic and 
dyadic predications concerning the same object, formally, 3x [Fx a  R(x, 
a)].
Given these explanations, it is obvious that the apparent and actual logical 
form of a given mathematical sentence may differ, since the semantic 
theory we chose for mathematics may provide a different interpretation of 
mathematical language from that produced by the method we have 
described. When a semantic theory posits a divergence of this kind, there 
is a sense in which it treats mathematical language as being semantically 
defective, cloaking mathematical statements in linguistic expressions that 
are misleading as to actual logical form. This is because the method we 
have invoked to identify the apparent logical form of mathematical 
statements is also the most natural method of identifying their actual 
logical form. Even so, many philosophical accounts of mathematics adopt 
semantic theories according to which there is a divergence of this kind (a 
specific example is in Heilman (1989), others can be found in Burgess and 
Rosen (1997)). However, we will assume that mathematical language is 
not in this sense defective, taking it for granted that the apparent logical 
form of mathematical statements coincides with their actual logical form.
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This assumption allows us to interpret mathematical language by analogy 
to the language of everyday talk about commonplace objects, as 
described above. Call this “taking mathematical language at face-value”. 
One must be circumspect when applying this method. The loose talk used 
in everyday mathematical practice, abbreviatory idioms and the like, are 
potentially misleading if taken at face-value, so this method of 
interpretation should only be used with the claims of rigorously developed 
theories. For example, one should not apply this method to the claim:
There are infinitely many primes
but rather to something like:
For every prime number, there is a greater prime number.
Moreover, as Wilson (1994) indicates, the best expression of a 
mathematical result may not at first be clear, but may only emerge when 
the result can be placed in the context of a home theory. Mathematical 
language should thus be taken at face-value only when it is being used to 
express the claims of mature mathematical theories, in which the best 
expression of results has presumably been achieved. With these 
provisos, taking mathematical language at face value seems to be a 
satisfactory method of interpretation.
We have now put forward two substantial assumptions:
(i) Mathematical language should be treated classically and 
referentially, following Tarski’s model for semantic theories.
(ii) Mathematical language should be taken at face-value 
when used rigorously to express claims of mature 
mathematical theories.
10
We will call the conjunction of these claims linguistic realism.1 As we have 
indicated, linguistic realism is not a trivial position to take in the philosophy 
of mathematics. However, it coheres with empirical studies in linguistics 
and it enjoys widespread support in the recent literature. The position is 
also intuitively appealing, providing a simple, effective way of deciding 
what, semantically speaking, mathematics is about and it delivers opinions 
on this that largely agree with the opinions of mathematicians. Linguistic 
realism is thus an interesting philosophical position with considerable 
virtues, a good starting point for our investigation into how best to 
conceive of what passes for mathematical knowledge.
1 Borrowing a term introduced by Azzouni (1994, 4) for what is effectively the same point of view.
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1.2 Ontological commitment
Our second basic assumption concerns the notion of ontological 
commitment. Quine introduced this notion by means of the following 
criterion:
a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which 
the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring 
in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true.
(1948, 13-14)
After this remark, Quine indicates that this principle identifies the 
ontological commitments of a theory with what it says there is (op. cit., 15). 
We will be adopting Quine’s approach to ontology throughout this study, 
and, with one modification, will be assuming this criterion.
The modification arises because of a difficulty with taking ontological 
commitment to be a relation borne towards entities. Consider the “theory” 
that comprises just this claim:
Something is a prime number
This theory says that there are prime numbers, so it has ontological 
commitments. However, if these must be entities, as Quine suggests, they 
must presumably be certain individual prime numbers. In order to state 
what the ontological commitments of the theory are, therefore, we would 
have to say to which prime numbers it is committed. But the theory does 
not allow us to do this; the only information it conveys is that there are 
prime numbers. We are thus left in the uncomfortable position of not 
being able to state the ontological commitments of a theory whose 
commitments should be perfectly clear.
To avoid this, Quine’s principle needs to be modified so that ontological 
commitment becomes a relation borne towards kinds of things:
12
A theory is committed to the instantiation of all and only 
those kinds of thing, to instances of which its bound 
variables must be capable of referring if its claims are to be 
true.
From this principle, it follows that the theory “Something is a prime 
number” is committed to the instantiation of the kind prime number. We 
may express this loosely by saying that it is committed to the existence of 
prime numbers, or, more simply by saying that it is committed to prime 
numbers. It is thus quite clear what the ontological commitments of the 
theory are and, as Quine intended, they are just what the theory says 
there are. This is not to say that it will always be clear what ontological 
commitments a theory bears. But if they are hard to identify, this will be 
because it is not clear what information the theory conveys, not because 
we have picked a problematic notion of ontological commitment.
We will call this modified criterion the Quinean criterion of ontological 
commitment, or the Quinean criterion, for short. It is important to realise 
that the criterion is intended to identify a unique notion of ontological 
commitment. It thus presupposes that a unique notion of truth has been 
settled upon in respect of which the ontological commitments of any theory 
are to be assessed. Note that the Quinean criterion admits no degrees of 
ontological commitment, because a theory either entails claims about 
objects of a given kind or it does not. It also takes existentially quantified 
statements as the indicators of ontological commitment, a result of the 
Quinean doctrine that the existential quantifier 3 is be read “there exists an 
x such th a t...” or “there is an x such th a t...".
The main alternatives to the Quinean criterion are inspired by the 
Meinongian view that there are non-existent objects (the golden mountain, 
the round square, etc.). This involves rejecting the Quinean view that the 
ontological commitments of a theory are indicated by its existentially 
quantified statements in favour of the view that existence should be
13
expressed by a predicate of the language of the theory. This idea has 
been defended by T. Parsons (1980), Zalta (1988) and Priest (2000). It 
has also been brought to bear specifically on the ontology of mathematics 
by Azzouni (2004).2 In adopting the Quinean criterion, we reject 
philosophical accounts of mathematics based on this approach.
As with linguistic realism, we have not proposed arguments in favour of 
the Quinean criterion. But we can make various observations to justify 
taking it as an assumption: it is assumed in much contemporary 
philosophy of mathematics; it is appealing in its own right; it seems 
intuitively preferable to Meinongian alternatives. The criterion also allows 
us to give a concise but informative statement of the ontological 
commitments of mathematics: mathematics is committed to the 
instantiation of those kinds that must be instantiated if mathematical 
claims are to be true. Since linguistic realism, demands that we take 
mathematical language at face-value, so that we must acknowledge 
mathematical kinds, this means that mathematics is committed to the 
instantiation of those mathematical kinds that must be instantiated if 
mathematical claims are to be true. As with our example above, we can 
express such commitment more loosely, saying either that mathematics is 
committed to the existence of mathematical objects or that it is committed 
to mathematical objects. Adoption of the Quinean criterion thus leads us 
to the attractive view that mathematics is committed to those mathematical 
objects that it says there are, numbers, sets, functions, etc.
2 Though the precise import o f this move in the case of Azzouni is not entirely clear as he denies 
that that there is a “fact o f the matter” as to what the right criterion of ontological commitment is 
(1998, 2004).
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1.3 Mathematical realism
Having set out our basic assumptions, we can return to the question of 
how we should conceive of what passes for mathematical knowledge. 
Clearly two approaches are available, one saying that this should be 
conceived of as knowledge, the other saying that it should not. We will 
now consider what possibilities there are for the first approach. For ease 
of exposition, we will use “apparent mathematical knowledge” as an 
abbreviation for “what passes for mathematical knowledge”.
If apparent mathematical knowledge is to be taken as knowledge, it must 
be true, for only that which is true can be known. Assuming linguistic 
realism, this would involve granting the truth of claims implying the 
existence of mathematical objects. Assuming the Quinean criterion, this 
would involve acknowledging commitment to the existence of 
mathematical objects. A philosophical theory of mathematics that 
endorses our basic assumptions should thus take apparent mathematical 
knowledge as mathematical knowledge only if it is prepared to affirm the 
existence of mathematical objects.3
Such views can be distinguished according to whether they take 
mathematical existence to be independent of the mental or linguistic 
activities of those who engage with mathematics. The sense of 
dependency here needs to be spelled out with some care, for obviously 
any view on which there is thought or talk about mathematical objects is a 
view on which mathematical existence is not entirely independent of 
mental and linguistic activity. Mathematical objects are independent in the 
intended sense if and only if they do not depend for their existence on 
mental or linguistic activity, if and only if they have some properties 
regardless of what properties they are said or thought to have.
3 Here we are ignoring the possibility that what passes for mathematical knowledge may contain 
cases of purely mathematical error, as it does not affect the arguments to be made.
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Having clarified this, let mathematical realism be the view that there are 
independently existing mathematical objects. Let ontological 
constructivism be the view that there are mathematical objects but that 
these are not independent of the mental and linguistic activity of those who 
engage with mathematics. An account of mathematics that assumes 
linguistic realism and the Quinean criterion, and which portrays apparent 
mathematical knowledge as knowledge, must embrace either 
mathematical realism or ontological constructivism.
The most obvious strategy for ontological constructivism is to regard 
mathematical objects as items of construction. Frege argued against one 
version of this approach when he criticised the suggestion that numbers 
are private mental objects (i.e. mental objects in the minds of individual 
thinkers). His main objections were that this view cannot account for the 
objectivity of arithmetical truth (Grundlagen §§26-27) and that it cannot 
guarantee that infinitely many numbers exist (§27).4 These objections 
seem decisive against this particular view of numbers, as well as the view 
that mathematical objects in general are private mental objects. 
Moreover, Frege’s concern about the infinitude of numbers suggests that 
we can expect little better from versions of ontological constructivism that 
treat mathematical objects as linguistic objects; in order to ensure that 
there are infinitely many mathematical objects, a view of this kind would 
presumably have to treat the relevant linguistic objects as independently 
existing types, rather than tokens, in which case it has reverted to a form 
of realism.
A more sophisticated strategy for ontological constructivism is to regard 
mathematical truth as being constructed, taking the ultimate epistemic test 
for mathematical claims to be derivability from agreed upon mathematical 
conventions, or something very similar. Mathematical objects can still be
4 One point being made here is that there would not be sufficiently many numbers to make 
standard arithmetical theorems true. But Frege also entertained the semantic worry that if  there are 
not sufficiently many numbers, meaningful arithmetical language would be rendered meaningless: 
“ 1010, perhaps, might be only an empty symbol, and there might exist no idea at all, in any being 
whatever, to answer to the name.” Frege (1953, 38)
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said to be items of construction on this view, in the derived sense of being 
objects that the mathematical conventions are about. As this kind of view 
does not require that mathematical objects be constructed one by one, 
worries about whether infinitely many of them can be produced seem 
misplaced. As it seems possible to argue that the objectivity of 
mathematical results resides in the objectivity of our agreement of the 
relevant conventions, it may perhaps also be possible to allay doubts 
about the recovery of mathematical objectivity.5 Thus this kind of 
approach may perhaps withstand the Fregean critique.
However, if a view of this kind is to qualify as a version of ontological 
constructivism, derivability from the mathematical conventions must be put 
forward as a constitutive account of mathematical truth. But, as we said in 
the previous section, the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment 
presupposes that there is just one notion of truth in respect of which 
ontological commitments are to be assessed. Thus, unless the notion of 
derivability from the mathematical conventions is proposed as the notion 
of truth according to which the ontological commitments of all theories are 
to be assessed, which would be implausible, it cannot be proposed in the 
case of mathematics without abandoning the Quinean criterion. This 
would be to abandon the project of conjoining our basic assumptions with 
the view that apparent mathematical knowledge should be taken for 
knowledge.
In the present context, then, ontological constructivism does not seem 
very plausible. To unify our basic assumptions with the view that apparent 
mathematical knowledge should be taken for knowledge, some form of 
mathematical realism will thus have to be embraced. The initial attraction 
of the realist approach cannot be doubted. It is consistent with linguistic 
realism and the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment and so has 
all the virtues associated with those positions. Moreover, it allows us to
5On the other hand, it may be felt that there is a fundamental tension between ontological 
constructivism, with its claim that mathematical objects have no properties independently of what 
we say or think about them, and the idea that mathematics is objectively true.
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recover the outward practice of mathematics in a straightforward way. 
However, mathematical realism faces an epistemological challenge. It is 
legitimate to regard apparent mathematical knowledge as knowledge only 
if we are, or could be, in possession of adequately strong grounds in its 
favour. Mathematical realism must therefore provide good reason to think 
that we are, or could be, in possession of adequate grounds for knowledge 
of what passes for mathematical knowledge.
Note that this challenge is not the same as that associated with 
Benacerraf (1973), that of explaining from a realist perspective how 
knowledge is possible of abstract mathematical objects.6 Accounts of 
mathematics that are realist in our sense do tend to regard mathematical 
objects as abstract. This is usually taken to mean that mathematical 
objects exist “outside space and time”, i.e. lack spatial and temporal 
properties, although some realists, notably Hale (1987, Chapter 3), 
propose more refined criteria. However, we have not assumed that 
whatever mathematical objects there are are abstract, and neither have 
we made this an assumption of mathematical realism. Our challenge to 
mathematical realism thus differs from that of Benacerraf.
6 Benacerraf argued that on a causal approach to knowledge, such as that of Goldman (1967), 
knowledge of abstract mathematical objects would not be possible since abstract objects cannot 
enter causal relations.
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1.4 Mathematical fictionalism
Let us now consider what possibilities our basic assumptions allow for the 
view that we should not conceive of apparent mathematical knowledge as 
knowledge. One difficulty with this is that mathematics includes sentences 
like “Vx (x is a prime number -> x is a prime number)” that express logical 
truths according to linguistic realism. To claim that no apparent 
mathematical knowledge should be conceived as knowledge would thus 
require denying that these logical truths should be thought of as items of 
knowledge. But this would be unacceptable; we are very often capable of 
recognising logical truth when we see it, and this ability allows us to attain 
knowledge of (some) mathematically expressed logical truths.
The view that apparent mathematical knowledge should not be counted 
knowledge, if it is to be proposed at all, should therefore be limited to the 
object-committed fragment of apparent mathematical knowledge, the body 
of claims that passes for mathematical knowledge and that is committed to 
the existence of mathematical objects according to the Quinean criterion. 
Call this “object-committed apparent mathematic knowledge”. Such a view 
might be put forward on the grounds that that there are no mathematical 
objects or that there are not adequate grounds for belief in standard claims 
about them. However, without powerful metaphysical assumptions about 
what kinds of things could exist, it is hard to see why one might claim there 
are no mathematical objects without assuming or arguing that there are 
not adequate grounds for belief in standard claims about them. We have 
not made any such assumptions, and do not consider it wise to do so. So 
if we are to deny that object-committed apparent mathematical knowledge 
should be conceived of as knowledge, it will have to be on the grounds 
that there are not adequate grounds for belief in this body of claims. This 
approach thus requires claiming that object-committed apparent 
mathematical knowledge should not be believed.
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A second condition on this approach to apparent mathematical knowledge 
is that it must avoid commitment to the existence of mathematical objects. 
The question thus arises of whether we should continue to practice 
mathematics, as this appears to involve putting forward claims that are so 
committed. In response, it could be claimed either that mathematical 
practice should be rejected along with belief in object-committed 
mathematics, or that mathematical practice should be sustained without 
belief in object-committed mathematics.
The wholesale repudiation of mathematical practice would be highly 
controversial. Nevertheless, it is worth asking what reasons there are for 
someone who rejects knowledge of object-committed mathematics to 
avoid it. One very good reason is that mathematics is of great utility in 
empirical science. If we were to abandon the practice of mathematics, or 
at least, if we were to stop practising object-committed mathematics, we 
would have to abandon those theories of empirical science in which 
object-committed mathematics appears. But this would be to abandon 
most contemporary empirical science, which would be a crippling 
expense.
Philosophical accounts of mathematics claiming that object-committed 
apparent mathematical knowledge should not be believed must therefore 
propose a conception of mathematical practice that does not require such 
belief. If they are to respect linguistic realism, such accounts will have to 
accept that when we practice mathematics we advance claims that are 
true only if there are mathematical objects. So they must be committed to 
the view that we act as if object-committed apparent mathematical 
knowledge is true without believing it. Since one who acts as if something 
is true without believing it thereby pretends that it is true, this approach 
must endorse some version of mathematical fictionalism, the view that 
mathematics is, or should be, a form of pretence.
Mathematical fictionalism is usually explained or argued for by appeal to 
an analogy between mathematics and literary fiction. The analogy
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presupposes that when we engage with literary fiction, we imagine or 
pretend that we believe certain claims when in fact we do not. It maintains 
that engaging with object-committed mathematics involves entering into 
forms of pretence comparable to those into which we enter when we 
engage with works of literary fiction. However, literary fiction does not play 
the roles mathematics plays in empirical applications, so one might 
suspect that holding mathematics analogous to literary fiction makes it 
unfit to play these roles. Like mathematical realism, therefore, 
mathematical fictionalism faces an epistemological challenge. The 
challenge is to explain how mathematics can discharge its roles in 
empirical applications even if it is a form of pretence.
We should point out here that the literature contains another kind of view 
that has some claim to be regarded as a version of mathematical 
fictionalism. On this kind of view, the comparison with literary fiction is 
supposed to make us think that there are mathematical objects but that, 
like fictional objects, their nature is fixed by what we say about them (see, 
e.g., Azzouni (2000)). This approach can perhaps be connected to 
conceptions of literary fiction, such as that of Searle (1974), according to 
which fictional objects are creations of the authors of the literary works in 
which they appear. Perhaps to this extent it can be considered a form of 
mathematical fictionalism. However, this kind of view must either accept 
the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment, in which case its claim 
that there are mathematical objects whose nature is fixed by what we say 
about them means that it is a form of ontological constructivism, or it must 
reject the Quinean criterion, in which case it is of no interest to us. It is 
therefore quite legitimate for us to take mathematical fictionalism to be the 
view explained above, that mathematics is, or should be, a form of 
pretence.
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1.5 Programme
We have posed the question of how we should conceive of what passes 
for mathematical knowledge. Having made two basic assumptions, 
linguistic realism and the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment, we 
have argued that there are just two promising approaches to our question. 
Mathematical realism affirms the existence of independently existing 
mathematical objects and says that apparent mathematical knowledge 
should be conceived of as knowledge of such objects. Mathematical 
fictionalism rejects belief in mathematical objects but aims to preserve 
mathematical practice by saying that object-committed apparent 
mathematical knowledge is, or should be, a form of pretence. Each 
approach faces its epistemological challenge; mathematical realism must 
make plausible that we are, or could be, in possession of adequately 
strong grounds for knowledge of apparent mathematical knowledge, 
mathematical fictionalism must explain how object-committed apparent 
mathematical knowledge can discharge its roles in empirical applications 
even if it is a form of pretence. Constrained by our basic assumptions, 
therefore, we can address our original question of how we ought to 
conceive of apparent mathematical knowledge by investigating whether 
these challenges can be met. This will be our project.
We will first address whether there is a satisfactory realist account of the 
grounds of apparent mathematical knowledge. Different approaches here 
are to be distinguished according to where they locate the ultimate 
epistemic grounds upon which knowledge of this body of claims is taken to 
rest. Rationalist approaches look exclusively to the human mind, or 
intellect, for this, arguing that it can produce an epistemic basis for 
knowledge of mathematics without recourse to evidence from sense- 
perception. Empiricist approaches oppose this point of view, arguing that 
evidence from sense perception provides ultimate grounds for knowledge 
of mathematics. We will assess these approaches in Chapters 2 through 
5.
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Our attention will then turn to whether mathematical fictionalism can 
explain how object-committed mathematics can perform its roles in 
empirical applications even if it is a form of pretence. The first strategy for 
addressing this argues that such mathematics is an eliminable 
convenience to science, that science could be practised, with no 
significant loss, without assuming that this mathematics is true. We will 
assess this in Chapter 6. The second strategy is to argue that the roles 
object-committed mathematics has in science are played in other contexts 
by acknowledged forms of pretence. This will be considered in Chapter 7.
Before we embark on this project a terminological note is in order. During 
our discussion of realist approaches in Chapters 2 through 5 it will be 
convenient to adopt the realist way of speaking, talking of “mathematical 
knowledge” rather than “apparent mathematical knowledge” in order to 
investigate putative explanations of how we could come to posses it. Bear 
in mind, however, that this way of speaking is only adopted for 
convenience.
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2Realism and reason
It is a platitude that we arrive at prospective grounds for items of 
mathematical knowledge with the help of the mind, or intellect. But how 
far might we get with mathematical knowledge if we do nothing but 
exercise the mind? In the following passage, Leibniz suggests an 
optimistic response:
33. There are also two kinds of truth: those of reasoning, and 
those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their 
opposite is impossible; those of fact are contingent, and their 
opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, the reason 
for it can be found by analysis, by resolving it into simpler 
ideas and truths until we arrive at the basic ones.
34. Thus mathematicians use analysis to reduce speculative 
theorems and practical canons to definitions, axioms, and 
postulates.
35. And finally there are the simple ideas, which cannot be 
given a definition; and there are axioms and postulates -  in a 
word, basic principles, which can never be proved, but which 
also have no need of proof: these are identical propositions, 
the opposite of which contains an explicit contradiction. 
M onadolog/
Reading this passage, we can presume that when Leibniz mentions 
reasons for truths he is talking about considerations knowledge of which 
would suffice for knowledge of the relevant truths. His claim that “the 
reason” for a necessary truth “can be found by analysis” thus implies that
7 This translation is from Woolhouse and Francks (1998, 272)
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we can discover grounds for necessary truths, which for Leibniz includes 
mathematical truths, by exercising our capability for analysis. These 
grounds depend ultimately on both “simple ideas” and “basic principles”. 
But as it is claimed that the latter “have no need of proof, the position 
developed in the passage appears to be that as epistemic (rather than 
conceptual) supports for mathematical truths, these grounds do not 
require supplementation in order to be adequate.
Leibniz thus appears to have maintained that the human mind can provide 
compelling evidence for belief in mathematics independently of evidence 
from sense perception. This striking thought is the fundamental claim of 
rationalist approaches to mathematical knowledge. If it is correct, it may 
be possible to provide a satisfactory realist account of how what passes 
for mathematical knowledge is known. In this and the next chapter, we will 
address the prospects of this approach.
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2.1 Two strategies for rationalist epistemology
Different strategies for rationalist accounts of mathematical knowledge can 
be distinguished by reference to the cognitive capacities to which they 
appeal as sources of grounds for mathematical beliefs. What might these 
be?
Mathematical practice clearly shows that deductive inference is essential 
to the pursuit of mathematical knowledge. It also suggests that non- 
deductive inference has an epistemic role to play. However, a 
mathematical rationalism will not be able to view all mathematical 
knowledge as inferential, for if there is to be inferential mathematical 
knowledge, there must be non-inferential knowledge from which it is 
inferred (regardless of the nature of the inferences involved). As this non- 
inferential knowledge will have to rest on rationalistically acceptable 
grounds, it is by reference to the cognitive capacities invoked to supply 
them that we should distinguish amongst possible forms of mathematical 
rationalism.
As we have already seen, one cognitive capacity to which rationalists 
often appeal for grounds for non-inferential knowledge, and which we have 
already encountered in the passage from Leibniz quoted above, is the 
ability to analyse concepts. This allows a subject to reflect on concepts in 
such a way as to arrive at relations they bear to other concepts. Whilst it 
seems plain that we possess this ability, the rationalist argues for the more 
controversial view that conceptual analysis, the process of analysing 
concepts, provides grounds for non-inferential knowledge. It may be 
claimed, for example, that conceptual analysis can provide a subject who 
possesses concepts for colours with grounds for the conditional claim that, 
if something is wholly red, it cannot be wholly green. The idea here would 
be that the subject, simply by reflecting on what their concepts demand of 
a thing that is wholly red, could realise that being wholly red excludes 
being wholly green, so that they could know the conditional claim on this 
basis (provided they also understand the logical concepts it involves). If
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conceptual analysis does furnish us with grounds for knowledge in 
something like this manner, these grounds could perhaps secure non- 
inferential mathematical knowledge.
Even granting the epistemic effectiveness of conceptual analysis, 
however, one might reasonably doubt that it could provide enough non- 
inferential mathematical knowledge to provide premises from which the 
rest of mathematics could be inferred. If the conditional claim “if 
something is wholly red, it cannot be wholly green”, can be known through 
conceptual analysis, this may perhaps be because it is about relations 
between concepts. What matters for the truth of the conditional is what 
things must be like if they are to be wholly red or wholly green; whether 
there are things that are wholly red or wholly green is beside the point. 
But many mathematical claims are not about relations amongst concepts. 
The truth of 3x (x is an even prime number), for example, requires the 
existence of something answering to the concept of an even prime 
number, not merely the obtaining of certain relations between 
mathematical concepts. The set theoretic axiom of infinity demands the 
existence of infinitely many objects, the elements of an infinite set, not just 
that certain set theoretic relations stand to each other in certain ways. 
Because they bear ontological commitments, it seems unlikely that these 
claims could be known on grounds (if such exist) of conceptual analysis. 
But clearly some such claims will have to be known this way if 
mathematical knowledge quite generally is to be secured on the basis of 
conceptual analysis.
In response to pressures such as this, rationalists sometimes appeal to a 
second cognitive capacity as a source of grounds for non-inferential 
knowledge; the ability to have intuitions. Intuition is taken to be a cognitive 
relation obtaining either between subjects and objects, in which case it 
licenses talk of intuitions of mathematical objects, or between subjects and 
propositions, in which case it licenses talk of intuitions that things are thus 
and so in the mathematical realm. In either case, intuitions are
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understood to be the deliverances of an epistemically effective faculty of 
intuition delivering non-inferential knowledge. Note that the epistemic 
effectiveness of intuition is intended to outstrip that of conceptual analysis, 
whichever conception of intuition is in play. Rationalists posit a faculty of 
intuition in an attempt to make grounds available for non-inferential 
knowledge that could not be established on other rationalistically 
acceptable grounds, such as grounds of conceptual analysis. Because 
intuition is typically posited to address the perceived limitations of other 
rationalistically acceptable sources of knowledge, intuition is an artefact of 
rationalist philosophy.
Given these two potential sources of rationalistically acceptable grounds 
for non-inferential mathematical knowledge, it is clear that there are three 
strategies for mathematical rationalism: the first strategy appeals only to 
conceptual analysis as source of grounds for non-inferentially known 
mathematics; the second appeals for this only to intuition; the third 
appeals to both conceptual analysis and intuition. In the remainder of this 
chapter we will assess the chances of success for the first strategy. We 
aim to find out whether the prospects are good for an account of 
mathematical knowledge that secures non-inferential mathematical 
knowledge on the grounds of conceptual analysis.
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2.2 Conceptual analysis as a source of mathematical knowledge
Cognitive capacities for analysis can be understood in relation to 
concepts, the constituents of thoughts, or in relation to meanings, the 
connotations of linguistic expressions. In each case, analysis itself is the 
process of reflecting upon the things concerned in such a way as to bring 
to our attention what we understand of them. We will not be making any 
claims that turn on the distinction between concepts and meanings, so for 
simplicity we will assume that they are the same (treating thoughts as 
sentence meanings, and concepts as word meanings).
Our present concern is with the strategy of appealing only to conceptual 
analysis as a source of grounds for non-inferential mathematical 
knowledge. This strategy must address the worry we touched on in the 
previous section, that it seems initially implausible to maintain that 
conceptual analysis could provide grounds for knowledge of claims with 
ontological commitments. More specifically, it must address the challenge 
of explaining how conceptual analysis could deliver knowledge of 
mathematical objects. There is just one promising approach to this. It 
depends on two key ideas.
2.2.1 Analytic truth
Whether any thoughts are knowable by reflection on concepts has been 
the subject of much controversy. Kant introduced the term “analytic” for 
judgments in which what is predicated of the subject is already contained 
in the concept of the subject, and held that judgments of this kind could be 
known through analysis (Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction, §4). Frege 
modified this account, defining analytic truths as those that can be proved 
on the basis of logical laws and definitions (Grundlagen, §3). Afterwards 
Camap explained analytic truths as the logical consequences of meaning 
postulates (1952; 1956, Chapter 1, §2). Each successive definition 
widens the class of analytic truths, Frege’s extending Kant’s because it
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applies also to statements that are not in subject-predicate form, Carnap’s 
extending Frege’s because the notion of a “meaning postulate” includes 
semantic rules over and above those that Frege would have recognised as 
definitions.
If we are interested in whether there are analytic thoughts, however, we 
must do more than just pick out a class of truths to call analytic. As 
Quine’s famous attack on analyticity makes clear (1951, 1960), an account 
of the analytic must also help to show why the truths specified as analytic 
should be counted as items of knowledge. Recent contributions to the 
discussion thus focus less on delimiting the analytic truths and more on 
how conceptual analysis is supposed to provide grounds for knowledge of 
them. In this vein, Peacocke (1993) argues that in some cases the mere 
possession of concepts can be sufficient to there being a reflective route 
to knowledge, whilst Boghossian (1996) argues that knowledge of some 
sentences or inferences is guaranteed by an understanding of the words 
they contain.
The common thread to proposals like these is that the epistemic 
effectiveness of conceptual analysis can be seen from adequate theories 
of the understanding. If this is correct, then recognition that mathematical 
knowledge can be grounded on conceptual analysis may emerge from a 
clear conception of what it is to possess or understand mathematical 
concepts or meanings. Let us call analytic those thoughts that can be 
known on grounds of conceptual analysis. The idea is then that appeal to 
adequate explanations of what it is to possess mathematical concepts 
helps to show that mathematics is analytic.
2.2.2 Logicism
No consensus has emerged on whether there are analytic truths. But the 
debate does show that the truths deemed most likely to be analytic are the 
logical truths, statements like 2 is prime or 2 is not prime, all prime
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numbers are prime numbers, etc. This, together with the close connection 
between logic and mathematics, suggests that a reflective route to 
knowledge of mathematics might start from the analyticity of logic. This is 
the second key idea for rationalist attempts to ground mathematical 
knowledge on conceptual analysis.
Early logicists sought to capitalise on this idea by claiming that 
mathematics is, or is reducible to, logic. The relevant sense of reduction 
required that mathematical concepts be defined in terms of logical ones, 
so as to make all theorems of mathematics consequences of logical laws. 
The analyticity of mathematics would then follow from the analyticity of 
logic.8
However, attempts to follow through this strategy met with a stubborn 
problem: mathematics could not be reduced to uncontroversially logical 
systems. Principia Mathematics, for example, made use of the axioms of 
reducibility, choice and infinity, non-logical principles all (these axioms are 
introduced in *12 of Part I, Section B, the Summary of Part II, Section D 
and the Summary of Part III, Section C, respectively). Russell and 
Whitehead responded to this in the second edition by arguing that the 
axiom of reducibility is pragmatically justified (see the introduction) and by 
presenting theorems that depend on the axioms of choice (the 
“multiplicative axiom”) or infinity as conditionals with those axioms as their 
antecedents (see the Summaries to Part II, Section D, and Part III, Section 
C).9 But even if the axiom of reducibility is pragmatically justified, it 
remains a non-logical principle. And even though it is possible to 
conditionalize theorems in the way described, this seems not to be a 
method of reduction but rather a method of replacement: theories of 
concrete mathematics, set theory and real analysis, for example, assert
8 Other kinds of reduction are possible. Concentrating on this kind of reduction, we are focussing 
on the logicist tradition of Frege and Russell, rather than that o f Dedekind. Dedekind’s approach 
depends on a view of the semantics of mathematical language that conflicts with linguistic realism,
9 It should be noted concerns with the axiom of reducibility had already been noted and discussed 
in the introduction to the first edition, Chapter II, §§VI -  V II.
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the existence of their objects; such assertions cannot be adequately 
represented by the relevant conditional claims.
Recent logicist approaches to mathematics accept that this kind of 
reduction is not possible but try to salvage the epistemological project by 
taking a more sophisticated view of the relationship between logic and 
mathematics. Rather than saying that mathematics is reducible to logic, 
these more recent views hold that mathematics is recoverable from logic 
together with a moderate stock of non-logical machinery. Thus Bostock 
(1974, 1979) explores the possibility of understanding natural numbers, 
rationals and irrationals by reference to special quantifiers, as does Hodes 
(1984, 1990, 1991a, 1991b) for natural numbers and sets. Having given 
up on the kind of reducibility demanded by early logicism, such 
approaches can no longer argue that the analyticity of mathematics 
follows from the analyticity of logic. However, if it can be shown that the 
extra machinery involved does not itself stand in need of any justification 
over and above the deliverances of conceptual analysis, then the 
analyticity of logic might still play an important role in showing that 
mathematics is analytic.
2.2.3 Mathematics as an analytic extension of logic
The two key ideas for use in rationalist attempts to ground mathematical 
knowledge on conceptual analysis are thus (a) that the analyticity of a 
thought might be seen from a proper understanding of what it is to 
possess the concepts it involves (b) that the analyticity of logic might help 
to establish the analyticity of mathematics. Together these ideas suggest 
a strategy with which to address the challenge of explaining how 
conceptual analysis grounds knowledge of mathematical objects. The 
strategy argues that standard mathematical concepts are defined, 
explained or in some other way introduced by principles from which 
knowledge of mathematical objects can be deduced. Assuming that logic 
is analytic, it is then argued that mathematics is an analytic extension of
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logic. Call this the logicist strategy for showing that mathematics is 
analytic. In the rest of this chapter we will assess its chances of success.
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2.3 Neo-Fregeanism
Neo-Fregeanism is a philosophy of arithmetic devised by Crispin Wright 
(1983) and staunchly defended by Bob Hale (1987). It claims that the 
natural numbers are mind independent, abstract objects, knowledge of 
which can be obtained from logic and Hume’s Principle, the statement 
that:
The number of Fs is the number of Gs if and only if there is a
one-one correspondence between the Fs and the Gs.
The background logic is understood to be at least second order. “F” and 
“G” are schematic, occupying places to be filled by terms for entities of the 
kind ranged over by the second order variables (these could be properties, 
predicates, Fregean concepts, etc., more on this later).
The Neo-Fregeans claim that Hume’s Principe (HP) can be stipulated to 
be true, and thus that it stands in no need of justification. They also claim 
that when it is stipulated to be true, HP introduces a concept for cardinal 
number and simultaneously fixes truth-conditions for some claims of 
cardinal identity (claims of the form “the cardinal number of Fs is identical 
to the cardinal number of Gs”). From this the Neo-Fregeans argue that 
HP, together with the background logic, provides all the resources 
necessary to the understanding and justification of arithmetic. Since they 
feel that HP does not stand in need of justification, they infer that 
arithmetic is justified in the same way as the background logic, concluding, 
from the assumption that logic is analytic, that so, too, is arithmetic. The 
Neo-Fregean account of arithmetic is thus a prime example of the logicist 
strategy described in the previous section.
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2.3.1 The method of Fregean abstraction
Behind this view of arithmetic lies a distinctive method for introducing new 
ranges of abstract objects. Imagine for a moment that our universe 
consists of geometric figures in a Euclidean plane and that our knowledge 
is limited to the behaviour of these figures under mappings of the plane to 
itself. Much of our thinking will be concerned with the effects such 
mappings have on particular geometric figures, such as that mapping M 
shifts figure A three feet to the right, that mapping M’ sends figure A to 
figure B, etc. Assume, though, that we lack concepts for, and entertain no 
thoughts about, shape.
In an idle moment, some bright spark reflects on the possibility of a new 
kind of object. These objects are to be correlated with geometric figures in 
such a way as to keep track of congruence relations amongst them. The 
idea is to introduce a functional expression “The shape of x”, whose 
arguments are terms for geometric figures and whose values are singular 
terms, and to hold true identities of the form “The shape of a = the shape 
of b” when there is a rigid motion of the figure a onto the figure b.10 In 
short, the principle:
The shape of a = the shape of b *-+ there is a rigid motion of a to b
is stipulated to introduce terms for a new range of objects, for shapes, by 
fixing the truth-conditions of identity statements involving them. The 
method used here is that of Fregean abstraction.
This method cannot be applied to any relation amongst figures. To avoid 
some rather obvious contradictions the relation must be symmetric,
10 That is to say, when there is a linear mapping of the Euclidean plane under which the image of a 
is Z>. I f  the plane is equipped with co-ordinate axes, a linear mapping sends (x, y) to ( x \ y r) where:
x ’ = ax + by + r, 
y ’ = cx + dy + s,
a , b, c, d, r  and s real numbers.
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reflexive and transitive; it must be an equivalence relation. Since 
equivalence relations partition the domains over which they are defined 
into disjoint equivalence classes, in which each element is related to all 
the others, this gives us a useful way of understanding how Fregean 
abstraction is supposed to work. The same new object is assigned to 
each element of a given equivalence class. The stipulation for shapes, for 
example, assigns the same shape to all figures congruent to a given figure 
a (the equivalence class containing a), the same shape to all figures 
congruent to figure b (the equivalence class containing b), and so on. In 
general, then, the method of Fregean abstraction takes an equivalence 
relation defined over previously accepted objects and introduces a new 
range of objects as the abstract indices of its equivalence classes. 
Terminology for the new objects is introduced by stipulations of the form:
f(a) = f(b ) <- R(a, b)
which fix truth conditions for some identity statements involving singular 
terms formed with the new functional operator f. We will call principles like 
these abstraction principles.
2.3.2 Application of Fregean abstraction to Hume’s Principle
The Neo-Fregean account of arithmetic appeals to a Fregean abstraction 
from HP. Consider a second-order language L containing no non-logical 
vocabulary (assume that identity is logical) and imagine that this language 
is actually used for communication. The Neo-Fregeans suggest extending 
L to a new language L* by stipulating HP:
VFVG((Nx:Fx = Nx:Gx) <-> 3R(F 1 - 1R G))
Here “Nx: Fx” is a new non-logical expression, the so-called cardinality 
operator, to be read “the number of Fs”, and “3R(F 1 - 1R G)” is a formal
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expression of L for “there is a one-one correspondence between F and 
G”.11 Note that one-one correspondence is an equivalence relation and 
that when HP is laid down it is part of what is stipulated that the terms 
formed by the cardinality operator are singular terms. Thus HP has the 
form required of an abstraction principle and so the extension of L to L* 
can be taken as an instance of Fregean abstraction.
The key cognitive claim of Neo-Fregeanism is that when HP is stipulated 
in this way, the conceptual resources necessary to understanding the 
arithmetical claims formulable in L* are made available. In support of this, 
they point out that the cardinality operator alone is a sufficient definitional 
basis for the arithmetical terms involved in the Dedekind-Peano axioms for 
arithmetic, the terms “0”, “successor'1 and “number” (see, e.g., Wright 
(1998, 389)). This striking result makes clear that the only new concept 
that speakers of L must come to possess if they are to understand 
arithmetical claims is a concept for cardinal number. However, it does not 
provide any evidence that speakers of L could acquire possession of such 
a concept from the stipulation of HP. So why do the Neo-Fregeans think 
that this is possible?
The argument here is that HP can be taken as a meaning equivalence:
TNx:Fx = Nx:Gxl means that T3R(F 1 - 1R G)1
Because speakers of L already understand sentences exhibiting the form 
displayed on the right hand side, the meaning equivalence puts them in a 
position to express what they understand by these sentences using 
sentences of the form displayed on its left hand side. For example they 
can state the thought expressed by:
There is a one-one correspondence between the concepts cow and goat
11 What’s needed here is a formal sentence expressing the existence of a relation pairing off each 
thing satisfying F with a unique thing satisfying G and each thing satisfying G with a unique thing 
satisfying F, e.g., 3R[Vx (Fx —► 3y (Gy & Rxy &  Vz ((Gz & Rxz) —> z = y))) & Vy (Gy —► 3x (Fx
& Rxy & Vz ((Fz & Rzy) —► z = x)))].
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using the sentence:
The number of cows = the number of goats.
For the Neo-Fregeans, however, this is not a mere change in language. 
They argue that, by taking the terms formed by the cardinality operator in 
these sentences as singular terms, speakers of L can understand the 
claims these sentences express as numerical identities. In support of this, 
they argue that speakers of L who approach the meaning equivalence in 
the right frame of mind “reconceptualize” facts about equinumerosity as 
facts about numbers (see, e.g., Wright (1997, 207-209)). To be in the right 
frame of mind, the speaker must take the left hand side of instances of the 
equivalence as semantically complex symbols (not merely unstructured 
labels for the corresponding right hand sides) and they must not allow any 
reinterpretation of the vocabulary of L .meaning during the shift to L*. 
According to the Neo-Fregeans, a speaker who approaches an instance of 
the meaning equivalence this way is forced to rethink the content of its 
right hand, a statement about equinumerosity, as a statement of identity 
about a new range of objects, the numbers. This process is said to 
culminate in their having a fully articulate understanding of numerical 
identities formed with the cardinality operator. Because it is fully articulate, 
it is alleged to involve possession of a concept for cardinal number. So 
the stipulation of HP is supposed to put speakers of L in a position from 
which they can acquire, by a little conceptual surgery, the only new 
concept they need in order to understand any arithmetical claim. Thus the 
stipulation of HP is said to provide a conceptual basis for arithmetic.
Let us now consider the second key claim of the Neo-Fregean view, that 
HP and second order logic provide a sufficient epistemic basis for 
arithmetic. To help establish this, the Neo-Fregeans argue that, once it 
has been stipulated, HP lays down truth conditions for (some) arithmetical 
identity claims of the form TNx :Fx = Nx:Gx] (see, e.g., Wright’s discussion 
of abstraction principles at (op. c/Y., 208-209)). From this it is argued that
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HP is able to provide evidence for certain arithmetical thoughts by allowing 
evidence for the right hand side of an instance of HP to be taken as 
evidence for the corresponding left hand side. In this way, for example, 
our evidence for the claim that the concept proton in a hydrogen atom is 
equinumerous to the concept electron in a hydrogen atom becomes 
evidence for the claim that the number of protons in a hydrogen atom 
equals the number of electrons in a hydrogen atom, as this follows from 
the statement about equinumerosity together with HP.
To make this point relevant to the justification of arithmetic, Wright 
demonstrates (1983, 154-169) that it is possible to derive versions of the 
Dedekind-Peano axioms for arithmetic from second-order logic and HP. 
Call the resulting theory Frege Arithmetic (FA). Assuming that HP does 
indeed transfer evidence from one claim to another in the way described, 
this derivation converts whatever evidence there is for its premises into 
evidence for its conclusions, i.e. for FA. So if speakers of L possess (or 
could possess) adequate grounds for knowledge of the premises, they 
could also come to know the arithmetical theory. Crucially, the premises 
required by the derivation are theorems of second order logic with identity. 
So since it follows from the Neo-Fregean assumption that logic is analytic 
that there are adequate grounds for all theorems of second order logic, 
this suggests that second-order logic and HP provide a sufficient epistemic 
basis for arithmetic, as the Neo-Fregeans claim.
We mentioned above that the domain over which the second order 
variables of HP range is a matter of some ambiguity. In Wright’s original 
exposition it is clear that concepts of some kind are intended, but it is not 
clear whether these should be understood as Fregean concepts (the 
things referred to by predicates), as constituents of thoughts or perhaps as 
something else.12 The ambiguity seems to be resolved in a later 
discussion during which Wright refers to the entities in question as
12 Wright (1983, §iv) discusses extending reference to predicates. But he does not in fact endorse 
the idea, the point of the discussion is to argue that this move would not threaten the Neo-Fregean 
conception of objects.
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Fregean concepts, but all he really means by this is that, like Fregean 
concepts, the things in question are extensionally individuated (1997, 208, 
n. 13). Thus the ambiguity remains.
This is important because the very content of HP, and therefore its 
suitability for the role intended in the Neo-Fregean account of arithmetic, 
depends upon the range of its second order variables. For suppose we 
took these to range over predicates. Then HP would imply that, if two 
predicates were satisfied by the same number of things, there would have 
to exist a relational expression satisfied by unique pairings of the things 
satisfying the predicates. Since we do not consider statements of 
numerical identity to depend on language in this way, it would then not be 
possible to maintain that HP introduces a concept for number. For the 
sake of definiteness, then, we shall assume that the second order 
variables range over Fregean concepts. This would seem to avoid the 
problem associated with predicates, though, of course, it may bring with it 
problems of its own.
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2.4 Problematic cardinal numbers
Given F, an arbitrary sortal concept, there is a one-one correspondence 
between the Fs and the Fs. If the Neo-Fregeans are right that HP 
introduces a concept for cardinal number, it follows from this and HP that, 
for any such concept F, the cardinal number of Fs is identical to the 
cardinal number of Fs. Then, by existential generalisation, we have that 
there exists x such that x is identical to the cardinal number of Fs. Thus 
Neo-Fregeanism must endorse the principle that there is always a cardinal 
number of things satisfying an arbitrary concept, formally:
VF 3x (x = Ny: Fy)
This is very similar to the principle of set existence:
VF 3x(x = {y. Fy})
which says that there is always a set of things satisfying an arbitrary sortal 
concept. As is well known, this principle leads to the existence of 
inconsistent sets such as the Russell set. By virtue of the similarity, it is 
natural to wonder whether the former principle suffers comparable 
difficulties. We are thus lead to ask whether FA implies the existence of 
cardinal numbers which are inconsistent, or in some other way 
problematic.
Several commentators have pointed out that FA is consistent relative to 
classical analysis (e.g. Burgess (1984); Hodes (1984); Wright (1997)). 
Working under the assumption of mathematical realism, this suffices for 
the consistency of FA as both classical analysis and the set theory 
required for the relative consistency proof can be taken as true. Since the 
Neo-Fregeans originally intended to establish the analyticity of arithmetic 
without assuming mathematical realism, they would prefer not to rely on 
this argument. However, it is hard to see what else guarantees that FA is
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consistent. Wright points out that neither Russell’s paradox (1983, §19, 
155-158), nor Cantor’s paradox (op. c/f., n.5, 185-187), can be reproduced 
in FA. But this shows merely that well-known routes to contradiction in 
naive set theory cannot be imitated in FA; it does not establish that FA is 
consistent. Since there does not seem to be anything else to put forward 
in favour of the consistency of FA, it is thus not obvious how the absence 
of inconsistent cardinals might be ascertained without weakening the 
original Neo-Fregean argument.
Assuming there are no inconsistent cardinals in FA, might there be 
cardinals whose existence is in some other way problematic? Boolos 
(1997) suggests that there are. Substituting the concept self-identical into 
the principle:
VF 3x(x = Ny: Fy)
yields 3x (x = Nx: x=x), so in FA the cardinal number of self-identical things 
exists.13 But, as Boolos points out (op. cit. 260), the existence of this 
number is not compatible with set theory. In his view, this suggests that 
HP is not true, and so casts doubt on the Neo-Fregean claim that it is 
analytic. What makes matters worse is that this is not an isolated case. 
Substituting the concept ordinal number into the Neo-Fregean principle of 
cardinal existence, we find that FA is committed to the existence of the 
cardinal number of ordinal numbers. Substituting the concept cardinal 
number we find a commitment to the cardinal number of cardinal numbers. 
But the existence of these cardinal numbers is not permitted by set theory. 
It thus appears there is a deep disagreement between set theory and FA. 
If Boolos has things aright, this gives reason to doubt that HP is analytic.
The Neo-Fregeans might reply to this by arguing that the incompatibility of 
set theory and FA is not problematic. However, this does not seem a very 
plausible response. The conflicts between FA and set theory show that
13 Here we are assuming that the concept self-identical is the concept x = x.
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they cannot both be true. Since we are currently working under the 
assumption of mathematical realism, and since this implies that standard 
mathematical theories such as set theory are true, it follows that FA is 
false. This result is nothing short of catastrophic for the Neo-Fregean 
account of arithmetic because the only plausible explanation of the falsity 
of FA is the falsity of HP (the theory’s sole non-logical axiom). If HP is 
false, then its truth cannot be stipulated as a means of introducing a 
concept for cardinal number. But it is essential to Neo-Fregeanism that 
HP can be stipulated, as it is this, together with the fact that Peano 
arithmetic can be derived in second order logic from HP, that is meant to 
show that arithmetic is analytic. So, given mathematical realism, the 
incompatibility of FA and set theory shows that Neo-Fregeanism fails to 
establish the analyticity of arithmetic.
An objection can also be made here without assuming mathematical 
realism. Boolos draws our attention to the fact that FA conflicts with an 
accepted mathematical theory, namely the theory of transfinite cardinal 
numbers. To argue for the analyticity of arithmetic from the (alleged) 
analyticity of FA it would thus be necessary to reject a mathematical theory 
that has hitherto been accepted. Perhaps the Neo-Fregeans will be willing 
to take this step. Perhaps they will claim to have discovered that the 
standard theory of transfinite cardinal numbers should be rejected. But 
although this response is possible, it does not as it stands seem very 
reasonable; to reject the standard theory of transfinite cardinal numbers 
without independent argument would be dogmatic.
If the Neo-Fregeans are to meet either of these objections, they must find 
some way of reconciling FA with set theory, some way of stopping the 
theories from delivering contradictory claims about cardinal existence. To 
do this they might argue that there is a well-motivated revision of the 
standard set theoretic account of cardinal number under which the non­
existence of the problematic cardinals cannot be proved in set theory. Or 
they might argue that there are reasonable revisions of FA under which
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the existence of the problematic cardinals can no longer be proved in FA. 
We will consider each possibility in turn.
Rumfitt (2001) argues that the conflict between FA and set theory over the 
existence of the cardinal number of self-identical things disappears if the 
set theoretic definition of the cardinal numbers as initial ordinals is 
rejected.14 He also suggests that this could be justified on the basis of 
Frege’s argument that cardinals should not be identified with ordinals (the 
former being introduced to answer questions concerning how many things 
there are, the latter being introduced to provide answers to questions 
concerning the position of things in orderings). If Rumfitt is right about 
this, then perhaps there is a well-motivated revision of set theory that 
blocks set theoretic proofs of the non-existence of the problematic 
cardinals.15
Revising the set theoretic treatment of cardinals this way certainly blocks 
the proof Rumfitt describes for the conclusion that there is no cardinal 
number of self-identical things (op. c/f., 516-517). Starting from the 
definition of cardinal numbers as initial ordinals, this infers, via the axiom 
of replacement, that if there is a cardinal number of Fs, there is a set of 
Fs.16 From the assumption that there is a cardinal number of self-identical 
things, it would follow from this conditional that there is a set of self­
identical things, whence, by the axiom of separation, that there is a set of
14 The discussion of Rumfitt (2001) focuses almost exclusively on the conflict between FA and set 
theory concerning the number of self-identical things. He does point out that the existence of a 
cardinal number of all ordinal numbers conflicts with the Burali-Forti paradox. But the conflict he 
envisages arises because set theory proves the existence of a set of all ordinal numbers if  it 
assumes that the number of self-identical things exists, so here again it is really the existence of the 
cardinal number of self-identical things that is at stake. From our point of view, this emphasis is 
not justified because various disagreements between FA and set theory over problematic cardinals 
can be generated on their own, independently of claims about other potentially problematic 
cardinals. As Neo-Fregeanism will be subject to the objections described in the text if  any one of 
these disagreements resists principled elimination, it follows that all the potentially problematic 
cardinals must be considered.
15 In fairness to Rumfitt, we should say that he only suggests this defence of Neo-Fregeanism, he 
does not go into it in great detail.
16 The axiom of replacement states that, given a function/ whose range is a set A, there exists a set 
containing exactly the images under/ of the elements of A. Given a concept F, if  the Fs are 
mapped one-one to an ordinal, a, by a function, g, then, since a  is a set, the Fs form a set by virtue 
of being the image under the inverse of g o f a.
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sets not members of themselves.17 But as we know from Russell’s 
paradox, there is no such set, so there can be no cardinal number of self­
identical things. Clearly this proof cannot be carried out if cardinals are 
not treated as initial ordinals.
However, the proposed revision of set theory does not block all set 
theoretic proofs of the non-existence of the problematic cardinals. There 
are two reasons for this. The first is that Frege’s observation that cardinals 
cannot be identified with ordinals does not motivate rejecting the definition 
of cardinals as initial ordinals. Frege’s observation, if accepted, stops us 
taking it as a genuine identification of cardinals with ordinals, but it does 
not stop us taking it as a description of a model of the cardinals in the 
ordinals. Thus we can agree with Frege that cardinals are not the same 
kind of thing as ordinals and yet derive the non-existence of the cardinal 
number of objects in precisely the way Rumfitt describes.
The second reason Rumfitt’s move does not suffice is that there are set 
theoretic proofs of the non-existence of the problematic cardinals that do 
not rely on the definition of cardinals as initial ordinals. The cardinal 
number of Fs can also be defined as the collection of sets of least rank 
that are equinumerous to the least ordinal with which the Fs are in one- 
one correspondence (this definition is attributed to Scott). Provided there 
are sets in one-one correspondence with the Fs, it follows from the axiom 
of foundation that this constitutes a set. So by the axiom of replacement, if 
there is a cardinal number of Fs, then there is a set of Fs.18 Assuming that 
the cardinal number of self-identical things exists we can now derive a 
contradiction as before, to conclude that no such number exists. Defining 
cardinals as initial ordinals is thus not essential to set theoretic proofs of 
the non-existence of the problematic cardinals. In fact, such proofs do not
17 The axiom of separation states that, given a unary predicate <j>(x) and a set A, there exists a set 
containing the elements x of A such that <J>(x).
18 Note that the definition of cardinals as initial ordinals requires the axiom of choice, or some 
equivalent to show that it is adequate. This is because the definition requires that there be a 
cardinal for every set, so that every set must be in one-one correspondence with an initial ordinal, 
so that every set can be well-ordered. This is the well ordering principle, which is equivalent to 
the axiom of choice.
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demand any particular definition of cardinals in terms of sets. Set 
theoretic proofs of the non-existence of the problematic cardinals will be 
possible whenever the chosen definition implies the conditional claim that, 
if there is a cardinal number of Fs, then there is a set of Fs. This, surely, is 
a condition on the adequacy of such definitions, as it follows from the 
basic Cantorian principle that a plurality of things is a set if and only if it 
has a cardinal number.
A well-motivated revision of set theory that will block proofs of the non­
existence of the problematic cardinals therefore seems unavailable. So let 
us consider the possibility of reconciling FA with set theory by arguing that 
FA does not imply the existence of the problematic cardinals. The only 
plausible way to do this is to argue that the concepts of which the 
problematic cardinals are supposed to be the cardinals cannot be 
substituted into the principle governing existence for cardinal numbers:
VF 3x (x = Nx: Fx)
On the Neo-Fregean approach, the concepts that can be substituted into 
this principle are those that occur in true instances of HP. Such concepts 
are those that enter into one-one correspondences with other concepts. 
Note that the identity relation sets up such a correspondence between a 
concept and itself whenever its instances are in the field of the identity 
relation. This means it can be denied that a concept can be substituted 
into the principle only if it can be denied that its instances are in the field of 
the identity relation. Thus, if the Neo-Fregeans are to deny that the 
existence of problematic cardinals follows from FA, they must deny that 
the instances of concepts of which they are supposedly the numbers are 
not in the field of the identity relation. Is this a position the Neo-Fregeans 
could plausibly adopt? We will argue that it is not.
Consider first concepts for ordinal numbers. Instances of such concepts 
are ordinal numbers. Our best accounts of these either represent them as
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sets or identify them with sets. In either case, the axiom of extensionality 
guarantees that the sets chosen for the ordinals are in the field of the 
identity relation, identical if and only if they contain exactly the same 
elements. To deny that ordinals are in the field of the identity relation, the 
Neo-Fregeans would have to claim that set theoretic treatments of the 
ordinals misrepresent them in this respect. This would be extremely 
implausible.
Consider now concepts for cardinal numbers. A key claim of the Neo- 
Fregean argument is that HP introduces a concept for cardinal number, 
expressed by the cardinality operator in FA, which is such that sentences 
in FA formed by placing terms involving the cardinality operator on either 
side of the sign for identity are genuine numerical identities. Clearly it is 
essential to this position that instances of the Neo-Fregean concept for 
cardinal number are in the field of the identity relation. This point also 
arises in connection with the proof of Frege’s Theorem. This requires 
existential generalisation into positions in identity statements occupied by 
terms formed by the cardinality operator, such as in the proof of the 
existence of 0 in which 3y(y = Nx: -,(x = x)) is derived from Nx: -«(x = x) = 
Nx: -«(x = x). Using existential generalisation in this way is legitimate only 
if these identity statements express genuine claims of numerical identity, 
which requires that terms formed with the cardinality operator refer to 
things that are in the field of the identity relation.
Finally, consider the concept self-identical, that is to say the concept x = x. 
The instances of this concept are precisely those things that are in the 
field of the identity relation so for the Neo-Fregeans to say otherwise 
would be absurd. Seemingly, then, it is not possible to reconcile FA with 
set theory by arguing that FA does not imply the existence of the 
problematic cardinals. This would involve denying that the instances of 
the concepts from which their existence can be derived are not in the field 
of the identity relation, which is not possible, for the reasons explained 
above.
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The issue we raised at this beginning of this section was whether FA 
implied the existence of problematic cardinals. Building from the case put 
forward by Boolos, we have argued that it does. The Neo-Fregeans are 
committed to the existence of a cardinal number of things satisfying every 
concept the instances of which are in the field of the identity relation. We 
argued that this commits them to the existence of a cardinal number of 
cardinal numbers, to a cardinal number of ordinal numbers and to a 
cardinal number of self-identical things. These cardinals are problematic 
because they lead to contradictions when FA is conjoined with set theory. 
As we found no grounds for thinking that there is a well-motivated revision 
of set theory that eliminates the conflict, this means that FA is false and so 
cannot stipulated to be true. Neo-Fregeanism therefore provides no 
compelling grounds for thinking that arithmetic is analytic.
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2.5 Tennant’s logicist account of arithmetic
Tennant’s account of arithmetic (1987, Chapters 20, 25; 1997a; 1997b, 
Chapter 9) shares much in common with the Neo-Fregean account. It is 
inspired by Frege’s analysis of cardinal number, it aims to establish the 
analyticity of arithmetic and it attempts to do so by deriving a version of 
arithmetic from principles alleged to be constitutive of arithmetic concepts. 
Despite these similarities, the accounts are quite different. Working in a 
second order free logic, not a classical logic, Tennant grounds his version 
of arithmetic on a system of introduction and elimination rules for number 
theoretic primitives, not a Fregean abstraction from HP. Most importantly 
for us, Tennant’s version of arithmetic does not imply the existence of the 
problematic cardinals discussed in the previous section. This means that 
the claim that this theory is analytic cannot be objected to on grounds of 
incompatibility with set theory. So for all we have said so far, Tennant’s 
arguments may show that arithmetic is analytic.
When working in a free logic, the classical assumption that every well- 
formed singular term refers is not made. This means inferences from F(t) 
to 3xF(x) (t a well-formed singular term) are not in general valid since there 
may not be anything answering to t. According to Tennant there is a clear 
advantage to this approach when investigating matters of mathematical 
ontology:
Philosophical discussion about the existence of numbers 
should be conducted against the background of a logic that is 
absolutely neutral on the question whether any particular term 
happens to denote. The whole point is to examine the 
foundations of our commitment to numbers; and to identify, 
with the help of our logical techniques, the precise juncture at 
which explicit existential commitment to numbers is indeed 
incurred. (1997a, 311)
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In other words, classical assumptions about singular terms have the 
potential to mislead us with respect to our true numerical commitments, 
but we can guard against this eventuality by working in a free logic. On 
these points, Tennant is surely correct.
Tennant’s free logic is a system of natural deduction, so the principles 
governing the number theoretic primitives are presented as introduction 
and elimination rules.19 The number theoretic primitives are 0, the 
cardinality operator, Nx: Fx, and the successor operator, s(x).20 The rule 
for introduction of 0 makes use of the idea that 0 is the number of any 
unsatisfied concept. A concept is unsatisfied if assumptions to the effect 
that there is something satisfying it are contradictory. In a free logic, Fa 
and 3!a (defined in free logic as 3x (x = a)) jointly assert that there is 
something satisfying F. Accordingly, Tennant’s rule for the introduction of 
0 allows us to derive Nx: Fx = 0 if the assumptions Fa and 3!a lead to a 
contradiction, graphically:
0-introduction
FaV) 3! a
1
N x : Fx = 0 <0
Note that this is a rule of proof, the indexed bars over the assumptions Fa 
and 3!a indicating that they are discharged as Nx: Fx = 0 is derived. Note 
too that a must be arbitrary, i.e. that the derivation of _L prior to the step in 
which 0 is introduced must not depend on assumptions containing a other 
than Fa and 3!a.
19 Tennant (1978, Chapter 4) presents a natural deduction system of classical logic, which he later 
modifies to arrive at his free logic (op.cit., Chapter 7).
20 In what follows, we adopt Tennant’s presentation of his rules for the number theoretic primitives 
(1987, 290-292) with minor changes to the symbolism.
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Tennant’s elimination rule for 0 complements this introduction rule. If we 
can prove that Nx: Fx = 0, then given the introduction rule we must have 
been able to show that the assumptions Fa and 3\a are contradictory. It 
follows that if we can prove Fa and 3!a, we must derive the contradiction to 
which those assumptions lead. What this shows is that it is not possible to 
assume both the premises and the conclusion of the introduction rule, 
since by doing so we make contradictory assumptions. Accordingly, 
Tennant proposes that the elimination of 0 be a rule making clear the 
incompatibility of Fu, 3\u and Nx: Fx = 0, u a variable term, graphically:
0-elimination
Nx:Fx = 0 F u 3 In.
_L
Note that this is a rule of inference, the assumptions not being discharged 
in the transition to 1.
Tennant’s introduction and elimination rules for the cardinality operator are 
suggested by HP. A rule equivalent of HP would allow us to infer Nx: Fx = 
Nx: Gx from the equinumerosity of F and G, and vice versa. Such a rule 
would treat facts about the identity of cardinal numbers as always 
indicative of facts about one-one correspondences amongst concepts, and 
facts about one-one correspondences amongst concepts as always 
indicative of facts about the identity of cardinal numbers. Tennant’s rules 
for the cardinality operator also take the identity of cardinal numbers to be 
intimately related to one-one correspondences on concepts. But to 
respect the free logic background, Tennant’s rules treat facts about 
equinumerosity amongst concepts as indicative of facts about cardinal 
numbers only when assumptions implying the existence of the relevant 
cardinals have already been established. Accordingly, the introduction 
rule for the cardinality operator allows us to infer from the assumptions Nx:
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Fx = t and Rxy[Fx 1 - 1  Gy] (the Fs and the Gs correspond one-one by R) 
to the conclusion that Ny. Gy = t, graphically:
Nx: Fx-introduction
Nx: Fx = t RxvfFx 1 -1  Gv\
Nx: Gx = t
The corresponding elimination rule allows us to infer a conclusion <|> from 
the assumption Nx: Gx = t, when we have shown that <|> follows from Nx: 
Fx = t and Rxy[Fx 1 -1  Gy]:
Nx: Fx-elimination
N x : Fx = t(l) Rxy[Fx 1-1 Gy]10
N x: Gx = t <{>
Note that this is a rule of proof allowing us to discharge the assumptions 
Nx: Fx = t and Rxy[Fx 1 - 1  Gy] when we draw the conclusion Nx: Gx.
Tennant’s rules for the successor operator s(x) are similar to those for the 
cardinality operator. However, for the number of Gs to be the successor 
of the number of Fs, one-one correspondence between the two concepts 
is not at stake, but rather one-one correspondence between the Fs and all 
the Gs save one. Tennant uses the expression “Rxy[Fx 1 -  1 Gy, Q” for 
this (giving introduction and elimination rules for it in the course of his 
discussion of correspondences between concepts (1987, 276-281)). His 
rules for the introduction and elimination of successor as follows:
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s(x)-introduction
Nx: Fx = €  RxvTFx 1 -1  Gy. r]
Nx: Gx = s(t)
s(x)-e limination
N x: Fx = tU) Rxy[Fx 1-1 G y , a f
N x: Gx = s(t) (|>
♦  ,l>
As with the rules for the cardinality operator, s(x)-introduction is a rule of 
inference and s(x)-elimination is a rule of proof. These rules for the 
successor operator complete Tennant’s introduction and elimination rules 
for number theoretic primitives.
We have already stated that Tennant uses his rules to help derive a 
version of arithmetic in which the existence of the problematic cardinals 
discussed in the previous section cannot be proved. But given the 
background of free logic, how can the rules presented above prove the 
existence of infinitely many natural numbers? The answer is that they 
cannot. Besides these rules for introduction and elimination of the 
arithmetical primitives, two further rules are required.
One of these is supplied by Tennant’s free logic. Being a free logic, F(t) 
does not in general imply t exists, but according to the denotation rule, this 
implication does hold when the predication is atomic (see Tennant (1978, 
168):
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Denotation rule
If
3\t 21
This rule allows Tennant to prove the existence of 0 as follows:
— a — a
_L
N x: -^(x = x) = 0 0)
Here O-introduction is applied to the concept -*(x = x) to prove that Nx: -’(x 
= x) = 0, from which it follows by the denotation rule that 0 exists.
The other rule require to prove the existence of the natural numbers is not 
supplied by the logic, so like the rules governing the arithmetical primitives 
Tennant presents it as a stipulation. The rule states that if the number of 
Fs exists and if the Fs are equinumerous with the all the Gs save one then 
the number of Gs exists, graphically:
Ratchet principle
3!Nx: Fx RxvfFx 1 -1  Gy. f)
3!Nx: Gx
This principle gives Tennant’s system the capacity to prove the existence 
of the successors of cardinal numbers whose existence has already been 
established. For example, it can be used to prove that the successor of 0 
exists, i.e. that 3x (x = s(0)) (see Tennant (1987, 293-294)). Ultimately, it 
is this capacity that allows Tennant to prove that the natural numbers
21 It may seem that this rule could not possibly be valid, as, if  we put “x = x” for “ ” and “the
largest number” for “r” , it allows us to infer that the largest number exists. However, it is not the 
rule that is at fault in such reasoning, but rather the premise that the largest number = the largest 
number. This is false precisely because the largest number does not exist.
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exist. For each term reached by iterated application of the successor 
operator to 0, it allows proof that there exists a cardinal number answering 
to that term (given that the existence of 0 has already been proved) (op. 
cit., 293-294). These can then be taken as the natural numbers. For 
having already given a treatment of ancestrals of one-place functions, in 
particular introduction and elimination rules for an expression intended to 
mean “x is only finitely many steps of f  away from /  (op. cit., 281-282), 
Tennant can define the natural numbers as those things that can be 
reached from 0 by finitely many applications of the successor operator.
Tennant’s proofs of the existence of the natural numbers are given during 
the course of a detailed proof of rule equivalents of the Dedekind Peano 
axioms for arithmetic (op. cit., Chapter 25, 275-300). Let us call this 
version of arithmetic FAT. As we have already stated, FAj differs from 
Wright and Hale’s arithmetical theory FA in that it does not allow derivation 
of the existence of problematic cardinals such as the cardinal number of 
self-identical things. We are now in a position to see why this is so. The 
crucial point is that cardinal numbers can be proved to exist in FAT only 
when they can be represented as /7th successors of 0. This is because 
proofs of numerical existence in FAj depend ultimately on the existence of 
0 and the ratchet principle. Once the existence of 0 as a natural number is 
established, the ratchet principle transmits existence and “naturalness” up 
through the progression of cardinals as far as can be reached from zero in 
any finite number of applications of s(x), but proofs of the existence (or 
naturalness) of other cardinal numbers are not possible. A proof of the 
existence of the cardinal number of self-identical things is thus not 
available because although FAj allows the formation of terms that refer to 
this number, if they refer at all, it does not provide a method by which the 
cardinal number of self-identical things can be represented as an 11th 
successor of 0.
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2.6 Stipulation, conceptual analysis and the rules of FAt
We argued against the analyticity of FA because it implies the existence of 
cardinals that do not exist, according to set theory. Tennant’s claim that 
FAj is analytic cannot be rejected on that count since FAT does not imply 
the existence of the problematic cardinals. But this does not yet mean that 
FAj is analytic. We will now consider whether it is.
A theory is analytic, in our sense, if it is knowable on grounds provided by 
conceptual analysis. Tennant’s development of FAT thus makes plausible 
that arithmetic is analytic if it provides reason to believe that conceptual 
analysis provides adequate grounds for arithmetical claims. The items 
Tennant puts forward as candidates for such grounds are his derivations 
of rule equivalents of the Dedekind-Peano axioms. As these derivations 
have no premises, they constitute adequate grounds for belief in their 
conclusions if the rules for FAt are valid. Thus, if the rules can also be 
formulated from conceptual analysis of our usual arithmetical notions, then 
the derivations will constitute analytic grounds for arithmetical claims. But 
does Tennant provide sufficient reason to think that these two conditions 
obtain? In what follows, we argue that he does not.
2.6.1 Stipulation and validity
Tennant’s approach to the validity of the rules of FAT is comparable to that 
of Wright and Hale to the truth of HP. The Neo-Fregeans viewed HP as 
an explanation of a concept for cardinal number, and argued on this basis 
that it is a stipulation whose truth is guaranteed; likewise, Tennant views 
the rules of FAt as introductive of primitive arithmetical notions, taking this 
to show that they are stipulations the validity of which is guaranteed. In 
each case, the underlying thought is that since we can explain or introduce 
whatever concepts we like, the stipulation of these principles, whose role 
is to explain or introduce concepts, is sufficient to guarantee their truth or
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validity without any further epistemic support. If this is correct in the case 
of the rules for FAT> then clearly they must be valid.
We will argue that this line of argument does not secure the validity of the 
rules of FAj. More specifically, we will argue that the validity of 0- 
introduction and the ratchet principle cannot be established in this way. 
We will not at this stage challenge the idea that these rules might be 
(partly) constitutive of our usual arithmetical concepts, nor the related idea 
that they could be used to help introduce our arithmetical concepts. The 
argument of this section will rather be that 0-introduction and the ratchet 
principle perform a further function that puts their validity beyond whatever 
epistemic support may come from their stipulation.
For any principle P, let us say that P is stipulatively valid under the 
following conditions:
P is stipulatively valid if and only if either it can be made 
valid by stipulation, or good reason to believe it valid can be 
had from stipulation.
Similarly, let us say that a principle is stipulatively true if and only if either it 
can be made true by stipulation, or good reason to believe it true can be 
had from stipulation. Given principles describing matters of convention, 
points of etiquette, rules from the Highway Code, etc., it can sometimes be 
plausible to maintain that they are stipulatively true or valid. However, it is 
not plausible to regard principles this way when they describe 
independently existing matters of fact. If John stipulates that his son is to 
be his heir, we might say that it is stipulatively true that John’s son is his 
heir, for John’s stipulation helps to make this the case. But we would not 
say that it is stipulatively true that John’s son will be the next winner of 
Stars in Their Eyes, for no comparable stipulation on John’s part can help 
to bring about this state of affairs. Similarly, we would never say that it is 
stipulatively true that a is the first counter example to Goldbach’s 
Conjecture. We might first establish that there is a counter example to
57
Goldbach’s Conjecture, and then resolve to think of this as a. But the 
stipulation involved here would be a conditional governing our use of the 
singular concept a, something like “If there is a counter example to 
Goldbach’s Conjecture, let a be the first such counter example”. Since a 
stipulation of this kind could not make it true that a is the first counter 
example to Goldbach’s Conjecture, nor provide good reason to think that 
this is the case, the claim that a is the first counter example to Goldbach’s 
Conjecture is not stipulatively true.
Having introduced the idea of stipulative validity, we will argue that 0- 
introduction and the ratchet principle are not stipulatively valid. Recall that 
the rule of 0-introduction is as follows:
_L
Nx : Fx = 0
Because this rule may be used to prove that 0 exists, it cannot be claimed 
simply to serve as a means of introducing a concept for 0, for whilst it 
might plausibly be said to introduce a concept for 0, it must also be said to 
carry with it a substantive theory about the existence of mathematical 
objects. From the point of view of mathematical realism, it is an 
independent matter of fact whether such theories are true because 
mathematical objects do not depend for their existence on thought or talk 
about them (see section 1.3). 0-introduction thus cannot be stipulatively 
valid.
To amplify this point, compare the rule of 0-introduction with the following, 
closely related rule:
3\a In
58
O-introduction*
3 ! N x : Fx J_
N x: Fx = 0 (/)
It is not possible to derive the existence of an object answering to the 
concept of 0 if we introduce the concept with this rule. We may derive a 
contradiction from the assumptions 3!a and -*(a = a) and so introduce the 
claim Nx: -•(x = x) = 0, as Tennant does in deriving the existence of 0, but 
this remains conditional on the premise 3!Nx: -i(x = x):
-n(a = a) a = a
3 !N x :-i(x  = x) _L
N x:-<x = x) = 0 <*)
The rule of 0-introduction* thus does not allow us to prove that Nx: -«(x = x) 
= 0, rather it allows us to prove a derived rule, which when expressed as a 
conditional claim says that if there is such a thing as the number of non­
self-identical things, then that thing is 0. As this expresses a resolution to 
use a given term in a certain way, without making any ontological 
demands, 0-introduction*, unlike 0-introduction, can plausibly be regarded 
as stipulatively valid.
It is interesting to note that Tennant himself seems to be committed to 
viewing matters with the rule of 0-introduction in this way. One of the 
reasons he puts forward against the Neo-Fregean use of Hume’s Principle 
is that it is not acceptably formulated from the perspective of free logic:
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But is the Humean identity (N) [HP] really analytic? Not quite; 
in due course its proper analytic core will be extracted in the 
form of two conditionals, (A/1) and (A/2)* below. The reason 
why (A/) is not analytic as it stands at present is that it has not 
been suitably qualified within the context of a free logic.
(1997a, 311)
Later on, when (N1) and (N2)* are set out (op. cit., 312-313), it becomes 
clear that the qualification deemed necessary for HP is that it be made 
conditional on the existence of cardinal numbers (this is why Tennant’s 
introduction rule for the cardinality operator includes a premise which 
implies the existence of the number of Fs). What is baffling about this, 
however, is that if this kind of existential conditioning is required for HP to 
be acceptable, then the same kind of conditioning should be expected of 
whatever rule is proposed for the introduction of 0. Our rule 0- 
introduction* is conditioned in just this way: Tennant’s rule 0-introduction is 
not. Seemingly, then, Tennant employs a double standard here.
How might Tennant respond to our charge that 0-introduction cannot be 
viewed as stipulatively valid? We might hope to find answers to this in the 
passages in which Tennant discusses the possibility of existentially 
conditioning 0-introduction. However, Tennant only considers the 
following rule as a suitably conditioned alternative (op. cit., 323-324):
0-introduction$
3!a■(/)
3! 0 1
N x : Fx = 0 ( / )
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Against the acceptability of this rule, Tennant argues (op.cit., 324) that 
someone who accepted it and yet denied that 0 exists would (a) be unable 
to distinguish correct arithmetical claims from incorrect arithmetical claims 
(since all arithmetical claims would be conditional on the existence of 0, 
which would be regarded as false) (b) would be left needing an 
explanation of why he develops his mathematics on the basis of an 
acknowledgedly false assumption and (c) would be embarrassed by 
having his applications of arithmetic depend on this assumption. Thus 
Tennant concludes that it would be incoherent to take 0-introduction$ as 
the introduction rule for 0.
However, the alleged incoherence of this approach does not increase our 
confidence in the coherence of Tennant’s own approach; perhaps neither 
is viable. More persuasively, Tennant points out (op.cit., 325) that 0- 
introduction$ would not be a very good rule for the introduction of 0 as it 
presupposes understanding of the very concept it would then be supposed 
to introduce (since possession of a concept for 0 is necessary to 
understand premises to which it may be applied). This is a good point and 
a solid reason to prefer Tennant’s 0-introduction to 0-introduction$ as a 
means of introducing a concept for 0. But clearly this has no bearing on 
our claim that 0-introduction is not stipulatively valid.
Another response to our charge might be for Tennant to argue that 
commitment to the existence of 0 does not belong with 0-introduction 
alone but rather with 0-introduction taken together with the existence of 
necessarily uninstantiated concepts, like the concept -*(x = x) (similarly, 
Wright suggests that the ontological commitments associated with 
Fregean abstraction principles belong with the principles together with true 
claims concerning the equivalence relations from which they abstract 
(1997, 208)). However, this response is not convincing. Prior to the 
extension of the background logic with the rules for FAt, it is provable that 
the concept ~>(x = x) is not instantiated. Any logic that includes the logic of 
identity must prove this, so it is, in a sense, forced upon us. However, it is 
only after the extension of the system with some rule for the introduction of
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0 that we are able to represent this claim as a claim about the number 0. 
Here, we do have a choice as to which rule to adopt, for we can adopt the 
rule of 0-introduction* given above. Tennant’s rule of 0-introduction is 
therefore an option which brings with it commitment to the existence of 0, 
so the commitment does belong with the rule.
So far we have argued that 0-introduction cannot be held to be 
stipulatively valid because it is committed to the existence of 0. We will 
now argue that a comparable difficulty affects the ratchet principle. As this 
principle is essential to Tennant’s proof that successors of natural 
numbers exist, it is committed to the existence of successors of 0. But this 
is an independent matter of fact from the perspective of mathematical 
realism, and so the ratchet principle cannot be stipulatively valid.
Tennant addresses worries about the ontological commitments of the 
ratchet principle with the following argument:
To the objection that they [the ratchet principle and a related 
principle of succession] express ‘conditional existence’ claims, 
the reply would be: their antecedents involve existential 
commitments; and all the principles are doing is drawing out 
the analytic consequences of entering into such commitment.
(1997a, 319-320)
However, this does not provide a convincing response to our objection. If 
Tennant’s point is supposed to be that instances of the ratchet principle 
bear no genuine ontological commitments, then this is false because the 
ontological commitments of the consequents differ from those borne by 
the antecedents. In addition to this, the claim that the consequents are 
analytic consequences of the antecedents does not obviously address the 
point we are making, that ontologically committed principles cannot be 
stipulatively valid. It also seems wrong to say that the consequents of 
instances of the ratchet principle are analytic consequences of the 
relevant instances of its antecedent; strict finitists can coherently reject the
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existence of non-finite collections of objects. Tennant’s comments thus 
provide no reason to resist our argument that the ratchet principle cannot 
be stipulatively valid.
Our argument in this section has been that 0-introduction and the ratchet 
principle cannot be stipulatively valid, because their validity depends on 
independently existing matters of fact. One final, general response to this 
is suggested by Tennant’s view that the natural numbers are somehow 
already present in any conceptual scheme that contains the standard first 
order apparatus of quantification and identity. Tennant says that the 
natural numbers are “manifest ontological commitments arising from our 
ways of speaking and thinking” (op. cit., 325) and that once predicative 
and quantificational thought is possible “so is its extension (if it is not yet 
extensive enough) to thought about numbers” (op. cit., 326). If this idea 
could be satisfactorily developed, then perhaps it would be possible to 
maintain that the rules we have been considering do not bring with them 
commitment to the existence of natural numbers, but rather unearth a prior 
commitment that was already present before their stipulation.
But how might this idea coherently be cashed out? One suggestion might 
be that concepts for natural numbers are already present in the logical 
scheme prior to its extension to FAt. On the current approach to concept 
formation, however, according to which concepts are constituted by rules 
dictating the role they play in thought, that would surely not be plausible; 
the rules said to be constitutive of arithmetical concepts are neither 
contained in nor derivable from the logical scheme prior to being 
stipulated. An alternative suggestion might be to say that someone who’s 
thought is structured by the standard predicative and quantificational 
apparatus is already committed to the natural numbers. But that would 
just seem to be false. Someone is committed to a kind of thing if they 
have beliefs from which the existence of such things can be derived using 
a theory they accept. But prior to the allegedly concept forming 
stipulations of FAt, someone who thinks in the usual predicative and 
quantificational ways does not thereby accept a theory that allows the
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derivation of the existence of numbers from their beliefs. So prior to the 
extension of the conceptual scheme to FAt, they need not be committed to 
the existence of natural numbers.
Our argument that 0-introduction and the ratchet principle cannot be 
stipulatively valid thus seems cogent. By viewing 0-introduction and the 
ratchet principle as stipulatively valid, Tennant’s position attempts to settle 
the ontological issue of whether there are numbers by fiat. But from the 
perspective of mathematical realism, the existence of numbers is an 
independent matter of fact that cannot be settled this way. It may be that 
there are natural numbers out there awaiting description by the concepts 
constituted by the various rules of FAt. If so, then, by sheer good fortune, 
Tennant’s stipulations may provide arithmetical concepts that pick out 
those objects. However, there is no guarantee that this will be the case 
and the mere fact that Tennant has stipulated the rules for FAt provides 
no reason whatsoever for thinking that it obtains. On the assumption that 
the natural numbers are independently existing objects, the question of 
what inferences are valid between thoughts about them is an independent 
matter of fact. Thus 0-introduction and the ratchet principle cannot be 
made valid by stipulation, nor can adequate reasons for belief that they 
are valid be had from stipulation.
This conclusion completely undermines the view that the rules for FAt can 
be regarded as stipulatively valid because they can be used to introduce 
our usual arithmetical concepts. Against this, we have argued that 0- 
introduction and the ratchet principle have another function, that of 
introducing commitment to the existence of numbers, and that this means 
they cannot be regarded as stipulatively valid. If this is correct, Tennant 
provides no grounds for belief in the validity of the rules of FAT.
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2.6.2 Conceptual analysis and formulability
We will now address the question of whether the rules of FAT can be 
formulated from conceptual analysis of our usual arithmetical notions. 
Tennant’s main reason for thinking they can appears to be that FAT 
satisfies his proposed adequacy condition on prospective theories of 
natural number.22 The condition, which Tennant gets from reflection on 
arithmetic and its applications, is that the candidate theory entails every 
instance of the “disnumerical schema":
Nx: Fx = n <-> 3nx Fx
Here “n” is schematic for a numerical in canonical notation, u3nX Fx” is to 
be read “there are n Fs”, where this is defined without reference to 
numbers using indexed variables in the usual way, and F can be 
instantiated by any predicate the instances of which can be distinguished 
and identified amongst themselves (1997, 316-317). Call the requirement 
that a prospective theory of natural number entail every instance of this 
schema the disnumerical condition.
Tennant argues that imposition of the disnumerical condition is based on 
two insights; the philosophical insight that natural numbers are governed 
by clear identity criteria and the mathematical insight that the natural 
numbers are the elements of the progression formed from 0 by repeated 
application of the successor relation (1987, Chapter 20). As these insights 
are at least in the market for being produced by conceptual analysis of our 
usual arithmetical concepts, this gives a connection between analysis of 
those notions and the rules from which theories satisfying the disnumerical 
condition may be derived. But does a theory’s satisfaction of the 
disnumerical condition show that its primitive mathematical rules are 
formulable from conceptual analysis of our usual arithmetical notions? We 
claim that it does not.
22 For discussion of this condition see (1987, Chapter 20; 1997a, §4, §6).
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A first point to note here is that some theories satisfying the disnumerical 
condition obviously have a much richer mathematical content than the 
arithmetic of the natural numbers. For example, ZFC together with some 
standard construction of the natural numbers as sets will entail every 
instance of the disnumerical schema. But it will clearly entail an awful lot 
more, a great deal of which is to do with sets rather than natural numbers. 
A theory can thus satisfy the disnumerical condition and yet involve rules 
concerning mathematical concepts other than those of arithmetic (as 
would a rule equivalent formulation of ZFC). Such rules would presumably 
not be formulable from conceptual analysis of our usual arithmetical 
notions.
A second point to make is that Tennant’s remarks about the mathematical 
insight underlying the disnumerical condition suggest that it is not 
produced by conceptual analysis alone:
Mathematically, Dedekind (1888) and Peano (1889) made a 
breakthrough by laying down axioms designed to capture the 
intuitive picture of the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, .... forming a 
recursive progression. (1987, 226)
Analysis seems to have dropped out of consideration here, to be replaced 
by intuition. The shift away from considerations bearing on concepts is re­
emphasised shortly after when Tennant says that “the two strands, the 
philosophical and the mathematical could also be called the conceptual 
and the structural” (op. cit., 227). Because of this, it is not clear that we 
should think of the mathematical insight which underlies the disnumerical 
condition as purely a product of conceptual analysis. Thus it is not clear 
why we should think of satisfaction of the disnumerical condition as a test 
by which to judge whether the mathematical rules of a given theory are 
formulable from conceptual analysis of our usual arithmetical notions.
If this is correct, then the fact that FAT satisfies the disnumerical condition 
does not establish that its rules can be formulated from conceptual
66
analysis of our usual arithmetical notions. However, Tennant does not 
provide any other general reason for thinking that the rules of FAt can be 
produced this way, and neither does he provide reasons specific to each
rule of FAj for thinking that they can be so produced. He does spend
some time arguing that 0-introduction and the ratchet principle ought to be 
considered analytic, but the passages in which he deals with these issues 
do not provide grounds for thinking that these rules can be formulated 
from conceptual analysis of our usual arithmetical notions (see (1997a, 
§6.3-6.5)). For example, Tennant has this to say about why the ratchet 
principle ought to be considered analytic:
The ratchet principle is really toothless ontologically. All it 
expresses is the thought that if one has gone so far as to 
acknowledge the existence of any one natural number, then 
there is no reason to refuse to recognize the ‘next’ number.
That seems reasonable: not even the nominalist opponent 
wishes to visit on the Platonist a prematurely truncated initial 
segment of the natural number series, denying the Platonist all 
(and only) the numbers after some allegedly ‘final’ one! The
Ratchet Principle can be expressed by the rhetorical question
‘Wherever you are, why stop there?’ There is no reason not to 
regard the Ratchet Principle and the Principle of Succession 
as analytic. (1997a, 319)
Here Tennant means by analytic any ’’conceptual truth” which yields to 
“purely conceptual analysis” (loc. cit.), so his intention seems to be to 
establish that the ratchet principle is analytic in our sense of being 
knowable on grounds produced by conceptual analysis. But it is quite 
clear that the passage does not establish this. The strict finitist does wish 
to deny the Platonist more than an initial segment of the natural numbers, 
so it has not seemed plausible to everyone that “if one has gone so far as 
to acknowledge the existence of any one natural number, then there is no 
reason to refuse to recognize the ‘next’ number”. Explanations of the
appeal of the ratchet principle other than that it is analytic are not ruled
out; perhaps, in light of Tennant’s remark quoted above concerning the
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intuitive insight that the numbers form a progression, we might consider 
explanations in terms of some kind of intuition.23 In addition to this, the 
ratchet principle does not express the thought that “if one has gone so far 
as to acknowledge the existence of any one natural number, then there is 
no reason to refuse to recognize the ‘next’ number”: the ratchet principle 
states that if the number of Fs exists and if there is one more G than there 
are Fs, then the number of Gs exists. The quoted passage thus provides 
no convincing reason for thinking that the ratchet principle is analytic. And 
more significantly for us, it does not even touch upon the question of 
whether the ratchet principle can be formulated from conceptual analysis 
of our usual arithmetical notions.
So far we have argued that Tennant provides neither general nor specific 
reasons for thinking that the rules of FAt can be formulated from 
conceptual analysis of our usual arithmetical notions. Since this does not 
yet mean that those rules cannot be so formulated, we will now consider 
whether considerations can be found against thinking that they can. We 
will argue that such considerations can be found for the ratchet principle 
and 0-introduction.
Unlike the other rules, the ratchet principle is neither an introduction nor an 
elimination rule for a concept. Moreover, its use in Tennant’s derivations 
suggests that its sole purpose is to allow proofs of the existence of 
elements in the logical posterity of 0 under the successor relation.24 One 
might therefore suspect that the ratchet principle does not contribute 
anything to our arithmetical concepts beyond what may be understood 
from the other rules of FAT. It thus may seem plausible to conclude that 
the ratchet principle does not play a constitutive role in the arithmetical 
concepts of FAt, which would make it seem unlikely that the principle 
could be produced by conceptual analysis of our usual arithmetical notions
23 Rumfitt (2001, 523) also worries that Tennant has not ruled out the possible involvement of 
intuition.
24 As Tennant points out in his discussion o f ancestral relations (1987, 281-290), given concepts 
for 0 and s(x) it is possible to define the concept natural number as the logical posterity of 0, and 
even to show that induction holds for all existent successors, without first having to prove that 0 
and the objects in its posterity under s(x) exist.
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(even assuming that these and the arithmetical notions of FAt are the 
same). For presumably conceptual analysis is a facility that, when 
correctly applied, enables us to delve deeper and deeper into the nature of 
the concepts we deploy, revealing the fundamental regularities of thought 
by which they are constituted. If this is so, then it could be expected to 
deliver up only rules that are constitutive of the concepts under analysis. 
The role played by the ratchet principle in Tennant’s system of arithmetic 
thus gives reason to suspect that it is not formulable from conceptual 
analysis of our usual arithmetical notions, because it suggests that the 
ratchet principle may not be a constituent of them.
In addition to this somewhat speculative conclusion, the considerations of 
the previous paragraph point the way to a more general objection affecting 
both the ratchet principle and the rule of 0-introduction. If, as we have 
claimed, the function of conceptual analysis is to deliver up constituent 
concepts of whatever notions are under analysis, then conceptual analysis 
of our usual arithmetical notions can only produce the rules of FAt if the 
latter are constituents of the former. A reason to think that the rules of FAT 
cannot be regarded as constitutive of our usual arithmetical concepts 
would thus be a reason to think that they cannot be formulated from 
conceptual analysis of them. This is significant because, as we argued in 
the previous section, 0-introduction and the ratchet principle bear 
ontological commitments. But on the Quinean approach to ontology that 
we have assumed, theories, not concepts, bear ontological commitments 
(see section 1.2). It therefore follows that O-introudction and the ratchet 
principle cannot be regarded simply as constituents of our usual 
arithmetical concepts, because the fact that they bear ontological 
commitments indicates that they perform a function that cannot be 
performed by concepts alone. 0-introduction and the ratchet principle thus 
cannot be formulated from conceptual analysis of our usual arithmetical 
notions.
Defenders of Tennant’s position would perhaps respond to this argument 
by claiming that his underlying approach is intended to challenge the view
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that concepts cannot bear ontological commitments, at least for the case 
of arithmetical concepts. It does not seem credible that the new approach 
to ontology that this would require could be made to cohere with the 
Quinean approach that we have assumed. Even if it could, however, 
convincing reasons would still be required for regarding commitment to the 
existence of natural numbers as partly constitutive of our arithmetical 
concepts. As yet, we have seen no reason to think that this should be our 
approach.
2.6.3 Summary
Tennant’s discussion of FAT establishes that arithmetic is analytic only if 
(a) it provides reason to believe that the rules for FAj are valid and (b) it 
provides reason to believe they can be formulated from conceptual 
analysis of our usual arithmetical notions. We have argued that Tennant 
provides no adequate reason to think that these conditions are met. We 
have also argued that the ontological commitments bome by 0- 
introduction and the ratchet principle exclude them from being stipulatively 
valid and show that they cannot be formulated from conceptual analysis of 
our usual arithmetical notions. We thus conclude that Tenant’s 
development of FAT provides no compelling reason to think that arithmetic 
is analytic.
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2.7 Rumfitt’s principle C
Rumfitt (2001) argues, as we have, that FAT does not provide a secure 
basis for the analyticity of arithmetic. However, he maintains that the 
prospects for showing that arithmetic is analytic are improved when FAj is 
combined with a general principle expressing necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence of cardinal numbers. From this principle, 
Rumfitt derives the conditional claim that if there are 0 Fs then Nx:Fx = 0 
(op., cit, 534), and also the ratchet principle (op. cit, 534-535). In 
addition, he considers the general principle to be formulable from 
conceptual analysis of our notion of cardinal number. If this is correct, 
then perhaps the availability of this general principle will help to show that 
arithmetic is analytic after all.
To state Rumfitt’s existence principle for cardinal numbers, we need the 
notion of a generalised tally. This is defined as a concept the instances of 
which are strictly well-ordered (op. cit, 529). Rumfitt’s existence principle 
for cardinals is then the following:
(C) There is such a thing as the number of Fs iff either F is 
empty or F is equinumerous with a bounded initial segment 
of some generalised tally.
Here a concept F is taken to be equinumerous with a bounded initial 
segment of some generalised tally whenever there exists G, R and x such 
that R is a strict well-ordering on G, Gx and F is equinumerous to all the 
Gs under R up to and including x (/oc. cit).
Rumfitt arrives at this principle by considering what it is successfully to 
count, or tally, a collection of objects (op. cit, 524-529). He argues that 
this requires that the objects be put in one-one correspondence with 
another collection of objects that could be used as names for cardinal 
numbers. This is possible when the objects are ordered by a specific kind 
of relation. The relation must have an initial element, from which a count
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could begin. It must be transitive and connected, to ensure that that there 
is always just one correct way of proceeding with the count. It must be 
irreflexive, since otherwise the presence of the same object in two or more 
places in the ordering would render the result of the count ambiguous. 
Finally, the relation must be such that each non-empty collection of the 
objects has a least element under the relation, because counts proceed by 
association of an object not yet counted with the least element of the 
collection of number words that have not yet been used in the count. 
Together these conditions demand that the relation on the objects used in 
the count is a well-order.25 Arguing that to count or tally a collection of 
objects is to show that they can be put in one-one correspondence with 
the elements of a generalised tally up to and including some element of it, 
Rumfitt thus arrives at his principle C.
Our question is whether combining FAT with principle C helps to show that 
arithmetic is analytic. Clearly it does only if principle C is analytic. But this 
seems unlikely, for on the present model of analyticity, an arithmetical 
principle is analytic only if (a) it can be formulated from conceptual 
analysis of arithmetical notions and (b) it is stipulatively true or valid. 
Arguably, however, principle C does not satisfy these conditions.
A first point to make here is that Rumfitt’s route to principle C leaves room 
for doubt that it is formulable from conceptual analysis of arithmetical 
notions. Rumfitt makes quite clear that the principle is supposed to be 
formulated from conceptual analysis of our notion of cardinal number, and 
counting:
\
Principle (C) ... gives a quite general necessary and sufficient 
condition for there to be such a thing as the number of Fs -  a 
condition grounded in a conceptual analysis of the notion of a
Formally, a relation R on instances of a concept G is a well-ordering if and only if: Vjc Vy Vz 
[Gjt a  Gy a  Gz - *  ((Rjcy a  Ryz) - *  R*z) a  (Rxy v jc=y v Ryjr) a  -<Rjrjr a  VH [Vw (H w  - *  Gw) a  
3w Hk») -» (3m H m a  Vv (H v - *  Rmv v m= v ))])J. Rumfitt (2001, 529) has almost this 
formalisation, though his final clause neglects to demand that the lower hound u is contained in H, 
a non-empty subconccpt of G. This is crucial since otherwise H need not contain a least element.
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cardinal number (and, more particularly, of the connections 
between that notion and our practices of counting). (2001,
532)
The presupposition made here, that constraints governing what it is for a 
practice to be a correct counting practice are sufficiently bound up with our 
notion of cardinal number for reflections on the former to contribute to 
analyses of the latter, is quite plausible. But since we can only count finite 
collections of objects, it is obvious that not all the constraints governing 
our actual counting practices should be thought to play a role in general 
conditions of existence for cardinal numbers (for example the constraints 
of time and energy available to the finite counter should not be considered 
relevant to the existence of infinite cardinals). Supposing, then, that we 
have identified all the constraints that govern our actual (finite) counting 
practices, the question would arise of how we are to distinguish between 
those that govern counting practices in general (including “infinite counts”) 
and those that do not. Rumfitt does not explain how we are to do this, and 
so we cannot be confident that no processes other than conceptual 
analysis are involved. There is a suggestion that reflection on idealized 
versions of our actual counting practices may be involved here:
The requirement that a concept F  to which a number belongs 
should be equinumerous with a bounded segment of a tally 
reflects the fact that in giving an exact non-zero answer to a 
“How many?” question a respondent indicates that all the Fs 
may be put in correspondence with the members of the tally 
up [to] and including x. Even if the count could not be 
completed in a finite time, the count must in this sense be 
exhaustive (2001, 529)
But this just intensifies the worry, for since Rumfitt does not describe the 
kind of idealization involved, the possibility that the relevant reflective 
processes contain non-analytic elements is not ruled out.
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Further reason to doubt the analyticity of principle C comes from our case 
against the analyticity of FAj. We argued that, because the ratchet 
principle and the rule for 0-introduction are committed to the existence of 
natural numbers, they are not formulable from conceptual analysis of our 
usual arithmetical notions and are not stipulatively valid (i.e. could not be 
made valid by stipulation nor reason to believe them valid be got from 
stipulating them). On the basis that it is committed to the existence of 
cardinal numbers, similar points can be made with respect to principle C. 
Whether there are cardinal numbers is, from the realist perspective, a 
matter of independently existing fact, so principle C cannot be made true 
by stipulation, nor can we get good reason to believe it true by stipulating 
it. Moreover, on the assumption that theories, not concepts, bear 
ontological commitments, the fact that principle C is committed to cardinal 
numbers suggests that it could not be formulated from conceptual 
analysis.
One final reason for doubting the analyticity of principle C emerges from 
the following line of thought. The principle demands that when the number 
of Fs exists, the Fs must be equinumerous with a bounded initial segment 
of a generalised tally. Rumfitt treats this as equinumerosity with the 
elements of a generalised tally up to and including some specific element 
(op. cit., 529). However, with this interpretation principle C implies that the 
number of Fs exists only if the Fs form a well order with a maximal 
element, which is not necessary. The collection of natural numbers, for 
example, has no maximal element under their natural ordering according 
to the successor relation, yet it has a cardinal number. Principle C thus 
makes an inessential demand on cardinal existence.
In itself, this is not a threatening point, for the general thrust of Rumfitfs 
approach remains if we understand principle C to demand that the cardinal 
number of Fs exists (when there are Fs) if and only if the Fs are 
equinumerous with an initial segment of a generalized tally. But having 
had to deal with one inessential demand on cardinal existence, it is natural
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to wonder whether principle C makes other inessential demands which 
cannot so easily be eliminated. We will argue that it does.
We note first that principle C does not allow us to think of cardinal 
numbers as properties of non-well-orderable sets. Suppose that A is a set 
that is not well orderable, and consider the concept element of A. 
Suppose that A has a cardinal number. Presumably this has to be the 
number of the concept element o f A. Assuming principle C, this means 
that the instances of the concept element of A can be put in one-one 
correspondence with an initial segment of a generalised tally up to some 
element x. Since a generalized tally is a well order, this correspondence 
can be used to establish a well order on the concept element of A. But 
since the instances of this concept are just the elements of A, this means 
that A is well orderable, which is a contradiction. The original assumption 
must therefore have been mistaken, so A must be well orderable after all.
This shows that if principle C governs cardinal existence, only well 
orderable sets can have cardinal numbers. However, as we have already 
explained (see section 2.4), it is possible to represent cardinal numbers in 
ZF without the axiom of choice (or any equivalent) by taking the cardinal 
number of a set as the set of sets of least rank equinumerous to it. Such 
representations allow non-well-orderable sets to have cardinal numbers 
too. Principle C thus makes a demand on cardinal existence that is not 
made by some adequate set theoretic representations of cardinal number. 
This suggests that the principle ought not to be regarded as giving 
necessary and sufficient conditions on cardinal existence, and this in turn 
suggests that the principle could not be formulated from conceptual 
analysis of our usual arithmetical notions.
In response to this, it may seem tempting simply to deny that non-well- 
orderable sets have cardinal numbers. But it is hard to see what 
motivation there would be for this restriction of the range of application of 
cardinal numbers. Frege found out in the most unpleasant way that 
cardinal numbers cannot be taken to belong to proper classes, but no
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corresponding threat of contradiction is known to motivate the suggestion 
that only well orderable sets have cardinal numbers. Denying that non- 
well-orderable sets have cardinal numbers would also conflict with 
Cantor’s explanation of the cardinal numbers as what we are left with 
when we abstract away from the identity and order of the elements of a 
set:
Let M  be a given set ... . If we abstract not only from the 
nature of the elements, but also from the order in which they 
are given, then there arises in us a definite general concept... 
which I call the power of M  or the cardinal number belonging to 
M.26
Although Cantorian abstraction has received deserved criticism, the 
thought that a set has a cardinal number regardless of whether its 
elements are well-orderable cannot be assumed to be a casualty of the 
standard objections. Finally, denying that non-well-orderable sets have 
cardinal numbers would conflict with the received mathematical opinion 
that the Scott representation of cardinal number is adequate.
It thus appears that Rumfitt’s method of determining necessary and 
sufficient conditions for cardinal existence has led him astray. He is right 
that our canonical method of determining the cardinal number of finitely 
instantiated concepts, counting their instances, applies only to concepts 
whose instances can be well-ordered. But to claim that this is a necessary 
condition on the existence of cardinal numbers for concepts in general 
seems implausible. This makes it seem unlikely that principle C is 
formulable from conceptual analysis of our usual arithmetical notions.
To bring this discussion to its close, it helps to set it in context. Rumfitt 
thinks that Wright and Hale’s Neo-Fregean programme is shown to be 
unworkable by the fact that HP implies the existence of problematic
26 This quotation is an abbreviated version of a quotation from Cantor translated by Hallett (1984, 
122). The corresponding passage in German is in Cantor (1932,411).
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cardinals such as the cardinal number of self-identical things. He believes 
that Tennant’s approach successfully avoids commitment to these 
cardinals but at the cost of appeal to principles the analyticity of which is in 
doubt. So far, we are in agreement with him. However, Rumfitt attempts 
to steer a path between the two approaches by putting forward general 
necessary and sufficient conditions for cardinal existence that will avoid 
the excesses of the Neo-Fregean programme and the shortcomings of 
Tennant’s. To anyone who is prepared to appeal to set theory, it is clear 
how necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the cardinal 
numbers, considered in Frege’s way as the number belonging to a 
concept, should be given. The principle, which derives from Cantor, 
should be:
The number of Fs exists the extension of F is a set.
However, this principle cannot be used to help show that arithmetic is an 
analytic extension of logic, as it involves the notion of set. If the project is 
to succeed, therefore, a principle of cardinal existence must be found that 
is coextensive with this one, that is formulable from conceptual analysis of 
arithmetical concepts and that is stipulatively true. Principle C is Rumfitt’s 
response to this need. But if what we have argued above is correct, 
principle C is neither formulable from conceptual analysis of our 
arithmetical notions, nor stipulatively true.
77
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter addressed the question of whether mathematics can be 
shown to be analytic, in the sense of knowable on grounds provided by 
conceptual analysis. The strategy we identified for this was the logicist 
strategy (section 2.2). On the basis that logic is analytic and that 
mathematics follows logically from principles constitutive of central 
mathematical concepts, this argues that mathematics is an analytic 
extension of logic.
We considered first the Neo-Fregeanism of Wright and Hale (section 2.3). 
Following Boolos, we argued against the analyticity of Frege Arithmetic, 
the second order classical theory in which Hume’s Principle is the only 
non-logical axiom, on the grounds that it proves the existence of cardinal 
numbers whose existence conflicts with ZF (section 2.4). We claimed that 
this shows that Hume’s Principle is not true, hence not analytic, and that 
the conflict with set theory is incompatible with the Neo-Fregean 
programme for mathematics in general. We then considered Tennant’s 
free logic alternative to Frege Arithmetic (section 2.5). We argued that the 
rule of O-introduction and the ratchet principle upon which it is based are 
neither stipulatively valid nor formulable from conceptual analysis, and 
thus not analytic, because they bear ontological commitments (section 
2.6). Finally, we considered Rumfitt’s attempted resuscitation of Tennant’s 
approach by appeal to the general necessary and sufficient conditions for 
cardinal existence allegedly given by his principle C (section 2.7). As with 
the ratchet principle and O-introduction, we argued that its ontological 
commitments ruled against the analyticity of principle C. Moreover, we 
argued that the fact that principle C does not allow non-well-orderable sets 
to have cardinal numbers suggests that it is neither formulable from 
conceptual analysis of the notion of cardinal number nor stipulatively true.
If the arguments made throughout our discussions are correct, they 
suggest a bleak outlook for the view that mathematics is analytic. Having 
dismissed the most detailed, recent attempts to prosecute the logicist
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strategy for arithmetic, we are left with no compelling reason to regard 
arithmetic as analytic. Since there is no serious prospect of achieving for 
any more extensive mathematical theory what these views tried 
unsuccessfully to achieve for arithmetic, the logicist strategy is useless as 
a means of showing that mathematics is analytic. But there is no other 
suggestion as to how grounds provided by conceptual analysis might be 
thought to support knowledge of mathematical claims. We thus conclude 
that appeal to conceptual analysis does not provide an adequate account 
of mathematical knowledge.
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3Realism and intuition
We saw in the last chapter that rationalist attempts to ground 
mathematical knowledge in reason might appeal to conceptual analysis, to 
a faculty of intuition or to both as sources of grounds for non-inferential 
mathematical knowledge. Having argued against the view that conceptual 
analysis is epistemically effective, the purely analytical approach no longer 
seems attractive. Thus, if rationalism is to provide an adequate account of 
mathematical knowledge, it will have to appeal to a faculty of intuition for 
grounds for non-inferential mathematical knowledge. But is this approach 
likely to succeed? This is the subject of the present chapter.
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3.1 Two kinds of intuition
On the approach we are interested in, the faculty of intuition, supposing 
we have one, is a special cognitive capacity providing us with 
rationalistically acceptable, sense-experience independent, grounds for 
knowledge. The suggestion we are concerned with is that a faculty of 
intuition of this kind provides grounds for non-inferential mathematical 
knowledge.
If this is to be sustained, it will be necessary to explain how the faculty of 
intuition issues in non-inferential mathematical knowledge. This will 
require a clear conception of the faculty of intuition. In broad terms, two 
conceptions are available. On the first, a subject’s having an intuition is 
construed as his standing in a certain relation to a mathematical object. 
Assuming this object-relational conception, we can speak of intuitions of 
mathematical objects, we might say, for example, that Hippasus had an 
intuition of, or intuited, V2. Call this kind of intuition mathematical intuition. 
On the second conception of intuition, a subject’s having an intuition is 
construed as his standing in a certain relation to a mathematical 
proposition or thought. Assuming this propositional conception, we can 
speak of intuitions that things are thus and so in the mathematical realm; 
we might say, for example, that Pythagoras had an intuition, or intuited, 
that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on 
the other two sides. Call this kind of intuition rational intuition. Clearly a 
rationalist account of mathematical knowledge might appeal to 
mathematical intuition, to rational intuition or to both as source of grounds 
for non-inferential mathematical knowledge.
The direction taken here will distinctively season the resulting explanation 
of mathematical knowledge. Because it relates subjects to mathematical 
objects, arguing that we possess a faculty of mathematical intuition 
suggests that we have a kind of direct access to mathematical objects, by 
which we get information about them. Epistemological theories appealing
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to mathematical intuition thus bear comparison to causal accounts of our 
knowledge of concrete objects, according to which such knowledge 
depends ultimately on the information-providing access to concrete 
objects made possible by causal relations.27 In contrast, appeal to a 
faculty of rational intuition does not suggest, at least, not initially or 
immediately, that we have a kind of direct access to mathematical objects, 
because this kind of intuition connects subjects with mathematical 
propositions or thoughts. Rationalist attempts to explain mathematical 
knowledge by appeal to mathematical intuition thus differ fundamentally 
from those that appeal to rational intuition; the former portray 
mathematical knowledge as resulting from a kind of access to 
mathematical objects, the latter do not.
Assuming that some non-inferential mathematical knowledge can be 
secured on the deliverances of a faculty of intuition, a satisfactory account 
of mathematical knowledge would then have to explain how this supports 
inferential mathematical knowledge. Clearly this will require recourse to 
logic as a means of transferring warrant or justification from one thought to 
another. However, this leaves room for different accounts depending 
upon what kinds of logic are permitted. One possibility might be to hold 
that mathematical inference is exclusively deductive. But it might also be 
possible to hold that non-deductive inference plays a role.
The preceding remarks make clear where rationalist proponents of 
intuition need to concentrate their efforts. To begin with, they will have to 
convince us that we possess a faculty of intuition. It will be necessary to 
describe the faculty in some detail, explaining how it works, arguing for our 
possession of it and, crucially, justifying the claim that it provides us with a 
non-trivial body of non-inferentially known mathematics. Proponents of 
intuition will also have to convince us that mathematical knowledge in 
general can be secured on the basis of the intuitive evidence they 
describe. They will have to show that the intuitively and non-inferentially
27 Goldman (1967) contains the classic statement of a causal theory.
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known body of mathematics supports mathematical knowledge more 
generally. With this in mind, we proceed to a consideration of the 
prospects for accounts of mathematical knowledge appealing to 
mathematical intuition.
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3.2 Gddel’s account of set theoretic knowledge
Godel declares his commitment to a faculty of intuition in this well-known 
passage:
But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do 
have something like a perception also of the objects of set 
theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force 
themselves upon us as being true. I don’t see any reason why 
we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., 
in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which 
induces us to build up physical theories and to expect that 
future sense perceptions will agree with them and, moreover, 
to believe that a question not decidable now has meaning and 
may be decidable in the future. (1963, 483-484)28
The intuition postulated here is understood as a relation between knowing 
subjects and mathematical objects, a species of intuition of mathematical 
objects. It gives cognitive access to sets and is distinct from sense 
perception, although analogous to it. In the terminology of the previous 
section, Godel here posits a mathematical intuition of sets.
It is a characteristic tactic of proponents of mathematical intuition to 
expand upon their views with the help of an analogy between 
mathematical intuition and sense perception. Godel is no exception, and 
he returns to his analogy in later remarks:
It should be noted that mathematical intuition need not be 
conceived of as a faculty giving an immediate knowledge of 
the objects concerned. Rather it seems that, as in the case of 
physical experience, we form our ideas also of those objects 
on the basis of something else which is immediately given.
28 The passage occurs in a supplement added to a much earlier version of the paper, Godel (1947). 
C. Parsons (1995) investigates just when Godel became convinced of the existence of this form of 
mathematical intuition.
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Only this something else here is not, or not primarily, the 
sensations. (1963, 484)
Here Godel conceives of sense perception as a faculty giving us indirect 
access to physical objects on the basis of direct access to sensations, 
where sensations are understood to result from the causal commerce we 
have with physical phenomena through our sense organs. He invites us to 
think of mathematical intuition in a similar way, as a faculty giving us an 
indirect access to sets on the basis of direct access to certain special data, 
a distinctively mathematical “given” corresponding to sensations. 
Expanding on the relationship between these data and sensations, Godel 
remarks that the ideas of physical objects arising from our sensory 
experience contain elements, such as the idea of an object, which are not 
sensations and that the data of mathematical intuition must be related to 
these non-empirical constituents of our empirical ideas (1963, 484). The 
data of mathematical intuition are thus not so far removed from sensations 
as one might have thought. They are certainly to be distinguished, 
however; Godel maintains that the data of mathematical intuition, in 
contrast to sensations, are not produced in us as a result of causal 
interactions with particular things (loc. cit).
We saw in the previous section that a rationalist appeal to intuition must 
provide an explanation of how the faculty of intuition supports non- 
inferential mathematical knowledge together with an account of how this 
body of knowledge supports the rest of mathematics. We may assume 
that for Godel it is set theoretic knowledge that is to be grounded in 
intuition, as the conception of intuition he introduces is supposed to issue 
in intuitions of sets. But which set theoretic claims does Godel think are 
non-inferentially supported by intuition? We may approach this question 
from his remark that the axioms of set theory “force themselves upon us 
as being true”. This is supposed to provide evidence that we possess set 
theoretic intuition, but it also clearly suggests that the mathematical claims 
Godel takes to be known through intuition are those very axioms,
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presumably the axioms of NBG.29 Having concluded that Godel takes set 
theoretic axioms to be non-inferentially grounded on intuition, it then 
seems reasonable to read him as proposing that inferential set theoretic 
knowledge is produced by deduction from the non-inferentially known set 
theoretic axioms. In this way, we arrive at a view of set theory according 
to which set theoretic knowledge proceeds deductively from intuitively 
known axioms.
Some of Godel’s remarks, however, suggest that this picture is not 
intended. During his discussion of the system developed in Principia 
Mathematics, Godel writes:
He [Russell] compares the axioms of logic and mathematics 
with the laws of nature and logical evidence with sense 
perception, so that the axioms need not necessarily be evident 
in themselves, but rather their justification lies (exactly as in 
physics) in the fact that they make it possible for these “sense 
perceptions” to be deduced; which of course would not 
exclude that they also have a kind of intrinsic plausibility 
similar to that in physics. I think that (provided “evidence” is 
understood in a sufficiently strict sense) this view has been 
largely justified by subsequent developments, and it is to be 
expected that it will be still more so in the future. Godel (1944,
449)
Here Godel endorses the view that mathematical and logical axioms can 
be supported not only by intuitive evidence (intrinsic plausibility) but also 
by non-deductive means, akin to inference to the best explanation in 
physics. On this view, an axiom might be justified not because it is
29 There is textual evidence to support mentioning the axioms of NGB here. Godel (1963,475, 
n. 13) refers to several works to pinpoint axioms he takes to underlie a conception of set not known 
to be paradoxical. As these works include Von Neumann (1925), Bemays (1958), and Godel 
(1940), the axioms in question are those of NBG. Since there is no indication in Godel’s text o f a 
change of subject when he goes on to discuss our intuitive knowledge of set theoretic axioms, it is 
reasonable to assume that these are the axioms Godel believes “force themselves upon us as being 
true”. Thus Godel’s view was that the axioms of NBG are intuitively known.
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intuitive but because it allows us to prove intuitive claims. Godel returns to 
this idea during his reflections on the continuum problem:
even disregarding the intrinsic necessity of some new axiom, 
and even in case it has no intrinsic necessity at all, a probable 
decision about its truth is possible also in another way, 
namely, inductively by studying its “success.” ... There might 
exist axioms so abundant in their verifiable consequences 
[consequences provable without the new axioms], shedding so 
much light upon a whole field, and yielding such powerful 
methods for solving problems (and even solving them 
constructively, as far as that is possibe) that, no matter 
whether or not they are intrinsically necessary, they would 
have to be accepted in at least the same sense as any well- 
established physical theory. (1963, 477)
In this passage, Godel lays a greater emphasis on his view that even an 
axiom for which we have no intuitive evidence may nevertheless by 
justified on the basis of a kind on non-deductive, non-intuitive evidence.
If these passages are to be given as much weight as Godel’s clear belief 
in the existence of deductive evidence for set theoretic claims, then the 
picture of set theory as a deductive outgrowth of intuitively known axioms 
is too simple. Godel certainly thinks there is intuitive evidence for the 
axioms but he seems also to think that there is another kind of non- 
deductive evidence, supporting set theoretic axioms independently of 
intuition, on the basis of their theoretical role. So it would seem that the 
picture of set theory he really advances portrays set theoretic knowledge 
as growing out of intuitively known set theory in not one but two directions, 
deductively and non-deductively.
However, we should be cautious about drawing this conclusion. Godel is 
careful to say only that there “might” be axioms justified on the basis of 
their non-deductive relations to intuitively known mathematics. He also 
takes care to describe decisions regarding new axioms made on the basis
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of such evidence as “probable”. This contrasts with the case of intuition, 
which provides evidence not of probability but of truth. In addition to this, 
Godel points out in the revised edition of his paper on the continuum 
problem that non-deductive evidence is of only limited application to 
axioms of set theory:
It was pointed out earlier that, besides mathematical intuition, 
there exists another (though only probable) criterion of the 
truth of mathematical axioms, namely their fruitfulness in 
mathematics and, one may add, possibly also in physics. This 
criterion, however, though it may become decisive in the 
future, cannot yet be applied to the specifically set-theoretical 
axioms (such as those referring to great cardinal numbers), 
because very little is known about their consequences in other 
fields. The simplest case of an application of the criterion 
under discussion arises when some set-theoretical axiom has 
number-theoretical consequences verifiable by computation up 
to any given integer. On the basis of what is known today, 
however, it is not possible to make the truth of any set- 
theoretical axiom reasonably probably in this manner. Godel 
(1963,485)
In light of these remarks, it is not plausible to accord non-deductive 
methods the same status in Godel’s set theoretic epistemology as 
deduction from intuitively known axioms; deduction is the primary 
mechanism for the growth of intuitively known set theory, non-deductive 
methods are secondary to this.
Godel’s account of set theoretic knowledge can be summarised as follows. 
Positing a mathematical intuition of sets, it takes set theoretic intuition to 
provide evidence for the axioms of NBG and regards set theoretic 
knowledge primarily as a deductive outgrowth of this intuitively known 
base. Another source of support for set-theoretic axioms is 
acknowledged, namely their fruitfulness in independently verifiable 
consequences, but this is of secondary importance.
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3.3 Objections to Godel’s account
Godel’s picture of set theory as primarily a deductive outgrowth of 
intuitively known axioms provides a clear example of a rationalist appeal to 
mathematical intuition. Because the axioms of NBG provide a set theory 
powerful enough to model other central mathematical theories such as 
arithmetic and real analysis (see, e.g., Mendelson (1997)), and because it 
would be highly controversial to deny the epistemic effectiveness of 
deductive inference, acceptance of Godel’s views on mathematical 
intuition would engender considerable sympathy with the view that 
mathematical intuition can underpin a successful general account of 
mathematical knowledge. And provided there are no objections to the 
rationalistic acceptability of deductive inference, this would be a very 
satisfying result for mathematical rationalism.
However, we will argue that Godel’s account of mathematical intuition is 
not satisfactory. Our first argument is that Godel’s description of the 
faculty of mathematical intuition is not detailed enough to provide an 
adequate understanding of how we are meant to acquire intuitive 
knowledge. Godel provides only the briefest description of his conception 
of mathematical intuition, through the analogy he draws between it and 
sense-perception and a few elucidatory remarks. These make clear that 
mathematical intuition is supposed to provide a sense-perception like 
access to sets on the basis of a non-causal relationship with immediately 
given data that play something like the role of sensations in sense- 
experience. But we are not told what the data are, how they are produced 
in us or how they lead to intuitions of sets.
Godel does state that the immediately given data of mathematical intuition 
are “closely related to the abstract elements contained in our empirical 
ideas” (1963, 484). From the context, it is clear that these abstract 
elements are things like our concepts of objects. But this does not really 
provide us with an adequate grasp of what the data of mathematical 
intuition are, and Godel provides no further description, nor any specific
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examples, of them. As regards the way these data are produced in us, 
Godel remarks that they cannot “be associated with the actions of certain 
things upon our sense organs” (loc. cit.), which presumably means that 
they are not causally produced, but he does not give any positive account 
of how they are or might be produced. On the subject of how the data 
lead to intuitions, Godel says nothing, beyond the claim implicit in the 
analogy with sense-perception that this must be something like the way in 
which sensations lead to sense-perceptions.30
Our argument here is not that a fuller account of the data given in 
mathematical intuition is impossible. Godel could perhaps appeal in his 
explanation of what the data are to the constituents of ideas of physical 
objects that represent duration and spatial extent. To explain when these 
data arise in our experience, he might describe some particularly good 
examples of the kind of experience in which such data are salient. 
Perhaps it would then be possible to come up with a perspicuous account 
of how these data produce intuitions of sets. The point we are making is 
just that Godel provides nothing like this to elaborate on his allusive 
remarks about mathematical intuition. The conception of mathematical 
intuition put forward is extremely meagre, and because of this it is not 
clear how we are supposed to be have intuitions of sets. As a result, it is 
not clear how we are supposed to come to possess intuitive knowledge of 
the axioms of set theory.31
We will now argue that Godel does not provide us with good reason to 
believe that we possess a faculty of mathematical intuition. His remarks 
suggest two putative reasons for thinking that we do, the fact that the
30 It may seem that Godel’s reliance on the notion of a “given” in sense-perception is problematic 
(for possible reasons why see Sellars (1956)). However, it is not clear that this does present a 
difficulty. Godel’s analogy between intuition and sense perception is no use to him as an 
argument for the existence of intuition if  the model o f perception it assumes is unsatisfactory. But 
Godel uses the analogy to explain his notion of mathematical intuition, not to argue for its 
existence. For this, the acceptability of the model of perception as an account of perception is not 
an issue, provided it is not found wanting for reasons of clarity.
31 Charles Chihara makes the point that Godel does not provide a characterisation of the class of 
experiences that he feels ought to be explained as intuitions of sets (Chihara (1982)). This is of a 
piece with the general complaint that Godel’s conception of mathematical intuition is not 
adequately explained.
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axioms of set theory “force themselves upon us as being true” (op. cit., 
484) and the fact that “our ideas referring to physical objects contain 
constituents qualitatively different from sensations or mere combinations 
of sensations” (loc. cit). However, it is by no means clear that either of 
these points support the view that we possess a perception-like access to 
sets.
Consider first the issue of the axioms “forcing themselves upon us as 
being true”. Presumably a statement forces itself upon us as being true if 
it demands our assent once we have understood it. However, if this is 
what is intended, then it can hardly be claimed that every axiom of NBG 
has this characteristic. It is plausible to claim, for example, that the axiom 
of union, which states that for every set x there is a set y containing 
precisely the elements of the elements of x, feels this way. But it is not 
plausible to claim, for example, that this feel attaches to the axiom of 
infinity, which states that there is a set containing the empty set and which 
is such that if x is an element of the set then so is the union of x and {x}, or 
to the axiom of limitation of size, which states that for any class C there is 
a set identical to C if and only if there is no bijection from C to V, the class 
of all sets. Thus if we have correctly understood what phenomena Godel 
has in mind here, then his claim about the axioms of NBG stands in need 
of qualification. If, on the other hand, we have misunderstood what he 
means, then it is no longer clear what phenomenon is in question.
A second complaint to be made here is that it is unclear what argument 
Godel has in mind for the existence of mathematical intuition. He says 
that the fact that we have a perception-like access to sets can be “seen 
from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true” (loc. 
cit.). Presumably this is not intended as an endorsement of the argument:
(1) The axioms of set theory force themselves upon us as
being true
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(2) Therefore we possess a faculty of mathematical intuition 
giving us knowledge of the axioms of set theory on the basis 
of a perception-like access to sets.
This argument is not sufficiently detailed to be convincing. Then again, 
Godel gives no indication of what other premises might be taken to 
support this inference. Because of this it is just not clear why Godel thinks 
that recognition of the phenomenon mentioned in claim (1) should lead us 
to recognise that we have a perception-like access to sets, as mentioned 
in (2).
Let us consider now the second reason suggested for thinking that we 
possess a faculty of mathematical intuition, the fact that “our ideas 
referring to physical objects contain constituents qualitatively different from 
sensations or mere combinations of sensations” (op. cit., 484). Godel 
appeals to this in support of his view that there are immediately given data 
functioning in the production of mathematical intuitions in something like 
the way sensations produce sense-perceptions. His argument appears to 
be that since the mind cannot create ideas or their constituents save by 
the recombination of constituents previously grasped, these non-sensory 
constituents of our ideas must enter our understanding in some other way 
rather than having been produced by the mind itself (loc. cit.).
If this is the argument intended, it is not convincing. The assumption that 
the intellect is only able to contribute conceptual elements to the 
organisation of experience by combining and recombining independently 
given constituents belongs to a dated conception of the mind that 
contemporary cognitive science rejects. In order to combat the view that 
the non-sensory constituents of our ideas are subjective, Godel points out 
that this cannot be inferred from the fact that they are not produced by 
sensory experience of physical objects (an inference he attributes to 
Kant). But one can accept this whilst still maintaining that the mind is 
capable of contributing conceptual elements to the organisation of 
experience, for contemporary cognitive science gives much better reasons
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for thinking that the mind is in this way active. The argument we have 
described thus does not provide any support to the view that our thought 
relies on data given to us immediately through some non-sensory 
interaction with an external reality. Since no other argument is suggested 
by these remarks, Godel gives us no reason to believe in these 
immediately given data of mathematical intuition.
If the points raised in the foregoing discussion are correct, Godels remarks 
on mathematical intuition leave us with no grounds for confidence that 
knowledge of set theory can be satisfactorily based on the deliverances of 
mathematical intuition. We argued that Godel’s description of the faculty 
of mathematical intuition is not sufficiently detailed to provide a satisfactory 
understanding of how it is supposed to issue in intuitive knowledge of the 
axioms of set theory. In addition, we argued that his remarks do not 
suggest any convincing reasons to think that we possess such a faculty. 
We thus remain unconvinced by Godel’s remarks that appealing to 
mathematical intuition will help to provide a convincing account of our 
knowledge of set theory.
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3.4 Consequences for rationalist appeals to mathematical intuition
Where does our assessment of Godel’s view of set theoretic knowledge 
leave the rationalist project of accounting for mathematical knowledge by 
appeal to mathematical intuition? Since our discussion does not provide 
any reason to think that Godel’s approach to set theory is impossible, and 
since it does not rule out appeals to mathematical intuition for explaining 
knowledge in other areas of mathematics, it may seem not to have much 
bearing on the more general issue, at least, no bearing beyond the 
obvious conclusion that Godel’s account of set theoretic knowledge cannot 
be accepted.
However, no-one after Godel has argued that a comparatively extensive 
body of mathematical knowledge can be secured on the deliverances of 
mathematical intuition. We should acknowledge here that C. Parsons 
(1971, 1980, 1986a, 1993, 1994) has argued that some truths of 
elementary arithmetic might be known on the grounds of a perception-like 
access to a specific range of abstract types whose tokens are concrete. 
However, Parsons is an isolated case. Moreover, he concedes that 
according to his theory the natural numbers are not objects of intuition 
(1993, 235, n. 5; 1994, 143), that the kind of intuition he has in mind would 
not secure knowledge of the principle of mathematical induction (1994, 
227; 1993, 240), nor even perhaps of any elementary inductive proofs 
(1994, 227), and that it may not secure knowledge that there are infinitely 
many objects of the allegedly intuitable kind (1993, 244). Because of 
these limitations, Parsons’ theory provides no assurance that 
mathematical intuition underpins an adequate general account of 
mathematical knowledge.
The literature thus contains no alternative to Godel’s account of 
mathematical intuition that promises to deliver a satisfactory general 
account of mathematical knowledge. Because of this, our negative 
assessment of Godel’s views is significant for the wider project; it shows 
that we have no reason to think that mathematical knowledge can be
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based on the deliverances of mathematical intuition. If a satisfactory 
account of mathematical knowledge is to be had by appeal to intuition, 
therefore, it must invoke the other kind of intuition we described above. 
Accordingly, we now turn our attention to the prospects of basing 
mathematical knowledge on a faculty of rational intuition.
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3.5 Katz’s theory of rational intuition
Jerrold Katz (1995; 1998) maintains that mathematical objects are 
aspatial, atemporal objects and that mathematical truth is a species of 
necessary truth. He holds that reason furnishes intuitions into the 
essential nature of mathematical objects and that these intuitions are 
items of mathematical knowledge. Katz also believes that the body of 
intuitively known mathematics is extended by proof and systematisation, 
that neither of these depends essentially on perception or introspection 
and that all mathematical knowledge can ultimately be secured by these 
methods. Katz’s account of mathematical knowledge thus provides a 
clear example of the kind of rationalism we are interested in at present.
Katz introduces intuition in this remark:
The notion of intuition that is relevant to our rationalist 
epistemology is that of an immediate, i.e., non-inferential, 
purely rational apprehension of the structure of an abstract 
object, that is, an apprehension that involves absolutely no 
connection to anything concrete. Katz (1998, 44)
Later on, he expands on the theme:
Intuitions are of structure, and the structure we apprehend 
shows that objects with that structure cannot be certain ways.
... What is present to our minds in a clear and distinct intuition 
of abstract objects is the fact that their structure puts the 
supposition of their being otherwise than as we grasp them to 
be beyond the limits of possibility. Katz (1998, 45)
Clearly intuition is here intended to be a cognitive capacity of some kind, 
providing states of apprehension with the characteristics of immediacy, 
independence and informativeness. Intuitions are immediate in the sense 
that they are not inferred from other states, they are independent in that
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they do not depend upon causal relations to concrete objects and they are 
informative because they give us information about abstract objects. The 
independence of intuition from causal connections should not be thought 
to rule out that having an intuition might be partly explicable in terms of 
being in certain sorts of brain states. Ruling this out would require 
commitment to a highly improbable form of mind-body dualism. Instead it 
should be taken to exclude that such states realise an intuition as a result 
of causal relations to items involved in the informational content of the 
intuition.
It is important to realise that for Katz intuitions do not depend on any kind 
of interaction with items involved in their informational content. Not only 
does he refuse to identify intuitions with perceptions by extending the 
range of perception to include abstract objects, he even refuses to 
understand intuition by analogy to perception (see his discussion of 
“classical platonism” (1998, 14-17)). In thus playing down comparisons 
between intuitions of mathematical thoughts and perceptions of physical 
objects, Katz is trying to distance himself from the idea, which he derives 
from the notion of acquaintance in our understanding of perception, that 
an apprehensive faculty can produce states of apprehension about given 
objects only on the basis of interaction with objects of the relevant kind. 
Katz does not believe this gives the right model for intuition, and he is 
careful to distinguish his account of intuition from accounts based on it. 
This strongly suggests that the conception of intuition Katz intends is 
propositional in form, not object-relational. This is confirmed by his remark 
that when we have an intuition, “what is present to our minds ... is the fact 
that their structure puts the supposition of their being otherwise than as we 
grasp them to be beyond the limits of possibility” (see quotation above; my 
italics). What this shows, in the terminology introduced in section 3.1, is 
that Katz intends a faculty of rational, not mathematical, intuition.32
32 Katz did once defend an object-relational conception of intuition (1981, Chapter 6). Inspired by 
Kant’s account of synthetic apriori knowledge, this conceived intuition as a faculty similar to, and 
running in parallel with, perception and introspection. The view was that intuitions are acts of 
apprehension of abstract objects, which a rational subject could have on the basis of constructing a 
concept of the object. Since Katz clearly abandons this conception in the later work, it is worth
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To help explain his notion of rational intuition, Katz states that the 
intuitable propositions are a subclass of necessary truths, containing 
elementary mathematical, linguistic and logical propositions. The 
cognitive mechanism by which such intuitions are produced is the 
apprehension of the structure of abstract objects alluded to in the 
quotation above. However, in defending reason’s ability to recognise 
some necessary truths Katz also mentions conceivability (op. cit, 56) and 
the ability to recognise inconsistency (op. cit, 57). It seems that intuitions 
as apprehensions of the structure of abstract objects are bolstered in 
some way by these further considerations.
Having described his notion of rational intuition, Katz goes on to explain its 
epistemological characteristics. Intuition provides grounds for belief in 
claims about abstract objects by revealing the limits of possibility 
concerning them. Given a supposition about how an abstract object is, 
grasp of the structure of the abstract object immediately reveals the 
necessary truth (or falsehood) of the supposition. Thus the intuition of four 
as a composite of two taken twice shows that it is impossible that four is 
prime; the intuition of the grammatical structure of the sentence “I saw the 
uncle of John and Mary” shows that it is impossible that the sentence “I 
saw the uncle of John and Mary” has a unique sense. Katz holds that 
intuitions are reliable when they satisfy the Cartesian criteria of clarity and 
distinctness (op. cit, 45)). However, he does not demand that they are 
infallible (op. cit, 44). Just as we can be deceived by sense perception, 
so that we seem to perceive that which is not, so too can we be misled by 
intuition, seeming to intuit propositions that we later discover are false. 
Finally, intuition is said to be of limited scope. Some truths about abstract
asking why. A poor answer (for which see Oliver (2000)) is that Katz rejects Kantian conceptions 
of intuition. Katz does reject Kantian conceptions of intuition like Parsons’ (1980) account, which 
invoke the idea that we can get information about abstract objects from introspection of mental 
objects (see Katz (1998,44)). But Katz’s earlier conception of intuition was not of this kind 
because it did not conceive of the construction of concepts of abstract objects to be or to depend 
upon an introspective process. The real reason Katz abandons his earlier model of intuition is 
given in the text, that he rejects all conceptions of intuition for which intuitions must ultimately be 
produced by interaction with objects of the relevant kind. This is another way of saying that he 
rejects the idea that intuition requires acquaintance: Katz’s earlier conception of intuition, although 
it did not spell out acquaintance in causal terms, appealed to it nevertheless.
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objects are considered too general to be intuited, either in the sense of 
being about too many abstract objects or in the sense of being about 
relations amongst such objects that cannot be ascertained from their 
structure (op. cit., 46). These limitations are comparable to the limitations 
of sense perception, for instance with the restricted ranges of vision or of 
hearing.
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3.6 Objections to Katz’s theory of rational intuition
As we have made clear, Katz’s theory of rational intuition can be divided 
into cognitive and epistemological claims. On the cognitive side, rational 
intuition is said to be a propositional form of apprehension giving us 
informative, immediate and independent grasp of truths about 
mathematical objects (grammatical structure and logical form, also). On 
the epistemological side, rational intuition is said to be warranting but 
fallible and limited in the sense that propositions about too many objects or 
about relations on abstract objects not determined by their structure are 
beyond its scope. Presumably the epistemological characteristics of 
rational intuition are intended to be consequences of its cognitive aspects.
We will argue that this theory is too bare to be convincing, that no account 
of the nature and constitution of rational intuition is given to make clear 
why its cognitive and epistemological characteristics are as they are 
claimed to be. As we will show, this completely undermines the only 
serious argument Katz suggests in favour of the existence of rational 
intuition, thus leaving us with no reason to believe that we possess the 
faculty of intuition upon which his mathematical epistemology relies.
3.6.1 Katz’s reasons for belief in rational intuition
Katz puts forward several grounds for belief in the existence of rational 
intuition. When evaluating these, it is important to separate two kinds of 
intuition that he deals with together. Katz remarks that:
The intuition of the number four as a composite of two and two 
shows the impossibility of four's being a prime number. The 
intuition of the logical structure of an instance of modus 
ponens shows the impossibility of the truth of the premises 
without the truth of the conclusion. (1998, 45)
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Here we have, on the one hand, intuitions of truths like “Four is a not a 
prime number”, and, on the other, intuitions of the validity of arguments 
like “If the air in the balloon gets hotter, it expands; the air in the balloon 
gets hotter; therefore it expands”. In each case, the way in which we 
grasp the content of the intuition seems to be similar, exhibiting the 
characteristics of immediacy, informativeness and independence laid 
down in Katz’s description of intuition. Nevertheless, what we are 
grasping is not the same: a direct apprehension of truth is one thing, a 
direct apprehension of the validity of an inference is another.
That Katz deals with these together is not objectionable. There is no 
reason why he should not posit one form of intuition issuing in two different 
kinds of output, or perhaps two forms of intuition, each issuing in just one 
kind of output. The importance of this distinction is rather that it allows us 
to be clear about the charge we are making. When we claim that Katz’s 
grounds for intuition do not give us reason to believe in its existence, we 
mean that he does not provide grounds for belief in a faculty issuing in 
intuitions of the first kind. It is the existence of rational intuition conceived 
of as a direct insight into truth that we are calling into doubt.
With this in mind we turn now to the grounds put forward in favour of 
rational intuition. Katz proposes an argument for rational intuition from the 
immediacy of certain items of mathematical knowledge (1998, 45). He 
also puts forward considerations suggesting that conceivability and our 
ability to recognise inconsistency might bolster reason’s ability to 
determine necessary truth (op. cit., 56-58). As these are clearly intended 
to support the view that reason contains a faculty of rational intuition, we 
must address these, as well as the argument concerning immediacy.
One difficulty with Katz’s discussion of conceivability is that he does not 
state what he takes it to be. Is it our ability to form concepts, our ability to 
recognise conceptual possibilities and impossibilities, something else? 
We are not told. This makes it unclear why we should accept 
conceivability as part of the faculty of reason. But rational intuition is
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supposed to be part of the faculty of reason. So even if conceivability 
considerations do help us to recognise the necessary truth of certain 
propositions, this gives no reason to think that we have rational intuitions 
of them.
A second difficulty with Katz’s discussion of conceivability is that it does 
not give any positive ground for thinking that conceivability considerations 
allow us to recognise the necessity of certain truths. The discussion is 
primarily aimed at defusing a possible objection to the suggestion that 
conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility. The objection is that it is not 
possible to infer metaphysical conclusions, concerning what is possibly the 
case, from psychological premises, concerning what is or is not 
conceivable (Katz (op. cit., 56) cites Mill’s A System of Logic, Chapter 5, 
§6, in connection with this objection). Appealing to Yablo (1993), Katz 
argues that this objection can be taken either as a sceptical doubt that 
conceivability might not be a fit standard for modal knowledge, or as a 
non-sceptical demand for explanation of the kind of conceivability that 
provides this standard. He then urges that it is not necessary to defuse 
the sceptical doubt but only to satisfy the demand for the right notion of 
conceivability to be made out:
From the standpoint of the present defence of reason’s ability 
to determine necessary truth, all that needs to be shown is that 
intuitions based on the proper sort of conceivability measure 
up to the prevailing standards for modal knowledge. (1998,
57)
However, Katz does not carry out this last task. He gives no suggestion 
for what the right kind of conceivability might be, and gives no rationale for 
thinking that conceivability sets up a standard for modal knowledge that 
corresponds to that of our modal discourse. We are thus left with no idea 
why conceivability ought to be taken as a guide to (some) necessary truth, 
and thus no idea why it should be viewed as issuing, somehow, in rational 
intuitions.
102
Katz’s remarks on conceivability thus do not provide a case for the view 
that our possession of a faculty of rational intuition is somehow supported 
by considerations of conceivability. It may be true to say that 
conceivability is a guide to possibility, so that for any proposition p we 
have the conditional:
p is conceivable - » p is possibly true.
However, if conceivability considerations are to allow us to recognise 
necessary truths, this is not enough. The general truth of:
p is conceivable p is necessarily true
would suffice, but this conditional is obviously not true in general; we can 
conceive of lots of things that are not necessarily true. Presumably, then, 
the hope is for a link between the inconceivability of propositions and their 
impossibility. If the conditional:
p is inconceivable -» p is not possibly true
is true in general, then certainly one might feel drawn towards an 
argument that conceivability considerations help us to recognise some 
necessary truths (the negations of propositions the truth of which cannot, 
in the relevant way, be conceived). But it is not obvious that there is a 
notion of conceivability for which this conditional is true. Moreover, to use 
considerations of inconceivability in conjunction with this conditional as a 
standard for necessary truth, we would presumably have to use 
psychological capacities of some kind to determine whether or not given 
propositions are inconceivable. But then our inability to conceive of the 
truth of a given proposition p could simply reflect limitations of the 
psychological capacities involved, rather than the inconceivability, in the 
relevant sense, of p’s being true. Mill’s point, at least with regard to the
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hoped for connection between inconceivability and impossibility, has not 
gone away.
It is worth pointing out that Katz himself suggests that inconceivability 
considerations should not be viewed as a guide to impossibility:
when we are right that something is inconceivable, there may 
still be a question of whether or not it is impossible. Yablo 
(1993, 36-40) himself offers no final assurance that there is a 
notion of inconceivability strong enough to provide satisfactory 
metaphysical grounds for thinking that inconceivability implies 
impossibility. (1998, 58)
Note, too, that one can take this approach to the epistemic effectiveness 
of inconceivability considerations whilst accepting that a proposition’s 
being conceivable indicates that it is possibly true. Thus one can deny 
that inconceivability is a guide to impossibility without embracing a general 
scepticism concerning the epistemic effectiveness of conceivability 
considerations.
It appears, then, that considerations of conceivability are not suited to 
helping us recognise the necessary truth of certain propositions. For this 
reason, and because Katz’s remarks provide no positive support for 
thinking otherwise, we conclude that it is not clear that considerations of 
conceivability support the view that we possess a faculty of rational 
intuition.
Let us now consider Katz’s remarks on our ability to spot inconsistency; 
perhaps these will provide evidence that we possess a faculty of rational 
intuition. Katz’s first introduces this ability as “reason’s power to recognise 
inconsistency” but then goes on to discuss “reason’s power to recognize a 
proposition as contradictory" (1998, 57). These are not the same. Our 
ability to tell, given any proposition p, that it is inconsistent with -*p, is not 
alone sufficient to explain how we recognise the contradictoriness of, for
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example, “That brick is red and green all over”. Holding these two abilities 
apart, therefore, we should ask whether either of them could perform the 
role assigned to rational intuition in Katz’s mathematical epistemology. It 
seems that they could not. Amongst the mathematical propositions that 
Katz claims are intuitable are some that imply the existence of particular 
mathematical objects, for example, the proposition that 4 is composite. 
However, neither our ability to spot inconsistency nor our ability to 
recognise a proposition as contradictory seems suited to produce intuitive 
knowledge of such propositions. The ability to recognise, given p, that p 
and -«p are contradictory can at most provide grounds for belief in 
instances of the law of non-contradiction. The ability to recognise a 
proposition as contradictory may have wider scope, it might perhaps give 
us grounds for knowledge of claims such as that nothing is red and green 
all over, which express containment relations amongst the extensions of 
predicates. But these claims do not include claims that are committed to 
the existence of mathematical objects. So it is not clear either that 
reason’s power to recognise inconsistency, or its power to recognize 
propositions as contradictory, can provide grounds for claims that, 
according to Katz’s conception, are knowable on the basis of rational 
intuition. The fact that reason includes these abilities thus provides no 
evidence for the existence of rational intuition.
The foregoing discussion shows that neither conceivability considerations 
nor considerations concerning reason’s ability to spot inconsistency deliver 
what is required of rational intuition. They thus do not support the 
existence of rational intuition. Katz’s claim that we possess such a faculty 
thus depends entirely on his argument from the immediacy of some items 
of mathematical knowledge. We will now assess this argument.
Katz states that if we think about the mathematics we know (and more 
generally about our formal knowledge), and ask ourselves how we know it, 
we will soon, by a process of elimination, arrive at rational intuition:
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Consider the pigeon-hole principle. Even mathematically 
naTve people see that, if m things are put into n pigeon-holes, 
then, when m is greater than n, some hole must contain more 
than one thing. We can eliminate prior acquaintance with the 
proof of the pigeon-hole principle, instantaneous discovery of 
the proof, lucky guesses, and so on as “impossibilities.” The 
only remaining explanation for the immediate knowledge of the 
principle is intuition. (1998, 45)
We may take it that the argument here proceeds as follows:
(1) Some mathematically naTve people have immediate 
knowledge of the pigeon-hole principle
(2) The theory of rational intuition provides a good 
explanation of this
(3) No other account provides a good explanation of this
(4) Therefore rational intuition exists and is as the theory 
describes it.
Clearly this argument is intended as support for the more general 
contention that only the theory of rational intuition explains the immediate 
knowledge some mathematically naive people have of some mathematics. 
Call this the eliminative argument for rational intuition.
Provided we assume that “mathematically naTve” means something like 
“without formal mathematical education” rather than “totally innocent of 
mathematical knowledge and concepts”, premise (1) seems, from a realist 
perspective, reasonable enough. Even if otherwise sound, however, this 
argument does not provide a compelling reason to believe in the existence 
of rational intuition in the present context. Our aim in chapters two through 
to five of this study is to find out whether there is a satisfactory 
mathematical epistemology given the assumption of mathematical realism. 
The present chapter deals with the suggestion that such an epistemology 
can be constructed around an appeal to rational intuition. It is clearly
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unacceptable to us, therefore, that the argument ostensibly demonstrating 
that rational intuition exists should assume, as (1) does, that we have 
mathematical knowledge: for us, appeal to rational intuition is supposed to 
explain possession of mathematical knowledge, not the other way round.
However, we can drop the knowledge condition from (1) to leave 
immediacy alone, understanding this to concern the nature of our 
apprehension of the pigeon-hole principle. What Katz has to say about 
rational intuition could then be taken as a putative explanation of this 
immediate apprehension, so that, if this were the only successful 
explanation, it would be possible to argue in just the same way that such 
states of apprehension are rational intuitions. Thus, an argument for 
rational intuition similar to Katz’s is available in the present context:
(5) Mathematically naive people immediately apprehend the 
pigeon-hole principle
(6) The theory of rational intuition provides a good 
explanation of this
(7) No other account provides a good explanation of this
(8) Therefore rational intuition exists and is as the theory 
describes it.
The corresponding general contention, the new eliminative argument for 
rational intuition, would be that only rational intuition provides a good 
explanation of the immediate apprehension the mathematically naive have 
of certain mathematical propositions. What we must address is whether 
this provides good grounds for belief that rational intuition exists.
We will argue that it does not. One way to approach this conclusion might 
be to attack premise (7), arguing that Katz does not set out sufficient 
reason for thinking that alternative explanations of the immediacy of the 
pigeon-hole principle that do not appeal to rational intuition. But even if 
this charge could be substantiated, it could be argued in response that the 
appeal to rational intuition gives a better explanation of the phenomena
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than the available alternatives. This will not be possible, however, if it can 
be shown that the appeal to rational intuition provides no good explanation 
of the immediacy of the pigeon-hole principle, that is to say, if (6) is false. 
More generally, the approach of the eliminative argument is completely 
undercut if it can be shown that rational intuition does not provide a good 
explanation of our immediate apprehension of mathematical propositions; 
there can be no inference to a good explanation, unique or otherwise, if 
the explanation is not good enough. Our approach should thus be to 
attack the explanation of the immediacy phenomena putatively given by 
rational intuition.
3.6.2 The constitution of rational intuition
When describing rational intuition, Katz uses visual imagery when in fact 
rational intuition is meant to be nothing like sense perception (for example 
in the claim that people see that the pigeon-hole principle is true (1998, 
45)). He also uses the object-relational form of the verb to intuit when in 
fact rational intuition is supposed to be propositional (for example when he 
says that, “The intuition of the number four as a composite of two and two 
shows the impossibility of four’s being a prime number.” (op. cit, 45)). 
Whilst we may perhaps view such claims as metaphors recruited to help 
get across a feel for what rational intuition is like, Katz’s use of them sets 
alarm bells ringing, suggesting that he found rational intuition a difficult 
notion to pin down. This leads to the worry that his conception of rational 
intuition is not detailed enough to support the burden his mathematical 
epistemology places upon it.
In the previous section, we saw just how heavy that burden is. Katz needs 
to provide an account of rational intuition detailed enough to support the 
argument that rational intuition provides the only good explanation of the 
immediacy of elementary mathematics. It won’t do simply to say that 
rational intuition is whatever it is that underpins our immediate grasp of 
elementary mathematical claims. This would not provide a good
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explanation of the facts about immediacy and so could not support the 
argument that rational intuition provides the only good explanation. 
Instead we must be given an account of the nature and constitution of 
rational intuition that (a) gets the facts about immediacy right, in the sense 
of making a distinction between intuitable and non-intuitable propositions 
which matches up to the distinction between immediate and non- 
immediate ones, and (b) provides a good explanation of immediate 
apprehensions of mathematical propositions as items of knowledge. 
However, Katz’s account of rational intuition does not satisfy the second of 
these requirements.
Recall that the epistemological characteristics of rational intuition are that 
it is limited and fallible. What we want to know is why rational intuition has 
these characteristics, what is it about the nature and constitution of the 
faculty that explains why it is as it is in these respects. Katz states that we 
are unable to intui propositions that are about too many objects or that are 
about properties of objects not discernible from their structure. But why 
does rational intuition not allow us to intuit propositions that are about too 
many objects? How many objects does a proposition have to be about for 
us not to be able to intuit it? Why is the critical number that number rather 
than some other? Katz does not say. Why, too, does rational intuition not 
allow us to have intuitive knowledge of properties of mathematical objects 
not discernible from their structure? Why could we not have knowledge of 
such properties through intuition of structures in which the objects appear 
(such as the natural number structure)? Again, Katz does not say. He 
thus provides no explanation of the limitations of rational intuition.
Consider, then, the fallibility of intuition. As Russell’s paradox shows, we 
are quite capable of making mistakes about the immediate. For someone 
like Katz who believes that immediacy is a mark of the intuitable, this 
means that we sometimes seem to intuit things that are not the case. To 
this extent, it can seem to us that we have intuitions when in fact we do 
not. But why does this happen? Why is rational intuition not infallible? 
Given that it is fallible, how we can we tell cases of genuine intuition from
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cases of seeming intuition? Once again, Katz does not say. Thus the key 
epistemological characteristics of rational intuition are left unexplained. 
We are given an idea of what they are, but no idea of why they are as they 
are. Thus we are not given a good explanation of why immediate 
apprehensions of mathematical propositions count as items of knowledge.
It is useful to contrast Katz’s account of rational intuition with the 
understanding of sense perception and the language faculty emerging 
from the cognitive sciences. Artificial intelligence, neuroscience, 
psychology, linguistics and anthropology, together with philosophical work 
building upon studies in these areas, are giving us an ever more detailed 
account of the nature and constitution of these two faculties, of the powers 
of the human mind/brain to perceive external phenomena and to acquire 
and make communicative use of language. For example, studies of non­
human animals, brain-imaging studies of humans and observation of 
humans with brains damaged in known ways has given us information 
about which areas of the brain are recruited during perceptual and 
linguistic acts. Studies of babies, infants and children have given us 
information regarding when and under what circumstances humans 
acquire these faculties.
This wealth of scientific knowledge can be used to explain features of 
sense perception and the language faculty. Consider, for example, the 
limitations of vision. We are able to see medium sized physical objects not 
subatomic particles. But we can explain this using our detailed knowledge 
of the nature and constitution of visual perception. We know about how 
our eyes work, how sensitive they are, what sorts of conditions they need 
to provide us with accurate visual information, and so forth. This 
knowledge shows quite convincingly why it is buses and figs we can see, 
not quarks and electrons. Similarly, this knowledge provides detailed 
explanations of what goes on in cases of non-veridical sightings, helping 
us to say just why the hexagonal tower looked circular from a distance. 
But Katz’s account of rational intuition provides no comparable 
explanations of why the characteristics of rational intuition are as he says
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they are. It is powerless to explain why intuition only operates within the 
limits he sets or what happens in cases of seeming intuition. Why can we 
intuit that 4 is composite but not that e is transcendental? Katz’s account 
does not say. Why does it seem intuitive that there is a set of sets not 
members of themselves? Katz’s account does not say. It is too bare to 
provide answers to these questions.
The more one reflects upon this disanalogy between our accounts of 
sense perception and the language faculty and Katz’s account of rational 
intuition, the more damaging it becomes. We can, if we choose, describe 
sense perception as a limited and fallible faculty of apprehension providing 
immediate and informative states about concrete objects. But we would 
never dream of explaining facts about perception on the basis of this 
description. We would not use it to explain, for example, how it is that 
when a normal mature human experiences a certain continuously varying 
input of differently coloured light through their eyes, they perceive a red 
ball travelling in front of them across a predominantly green background. 
Imagine asking someone how this happens, to be told no more than it 
happens through sense perception, a limited and fallible faculty of 
apprehension providing immediate and informative states about concrete 
objects. If this is all you are told, and if you have no prior knowledge of the 
faculty of sense perception, then clearly you have not been given a good 
explanation of this perceptual performance. Indeed, it seems fair to say 
that you have not been given any explanation of what is going on.
In the case of sense perception, of course, the wealth of knowledge 
provided by the cognitive sciences helps to flesh out the elements of this 
description, which becomes the skeleton of a truly explanatory account of 
the senses. But the situation with Katz’s account of rational intuition is not 
like this. First, cognitive science does not give us the slightest hint about 
what the alleged faculty of rational intuition might be like. Nowhere in its 
literature do we find talk of a cognitive faculty giving us direct access to 
necessary truth. Second, Katz’s account does not put forward any 
alternative way of understanding the nature and constitution of rational
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intuition that could perform the explanatory role with respect to rational 
intuition that theories of cognitive science perform with respect to sense 
perception. Thus, all we know about rational intuition is that, if it exists, it 
is a limited and fallible faculty providing immediate states of apprehension 
that contain information about abstract objects. Just as the list of 
characteristics of sense perception does not explain perceptual acts, so 
this list of characteristics of rational intuition gives no explanation of 
alleged acts of intuition. We have thus been given no understanding of 
why immediately apprehended mathematical propositions count as items 
of knowledge.
One response to this objection is that demands for explanations of the 
inner workings of rational intuition are misplaced. If this is taken to mean 
that it is not appropriate to demand accounts of the workings of rational 
intuition that, like our causal accounts of sense perception, make essential 
use of causal relations between the relevant states of apprehension and 
objects those states are about, then it is quite correct; rational intuition is 
supposed to provide intuitions without any kind of relation to the kind of 
objects they are about, let alone causal relations. But this misses the 
point. We have been demanding a theory of the nature and constitution of 
rational intuition comparable to our theories of sense perception and the 
language faculty, but we have not been demanding a causal account of 
this kind.
On the other hand, if the contention is taken to mean that no demands for 
an explanation of the workings of rational intuition are appropriate, then it 
is just wrong. If there can be no explanation of the workings of rational 
intuition, then there can be no explanation of the immediacy of 
mathematical knowledge in terms of rational intuition. So given that the 
eliminative argument for rational intuition requires an explanation of the 
latter sort, it cannot be the case that demands for the first kind are 
misplaced. As this response to our objection cannot be upheld, we must 
therefore conclude that Katz’s account of rational intuition does not 
provide a good explanation of the immediacy of some mathematics. The
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eliminative argument for rational intuition is thus unconvincing, and so we 
are left with no reason to believe in the faculty of rational intuition.
3.6.3 Summary
We have been concerned in this section to see whether Katz’s 
mathematical epistemology provides compelling reasons to think that non- 
inferential mathematical knowledge is intuitive. We have seen that Katz 
suggests three grounds for belief in the existence of rational intuition (a) 
considerations concerning conceivability (b) considerations concerning 
reason’s ability to recognise inconsistencies and (c) the eliminative 
argument. We argued that considerations of conceivability do not seem 
well suited to delivering knowledge of necessary truth and that reason’s 
ability to recognise inconsistencies does not promise to deliver knowledge 
of ontologically committed mathematical propositions. As rational intuition 
is supposed to deliver knowledge of the necessity of some such 
propositions, we concluded that these considerations do not provide 
grounds for thinking that it exists.
This left us with the eliminative argument. Pointing out that this depends 
on the claim that rational intuition provides a good explanation of our 
immediate apprehension of mathematical propositions, we argued that this 
claim is not warranted. We found that Katz gives no account of the nature 
and constitution of rational intuition that makes clear why its 
epistemological characteristics are as they are claimed to be. In the 
absence of such an account, and in particular since no such account is 
suggested by the cognitive sciences, there is no reason to suppose that 
these characteristics are the characteristics that rational intuition must 
have. They are, in effect, no more than a rationalist wish list. 
Consequently, Katz’s account of rational intuition does not provide any 
explanation of immediate apprehensions of mathematical propositions, the 
eliminative argument for rational intuition fails, and so we are left with no 
reason to believe in the existence of rational intuition. As this leaves us
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with no reason to believe that non-inferential mathematical knowledge is 
known through rational intuition, we must conclude that Katz’s account of 
mathematical knowledge is not adequate.
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with the rationalist strategy of locating 
the grounds for non-inferential mathematical knowledge in the 
deliverances of a faculty of intuition. We considered first the possibility of 
positing a faculty of mathematical intuition, issuing in intuitions of 
mathematical objects. Taking Godel’s account of set theoretic knowledge 
as an example of this approach (section 3.2), we argued that Godel’s 
remarks on mathematical intuition are too sketchy to provide us with a 
clear understanding of how we are supposed to intuit sets (section 3.3). 
Next we considered the possibility of positing a faculty of rational intuition, 
issuing in intuitions that things are thus and so with mathematical objects. 
We considered Katz’s account of rational intuition as an example of this 
approach (section 3.5), but argued that, because Katz fails to provide any 
explanation of the nature and constitution of rational intuition, he provides 
no convincing reason to think that we possess such a faculty (section 3.6).
Of what significance are these arguments for the general strategy of 
appealing to intuition in explanations of mathematical knowledge? To 
answer this, recall that the central point we made against Katz’s position 
was that the cognitive sciences do not provide us with anything like a 
constitutive account of the alleged faculty of rational intuition. Clearly it 
can equally be said that the cognitive sciences give us no inkling of the 
nature and constitution of any alleged faculty of mathematical intuition, 
either. Our objection to Katz’s theory of rational intuition thus depends on 
considerations of quite general significance. For initial plausibility, any 
rationalist appeal to a faculty of intuition will have to claim that the faculty 
exhibits epistemological characteristics like those alleged by Katz for 
rational intuition. But then for defensibility, any such appeal will have to 
provide us with an account of the nature and constitution of the faculty 
described that shows why it has such characteristics. Since the cognitive 
sciences do not provide this for either kind of intuition, and since the 
cognitive sciences provide our best understanding of our cognitive 
faculties, it follows that the issue of the existence of the faculty of intuition
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will be acute for any theory appealing to it, regardless of whether the 
appeal is to rational intuition, to mathematical intuition or to both. On the 
basis of the arguments we have presented in this chapter, therefore, it 
must be concluded that there is no serious prospect for a satisfactory 
general account of mathematical knowledge according to which non- 
inferential mathematical knowledge is intuitive knowledge.
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4Realism and perception
In the previous two chapters, we argued that reason alone does not 
furnish an adequate account of mathematical knowledge. We argued that 
conceptual analysis seems unable to provide epistemically effective 
grounds for mathematical truth (Chapter 2) and that it seems doubtful that 
we possess a faculty of intuition giving cognitive access to mathematical 
objects or truths (Chapter 3). These arguments suggest that, despite the 
cerebral nature of mathematics, it is not likely that mathematical 
knowledge rests ultimately on rationalistically acceptable grounds. If the 
realist approach to mathematical knowledge is to be convincingly 
developed, therefore, it seemingly must appeal to some other source than 
the intellect for ultimate grounds for mathematical belief. What might this 
source be?
Mill once addressed a similar question:
It remains to inquire, what is the ground of our belief in axioms 
-  what is the evidence on which they rest? I answer, they are 
experimental truths; generalizations from observation. The 
proposition, Two straight lines cannot inclose a space -  or in 
other words, Two straight lines which have once met, do not 
meet again, but continue to diverge -  is an induction from the 
evidence of our senses. (A System of Logic, Book II, Chapter 
5, §4)
Although expressed here with respect to geometry, Mill proposed this view 
as a quite general account of the mathematical axioms of his day. The 
specific claim, that mathematical axioms are known by simple enumerative
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induction, is not now considered plausible. However, the more general 
contention, that mathematical axioms are supported by evidence from the 
senses, still appeals.
It is not difficult to see why. To deny that our senses provide us with 
perceptual knowledge of the physical world, that we can see, touch and 
smell lots of things from figs to planets, would be extremely controversial. 
It would also be controversial to deny that we extend this perceptual 
knowledge of observable objects to knowledge that we cannot 
immediately get from observation, knowledge of general claims about 
physical objects and of unobservable physical objects, for example. It 
thus appears both that perception secures a body of knowledge about a 
wide variety of things, and that this body of knowledge is significantly 
richer than any collection of claims known through direct observation of 
the objects they are about. So why might not this knowledge contain 
mathematical knowledge? Why might not the epistemic mechanisms that 
generate this knowledge from sensory evidence also generate knowledge 
of mathematics? Without some kind of argument, there is no clear reason 
why not. Perhaps, then, mathematical justification can be grounded in 
perception, as Mill hoped.
A new realist approach to mathematical knowledge thus beckons. Reason 
alone could not supply ultimate grounds for mathematical belief, but it 
seems at least possible that these might be had from perception. Should 
this be bome out, we would arrive not at a mathematical rationalism but at 
a mathematical empiricism. In this and the next chapter, we will 
investigate the prospects for such a view.
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4.1 Two strategies for mathematical empiricism
One of the traditional objections to the empiricist approach to mathematics 
is that it cannot explain our knowledge of the necessity of mathematical 
truth.33 However, we are not committed to the view that mathematical 
truth is necessary. Neither of our basic assumptions, linguistic realism and 
the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment, entail the necessity of 
mathematical truth. Neither does mathematical realism, as on our 
characterisation this demands only that mathematical objects exist but do 
not depend for their existence on thought or talk about them. The 
possibility of grounding mathematical knowledge in sense perception is 
thus consistent with the philosophical background we have assumed.
The broad aim of mathematical empiricism is to account for mathematical 
justification by appeal to the warranting or justifying nature of perception. 
Clearly one way to do this is to offer an account of the nature of 
mathematical objects according to which some mathematical objects can 
be perceived, for then mathematical knowledge might ultimately rest on 
perceptions of mathematical objects. However, this approach would 
involve denying the orthodox view, which we mentioned in section 1.3, that 
mathematical objects are abstract, lacking spatial and temporal properties. 
An alternative empiricist approach may therefore be preferred, namely, to 
argue that perceptions of ordinary empirical objects constitute evidence for 
mathematical beliefs. The idea here would be that just as perceptions of 
ordinary empirical objects can constitute evidence for beliefs about objects 
not involved in those perceptions, so, too, could they constitute evidence 
for mathematical beliefs.34
33 M ill addresses this objection in A System o f Logic, Book II, Chapter 5, §6.
34 It may be thought that if  mathematical objects are abstract, then mathematical truths must be 
necessarily true, in which case the second strategy described here would invite the traditional 
objection that this cannot be explained by mathematical empiricism. However, this need not show 
that the strategy is unworkable. It could be defended by denying the inference from the 
abstractness of mathematical objects to the necessity of mathematical truth (a move considered by 
Yablo (2002)), or more simply by being offered as part of an explanation showing how knowledge 
of the necessity of mathematical truth is in fact attainable within the empiricist perspective.
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The literature contains a third version of mathematical empiricism 
according to which there are no mathematical objects, abstract or 
concrete. For example, Chihara (1990) takes mathematics to be about 
possibilities of construction, whilst Kitcher (1980, 1984), inspired by Mill, 
takes it to be about the idealised operations of an ideal agent. 
Programmes like these demand that mathematical sentences be 
reinterpreted so as to eliminate apparent reference to mathematical 
objects. Given our assumption of linguistic realism, however, we are 
committed to taking mathematical sentences at face value. Thus we need 
not consider reconstructive projects of this sort.
Consistent with our fundamental assumptions, then, there are two 
strategies for the pursuit of mathematical empiricism; to reject the 
abstractness of some mathematical objects, thus bringing them into the 
range of perception, or to affirm the abstractness of mathematical objects, 
but to argue that our knowledge of them is supported by our perceptions of 
ordinary empirical objects. To bring out the difference between these 
strategies, it is useful to consider what correspondences they posit 
between two different distinctions. On the one hand, we have the 
distinction between knowledge of particular mathematical objects and 
knowledge of general mathematical claims. On the other hand, we have 
the distinction between observational empirical knowledge, knowledge of 
empirical objects that could be had by direct observation, and theoretical 
empirical knowledge, knowledge of empirical objects for which this would 
not be possible. The first strategy for grounding mathematical justification 
in sense perception, that of denying the abstractness of some 
mathematical objects, assimilates some knowledge of particular 
mathematical objects to our observational empirical knowledge, and the 
rest of mathematical knowledge to theoretical empirical knowledge. In 
contrast, the second strategy, that of using sense perceptions of ordinary 
empirical objects as evidence for mathematical beliefs, assimilates no 
mathematical knowledge to observational empirical knowledge (as 
mathematical objects qua abstract objects cannot be observed); rather it 
assimilates all mathematical knowledge, knowledge of particular
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mathematical objects and of general mathematical claims, to theoretical 
empirical knowledge.
These two strategies for mathematical empiricism are therefore quite 
different, and must be dealt with separately. Accordingly, we shall in the 
remainder of this chapter consider a mathematical empiricism that brings 
mathematical objects in range of perception, before turning in the next 
chapter to a theory that grounds mathematical knowledge on perceptions 
of ordinary empirical objects. Throughout, however, our question will be 
the same: Is there a satisfactory realist account of mathematical 
knowledge that locates its ultimate grounds in sense perception?
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4.2 Maddy’s set theoretic empiricism
Penelope Maddy’s early account of set theoretic knowledge is inspired by 
the Godelian epistemology considered in Chapter 3 (Maddy (1980; 
1990)).35 Unlike Godel, however, Maddy grounds set theoretic knowledge 
in perception:
What I want to suggest now is simply that we do acquire 
perceptual beliefs about sets of physical objects, and that our 
ability to do this develops in much the same way as that in 
which our ability to perceive physical objects develops ... .
Maddy (1980, 126)
Thus Maddy does not claim that we have a special mode of apprehension, 
a “sixth sense”, for detecting sets, but rather that we detect and come to 
know sets using the same senses we use to detect and come to know 
ordinary physical objects, in short, through perception. Maddy defends 
this claim by rejecting the orthodox conception of sets as aspatial, 
atemporal objects. She uses it in an attempt to give an account of how we 
come to have knowledge of sets, conceived of as independently existing 
objects. Maddy’s account of set theoretic knowledge thus stands as a 
prime example of the first kind of mathematical empiricism described 
above, a realist attempt to ground knowledge of mathematics on 
perception of mathematical objects.
If the claim that sets of physical objects are perceivable is to form the 
basis of a satisfactory set theoretic epistemology, it must be justified. To 
this end, Maddy assumes a theory of perception intended to show, in 
combination with a philosophical theory of sets, that we can and do 
perceive sets of physical objects. If convincing, this will show how we 
know some claims about particular sets of physical objects. But it will not 
show how we acquire knowledge of general claims about sets, and in
35 Maddy (1997) rejects her earlier position because of doubts concerning its justification of set 
theoretic realism. Here we argue on independent grounds that her early epistemology is not an 
adequate account of mathematical knowledge.
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particular, knowledge of standard axioms of set theory. To explain how 
we come by this, Maddy expounds a theory of intuitive knowledge 
according to which standard axioms of set theory are supported by 
intuitively known principles generated from set theoretic concepts we 
acquire from perception. She also appeals to an analogy between natural 
science and mathematics according to which there is non-intuitive 
evidence for some set theoretic claims. Note that the kind of intuition 
involved here is very different from the kind of intuition to which rationalist 
accounts of knowledge appeal, as, on Maddy’s view, we cannot intuitive 
knowledge of sets unless sets are perceivable.
Maddy’s set theoretic empiricism thus involves four components, her 
theory of perception, her philosophical theory of sets, her theory of intuitive 
knowledge and her analogy between science and mathematics. As we 
are interested in the general strategy of appealing to sense perception of 
mathematical objects in realist accounts of mathematical knowledge, we 
shall describe only the theory of perception and the philosophical theory of 
sets, that is, the aspects of Maddy’s account that are relevant to the claim 
that sets are perceivable. What we want to know is whether Maddy makes 
a plausible case for thinking that we can have perceptual knowledge of 
mathematical objects. An account of her theory of intuitive knowledge and 
her analogy between mathematics and science is included in the appendix 
to this chapter, however, in which we also defend the theory of intuitive 
knowledge against an objection from the literature.
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4.3 Perceptual knowledge of sets of physical objects
Maddy’s claim that we perceive sets of physical objects depends on a 
theory of perception and a philosophical theory of sets. In this section we 
will describe these and describe how they are intended to underpin the 
idea that we perceive sets of physical objects.
4.3.1 The theory of perception
Maddy bases her theory of perception on that of Pitcher (1971). She does 
not explicitly state it, but she does discuss examples in which subjects 
perceive objects in the relevant sense (1990, 50-51). She closes her 
discussion of one of these as follows:
In sum, then, for Steve to perceive a tree before him is for 
there to be a tree before him, for him to gain perceptual 
beliefs, in particular that there is a tree before him, and for the 
tree before him to play an appropriate causal role in the 
generation of these perceptual beliefs. (1990, 51)
As Maddy says that this is what it is for Steve to perceive an object in the 
relevant sense, we may take it that she is offering necessary and sufficient 
conditions for this kind of perception. The condition that Steve gain the 
perceptual belief that there is a tree before him is designed to ensure that 
he perceives a tree only if it seems to him as if there is a tree before him. 
It thus appears that Maddy is concerned with a strong sense of perception 
according to which a subject perceives an object of a given kind only if 
they perceive it as an instance of the given kind. The condition that there 
must be a tree before Steve if he is to perceive one is intended to exclude 
the possibility of illusion, so that Steve cannot perceive a tree in this sense 
if there is no tree present, even if it seems to him that there is a tree 
present. The causal condition is designed to rule out cases in which it 
may seem to Steve as if there is a tree before him and in which there is in
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fact a tree before him, but in which the appearance to Steve of a tree 
before him is not produced in the right way (as, for example, when light 
from a different tree is reflected from a mirror between Steve and the tree 
that he seems to see). Generalising from this example, then, Maddy’s 
theory of perception states that a subject A perceives an object of kind K 
as a K at a location L if and only if:
(i) there is a K-object at L,
(ii) A acquires perceptual beliefs about K-objects, 
particularly: that there is a K- object at L,
(iii) the K-object at L is appropriately causally related to the 
generation of A’s belief that there is a K-object at L.36
Beliefs are here understood to be psychological states that can be 
attributed to subjects on the basis of their behaviour (op. cit., 52)). 
Perceptual states are thought of as bodies of beliefs acquired through 
perception on particular occasions. These are rich in content, are not 
inferred from other beliefs, need not be conscious or linguistic, and are 
contentually interdependent (op.c/Y., 51). The appropriate causal relation 
is not described in any detail but a situation in which it obtains is borrowed 
from Grice (1961); an object plays the right sort of causal role for 
perception when it plays the role of a normally sighted subject’s hand in 
the production of their belief that their hand is in front of them when they 
hold it up to their face in good light (op. c/f., 51).
By making perception of objects of a given kind depend on acquisition of 
the perceptual belief that there is an object of the kind at the relevant 
location, this account of perception ensures that to perceive objects as of 
a given kind one must possess and deploy a concept for the kind. This is 
a good condition to insist upon. Only a subject possessing a concept for a 
given kind can structure sensory input causally produced by instances of
36 Here, to be a K-object is simply to be an object of kind K.
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the kind as information about such instances. Ultimately, this is what it is 
to have perceptions of them.
Nevertheless, Maddy’s theory of perception is unduly restrictive. It does 
not seem necessary for perception of a K-object as a K that A acquires the 
perceptual belief that there is a K-object at L. This does suffice, together 
with the other conditions, but so too does the acquisition of any other 
perceptual belief that contains a constituent presenting the object as an 
instance of kind K. Another reason for thinking that the theory is too 
restrictive is that the forming of perceptual beliefs does not seem 
necessary to this kind of perception either. For it seems possible that, 
without forming beliefs in which a K-object is presented as a K, A could 
perceive a K-object as a K provided they acquire, in the appropriate causal 
way, perceptual information presenting a K-object to them as a K.37
However, these difficulties only show that Maddy’s theory of perception 
cannot be accepted as a set of necessary conditions on what it is to 
perceive an object as of a given kind. They do not undermine the 
sufficiency of these conditions for this kind of perception; in fact, these 
conditions seem to characterise quite well situations in which we would 
have perceptions of the relevant sort. This is important because Maddy 
has no need to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for what it is to 
perceive an object as an instance of a given kind. To argue that we have 
perceptions of sets in this sense, which is what her account of set 
theoretic knowledge requires, a collection of sufficient conditions will do. 
The account can thus be protected from these objections simply by taking 
Maddy’s theory of perception as a description of sufficient conditions for A 
to perceive an object as an instance of kind K. When taken this way, 
Maddy’s it seems to describe rather well circumstances in which we would
37 Suppose the redoubtable Steve happens to be in Africa and that he believes there are no tigers in 
Africa. A tiger escaped from a zoo is in front of Steve and it seems to him as if  there is a tiger 
there. Steve doesn’t form the belief that there is a tiger in front of him because he doesn’t believe 
there are tigers in Africa; nevertheless perceptual information about a tiger is being causally 
produced in him in the right kind of way for perception. It seems reasonable in this situation to 
say that Steve perceives the tiger.
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indeed perceive objects as instances of given kinds. At any rate, we shall 
assume henceforth that it does.
4.3.2 The philosophical account of sets
Maddy proposes that sets of physical objects have location in space and 
time. Sets are ordinarily thought to lack spatial and temporal properties, 
so this doctrine is controversial. But Maddy is undeterred:
Here I must agree that many sets, the empty set or the set of 
real numbers, for example, cannot be said to have location, 
but I disagree in the case of sets of physical objects. It seems 
perfectly reasonable to suppose that such sets have location 
in time -  for example, that the singleton containing a given 
object comes into and goes out of existence with that object.
In the same way, a set of physical objects has spatial location 
in so far as its elements do. (1980, 127)
Thus on Maddy’s account of sets, my crate of beer contains not just some 
bottles of beer, but also the set containing those bottles. This set occupies 
the same space as the bottles of beer and persists while they do. For 
Maddy, the spatio-temporality of sets of physical objects means that they 
can be taken as members of more complex sets which, themselves, have 
location in space and time (1990, 59). So in addition to the set of bottles 
of beer, my crate also contains the set of bottles in the first row of the 
crate, the set containing this set and all the other bottles, the set 
containing all the subsets of the set of bottles, etc. Each of these sets is 
located in the same place and time as the bottles of beer in their transitive 
closure.
It is clear that under this conception of sets of physical objects, the world 
around us is a great deal richer, ontologically speaking, than we might 
have thought. But it is less clear what kind of objects Maddy considers
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sets in general to be. In the early version of her set theoretic empiricism, 
sets of physical objects seem to be classified as abstract despite having 
spatial and temporal properties:
The arguments of Benacerraf and Lear [that abstract sets 
cannot be known, or referred to, respectively] ... involve an 
inference from the fact that sets are abstract objects to the 
claim that we cannot causally interact with sets. Abstract 
objects are supposed not to exist in space and time, which 
presumably provides at least part of the support for this 
inference. I have now denied that abstract objects cannot 
exist in space and time, and suggested that sets of physical 
objects do so exist. (1980, 127, n.39)
However, in her later work Maddy sets out the view that sets of physical 
objects are located in space and time and then continues:
On some terminological conventions, this means that sets no 
longer count as ‘abstract’. So be it; I attach no importance to 
the term. (1990,59)
No doubt Maddy is entitled to define her terms as she wishes. But as it is 
customary to regard mathematical objects as being abstract in the sense 
of “without spatial and temporal properties”, the attribution of spatial and 
temporal properties to sets of physical objects implies that they are not 
abstract in this customary sense applying to mathematical objects. The 
question then arises of whether, on Maddy’s view, there are any abstract 
sets. Although Maddy addresses this issue during a discussion of the 
connection between her set theoretic empiricism and physicalism (which 
she takes to imply that only spatio-temporal objects, and perhaps just 
those that are also causally efficacious, exist (1990, 156)), she is careful 
not to commit herself either way. She regards both the denial and the 
affirmation as live options. In the first case, she thinks it is possible to 
argue that abstract sets exist and are known by inference from facts 
concerning non-abstract sets (op. cit., 156), in the ways described by her
128
theory of intuitive knowledge and her analogy between mathematics and 
empirical science (we explain how in the appendix); in the second case, 
she thinks it is possible to take the subject matter of set theory to be the 
hierarchy of sets of physical objects generated in the usual ways from the 
collection of physical individuals but without formation of the empty set at 
any stage (op. c/Y., 156-157). Maddy’s philosophical theory of sets thus 
proposes that sets of physical objects have spatial and temporal location, 
and leaves it open whether these are all the sets there are, or whether 
there are also other sets, abstract in the sense of lacking spatio-temporal 
properties.
4.3.3 Perceiving sets of physical objects
The theory of perception and the philosophical theory of sets described 
above are put forward to show that we perceive sets of physical objects. 
But on what grounds is this supposed to follow? Recall that on Maddy’s 
theory of perception it suffices for A to perceive a K-object as a K at L that:
(i) there is a K-object at L,
(i) A acquires perceptual beliefs about K-objects, 
particularly: that there is a K- object at L,
(iii) the K-object at L is appropriately causally related to the 
generation of A’s belief that there is a K-object at L.
If we are to have perceptions of sets of physical objects, there must be 
sets of physical objects for which each of these conditions are fulfilled. On 
the assumption of Maddy’s philosophical theory of sets, condition (i) 
presents no difficulties; sets of physical objects are located just where their 
elements are, thus it is quite possible for an agent A to be confronted by a 
set of physical objects at a location L.
With respect to condition (ii), Maddy (1990, 59-60) mentions the empirical 
evidence of Kaufman et al. (1949), which shows that we form certain
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numerical beliefs non-inferentially. The beliefs in question arise through 
subitization, the process underlying our ability immediately to identify the 
cardinality of new collections of objects without having to count them. 
Together with the fact that such beliefs bear non-inferential links to 
uncontroversially perceptual beliefs (concerning the size and colour of the 
objects perceived, for example), this suggests that these numerical beliefs 
are themselves perceptual. Armed with her realist theory of sets, Maddy 
argues that such beliefs should be taken to be about small sets of physical 
objects, on the grounds that these are more attractive than are any of the 
alternative candidates for this interpretative role, such as classes, 
properties and physical aggregates (op.c/T, 60-63). She thus concludes 
that we sometimes acquire perceptual beliefs about sets of physical 
objects, as demanded by condition (ii).
This leaves us with condition (iii). Assuming that sets of physical objects 
have spatio-temporal location, Maddy argues that there is no block to the 
suggestion that we are causally influenced by them (op. cit., 49). But this, 
alone, is not sufficient to perceive a set of physical objects, for condition
(iii) requires the right kind of causal influence. For Maddy, this means we 
must organise our sensory stimulation using a concept of set produced in 
us through a combination of evolutionary and developmental factors. Her 
argument that we possess such a concept is quite detailed.
Maddy assumes that there is a correspondence between psychological 
states and brain states and that to possess a concept is to have the ability 
to form certain kinds of belief (op. cit., 52). This suggests that possession 
of a concept is in part a matter of having a particular kind of brain, namely, 
one whose development is such as to allow formation of brain states 
corresponding to psychological states involving the concept. Drawing on 
the neurological theory of Hebb (1949, 1980), Maddy explains this brain 
development in the case of concepts of perceivable kinds by reference to 
networks of synapses. When these networks all fire together, which they 
do under appropriate stimulation from sensory interaction with the
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environment, the brain state realised corresponds to a perceptual belief 
about objects of the kind concerned. Thus in the case of triangles:
Once an integrated cell assembly of this sort has been formed, 
looking at a triangle will make it reverberate for half a second 
or more. This represents a considerable gain both in 
organization and in duration over the random hum of activity 
brought by the same visual stimulation before the formation of 
the assembly. This longer, repeatable, trace should persist 
long enough to allow the structural changes required for long­
term memory. In other words, the cell assembly is what 
permits the subject to see a triangle with identity, to acquire 
perceptual beliefs about it ... it provides the subject with her 
concept of triangle. (1990,57)
According to Maddy, then, there are cell-assemblies in the brain that act 
as neural “detectors” of instances of perceivable kinds. These 
assemblies, which are activated by sensory interaction with instances of 
the relevant kind, are what make possible perceptions of them. So in a 
manner of speaking, these cell assemblies are physical proxies for 
concepts of perceivable kinds. Hebb’s theory implies that assemblies of 
this sort form in the brain even for very general categories such as that of 
physical objects (op. cit., 58).38
Assuming this account of the mind, Maddy appeals to behavioural 
research conducted by Piaget and others on the development of the ability 
to acquire beliefs about sets (she refers to Piaget (1937), Piaget and 
Szeminska (1941), Phillips (1975), and Gelman (1977)). This research 
reveals an analogy between the developmental process resulting in 
possession of a concept for physical objects and that resulting in 
possession of a concept for sets. On the basis of this analogy, Maddy
38 Maddy uses the term “detector” in connection with her triangle example, describing the cell- 
assembly that responds to sensory stimulation by triangles as a “triangle detector” (1990, 57). 
Later she talks about “object detectors” responsive to physical objects (op.cit., 58).
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argues that our brains develop neural set detectors in much the same way 
that they develop neural triangle detectors and neural object detectors:
Given the evidence that the set concept requires a similar 
developmental period involving repeated experience with sets 
in the environment parallel to the required experiences with 
triangles and physical objects, it seems reasonable to assume 
that these interactions with sets of physical objects bring about 
structural changes in the brain by some complex process 
resembling that suggested by Hebb, and that the resulting 
neural ‘set-detector’ is what enables adults to acquire 
perceptual beliefs about sets. (1990, 65)
On the basis of this analogy, Maddy claims that we can enter into the kind 
of causal relationship with sets of physical objects that is, on her theory, 
for perception of them, i.e. that condition (iii) can be fulfilled.
4.3.4 Summary
Maddy argues that sets of physical objects are spatial and temporal 
objects that we can encounter in the world around us; she argues on the 
basis of Kaufman et al. (1949), that we sometimes acquire perceptual 
numerical beliefs and urges that these should be understood as being 
about sets of physical objects; finally, by appeal to the work of Hebb, 
Piaget and others, she argues that our possession of a neural proxy for a 
concept of set is the result of the same sort of evolutionary and 
developmental factors that produce the neural apparatus required for 
perception of other kinds of objects. In this way, it is argued that sets of 
physical objects can fulfil three conditions sufficient for perception. Thus 
Maddy concludes that we can perceive sets of physical objects.
Before considering objections to Maddy’s view, we should note a difficulty 
of interpretation. Maddy’s theory can be taken either as a description of
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how in fact we know set theory, or as a description of how empirical 
knowledge of set theory is possible if Hebb’s neurophysiological theory is 
assumed to be true. Maddy herself explicitly states that her appeal to 
Hebb’s theory is intended heuristically (1990, 55), as part of an 
explanation of how the claim that we perceive mathematical objects might 
be made plausible by a respectable neuroscientific theory (op. cit, 67). 
This strongly suggests that the second reading is the correct one. 
However, the claim Maddy aims at establishing is that we “can and do 
perceive sets” (op.cit., 58), which is strong enough to make a merely 
heuristic appeal to Hebb’s theory seem insufficient. This suggests that the 
first reading must be right. It is thus not absolutely clear which reading of 
Maddy’s theory should be preferred. To avoid this difficulty, our 
discussion below will concentrate on issues that are neutral between the 
two readings.
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4.4 Do we acquire perceptual beliefs about sets?
As we have explained, the claim that we can perceive sets is of the utmost 
importance to Maddy’s account of set theoretic knowledge. If we do not 
perceive sets, we would acquire neither perceptions of sets nor intuitive 
knowledge about sets, and thus would lack an epistemic basis for 
knowledge of set theory. In the next few sections, we will assess whether 
Maddy’s claim that we can perceive sets is plausible, given her 
assumption that sets of physical objects are located in space and time. 
Given this assumption, it is trivial that perceiving subjects are sometimes 
confronted by sets of physical objects. But can we be so confident that 
the other conditions of Maddy’s theory of perception are sometimes 
fulfilled so as to lead to genuine cases of set perception? We will consider 
this below, addressing first the claim that we sometimes acquire 
perceptual beliefs about sets.
Maddy maintains that numerical beliefs acquired through subitization 
should be considered examples of perceptual beliefs about sets. Her 
argument for this claims that these beliefs are perceptual, which seems 
reasonable, and that they should be interpreted as being about sets. But 
what reasons are given for this latter view? Maddy maintains that this 
interpretation of subitized is “the simplest and most reasonable” given the 
assumption of sets of physical objects (1980, 128). Later she 
supplements this point with a holistic argument to the effect that sets are 
“best suited to playing the role of the most fundamental mathematical 
entity” (1990, 61). This argument is summed up as follows:
The elementariness of the notion of set, the ease of 
manipulation, and the immense success of set theory, both as 
a foundation for other branches of mathematics and as a 
mathematical theory in its own right, all help to make the s e t ... 
the most attractive candidate for the role of number-bearer.
(1990, 62)
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On the basis of holistic considerations, therefore, Maddy concludes that it 
is better to take sets as the bearers of number properties than the other 
available candidates, classes, properties, aggregates and the like.
A first point to make in response to this is that Maddy’s holistic argument is 
not sufficient for her conclusion that subitized numerical beliefs are about 
sets of physical objects. The argument assumes that all numerical beliefs 
have to be interpreted in the same way. But it is implausible to put this 
forward without support when there are various different kinds of situations 
in which we make determinations of number, subitization, counting and 
calculating for example. Maddy’s argument also assumes that the only 
kind of interpretation available for numerical beliefs is an ontological 
interpretation in which numbers are taken to be properties of some general 
kind of thing like sets or classes. But this assumption can also be 
questioned. An alternative kind of method takes its cue from Boolos 
(1984; 1985), using plural logic to understand numerical beliefs as 
collective attributions of numerical properties to collections of objects. In 
this way:
There are three eggs in the box
is not interpreted as saying:
The number of members of the set {.x: x is an egg in the box} is 3
But rather is understood to mean:
The eggs in the box are three.
where generalisation on the expression “the eggs in the box” would 
require use of plural quantification and “three” is understood to express a 
numerical property.39 We do not claim that this method of interpretation is
39 See Yi (1998) for a recent attempt to cash out this method of interpreting arithmetical claims.
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the best for subitized numerical beliefs, though it does seem well suited to 
the task. The point we are making is just that Maddy does not even 
consider the possibility of this kind of interpretation.
Maddy’s argument that sets must always be taken as the bearers of 
number properties thus rests on implausible assumptions. A second point 
against it is that it does not establish that concepts for set enter into the 
content of subitized numerical beliefs, not even if it establishes that 
subitized beliefs are about sets. A perceptual belief may be about sets in 
the weak sense of having a content a constituent of which refers to a set. 
Then again, it may be about sets in the stronger sense of having a 
constituent that presents the set to which it refers as a set; in this latter 
case the belief-content involves a concept for set. Clearly the global 
considerations described above for taking sets as the bearers of number 
properties give no reason to prefer one interpretation over the other as 
they do not tell us anything about the constituent concepts our subitized 
numerical beliefs involve. So even if we accepted Maddy’s argument that 
subitized numerical beliefs must be taken to be about sets it would still be 
possible for us to take them as being about sets in the weak sense, and 
thus as not involving a concept for set.
This presents a difficulty because it is crucial to Maddy’s account of set 
theoretic knowledge that we acquire perceptual beliefs that are about sets 
in the strong sense of involving a concept for set. As we have explained in 
previous sections, the idea of Maddy’s approach is to argue that we have 
perceptions of sets as sets, to infer from this that we possess a concept 
for set the structure of which is responsible for intuitive knowledge about 
sets (this is the neural set-detector), and then to argue from this that 
perceptions of sets together with intuitive knowledge about them provides 
a sufficient basis for knowledge of the axioms of ZFC. Clearly if we do not 
have perceptions of sets as sets, this approach falls apart. So the fact that 
Maddy fails to make a case for taking subitized perceptual beliefs as being 
about sets in the strong sense leaves her with no reason to think that we
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perceive sets in the way required by her explanation of set theoretic 
knowledge.
For two reasons, then, Maddy’s argument that sets should be taken as the 
bearers of number properties does not establish the required conclusion; it 
does not establish that sets should always be the taken as the bearers of 
number properties, and it does not establish that we acquire through 
subitization the kind of perceptual beliefs required by her account of set 
theoretic knowledge. Maddy’s claim that we do perceive sets of physical 
objects in this way is thus beginning to look decidedly shaky. But should 
we reject it? Not yet. The real difficulty here is that Maddy provides no 
good examples of perceptual experiences in which we might plausibly be 
said to form perceptual beliefs of the right sort. But this does not mean 
that there are no such examples. And if we shift our attention away from 
subitization and direct it instead at situations in which we perceive things 
to be grouped together in collections like flocks of birds and herds of 
cattle, then examples of the right kind can perhaps be found.40
When we watch some birds flying over a field, we are sometimes visually 
aware only of the individual birds. However, if the birds are grouped 
together closely enough in space, and especially if they move together as 
one, flying in the same direction and changing direction at the same time, 
then we also become aware of another object over and above the 
individual birds, namely, the flock of birds. What we are aware of in such 
a case has a distinctive phenomenological character, for what we see 
when we see a flock of birds looks different to what we see when we just 
see some birds individually. Such experiences can be quite marked, 
watching a group of redshanks flocking over an estuary, making tight turns 
low over the sand, one gets a real feeling of the flock being an individual in 
its own right, as if it had a life of its own. This effect arises because of the 
character of our visual awareness. It thus seems perfectly in order to 
describe this as a situation in which we perceive the birds as a flock of
40 I owe the suggestion that we might perceptually gain information about sets in situations like 
this to Marcus Giaquinto.
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birds, where a flock of birds is a collection of a certain kind. Moreover, it 
seems appropriate to describe this as a situation in which we have such a 
perception because we acquire perceptual beliefs about the flock in which 
it is presented as a flock; on the approach to perception we are assuming, 
this is what explains why it seems to us as if a flock is present rather than 
its just seeming to us that there are birds present. Given the assumption 
that sets of objects are located in space and time, and given the platitude 
that flocks of birds consist, in some sense, of the birds they contain, it may 
perhaps be reasonable to say that this kind of situation involves perceptual 
belief about a set, the set of birds in the flock, as a set.
The suggestion that there are situations in which we acquire perceptual 
beliefs that present sets as sets may also receives support from recent 
empirical research. The limit for reliable subitization of the cardinality of 
collections is very low, normally considered to be three. However, by 
perceptually arranging objects into distinct collections, “chunking” them, as 
the scientific literature has it, we are able to overcome these limitations 
and thus keep track of the whereabouts of collections of greater 
cardinalities. Infants are able to do this as well as adults, which would 
suggest that there is an evolutionarily selected basis for this ability. 
Scientists are even beginning to talk in terms of infants looking for sets:
Research suggests that, using representations from object- 
based attention, infants can represent only 3 individuals at a 
time. ... In the present experiments we used a manual search 
procedure to ask whether infants can overcome this limit of 3 
by chunking individuals into sets. ... Experiment 3 
demonstrated that infants tracked the 4 objects as two sets of 
2, searching for each set in its correct hiding location. That 
infants represented the number of individuals in each set is 
demonstrated by their reaching for the correct number of 
objects in each location. These results suggest that by binding 
individuals into sets, infants can increase their representational 
capacity. Feigenson and Halberda (2004)
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Because the abilities described here are based in perception, it does not 
seem too far-fetched to suggest, on the basis of this research, that there 
may be situations in which we acquire perceptual beliefs about sets 
represented as sets. This would certainly make good sense of the quoted 
remarks concerning infants chunking four objects into two sets of two, 
keeping track of the sets they formed in this way, looking for those sets in 
hiding locations and representing the number of the sets to themselves.
To summarise this discussion: Maddy’s grounds for thinking that we form 
perceptual beliefs about sets in the strong sense of containing constituents 
representing sets as sets are not convincing. Her argument that bearers 
of numbers properties must always be taken to be sets rests on 
questionable assumptions and is too general to deliver the required 
conclusion. Nevertheless, initial grounds for thinking that we acquire 
perceptual beliefs about sets as sets do seem to be available. Everyday 
experience of collections of objects like flocks of birds, etc., suggests that 
we acquire such beliefs as does empirical research on chunking abilities in 
infants. Assuming that sets of physical objects are located in space and 
time, Maddy’s claim that we acquire the kind of perceptual belief required 
for perceptions of sets as sets may thus not be an unreasonable one to 
make.
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4.5 Are we causally influenced by sets?
The condition (iii) of Maddy’s theory of perception connects a subject’s 
perception of an object to their being causally influenced by it in the right 
way, the way one is influenced by one’s hand when one sees it in front of 
one’s face under normal conditions. Since Maddy’s sets of physical 
objects are unusual new additions to our spatio-temporal ontology, it 
requires an argument to establish that they satisfy this requirement. Black 
holes and the centre of the universe are located in space and time, yet we 
do not have any kind of casual commerce with them. Electrons are 
located in space and time, yet we do not have the right kind of causal 
commerce with them. So why should we think that the causal precondition 
for perception is ever satisfied in the case of sets of physical objects?
In answer to this, Maddy argues that the causal efficacy of sets of physical 
objects is inherited from the causal efficacy of their elements. She draws 
an analogy between the relation between a physical object and its aspects 
and the relation between a set of physical objects and its elements (1990, 
49). Strictly speaking, we only causally interact with aspects of physical 
objects, yet still we take it that physical objects genuinely enter into causal 
relations. Similarly, Maddy argues, sets of physical objects genuinely 
enter into causal relations, even though, strictly speaking, we only interact 
with their elements. She suggests thinking of causal interaction with sets 
of physical objects either (a) as causal interaction with sets of aspects of 
physical objects or (b) as causal interaction with aspects of objects that 
are elements of sets (op.cit., n.34).
The first of these suggestions does not provide the reassurance we seek. 
If sets of aspects of physical objects are themselves simply sets of 
physical objects, the suggestion presupposes what it is meant to show, i.e. 
that sets of physical objects are causally efficacious. But if sets of aspects 
of physical objects are not themselves sets of physical objects then it 
remains unclear how we causally interact with them. Are aspects of 
physical objects abstract in the customary sense of being aspatial and
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atemporal? If so, we surely cannot causally interact with them. The 
suggestion that causal interaction with sets of physical objects comes 
about through causal interaction with sets of their aspects is thus does not 
seem plausible.
However, the suggestion that causal interaction with sets of physical 
objects arise through causal interaction with the physical objects they 
contain is better. It is part of Maddy’s philosophical theory of sets that a 
set of physical objects is located in space and time in the region occupied 
by their elements (1990, 59)). Because of this it seems reasonable to 
consider causal interaction with the elements of such a set as constituting 
causal interaction with the set itself. Provided we accept Maddy’s 
philosophical account of sets of physical objects, then, it seems 
reasonable to claim that some of them are causally efficacious. Clearly 
this approach would leave some sets of physical objects, the set of black 
holes for instance, lacking causal efficacy, because they contain elements 
that are not themselves causally efficacious. However, this is not a 
problem, as Maddy’s theory does not require that all sets of physical 
objects are causally efficacious, only that some of them are.
Assuming that sets of physical objects are causally efficacious, can they 
enter into the right kind of causal relations to produce perceptions? On 
Maddy’s approach, one causally interacts with a set in this way when the 
interaction triggers a neural set-detector, a cell assembly the development 
of which was evolutionarily selected because of its propensity to respond 
to that kind of causal interaction with sets (though the point is made with 
reference to the perception of physical objects (op. cit., 58)). If we are to 
accept this, we need to have a description of the circumstances required 
for triggering of the alleged set-detector, and we need reasons for thinking 
that its development is evolutionarily selected.
On Maddy’s development of the view, the relevant circumstances would 
have to be those in which subitization produces numerical beliefs, for, as 
we explained in the previous section, these are the situations in which she
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argues we acquire perceptual beliefs representing sets as sets. Since we 
have argued that this interpretation of subitized beliefs is unfounded, 
however, these may not be the right conditions to pick. But this does not 
mean that we lack a way of characterising the relevant circumstances. 
Having argued that we can regard perception of collections like flocks, 
herds etc., as examples in which we acquire the right kind of perceptual 
belief, we can say simply that the relevant circumstances are like those in 
which we perceive flocks of birds, herds of cattle, etc.
We should consider, then, whether there are reasons for thinking that the 
development of neural set detectors is evolutionarily selected. If sets of 
physical objects really are located in space and time, and if we grant 
Hebb’s neurophysiological theory, then it seems such reasons can be 
found, for the ability to represent sets of physical objects would have been 
advantageous to our ancestors. Developing this ability would have 
allowed them to respond more effectively to their environment, helping 
them to determine which of two sources of food is the more rich, which of 
two threats is the more dangerous, etc. It may be objected that 
developing this ability need not involve the development of a neural set 
detector, and that an assembly for some other kind of thing might do. Well 
perhaps it might. But it is not necessary to establish that development of a 
set detector is the only hypothesis available here, merely that it is a 
plausible hypothesis, given the Hebbian background.
The foregoing remarks suggests that once sets of physical objects are 
accepted as being located in space and time, the suggestion cannot be 
dismissed that they enter into the right kind of causal interactions for us to 
have perceptions in which they are represented as sets. Seemingly, then, 
sets of physical objects might well satisfy condition (iii) of Maddy’s theory 
of perception. Having already argued that condition (ii) might be satisfied, 
and having accepted that satisfaction of condition (i) is trivial, given the 
assumption of spatio-temporally located sets, the conclusion that some 
sets might be perceivable is therefore beginning to look quite attractive.
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However, the literature contains objections to this claim that must be 
overcome if it is to be borne out.
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4.6. Balaguer’s objection that we cannot see sets
Balaguer (1998, 28-35) argues that it is not possible to explain our 
knowledge of set theory by bringing sets in range of sense perception. In 
his view, any account of sets must take them to be abstract in some sense 
(even if sets of physical objects are taken to be located in space and time), 
and it would seem that the mathematically relevant features of sets belong 
with this abstract component. Thus we could not get any relevant 
information about sets through perception (op.cit., 30-31). If Balaguer is 
right about this, then we should accept his conclusion that, “there is still an 
unexplained epistemic gap between the information we receive in sense 
perception and the relevant facts about sets” (op. cit., 33)
Why must someone who takes sets of physical objects to be located in 
space and time nevertheless regard them as being abstract “in some 
sense”? One point Balaguer puts forward for this view is that if they are 
not so regarded, the challenge of explaining how knowledge of abstract 
objects is possible cannot be met by showing how knowledge of sets of 
physical objects is possible (op. cit., 30).41 Whatever the truth of this, 
however, it is not relevant to us. Our project is not to show how 
knowledge of abstract objects is possible but to discover whether there is 
a good, realist account of mathematical knowledge whether mathematical 
objects are taken to be abstract or not.
But Balaguer has a second reason for his view that sets must be abstract 
in some sense (op.cit., 30-31). If sets are located in space and time just 
as the agglomerations of matter comprising their elements, and if they 
consist of the same matter, then it would seem that nothing physical 
distinguishes the sets from the agglomerations of matter. Yet these are 
different objects, as can be seen from the fact that the set has a
41 Actually Balaguer couches his argument in terms of “naturalized-platonist sets”. But this makes 
no difference to the point being made.
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determinate number property whereas the agglomeration does not.42 
Similarly, nothing physical seems to distinguish a relatively simple set from 
a more complex one involving the same urelements ({a, b, c} from {{a, b}, 
c}, for example). Yet clearly these, too, are distinct objects. Thus what 
distinguishes sets from agglomerations and complex sets from more 
simple ones must be non-physical, or “abstract” in some sense (op. cit., 
30).43
Taking this to establish that sets (all sets) must be abstract in some sense, 
Balaguer argues from this premise that sense perception cannot provide a 
basis for knowledge of sets:
Can I perceive this abstract component of the set? It seems 
that I cannot. For since the set and the aggregate are made of 
the same matter, both lead to the same retinal stimulation.
Maddy herself admits this. But if I receive only one retinal 
stimulation, then the perceptual data that I receive about the 
set are identical to the perceptual data that I receive about the 
aggregate. More generally, when I perceive an aggregate, I 
do not receive any data about any of the infinitely many 
corresponding naturalized-platonist sets that go beyond the 
data I receive about the aggregate. This means that 
naturalized platonists are no better off than traditional 
Platonists, because we receive no more perceptual 
information about naturalized-platonist sets than we do about 
traditional non-spatiotemporal sets. Thus, the Benacerrafian 
worry still remains: there is still an unexplained epistemic gap
42 Balaguer uses the word “aggregate” rather than agglomeration. However, Maddy uses the word 
“aggregate” to mean an agglomeration of matter divided up in some way or other, for example an 
agglomeration of egg-matter divided up by the property of being an egg (1990, 60). Thus 
Balaguer says that aggregates (meaning agglomerations) do not have determinate number 
properties, but Maddy says that aggregates (meaning agglomerations divided up in some way or 
other) do have determinate number properties. To avoid confusion, we have used “aggregate” in 
accordance with Maddy’s definition and have stated Balaguer’s argument in terms of 
agglomerations.
43Balaguer claims that Maddy accepts this when she identifies singleton sets with their elements 
regarded as individuated things. He argues that this commits her to the view that sets are distinct 
from agglomerations in virtue of being structured differently, and urges that being structured 
differently must be a non-physical or abstract feature of the sets (Balaguer (1998, 31)).
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between the information we receive in sense perception and 
the relevant facts about sets. (1998, 32-33)
Balaguer’s argument thus seems to be as follows. Any set constructed 
from physical urelements shares spatio-temporal location with and is 
constructed from the same matter as the agglomeration of the urelements. 
Thus all such sets produce the same retinal stimulation as the 
agglomeration of matter. This means that we get the same “perceptual 
data” about all these sets as we do about the agglomeration. Thus, since 
we get no “perceptual data” about anything abstract from the 
agglomeration (because there is nothing abstract about the 
agglomeration), we cannot get any “perceptual data” about the abstract 
features of the sets. But these abstract features of the sets are the 
mathematically important features of sets (hence Balaguer’s description of 
them as the “relevant facts” about sets). So it follows that we get no 
“perceptual data” about what is mathematically important about sets. 
Therefore perception cannot play a useful role in our account of set 
theoretic knowledge.
What should we make of Balaguer’s objection? It is worth noting that the 
whole argument is in danger of being absurdly strong. My pen shares 
location with and is constituted by an agglomeration of ink, plastic and 
metal. Does this mean it is abstract in some sense? And if it is, does this 
mean that important information about my pen cannot be acquired through 
sense perception? Balaguer’s argument that sets are abstract in some 
sense relies on the fact that sets have different properties to 
agglomerations of matter. But surely the same is true of many everyday 
objects like my pen. If, then, Balaguer’s argument about sets is correct, it 
begins to look as if we might have been quite wrong about how useful 
sense perception is as a means of acquiring knowledge about ordinary 
physical objects.
This is, admittedly, no more than a vague worry. But more specific 
complaints about Balaguer’s argument can also be made. The argument
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assumes that whenever one has the same retinal stimulation one receives 
the same “perceptual data”. One problem with this is that it is unclear just 
what these perceptual data are meant to be. Clearly they cannot be 
retinal stimulations, for they lack the necessary intentionality (it makes no 
sense to say that my retinal stimulation at time t is about the tree in front of 
me, or indeed that it is about anything else). But neither can the 
perceptual data be perceptions because then it would just be false that the 
same retinal stimulations always lead to the same perceptual data (the 
duck-rabbit picture always gives the same retinal stimulation, but 
sometimes a picture of a duck is seen, at other times a picture of a rabbit) 
so Balaguer’s argument would fail. Perceptual data thus appear as things 
of another kind, somewhere between retinal stimulations and perceptions 
proper. But what are they exactly? Without a satisfactory answer to this 
question, it is not possible to accept Balaguer’s argument.
Following on from this, there is a strong feeling that with the theoretical 
background put forward by Maddy, there can be no perceptual data lurking 
between retinal stimulations and perceptions (or as Maddy, following 
Pitcher, would say, perceptual beliefs). The theory of perception 
described above, taken together with Hebb’s neurophysiological theory, 
paints a picture of sense perception in which our senses receive a 
continuous flow of sensory input (retinal stimulation in the case of our 
visual sense) which the very structure of our sense organs and brains 
presents as perceptual beliefs about various objects. There is no room 
here for intermediaries to call “perceptual data”. So presuming that 
perceptual data are meant to be items of information acquired through 
sense perception, the only things these could be on Maddy’s account are 
perceptions themselves. Of course Maddy’s account of perception could 
be wrong, but Balaguer provides no reason to think that it is. So because 
his argument fails when perceptual data are taken to be perceptions, it 
gives no clear reason to reject the perceivability of sets.44
44 Balaguer at one point records his opinion that the development of cell-assemblies responsive to 
sets does not undermine his claim that the perceptual data we get from agglomerations includes no 
perceptual data about sets: “But this would still be true even if  we grant that in response to these
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These problems over “perceptual data” also affect the other assumption of 
Balaguer’s argument, that perceptual data about abstract matters could 
not be had from a concrete object. Why not? Why do the perceptual data 
that arise from retinal stimulations caused by light bouncing off concrete 
objects never carry information about abstract objects? Without a clear 
understanding of what these perceptual data are it is not possible to say. 
And once again, such data are illegitimate from the point of view of 
Maddy’s account of perception. So this second assumption of Balaguer’s 
argument seems to be as objectionable as the first.
Before closing this discussion, it is worth mentioning that Maddy’s view is 
consistent with some of Balaguer’s conclusions. The view does not hold 
that everything about sets can be known through perception, and it would 
agree with Balaguer’s assessment that the existence and structure of 
many sets is something that we do not, directly anyway, know through 
sense perception. The disagreement arises over whether a very specific 
body of beliefs, the numerical beliefs acquired in instances of subitization, 
should be counted as evidence that we perceive sets of physical objects. 
Balaguer gives no reason to think that the empirical evidence for taking 
these beliefs to be perceptual is flawed. Neither does he refute Maddy’s 
claim that the numerical beliefs are best understood as beliefs about sets. 
Instead, he tries to persuade us to reject Maddy’s view with the argument 
above that no set “abstract in some sense” could be perceived. For the 
reasons described above, the argument is not convincing. But even had 
we not arrived at this conclusion, Maddy’s detailed account of how we see 
sets of physical objects may have been felt to be more compelling than 
Balaguer’s somewhat diffuse claims about what is and what is not 
perceivable.
data [the data we get from agglomerations], my brain has gone ahead and developed two different 
cell-assemblies, one for sets and one for aggregates, and that sometimes when I point my eyes at 
an aggregate, my cell-assembly is activated.” (1998, 33). However, this suggests a misconception 
of what perception is like on the view Maddy puts forward. On that view, there are no perceptual 
data to which the brain responds; rather, the structure of the brain transforms sensory stimulation 
into perceptual data.
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4.7 Chihara’s objection that we cannot see sets
Chihara (1982, 1990) objects to set theoretic realism on phenomenological 
grounds:
Suppose that I have completely cleared the surface of my 
desk, leaving nothing but a single apple. According to Maddy, 
we may think that there is nothing else on the desk, but in fact, 
there is something else there, namely the set whose only 
element is the apple. ... Now what does this set look like?
Evidently, it looks exactly like the apple. After all, I cannot see 
anything else there on my desk that looks different from the 
apple. Perhaps, then, this set feels different. But when I put 
my hand where the set is supposed to be, what I feel is no 
different from what I feel when I put my hand on the apple.
Well, does the set taste different from the apple? Take a bite 
and see. No, the set tastes just like an apple. We thus have 
an answer to the riddle: What looks like a duck, waddles like a 
duck, quacks like a duck, smells like a duck, tastes like a duck,
... but isn’t a duck? It’s the set whose only member is the 
duck. (1990,201)
Chihara’s main target here is Maddy’s view that sets of physical objects 
are located in space and time (which we will discuss in the next section). 
But his remarks suggest a difficulty with the idea that we perceive sets of 
physical objects, even if they are located in space and time. The point is 
that we do not seem to notice sets as we notice ordinary physical objects. 
If one were to walk into Chihara’s office set up as he describes one would 
immediately notice, provided one is not blindfolded, one’s sight is 
functioning normally, there is plenty of light, etc., an apple on Chihara’s 
desk. But one would not notice a set containing the apple (and clearly 
Chihara thinks it is not possible to notice this set in the relevant sense 
even when one is trying hard to do so). But why not? Why, if we perceive 
sets of physical objects in the same way we perceive ordinary physical 
objects, do we not notice them all the time, just as we notice ordinary
149
physical objects like apples and philosophers’ desks? Without some 
plausible answer, the fact that we do not seems to be evidence against the 
claim that we perceive sets of physical objects, in particular, against the 
view that we acquire perceptual beliefs about them.
The first issue at stake here is whether the phenomenology of (our 
alleged) set perception differs from the phenomenology of perception of 
ordinary objects. Do sets have their own special appearances, so that 
sets look like sets, just as desks look like desks and apples look like 
apples? Or do they not, so that sets actually look like desks and apples, or 
perhaps, don’t look like anything at all? The second issue is whether, if 
there is a difference in the phenomenology, it undermines the suggestion 
that we acquire perceptual beliefs about sets.
One option here might simply be to deny that any set has its own special 
appearances. However, given the general approach behind Maddy’s 
account of set theoretic knowledge, it does not seem possible coherently 
to adopt this position. Only objects that have their own special 
appearances can seem to us to be present, in the phenomenological 
sense of “seem” relevant to perception. As we have remarked before, it is 
crucial to Maddy’s account of set theoretic knowledge that our perceptions 
of sets of physical objects involve it seeming to us in this sense that sets 
are present; this is what motivates the claim that the content of our 
perceptual beliefs about sets involve a concept for set, which is required 
for the account of intuitive knowledge of sets. Thus there is no way to 
deny that any set has its own special appearances without totally 
undermining the proposed account of set theoretic knowledge.
A second option would be to argue that all sets of physical objects have 
their own special appearances, including sets like the set containing 
Chihara’s apple. Chihara (1990, 203) reports that Maddy once claimed 
her perceptual experiences of an apple were different from her perceptual 
experiences of a set containing an apple, and takes this to mean that, to 
her, apples do not look like their unit sets. This suggests that Maddy once
150
thought it possible to respond to Chihara’s objection by arguing that, 
generally speaking, sets of physical objects do have their own special 
appearances just like ordinary physical objects, and that in the kind of 
case Chihara remarks upon these different appearances are salient. In 
response to this, Chihara argues that a difference in perceptual 
experiences need not indicate a difference in how objects look. Taking the 
duck-rabbit figure of Gestalt psychology as an example, he claims that 
objects that look the same sometimes produce different perceptual 
experiences, and so takes it that Maddy should not infer from the fact that 
she has different perceptual experiences of apples and their unit sets that 
these things do not look the same (op. cit. 203-204).
It is not clear that Chihara is right about this, for if we are not to detect 
differences in the way things look by examining differences in our 
perceptual experience, it becomes rather unclear how we are to detect 
such differences. Nevertheless, the idea of arguing in response to his 
objection that sets of the kind he mentions look different from the objects 
they contain is implausible. Chihara is quite right to think that we should 
notice sets if they look different from the objects they contain; but in the 
case he mentions, we don’t.
A third way of responding to Chihara’s objection would be to claim that 
some sets of physical objects have their own special appearances, but 
that some do not, and that sets of the kind he mentions, single element 
sets that contain objects which have their own special appearances, are of 
the latter kind. This would be plausible for the straightforward reason that 
some ordinary physical objects have their own special appearances 
(apples, cars, etc.) whilst others (electrons, black holes, etc) do not. 
However, if this is to ground a successful response to Chihara’s objection 
a good reason will have to be given for holding that singleton sets of 
perceivable objects lack special appearances.
It is clear how to provide such a reason on Maddy’s view, for we would say 
that an object of a given perceivable kind lacks its own special
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appearances if it is not apt to trigger a neural detector the resonating of 
which in part constitutes a perception of the object as an instance of the 
kind. However, as Maddy develops her view, it is clear that this cannot be 
claimed for sets such as that containing Chihara’s apple. Maddy claims 
that numerical beliefs gained through subitization are perceptual in the 
sense relevant to her account of set theoretic knowledge. But collections 
of one object are small enough for us to subitize their number, and this is 
what we do every time we see a single object. So the way Maddy 
develops her view, it has to be claimed that singleton sets like that 
containing Chihara’s apple are apt to trigger our neural set detectors. 
Apparently, then, this option of denying that the set containing Chihara’s 
apple triggers our neural set detector is not available either.
However, in section 4.4 we suggested modifying Maddy’s theory in 
precisely this respect. Instead of arguing that we acquire perceptual 
beliefs about sets by appeal to examples of subitization, we suggested 
arguing for this by appeal to examples of perception of collections of 
objects like flocks of birds and herds of cattle. Once the argument for the 
acquisition of perceptual beliefs about sets is made with respect to 
situations like this, we are not committed to thinking of examples of 
subitization as situations in which perception of sets as sets occurs, and 
thus can coherently deny that the set containing Chihara’s apple is of a 
kind appropriate to trigger our neural set detector. On this basis we can 
deny that it has its own special appearance, and thus explain why we do 
not notice it, without having to deny that all sets lack such appearances. 
Thus the approach of Maddy’s theory, if not the theory as she herself 
develops it, can be defended against Chihara’s objection.
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4.8 Problems with the metaphysics of sets
In the preceding sections, we considered whether there are objections to 
the claim that spatio-temporally located sets of physical objects can be 
perceived as instances of the kind set. With a judicious alteration of 
Maddy’s theory (by arguing for our acquisition of perceptual beliefs in 
which sets are represented as sets by appeal to perceptual experience of 
collections of objects like flocks and herds, not examples of subitization) 
we argued that the claim stands up well to critical evaluation. It may be a 
surprising view, and it may be wholly at odds with what many philosophers 
of mathematics have considered to be the right view so far. But granting 
the underlying metaphysics, and the theory of perception, the claim that 
we sometimes perceive sets of physical objects seems a reasonable one 
to make. But does Maddy’s philosophical theory of sets paint a coherent 
picture of sets? In this section we will find out.
One puzzle raised by trying to think of sets of physical objects as located 
in space and time concerns just where and when to locate them. The 
principle governing Maddy’s thinking about this appears to be that any set 
whose construction proceeds from physical objects alone has spatio- 
temporal location:
But notice: there is no real obstacle to the position that the set 
of eggs comes into and goes out of existence when they do, 
and that, spatially as well as temporally, it is located exactly 
where they are. ... In this way, even an extremely 
complicated set would have spatio-temporal location, as long 
as it has physical things in its transitive closure. (1990, 59)
Presumably what Maddy means here is that a set has spatial and 
temporal location if it has only physical things in its transitive closure. The 
transitive closure of a set is the set containing its elements, the elements 
of its elements, the elements of those elements, etc., until the ultimate 
elements are found (as they must be given the axiom of foundation, AF).
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Thus we can imagine the application of this criterion of spatio-temporality 
in terms of membership trees. Given a set, work your way up through the 
membership tree; if you find a non-physical object at the end of any 
branch then the set from which you started is not spatio-temporally 
located.
Consider, then, the set containing Kant and Plato. Both were physical 
objects, so the set containing them, the set {Kant, Plato}, has spatio- 
temporal location, according to Maddy’s criterion. But where and when is 
this set located? Kant did not exist at any time during which Plato lived. 
Does the set pop into existence with Plato, pop out of existence when 
Plato dies, only to make a triumphant return with the birth of Kant? This 
sounds odd.
Admittedly, some spatio-temporal objects can exist for a while, cease to 
exist and then exist again later. An artefact that consists of several parts 
can be assembled, dissembled and then reassembled at a later date. 
However, in this kind of example we can explain what is going on. The 
artefact can be regarded as a mereological sum of its parts that exists only 
when the parts are joined together in the right way. It is apt to come in 
and out of existence because of the continued existence of its parts when 
they are not joined together the right way. However, this kind of 
explanation cannot be applied to the set containing Kan and Plato. For a 
start, there is a long period during which neither Kant nor Plato exist. So 
even if it is appropriate to think of Kant and Plato as parts of the set, there 
is a long period between the early and late periods of its existence during 
which even its parts do not exist. More importantly, it is just not 
appropriate to think of sets of physical objects as mereological sums of 
their members. The mereological sum of parts a and b has number 
property one; the set containing those parts has number property two.
Perhaps, then, Maddy should set a more stringent condition on which sets 
exist in space and time. A more demanding criterion would state that a set 
exists in space and time if and only if it has contemporaneous physical
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objects in its transitive closure. But this criterion seems to invite baffling 
questions too. We saw in section 4.7.4 that Chihara (1982, 1990) objects 
to set theoretic empiricism on the basis of a difference between the 
phenomenology of our (alleged) set perception and the phenomenology of 
our perception of ordinary objects. However, Chihara also has serious 
misgivings about the underlying metaphysics of set theoretic empiricism. 
Immediately following the passage concerning the apple, Chihara adds 
these remarks:
Actually, the situation is worse than it may appear at this point, 
for it is not just the unit set whose only element is the apple 
that is on my desk. Since this unit set has location in space, 
can be perceived, etc., we can infer that the unit set whose 
only element is the unit set also has location in space, can be 
perceived, etc. For Maddy accepts the following principle: If 
objects A, B, ... have location in space, then the set of these 
objects has the same location in space. It follows that there is 
on my desk, not only the apple and the unit set whose only 
element is the apple, but also the unit set whose only element 
is this unit set whose only element is the apple. Clearly, by 
this line of reasoning, we can infer that there are infinitely 
many such objects on my desk. And all these different objects 
take up exactly the same amount of space on the desk. 
Furthermore, this infinity of abstract objects came into 
existence when the apple came into existence and they will all 
go out of existence when the apple goes out of existence.
(1990, 201-202)
The tone of Chihara’s remarks, and the context in which they appear, 
make clear that he finds all these consequences of Maddy’s metaphysics 
quite unbelievable. As he points out (1990, 202), the difficulty is not 
specific to sets containing just one element, if we start with a cup and a 
saucer, we also have a set containing the cup and the saucer, a set 
containing that set and the cup, a set containing that set and the saucer, 
etc. Clearly, then, Chihara doubts that whenever there are some
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contemporaneous physical objects, there is a set in space and time whose 
elements are those objects.
One difficulty that seems to underlie Chihara’s complaint concerns the 
massive amount of superposition that goes on under Maddy’s view of sets, 
given the principle of set existence suggested above. We do not find it 
easy to accept that distinct objects can share location in space and time. 
So is there not something wrong with a view that leads to all these 
supposedly distinct sets occupying the same place? In response to this 
worry, Maddy (1990, 59) claims that it is no more objectionable that sets of 
physical objects are distinct from, but share location with, the aggregates 
formed from their elements than it is that a pack of cards is distinct from, 
but shares location with, its fifty two cards. But this example does nothing 
to dispel the worry. The fifty-two cards taken together constitute the pack 
of cards. Thus we do not have here an example of distinct objects sharing 
the same location.
Perhaps, though, the pack of cards was just a poor example to pick. 
There is a school of thought in philosophy which takes physical objects to 
be distinct from the matter of which they are constituted, for example that 
takes a statue like Rodin’s Thinker to be distinct from the lump of bronze 
from which it was formed. If this is a plausible approach to take to some 
physical objects, then it may be that Maddy could maintain a similar view 
in the case of her sets of physical objects.
However, in the case of statues and the matter from which they are 
formed, we have a plausible reason for believing in distinctness. The 
Thinker has different modal properties with respect to its location in space 
and time than does the lump of bronze from which it is made: it could not 
exist before Rodin was born, for example, whereas the lump of bronze 
could. Thus, by the indiscernibility of identicals, the Thinker and the lump 
of bronze are distinct. On Maddy’s view of sets, in contrast, it appears that 
the set containing Chihara’s apple necessarily exists exactly where and 
when the apple exists. Thus, the comparison with statues and the lumps
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of matter from which they are constituted does not help us to understand 
how sets of physical objects could be located as are the aggregates of 
their elements.
Note, too, that even proponents of the view that distinct objects can 
occupy the same spatio-temporal location do not claim that this is possible 
for distinct objects of the same kind. Chihara’s apple and the set 
containing it are different kinds of thing, so maybe that is sufficient reason 
to think they can be co-located yet distinct. But what of the sets {apple} 
and {{apple}}? These are the same kind, and necessarily share the same 
spatio-temporal location, on Maddy’s view. In fact, this view implies that 
every one of the class-many singletons (sets containing one element) that 
can be constructed from the apple are of the same kind and share exactly 
the same spatio-temporal location. Comparison to the case of statues and 
the lumps of matter from which they are constituted does help to dispel our 
unease at the idea of all these objects existing in the same place. Thus 
far, then, it does seem reasonable to avoid the difficulty by denying that 
there are sets of physical objects in space and time.
A related puzzle that Maddy herself draws from Chihara’s apple example 
is that of saying what difference there is between the apple and the set 
containing it, given that they look the same.45 Maddy claims that one can 
respond to this by saying that there is an unperceivable difference 
between the apple and the set (1990, 152). However, this does not 
resolve the problem. We want to know what the feature is whose 
presence in one and absence in the other is unperceivable. Maddy also 
claims that it is possible to respond to the difficulty by identifying, as a 
matter of convention, the sets containing a single physical individual with 
the individual they contain (loc.cit.), indeed she states a preference for this 
response (op.cit., 153). Certainly this resolves the difficulty, as it implies 
that there is no difference between the apple and the set containing it,
45 It is unclear, for the reasons discussed in section 4.6.4, that Maddy is entitled to the view that 
sets containing one perceivable object look different from the perceivable object they contain. 
However, when her claim that sets are perceivable as sets is defended in the way suggested in 
section 4.6.1, this view can be maintained. Thus the puzzle to which Maddy responds does arise.
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which is at least an answer to our question. However, the very fact that 
she is considering this ad hoc move suggests the lack of a stable 
metaphysical view. Moreover, the suggestion is not workable, not least 
because it involves attributing to physical objects lots of properties that we 
hitherto did not suspect that they had, but also for mathematical reasons.
Identifying singletons with their elements would contradict the axiom of 
foundation, AF, which states that every non-empty set x contains an 
element y with no elements in common with x. For let a be a physical 
object. Then, if we identify singletons with their elements, so that a = {a}, 
the only element of {a}, a, has an element in common with {a}, namely a. 
So it is not true that every set contains an element minimal in the sense 
required by AF.
A response to this might be to argue that AF can be given up. It is well 
known that the axiom system ZF + -*AF is inconsistent only if ZF is 
inconsistent. Moreover, it can be argued that AF is not mathematically 
active in the way the other axioms are, since it is not assumed in the 
proofs of important mathematical results (in contrast, say, to the axiom of 
choice). However, being assumed in proofs is not the only way for an 
axiom to be mathematically active. It is only by virtue of satisfying AF that 
sets form the cumulative hierarchy anticipated by the iterative conception 
of sets (for details of which see Boolos (1971)). Denying AF thus requires 
abandoning the iterative conception, together with whatever support it 
lends to axiomatic set theory (for an explanation of how the iterative 
conception supports the axioms see Schoenfield (1977)). Clearly it would 
be unwise to take this course.
In addition to contradicting AF, identifying singletons with their elements 
would disrupt even the axiom of extensionality, AE, which says that sets 
are identical if and only if they have the same members. Maddy tries to 
block this consequence by limiting the identificatory move to singletons 
containing physical individuals, that is, singleton sets formed in the first 
stage of set construction, from physical individuals (op. cit., 152-153).
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Thus, for example, {{a, b, c}} is not to be identified with {a, b, c}; these sets 
are to be held distinct as required by AE. However, it is by no means clear 
that what Maddy says is enough to stop the process of identification from 
ascending to higher stages of set construction. Since she claims that we 
can perceive sets of physical objects, and since we cannot perceive non­
physical things, sets of physical objects are themselves physical, on 
Maddy’s view. So unless there is something stopping sets of physical 
objects from being “individuals” in some peculiarly relevant sense, saying 
that the identification of singleton sets is only to apply to singletons 
containing physical individuals is not sufficient to limit the identification to 
singletons formed at the first stage of set construction. Moreover, it is not 
clear that there are grounds on which to insist that the process of 
identification stop there. If it is legitimate to identify a physical non-set with 
the singleton containing it (even though we ordinarily think that non-sets 
have no members, are not produced by set construction, and so on), why 
is it not legitimate to identify a physical set with the singleton containing it 
(even though we ordinarily think that the sets contains different members 
from the singleton sets containing them, that they are formed at different 
stages of set construction, and so on)? There appear to be no grounds 
upon which to make this distinction. Thus it seems that the identification 
of singleton with element should be made at higher stages of set 
construction if it is made at the first stage.
Now an example of what this means is that the set {{a, b, c}} is to be 
identified with the set {a, b, c}. But if we accept this identification, taking 
{{a, b, c}} and {a, b, c} to be the same set, then we must abandon AE. For 
otherwise it becomes utterly unclear what the members of this set are. As 
we cannot possibly abandon AE, we cannot identify singletons with their 
elements, at any stage of set construction.
What this shows is that identifying sets of physical objects with the 
aggregates of their elements does not provide a workable answer to the 
question of what, if anything, distinguishes them. The criterion of spatio- 
temporality we suggested for Maddy in response to our first puzzle, that
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sets are located in space and time that have contemporaneous physical 
objects in their transitive closure, thus seems not to address Chihara’s 
puzzle. This does not mean that there is no adequate solution but we 
have not yet seen what a solution might be like.
Our discussion in this section started from Maddy’s criterion of set spatio- 
temporality, suggesting that it could not deal with a puzzle concerning sets 
of non-contemporaneous physical objects. The alternative criterion we 
suggested ran into Chihara’s puzzle of explaining the difference between 
sets of physical objects and the aggregates of their elements. The 
solution to this put forward by Maddy turned out to conflict with the very 
axioms of set theory, principles that any version of set theoretic empiricism 
really must support. In trying to answer the very straightforward question 
of where and when sets of physical objects are located in space and time, 
we have thus had to deal with first one, then another baffling puzzle about 
the nature of sets, finally arriving at reason to doubt that the view that sets 
are located in space and time can coherently be maintained for objects 
satisfying the axioms of ZFC. What we have witnessed, therefore, is not 
just a series of objections and replies but rather the erratic unravelling of a 
bad idea. Our discussion shows not only that it is unclear whether a 
coherent conception of the nature of sets underlies this account of set 
theoretic knowledge, it also shows that no such conception is available 
that agrees with the axioms of set theory. In light of this, we should 
conclude that the very idea behind this approach, that of making set 
theoretic knowledge depend on perception by bringing sets into space and 
time, lacks a satisfactory metaphysical basis.
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4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have considered the empiricist strategy of bringing 
mathematical objects into space and time so as to make them perceivable 
and hence knowable. We considered Maddy’s account of set theoretic 
empiricism as an example of this approach but argued that it is not 
convincing.
Maddy’s tactic was to regard (some) sets of physical objects as on a 
metaphysical and epistemological par with ordinary physical objects like 
chairs and tables. She proposed a philosophical account of sets 
according to which sets of physical objects are located in space and time 
(section 4.3.2). By thus bringing sets into the causal nexus, and by 
appealing to certain theories of perception and neurophysiology, she 
hoped it would be possible to view set theoretic knowledge as being based 
on perceptions of sets. We defended Maddy’s theory of perception as a 
collection of sufficient conditions for perception of objects as instances of 
given kinds (section 4.3.1). We also defended her view that, given her 
theory of perception and her philosophical theory of sets, sets are 
perceivable. In particular, we defended this claim against objections from 
Balaguer (section 4.6) and Chihara (section 4.7). However, by appeal to 
some observations of Chihara concerning the metaphysics of sets, we 
subsequently argued that the claim that sets of physical objects are 
located in space and time conflicts conceptually with the axioms of set 
theory, that there is no coherent conception of sets under which both the 
axioms of set theory and the claim that sets of physical objects are located 
in space and time can be maintained (section 4.8). Maddy’s account of 
set theoretic knowledge thus seems deeply implausible, as it depends on 
a philosophical conception of sets at odds with our mathematical 
conception of sets.
Of what significance is this for the empiricist strategy under consideration? 
As any satisfactory account of mathematical knowledge will have to 
account for our knowledge of set theory, our conclusion suggests that
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regarding mathematical objects as on a metaphysical and epistemological 
par with ordinary physical objects like chairs and tables is not a good ploy 
for empiricism. But another approach is to regard the nature and 
knowledge of mathematical objects as comparable to that of properties of 
physical objects like redness. This suggestion cannot simply be dismissed 
as both its ontological and epistemological aspects have been defended in 
the literature (see, e.g. Bigelow (1988) and Giaquinto (2001), 
respectively). Moreover, our objection to Maddy’s theory does not 
obviously transfer over to this kind of view, even though it may perhaps be 
the case that a similar kind of objection can be made. The effect of our 
arguments, then, is to rule out one tactic for the empiricist strategy of 
bringing mathematical objects into space and time so as to make them 
perceivable and hence knowable. But for all we have said, it may still be 
possible successfully to develop this approach the other way, by making 
mathematical objects participate in our sense perceptions in something 
like the way that physical properties do.
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Appendix: Knowledge of the axioms of set theory
We said in section 4.2 that Maddy’s theory of set theoretic knowledge 
depends on a theory of intuitive knowledge and on an analogy between 
science and mathematics. In this appendix, we will explain how Maddy 
uses these claims to argue for her view that set theoretic knowledge is 
empirical knowledge. We will also defend her theory of intuitive 
knowledge against an objection from the literature.
A. Intuitive knowledge of sets
Maddy claims we have intuitive knowledge about sets. The idea here is 
that some set theoretic beliefs arise spontaneously in subjects who have 
had perceptual commerce with sets of physical objects, and that such 
beliefs are justified by the complex causal relationship between sets of 
physical objects and agents that ultimately explains how these beliefs are 
produced.
This idea depends on the suggestion (considered in section 4.3.3) that the 
brain develops neural detectors of one sort and another, cell assemblies 
that are active in our perceptions of objects of the relevant kinds. It is 
important to realise that these assemblies are potentially quite complex, 
built up of various neural substructures. Maddy thinks these substructures 
could correspond to features of the kind that the larger cell assembly 
detects. And on this basis, she claims that some beliefs about the objects 
our brains detect using these cell assemblies could be produced by virtue 
of the structure of the cell assemblies doing the detecting:
A subject with such an assembly would automatically have 
various general beliefs about the nature of the objects that 
stimulate it; we might say that these beliefs are ‘built into’ the 
cell assembly much as three sidedness is built into the triangle 
detector in the form of mechanisms stimulating eye
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movements from one corner to another . . . .  Crudely put, the 
very structure of one’s triangle-detector guarantees that one 
will believe any triangle to be three-sided. Similarly, anyone 
with a general physical object assembly would believe that 
physical objects are ‘space-occupying and sense-stimulating’, 
to use Hebb’s examples, or observation and trajectory 
independent, to use examples mentioned earlier. These are 
primitive, very general beliefs about the nature of whatever 
stimulates the appropriate higher-order assembly. I call them 
‘intuitive beliefs’. (1990, 69-70)
According to Maddy, then, intuitive beliefs about objects of perceivable 
kinds could be produced in us by the structure of the neural substrate 
underlying our ability to acquire perceptual beliefs. But this is not all. 
Maddy points out that the presence in our brains of these neural structures 
is supposed to result partly because of the evolutionary pressures on our 
distant ancestors and partly because of our own experiences with physical 
objects of the appropriate kinds during early stages of cognitive 
development (1990, 58, 72). Thus the presence in us of intuitive beliefs is 
to be explained by the existence of a complex causal relationship between 
us and the objects the beliefs are about. This, in Maddy’s opinion, would 
be sufficient to show that intuitive beliefs are justified (op. cit.f 72). The 
idea, familiar from causal theories of knowledge, is that the causal 
relationship responsible for the production of intuitive beliefs gives a sense 
in which their content is constrained by the actual nature of the objects 
they are about.
From the picture of the mind given in the Hebbian neurological theory, 
then, Maddy draws a theory of intuitive knowledge. This states that the 
structure of the neural assemblies required for perception of objects of 
various kinds gives rise to certain intuitive beliefs about such objects and 
that these beliefs are justified by the complex causal relationship that 
explains their production. According to Maddy, certain consequences of 
this theory are as follows:
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(i) Intuitive beliefs, or, at least, linguistic formulations of 
intuitive beliefs (recall from 4.3.1 that for Maddy beliefs need 
not be linguistic entities), are distinguished from other beliefs 
by their obviousness (op. cit., 70, 72).
(ii) Intuitive beliefs are fallible, as there is no absolute 
guarantee that the perceptual concepts we develop 
correspond to existing kinds of object (op. cit., 71).
(iii) A linguistic formulation of an intuitive belief may be false 
for this reason, or because it inaccurately expresses the 
content of an intuitive belief, (op. cit., 71).
In some respects, then, Maddy’s theory of intuitive knowledge resembles 
the theories of intuition considered in Chapter 3. However, Maddy's 
theory does not posit a faculty of intuition peculiar to mathematics (as 
Godel’s did) or peculiar to formal knowledge more generally (as Katz’s 
did). Hers is a general theory of intuitive knowledge that, if successful, 
shows how intuitive knowledge explicable in empiricist terms arises in any 
serious study of perceivable objects.
This generality in the theory of intuitive knowledge, together with the 
suggestion that we can perceive sets of physical objects, is what makes 
possible intuitive knowledge of general claims about sets. Having 
suggested in her account of the perception of sets that we develop neural 
cell assemblies sensitive to particular sets of physical objects, Maddy uses 
this to explain how we would come to have intuitive knowledge about sets:
What goes for physical objects should also go for sets: the 
development of higher-order cell-assemblies responsive to 
particular sets gives rise to an even higher-order assembly 
corresponding to the general concept set. The structure of this 
general set assembly is then responsible for various intuitive 
beliefs about sets, for example that they have number
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properties, that these number properties don't change when 
the elements are moved (barring mishap), that they have 
various subsets, that they can be combined, and so on. And 
these intuitions underlie the most basic axioms of our scientific 
theory of sets. (1990, 70)
As with other intuitive beliefs, intuitive set theoretic beliefs would count as 
knowledge by virtue of a complex causal relationship, one which this time 
explains the generation of these beliefs on the basis of our, and our 
ancestors’, causal interactions with sets of physical objects. And as with 
other intuitively known claims, it is their obviousness (when linguistically 
formulated) that marks them out as set theoretic intuitions, and so 
provides evidence for their truth.
B. The analogy between mathematics and science
Although Maddy believes that some general claims about sets are 
intuitively known, she does not think that all axioms for set theory can be 
known this way. Indeed, the only axioms she talks about in connection 
with purely intuitive knowledge are the axiom of unions and the axiom of 
pairs, and even these are carefully described as “nearly unadorned” 
intuitions rather than intuitions proper (1990, 125).46 To explain 
knowledge of other standard axioms for set theory from the perspective of 
set theoretic empiricism, Maddy appeals to her analogy between science 
and mathematics.
The claim, which Maddy attributes to Godel, is of a methodological parallel 
between mathematics and science:
According to Godel, higher set theory bears a relation to the 
rest of mathematical knowledge and to practical mathematical
46 The axiom of unions states that for any set x there is a set containing all and only the elements of 
the elements of x. The axiom of pairs states that for any set x and any sety there is a set containing 
x and y.
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dealings of everyday life which is analogous to the relation 
borne by theoretical physics to physical science in general and 
to common-sense knowledge of the world. Sense perception 
gives us knowledge of simple facts about physical objects, and 
a faculty of mathematical intuition gives us knowledge of sets, 
numbers, and of some of the simpler axioms concerning them.
In both cases, theories involving ‘unobservable’ entities or 
processes (that is, entities or processes beyond the range of 
sense perception or mathematical intuition) are formed in 
order to explain, predict, and systematize the elementary facts 
(of perception or intuition) and are judged by their success.
(1980, 114)
The parallel is this: there are corresponding justificatory foundations for set 
theory and theoretical physics, and these two disciplines grow from their 
respective justificatory foundations in similar ways. In the case of 
theoretical physics, sense perception yields knowledge of truths about the 
observable, and the succession of physical theories that delve beyond, 
culminating in theoretical physics, are each justified by their function as 
explanations, systematisations and predictive mechanisms for this base. 
In the case of set theory, mathematical intuition yields knowledge of sets 
of physical objects, and the succession of theories about other sets, 
culminating in full set theory, are justified by their function as explanations, 
systematisations and predictive mechanisms for this base.
Now Maddy rejects the suggestion that we possess a faculty of 
mathematical intuition. Thus she must reject this methodological parallel 
between science and mathematics. However, by bringing sets of physical 
objects in range of sense perception Maddy is able to preserve one of its 
underlying ideas. Set theory is still to be considered analogous to 
theoretical physics in the way it grows from its justificatory foundation. But 
we are to think of the justificatory foundation in both cases as a body 
consisting of sense perceptions and intuitive beliefs generated by the 
neural foundations of our sense perception. Thus a methodological 
parallel between science and mathematics is preserved from the point of
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view of set theoretic empiricism, which makes available non-intuitive 
grounds for set theoretic beliefs.
Maddy calls these non-intuitive grounds for set theoretic beliefs extrinsic 
justifications (contrasting with the “intrinsic” grounds of intuition). She lists 
a variety of features of set theoretic principles that might provide such 
extrinsic evidence: they may be rich in verifiable consequences; they may 
provide new approaches to as yet unanswered problems; they may 
contribute to the simplicity and systematicity of our theory of sets; they 
may imply prior conjectures or results considered to be “natural”; they may 
be supported by connections to other branches of mathematics (1990, 
145). She also conducts a detailed investigation into how considerations 
such as these were brought to bear on the axioms of ZFC by a particular 
group of practicing set theorists (1988a, 1988b). Maddy endorses 
justifying set theoretic axioms by appeal to extrinsic justifications and 
takes it that they will complete the grounding of set theoretic axioms not 
wholly established by intuition.
C. Lomas’s objection to Maddy’s theory of intuitive knowledge
Lomas (2002, 219-220) argues that Maddy’s theory of intuition cannot 
deliver knowledge of the axiom of pairs, on the basis that no account of 
intuition grounding intuition on perception could do this. One point that 
should immediately be made in response is that Lomas draws his 
understanding of set theoretic empiricism from Maddy (1980) rather than 
Maddy (1990). Although the spirit of the enterprise is preserved from the 
earlier to the later work, some of the details do change. In particular, 
Maddy (1990) no longer takes the axiom of pairs to be intuitive; rather it is 
presented as the closest thing we have to an “unadorned intuition”. Taken 
at its word, therefore, Lomas’s criticism is irrelevant because the point it 
seeks to demonstrate, that the axiom of pairs is not intuitive, is no longer 
part of Maddy’s set theoretic realism. However, the gist of his objection 
can be preserved if it is taken to be that the axiom of pairs could not even
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come close to being an “unadorned intuition”; it is thus still instructive to 
consider it.
The claim that no account of perception-based intuition could deliver 
intuitive knowledge of the axiom of pairs is quite general. The first reason 
Lomas puts forward in its favour is that sets exist, according to the axiom, 
which are not perceivable physical sets:
Consider sets which consist of two elements: another set and 
an element of that other set, e.g., {{x, y}, x}. If the above 
mentioned axiom holds, this should constitute a set. {x, y} is 
an object (namely a set) and x is an object; therefore by the 
axiom, {{x, y}, x} should be a set. However, it is not at all clear 
that there are perceivable physical sets which have the 
structure of {{x, y}, x}. The difficulty pertains to the element x 
which is both an element of the internal set and an element of 
the external set. An attempt to describe an example of a 
physical set with this structure illustrates the difficulty.
Suppose one has two baskets, one large, the other small. Put 
the small basket inside the large basket. Put a white egg and 
a brown egg inside the small basket. So far we have 
constructed the physical set {{brown egg, white egg}}, if 
Maddy’s construal of physical sets holds. (The external set is 
the large basket and the internal set is the small basket.)
What we need is a physical set described by {{brown egg, 
white egg}, brown egg} where the brown egg appears both 
inside the small basket and outside it and in the big basket.
This is impossible. The brown egg cannot be in both places at 
once. (2002, 220)
Here we must assume that talk of constructing the set {{brown egg, white 
egg], brown egg} is metaphorical. On Maddy’s view this set exists 
independently of our constructions, for as long as the brown and white 
eggs exist, regardless of where they are located. Presumably what Lomas 
really means is that by moving eggs into baskets in the way described we
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bring sets containing them to our visual attention. Then his point is that 
there is no way of bringing a set with the relevant mathematical structure 
to our visual attention, so that we cannot see such sets (or at least, see 
them as having the relevant mathematical structure).
This seems to be a very poor reason for thinking that the axiom of pairs is 
not intuitive. To being with, it is possible simultaneously to receive two 
visual presentations of one object at the same time, for example if we 
have a system mirrors making a given egg appear at two locations in our 
visual field, or if, as a result of gravitational lensing, we see the same star 
appearing in two different places in the night sky. W e are thus capable of 
seeing two objects x  and y as grouped together and of simultaneously 
experiencing a visual presentation of x  some way apart, as for instance if 
we see a brown egg and a white egg close together and experience a 
mirror image of the brown egg some distance away. As Lomas gives no 
reason to think that this would not count as having a set with the relevant 
mathematical structure brought to our visual attention, he cannot claim to 
have shown that such sets cannot be seen.
In addition to this, the fact that some sets whose existence is implied by 
the axiom cannot be perceived does not mean that no sets whose 
existence is implied by the axiom can be perceived. On Maddy’s view 
there are many pairs of perceivable objects that form a perceivable set 
containing two elements (Lomas’s white and brown eggs, for example). 
So she can say that perceptual experiences we have in situations 
involving such objects during the developmental phase relevant to 
acquisition of the neural set detector gives rise to a set detector which has 
“built into it” the idea that any two objects can be taken together to form a 
set. This would suffice, on her view of intuitive knowledge, to make the 
axiom of pairs intuitive.
Lomas puts forward a second reason for thinking that no account of 
intuition based in sense perception could make the axiom of pairs intuitive:
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Moreover, perception-based intuition would suggest that such 
a set is impossible because we do not simultaneously perceive 
the same object in two places at the same time. Accordingly, 
perception-based intuition can conflict with the axiom (stated 
above). Perception-based intuition stands in the way of 
accepting the truth of the axiom because perception-based 
intuition does not accept the set {{brown egg, white egg}, 
brown egg}, even though the object brown egg and the object 
small basket containing a brown egg and a white egg, {brown 
egg, white egg}, can be both separately perceived and 
accepted by perception-based intuition. (2002, 220)
It is hard to assess precisely what claim is being made here because 
Lomas does not explain what “perception-based intuition” is nor what it is 
for a set to be “accepted” by perception-based intuition. But the point 
seems to be that because we are unable to perceive the set {{brown egg, 
white egg}, brown egg} and because we are able to perceive the object 
brown egg and the set {brown egg, white egg}, perception-based intuition 
will tell us that there are pairs of sets that do not form sets so that a 
principle conflicting with the axiom of pairs is intuitive. Thus, perception- 
based intuition will “stand in the way of accepting the truth of the axiom”.
Again, however, this gives us no reason to reject the intuitiveness of the 
axiom of pairs. Given what we have said concerning the possibility of 
simultaneously receiving distinct visual representations of the same object 
at two different locations, it is not clear that it is not possible to perceive a 
set if this requires that the same object be perceived at two different 
locations. Maddy’s theory of perception does give grounds to reject this if 
it is taken as expressing necessary conditions for perception. But we are 
taking it only to express sufficient conditions, so there is no reason for us 
to think that this is ruled out. Moreover, the phenomenon of gravitational 
lensing suggests that we do sometimes see the same object at different 
locations. Contra Lomas, then, it may be that there are cases in which we
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can perceive sets of objects through perceiving the same object in 
different locations.
A second reason to reject Lomas’s argument is that he provides no reason 
to think that perception-based intuition will tell us that there are pairs of 
sets that do not form sets. On the basis of his considerations, one might 
think it would be intuitive that there are pairs of perceivable sets that do 
not form perceivable sets. But clearly this does not stand in the way of 
accepting the truth of the axiom of pairs. This axiom does not demand 
that a set formed from two perceivable sets be perceivable, it just 
demands that the set exist. Maddy’s theory of sets does not make the 
demand that a set formed from two perceivable sets be perceivable, 
either, because it does not demand that every set be perceivable. The 
suspicion that perception-based intuition must deliver intuitive principles 
that conflict with the axiom of pairs thus appears groundless, and so the 
axiom might still be intuitive. For this reason, and for the reasons 
explained above, we conclude that Lomas’s attack on perception-based 
intuition is not successful.
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5Realism and the applications of mathematics
In the last chapter, we distinguished two empiricist strategies for realist 
accounts of mathematical knowledge. These were to argue that 
mathematical knowledge is grounded on sense perceptions of 
mathematical objects, and to argue that mathematical knowledge is 
grounded on sense perceptions of ordinary empirical objects. Having 
considered the first strategy in the last chapter, we proceed now to a 
consideration of the second.
The argument that mathematical knowledge is grounded on sense 
perceptions of ordinary empirical objects assimilates mathematical 
knowledge to theoretical empirical knowledge. It claims that mathematical 
beliefs enjoy the same kind of support as theoretical empirical knowledge 
by virtue of the fact that they enter into our theorizing about empirical 
matters. Clearly mathematics only enters our theorizing about empirical 
matters in its empirical applications. So to assess this strategy for 
mathematical empiricism, we need to address the following question: Do 
the empirical applications of mathematics provide adequate grounds for 
mathematical knowledge?
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5.1 Quinean realism
The idea that evidence for mathematics is provided by its empirical 
applications is an important theme of Quine’s philosophy.47 So, too, is 
mathematical realism, the view that there are independently existing 
mathematical objects.48 We can thus take from Quine’s work a theory 
according to which mathematical knowledge is secured on its empirical 
applications. Convenience demands that this theory have a label, so we 
will refer to it as Quinean realism. Bear in mind however, that this is more 
in homage than in attribution, for although the view in question is strongly 
suggested by Quine’s work, it is not explicitly stated in it.
5.1.1 Quine’s theory of evidence
The first component of Quinean realism is a theory of evidence. With the 
same qualification as before, we will refer to this as Quine’s theory of 
evidence. The background to this is set by a kind of epiphany:
the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in 
some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and 
described. Quine (1981a, 21)
The philosopher who undergoes this experience:
sees natural science as an inquiry into reality, fallible and 
corrigible but not answerable to any supra-scientific 
tribunal, and not in need of any justification beyond 
observation and the hypothetico-deductive method. Quine 
(1981b, 72)
47 It is also clearly voiced by Putnam (1971). In fact, the suggestion that the empirical applications 
of mathematics are of significance for philosophical debates concerning mathematical knowledge 
has a long and distinguished pedigree. Frege put the point like this: “it is applicability alone which 
elevates arithemetic from a game to the rank of a science.” (Translated by M. Black from Frege’s 
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, II, §91, see Geach and Black (1952, 187).
48 Though this was not always Quine’s position, see section 5.1.2.
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Together these quotations home in on naturalism, one of the most 
important and widely discussed aspects of Quine’s philosophy, and the 
source of two components of Quine’s theory of evidence.
The first of these is the core empiricist belief that the evidence there is for 
science is provided by sense perception, and sense perception alone. 
Quine’s remark that science is “not in need of any justification beyond 
observation and the hypothetico-deductive method” presupposes the 
positive aspect of this belief, namely, that sense perceptions (in the form 
of observations) do in fact provide evidence for scientific beliefs. His 
remark that science is “not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal” 
appears to endorse its negative aspect, the idea that the only evidence 
there is for scientific beliefs is evidence provided by the senses. If any 
room is left for doubt about this, Quine clarifies matters elsewhere, stating 
that “whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence” (1969, 
75). Provided we understand this to refer to sense perceptions rather than 
mere sensation, we have here an unambiguous endorsement of the 
empiricist belief described.
The second naturalistic component of Quine’s theory of evidence is 
suggested by the remarks that “it is within science that reality is to be 
identified and described” and that “science is not answerable to any supra- 
scientific tribunal”. This vote of confidence in the methods of science 
rejects doubt that what according to science provides compelling support 
for a claim might nonetheless not be sufficient to warrant belief that it is 
true. Quine's theory of evidence thus contains the principle that, in normal 
circumstances, what counts by ordinary scientific criteria as compelling 
support for a claim warrants belief in its truth. Call this the “evidence- 
warrant principle”.
One more thesis is to be included in Quine’s theory of evidence, but this is 
not a consequence of Quinean naturalism. It comes from Duhem:
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the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to 
experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; 
when the experiment is in disagreement with his
predictions, what he learns is that at least one of the 
hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and 
ought to be modified; but the experiment does not
designate which one should be changed. Duhem (1954,
187)
The point being made here is quite simple. If two hypotheses jointly imply 
a claim that is discontinued by observation, and if neither of the 
hypotheses imply that claim on their own, then, logically speaking, we can 
say only that our observation disconfirms the conjunction of the
hypotheses, not that it disconfirms one or the other. On the positive side
of the same logical coin, if observation confirms the implied claim, then it is 
the conjunction of the hypotheses that is confirmed. Duhem’s point 
suggests that evidence attaches to hypotheses not individually but in 
systems, regardless of the nature or number of the hypotheses involved. 
It thus leads us to confirmational holism, the claim that scientific evidence 
attaches to all the hypotheses required to generate (successful) 
predictions.
Struck by this thought, Quine compares the evolving corpus of human 
knowledge to a fabric or a force field:
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the 
most casual matters of geography and history to the 
profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure 
mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which 
impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to 
change the figure, total science is like a field of force 
whose boundary conditions are experience. Quine (1951,
47)
176
The comparisons suggest that our beliefs, knitted together by their logical 
interrelations, form a unitary theory of the world in which each element is 
inseparable from the others. This idea of total science, a grand theory of 
everything we know, is at the heart of Quine’s account of knowledge. As 
he claims that total science is the smallest unit that can be measured 
against the evidence of sense-experience (1951, 47), the thesis of 
conformational holism appears in his philosophy in an extreme form.
Confirmational holism completes what we are calling Quine’s theory of 
evidence. This involves three claims: (a) that, ultimately, evidence for 
beliefs is provided by, and only provided by, sense perception; (b) that in 
normal circumstances what counts by ordinary scientific criteria to be 
compelling evidence for a claim warrants belief that it is true (the 
evidence-warrant principle); (c) that scientific evidence attaches to all the 
hypotheses required to generate successful predictions (confirmational 
holism). Taken together these theses tell us what evidence is, what it 
does and how it distributes across hypotheses. However, they do not tell 
us how evidence is brought to bear on scientific theory. So let us consider 
this now.
Quine maintains that scientific theory is tested with the help of observation 
categoricals, conditional sentences such as “When an athlete runs, their 
heart-rate increases” and “When alcohol is heated to 78 degrees C, it 
boils” which are directly evaluable by observation.49 When an observation 
categorical follows logically from a scientific theory, it can be viewed as 
part of the content of that theory. Observation categoricals are thus able 
to act as brokers for the evidential deal between theory and sense 
experience, bringing the content of a theory into contact with sense 
experience in the form of observation. Accordingly, Quine holds that a 
scientific theory is tested by observational evaluation of observation 
categoricals that it implies.
49 The following account of observation categoricals and the way they are used in testing theory is 
based on Quine (1992, Chapter 1, §§ 4 - 5).
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We can now spell out how Quine’s theory of evidence promises to secure 
mathematical knowledge on its empirical applications. To gather evidence 
for scientific theories we need to test them against sense experience, by 
virtue of the empiricist view that all evidence is sensory evidence. To carry 
out the test, we derive observation categoricals from our scientific theories 
and check these observationally, as we have just described. Because 
scientific theories are mathematically stated, this will often require use of 
purely mathematical claims as premises in our deductions, so that the 
systems of hypotheses that get measured up against observational data 
will involve mathematical hypotheses. By confirmational holism, these 
mathematical premises share in the confirmation provided by agreement 
with the observational data. By the evidence-warrant principle, such 
agreement provides grounds for belief in the truth of the mathematical 
hypotheses. So if Quine’s theory of evidence is accepted, mathematics, 
through its use in empirical applications, is supported by the observational 
evidence we have for science; in short, the Quinean view is that 
mathematical justification is constituted by scientific confirmation.
5.1.2 Indispensability
The theory of evidence described above brings scientific evidence to bear 
on mathematics only if mathematics is included in total science. However, 
one might feel that there are reasons to resist including mathematics in 
total science. Quine himself for a time eschewed mathematics as 
ordinarily understood, declaring with Goodman that there are no abstract 
objects (Goodman and Quine (1947)). But he later abandoned this point 
of view as his conviction grew that science cannot be done without using 
mathematics. Quine’s reason for including mathematics in total science is 
thus that it is indispensable.
What does this mean exactly? Loosely speaking, mathematics is 
indispensable to science whenever it is necessary to our best scientific 
account of the world. More precisely, a mathematical theory is
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indispensable when it is necessary to make use of it to give the best 
possible scientific account of given observations. More formally, letting T 
be a scientific theory accounting for observations O, and assuming T 
makes use of a mathematical theory M:
M is indispensable if and only if any theory T  not making
use of M is inferior to T as a scientific account of O.
Given the Quinean perspective, the theories of interest are global scientific 
accounts of all our observational data (prospective “total sciences”). So 
for Quine, a mathematical theory M is indispensable if and only if there is a 
global scientific account T of all our observational data such that T makes 
use of M and any theory T  not making use of M is an inferior scientific 
theory of all our observational data.
It can seem as if two different indispensability theses emerge from Quine’s 
work. When Quine is writing about contemporary science, he seems 
happy to regard total science as a kind of agglomeration of all the theories 
put forward by scientists in their various fields. Thus every mathematical 
theory used by scientists from day to day ends up being part of total 
science, with the result that all of standard mathematics, the arithmetic of 
the natural numbers, real and complex analysis, set theory, etc. is 
regarded as indispensable. However, when Quine is writing about 
ontology, and in particular about how to find out what exists, he prefers to 
regard total science as a translation of the everyday theories of scientists 
into an ontologically most perspicuous language (first order logic together 
with the language of set theory). The only mathematical theory regarded 
as indispensable from this perspective is set theory.
It would be possible to construct an account of mathematical knowledge 
from either of these positions on the indispensability of mathematics. But 
in the present context, it is best to pick the approach that seems most 
likely to provide a satisfactory account of how mathematical knowledge is 
grounded on its empirical applications. For this reason it seems advisable
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not to concentrate solely on set theory, but to take a wider view. We thus 
propose to view Quinean realism as being based on the claim that 
standard mathematics is indispensable to our best overall scientific 
account of all our observational data. Call this the scientific
indispensability of standard mathematics.
5.1.3 Summary
This completes our description of (what we are calling) Quinean realism. 
The view involves the following four theses:
(i) Sense perception provides evidence for beliefs; the 
only evidence we have for belief is that of sense 
perception;
(ii) In normal circumstances, what counts by ordinary 
scientific criteria to be compelling evidence for a claim 
warrants belief that it is true;
(iii) Scientific evidence attaches to all the hypotheses 
required to generate (successful) predictions;
(iv) Standard mathematics is indispensable to our best 
overall scientific account of all our observational data.
This theory is supposed to deliver mathematical knowledge on the basis of 
scientific confirmation. The theory of evidence constituted by theses (i) to 
(iii) is meant to show that mathematics is scientifically confirmed if it is to 
be taken as part of our best overall science. The scientific indispensability 
of standard mathematics (iv) is meant to show that mathematical science 
is to be taken as part of our best overall science. Quinean realism thus 
infers from the premise that standard mathematics is indispensable to the 
conclusion that it is scientifically confirmed.
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5.2 Objections to Quinean realism
Quinean realism is susceptible to three serious looking lines of attack.50 
The first takes issue with the indispensability of mathematics, arguing 
either that science can be replaced by a non-mathematical alternative 
(Field (1980, 1989a); Balaguer (1996a, 1996b)), or that the mathematics 
that is indispensable to science falls short of standard mathematics 
(Feferman (1993a)). We shall consider the first of these ideas in Chapter 
6 but will be addressing the second below.
The second threatening response to Quinean realism denies the 
evidence-warrant principle (Van Fraassen (1980)). This involves denying 
the efficacy of abductive inference as a means of supporting knowledge 
about unobservable scientific objects and so represents a radical 
departure from our usual ways of thinking about evidence. Because of 
this, we shall not attempt to assess this approach; instead we will assume 
that the evidence-warrant principle is correct.
The third promising line of argument appeals to facts of scientific and (or) 
mathematical practice to argue against confirmational holism (Chihara 
(1990); Maddy (1992, 1997); C. Parsons (1980, 1986b); Sober (1993)). 
This is explored in particularly close detail by Sober and Maddy. In 
Sober’s opinion, scientific practice shows that hypotheses are confirmed 
only when they appear in scientific accounts of observational data that 
outperform competing accounts from which the hypotheses in question are 
absent (1990, 1993). Assuming that indispensable mathematics is 
common to all competing scientific accounts of given observational data, 
he concludes that indispensable mathematics is not scientifically 
confirmed (1993, 44). However, the conception of indispensability 
involved here is quite different from the Quinean conception, according to
50 The literature also contains two putative objections that we do not consider to constitute genuine 
threats. The first is that Quinean realism may be capable of delivering knowledge of mathematical 
objects only if  these are taken to be, in some sense, concrete (Cheyne and Pigden (1996)). The 
second is that it is possible to invoke a non-standard theory of pragmatics in order to portray 
mathematical utterances in scientific contexts as something other than assertions (Melia (1995, 
2000); Yablo (1998)).
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which a mathematical theory is indispensable if and only if it is contained 
in our best overall scientific account of all our observational data, and any 
overall account not containing it would be an inferior account of the data. 
On this conception, it does not follow from the fact that a mathematical 
hypothesis is indispensable that it appears in all competing accounts of 
the relevant observational data; so the indispensability of a mathematical 
hypothesis does not rule out the possibility that it is scientifically 
confirmed. Sober’s argument therefore misses its intended target.
Accordingly, our appraisal of Quinean realism will start with a discussion of 
Maddy’s objections from scientific and mathematical practice. For the 
interested reader, we provide a fuller discussion of Sober’s criticism in the 
appendix to this chapter.
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5.3 Maddy’s objections from scientific practice
Maddy (1997, II, Chapter 6) raises three objections to Quinean realism 
from scientific practice: (a) that scientific confirmation is in practice more 
finely grained than it is in the Quinean view of science; (b) that there is a 
marked difference in practice between the scientific treatment of 
mathematical and physical hypotheses and (c) that scientific applications 
of mathematics are predominantly idealizations. We will consider these in 
turn.51
The first objection depends on a fragment of the history of science.52 
Early in the nineteenth century, Dalton introduced modern atomic theory. 
He suggested that a sample of any given element is made up of identical 
atoms, that these persist through chemical reactions and that compounds 
are constituted by aggregates of atoms of different elements. Dalton also 
applied this theory to explain the proportions in which substances and 
gases combine. In the following years, many scientists made important 
contributions to the theory. Frankland introduced the concept of valence in 
the early 1850s, Cannizzaro used it to calculate atomic weights in 1858, 
and Maxwell, Boltzmann and others used it as the basis of the kinetic 
theory of heat in the early 1860s. Despite these successes, the theory 
was not generally accepted until early in the twentieth century. Between 
1908 and 1911, however, Perrin published the results of experimental data 
on the basis of which he explained Brownian motion and calculated 
Avogadro's number. By doing so, he won almost universal acclaim for the 
atomic hypothesis.
Maddy claims that the atomic theory had become indispensable by the 
turn of the eighteenth century. But as she points out some sceptics, 
including luminaries such as Mach and Poincare, wanted to see the
51 Maddy actually presents her objections as part of a case against the indispensability argument 
for mathematical realism, which infers mathematical realism from the claim that mathematics is 
indispensable to science, and other assumptions. However, as our discussion will make clear, 
Maddy’s objections all concern alleged difficulties with the Quinean account of mathematical 
knowledge.
52 This account of highlights from the period is derived from Maddy (1997, 135-142).
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existence of atoms put to experimental test. These sceptics were not 
regarded as unscientific cranks by the rest of the scientific community. On 
the contrary, the community accepted that the atomic hypothesis had not 
passed a test of the kind envisaged and accepted that, in the absence of 
such a test, disbelief in atoms was scientifically respectable. This situation 
changed with the publication of Perrin’s results. Almost everyone (Mach a 
notable exception) took these to provide the experimental confirmation 
that had been demanded, and thus scepticism with respect to atoms was 
no longer considered scientifically acceptable. Thus in Maddy’s mind, 
Perrin’s results take on a special philosophical significance. It was these 
results, and not merely the indispensability of atomic theory, that finally 
established its acceptance.
Generalizing from this example, Maddy argues that evidence for 
hypotheses can be brought to bear more closely on them than it is by their 
mere indispensability. She also claims that belief in a hypothesis is only a 
requirement when it has been connected to the evidence by this tighter 
relation:
scientists do not, in practice, view the overall empirical 
success of a theory as confirming all its parts. In some 
cases, a central hypothesis of an empirically successful 
theory will continue to be viewed as a 'useful fiction' until it 
has passed a further, more focused, and more demanding 
test. (1997, 142)
Thus Maddy is lead to the view that scientific confirmation has a finer 
structure than Quinean realism allows and that when this fine structure is 
taken into account indispensability does not automatically lead to 
confirmation. She concludes that the inference from the indispensability of 
mathematics to its scientific confirmation is invalid.
What should we make of this objection? It is certainly true that the 
Quinean theory of evidence does not make sense of this episode from the
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history of science. But this was never its aim: it was meant as a theory 
about the nature of scientific evidence, not as a description of scientific 
practice. So the fact that scientists take a more fine grained view than 
Quinean realism of the relationship between observation and hypotheses 
does not show that it must be rejected but rather that it needs an addition, 
a theory explaining why it is rational to practice science the way we 
ordinarily do even though confirmation is holistic. If we looked into this to 
find that no such addition were possible, we would have to conclude that 
the Quinean theory of evidence could not be reconciled with any 
reasonable explanations of scientific practice, which would be a forceful 
objection to it and Quinean realism. As things stand, however, we only 
have reason to question whether such reconciliation is possible, not to 
conclude that it is impossible. Thus we do not yet have grounds to reject 
Quinean realism, but only to suspend judgment on it.
We turn now to Maddy’s objection that there is a marked difference in 
practice between the scientific treatment of mathematical and physical 
hypotheses. Maddy claims that scientists seem content to use whatever 
mathematics they find most useful in constructing and manipulating their 
theories, without worrying about the mathematical existence assumptions 
entailed (1997, 155). She claims also that they often do not care about 
the physical structural assumptions implied by the mathematics they 
invoke (loc. cit.) and that they do not seem to think of their observational 
evidence as evidence for their mathematics (op. cit., 156). This laissez- 
faire attitude towards mathematical hypotheses contrasts starkly with 
scientific attitudes towards physical hypotheses. Scientists care very 
much about the existence assumptions that their physical hypotheses 
entail, they are very much interested in the structural implications of these 
hypotheses and they certainly think of their observational evidence as 
evidence for their physical theories. Thus Maddy’s view is that there is an 
epistemic disanalogy between the way physical and mathematical 
hypotheses are treated in scientific practice (loc. cit.). As she thinks also 
that Quinean realism implies a scientific practice that does not vary in this 
way, she takes the disanalogy to be evidence against that view.
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One way of responding to this is to argue that the epistemic disanalogy is 
illusory. In this vein, Colyvan (1998, 51-53) argues that scientists do worry 
about the ontological commitments of the mathematics they use but that 
this is overlooked because they tend to do so only when new mathematics 
is applied. In support of this, he contrasts the passive acceptance of real 
analysis in contemporary science with the controversial introduction to 
science of the calculus (in particular infinitesimals), Dirac’s delta function 
and complex numbers.53
However, these examples are not decisive. Colyvan is correct to say that 
seventeenth century scientists had specifically ontological worries about 
infinitesimals, as Berkeley’s comments in The Analyst about the “ghosts of 
departed quantities” make clear. However, contemporary standard 
mathematics does not imply that infinitesimals exist, so these ontological 
worries may not be relevant.
On the subject of the delta function, Colyvan quotes a passage from Dirac 
to illustrate the kind of worries people had:
although an improper function [e.g., the Dirac delta 
function] does not itself have a well-defined value, when it 
occurs as a factor in an integrand the integral has a well- 
defined value. In quantum theory, whenever an improper 
function appears, it will be something which is to be used 
ultimately in an integrand. Therefore it should be possible 
to rewrite the theory in a form in which the improper 
functions appear all through only in integrands. One could 
then eliminate the improper functions altogether. The use 
of improper functions thus does not involve any lack of 
rigour in the theory, but is merely a convenient notation,
53 For the attitudes of contemporary science towards real analysis, Colyvan considers the views of 
Richard Feynman, whose use of real analysis in measurement contexts is one of Maddy’s leading 
examples of scientific nonchalance towards the mathematics used in science. Colyvan (1998, 51) 
suggests that Feynman may have been content to apply real analysis in measurement contexts 
because he believed that its ontological commitments were already supported by other applications 
in physics. However, Colyvan does not produce a quote in which Feynman expresses this belief 
(or, indeed, any others, Colyvan doesn’t quote from Feynman at all), so this is speculative.
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enabling us to express in a concise form certain relations 
which we could, if necessary, rewrite in a form not involving 
improper functions, but only in a cumbersome way which 
would tend to obscure the argument. Dirac (1958, 59)
Perhaps this remark can be read as a concern with the mathematical 
ontology of quantum theory. But given the lack of any explicit reference to 
such worries, given that the explicit concern is with a possible “lack of 
rigour in the theory”, it is not obvious that this how it should be taken.
This leaves the case of complex numbers. Colyvan cites passages in 
Kline’s standard history of mathematics (Kline (1972)) to show that 
Descartes, Newton and Euler had apparently ontological worries about the 
square root of negative one and other imaginary numbers (Colyvan (1998, 
53)). He explains that Newton’s worries were based on the fact that the 
imaginary roots of equations lacked physical significance (op. cit., 53). 
However to take this as evidence of ontological worries about complex 
numbers as we now understand them involves a somewhat questionable 
slide; presumably Newton, Descartes and Euler had no worries about 
complex numbers as we now understand them.
It is thus debatable whether these examples establish that scientists had 
specifically ontological worries about the introduction of currently accepted 
mathematical objects. Even if they did show this, they would not establish 
that it is normal for scientists to have ontological worries about the 
scientific uses of new mathematical objects.54 Since ontological worries of 
this kind are not the only basis for Maddy’s epistemic disanalogy between 
the scientific treatment of mathematical and physical hypotheses, it 
therefore appears that these examples are not a sufficient from which to 
show that there is no such disanalogy.
54 Colyvan himself concedes this: “Whether controversy surrounding the use of novel 
mathematical entities in physical theories is widespread or not I am in no position to say, but at 
least it seems that there are some cases where physicists are genuinely suspicious of new 
mathematical entities.” (1998, 53)
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However, arguing against the disanalogy is not the only available 
response. Maddy’s objection here depends on the thought that Quinean 
realism implies that there should not be such a disanalogy. But Maddy 
does not provide any argument in favour of this, and on reflection it does 
not seem particularly attractive. For why should the fact, if it is a fact, that 
mathematics shares in the evidence for science make scientists at all 
concerned about the ontological implications of the mathematics they use? 
What reason would this give them to worry about the physical 
assumptions their mathematics implies? And why should it make them 
show an interest in taking their experiments to confirm mathematics? 
There is no reason why it should. Scientists are interested in their own 
research projects and they have their own agendas. The discovery that 
mathematics is scientifically confirmed would not provide them with a 
reason to swap those projects and agendas for others. They could, if they 
chose, start addressing mathematical questions by asking what answers 
to those questions are most useful in their theories. But no requirement to 
do so falls out of adopting Quinean realism, so it does not necessarily 
bring with it a deviant scientific practice.
This indicates that the epistemic disanalogy does not provide grounds for 
rejecting Quinean realism. It would do so, if the view were meant as a 
description of scientific practice, for then the lesson of the disanalogy 
would be that the description is inaccurate. But just as the Quinean theory 
of evidence is not meant as a description of scientific practice, neither is 
Quinean realism meant as a description of the treatment of mathematics in 
scientific practice. It is true that the existence of the epistemic disanalogy 
lends urgency to the challenge raised by Maddy’s first objection, 
emphasizing once again that we stand in need of a theory explaining why 
our current scientific practice is appropriate, given that scientific 
confirmation is holistic. But this is the most that can be claimed for it. 
Having agreed that there is a difference in the way mathematical and 
physical hypotheses are treated in scientific practice, a valid question is 
raised as to whether an account of scientific practice can be found that 
coheres well with Quinean realism. But that is all.
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We now turn to Maddy’s third and final objection from scientific practice. 
This argues that mathematics cannot generally be scientifically confirmed 
because the applications in which it appears are predominantly 
idealizations (1997, 143-154). If this is correct, it would not only refute 
Quinean realism as it currently stands; it would also show that Quinean 
realism cannot be developed so as to satisfactorily explain the facts of 
scientific practice we have already discussed. Maddy’s argument from 
idealizations thus promises a powerful new objection to the Quinean 
approach. Let us examine it in more detail.
The argument depends on a distinction between two kinds of idealization. 
Ballistics experts assuming that the Earth is flat in order to calculate the 
trajectory of a missile are making idealizing assumptions of the first kind; 
they are adopting idealizing assumptions in full knowledge that they are 
false. In contrast, physicists assuming that space and time are continuous 
in order to apply real analysis in measurement contexts are making 
idealizing assumptions of the second kind; they are adopting idealizing 
assumptions the truth (or falsehood) of which they regard as being open. 
The attractions of each kind of idealization are the same, they may 
facilitate the scientific task by allowing us to apply simpler mathematics, 
they may allow us to apply mathematics where otherwise none could be 
applied, etc. However, the way they deliver these benefits are different; 
the first kind of idealization involves deliberate misrepresentations, the 
second does not.
Maddy contrasts idealizations of both these kinds with “literal applications”. 
Presumably, these are applications in which no assumptions are made 
that are not thought to be true.55 For Maddy, only literal applications could 
forge the strong connection between mathematical hypotheses and 
scientific evidence, which is provided by the focused scientific testing of 
scientific hypotheses, and which is required, on Maddy’s view, if they are 
to be scientifically confirmed (op. cit., 146). In light of this, she argues that
35 Maddy does not actually define what is meant by a literal application but this reading seems to 
accord best with the argument she makes.
189
there are not enough uncontroversial examples of mathematics appearing 
indispensably in literal applications to support the view that mathematics is 
scientifically confirmed.
To help establish this, Maddy considers the use in science of “continuum 
mathematics”, the body of mathematical theories built up from assumption 
of the real number continuum, real analysis, complex analysis, etc. Maddy 
concedes that there are very many indispensable applications of this 
mathematics. However, she argues that many of these applications are 
the kind of idealization in which false assumptions are knowingly made. 
For example, such idealization is involved when we assume that oceans 
are infinitely deep to represent water waves, when we use continuous 
functions on real numbers to represent discontinuous phenomena like 
charge and angular momentum, when we assume that liquids are 
continuous substances in fluid dynamics, etc. (op. cit., 143). Maddy also 
points out that other applications of continuum mathematics typically 
assume that space and time are continuous, and that whether this is the 
case remains an open scientific question (op. cit., 146-152). This makes 
them idealizations of the second kind. Thus, after arguing for the 
intermediate conclusion that uncontroversial examples of literal 
applications are typically dispensable, Maddy infers that there is scant 
evidence of literal applications in which mathematics is indispensable (op. 
cit., 152-153). And this leads her to the conclusion that there are 
insufficiently many uncontroversial examples of mathematics 
indispensably appearing in literal applications to support the view that 
mathematics, in general, is scientifically confirmed (op. cit., 154).
What should we make of this argument? It is uncontestable that some of 
the assumptions used in idealizations are not scientifically confirmed. 
Moreover, it seems plausible to maintain, with Maddy, that idealized 
applications could not provide the sort of focused tests that are required, 
on her view, to warrant belief in mathematical hypotheses. Nevertheless, 
we shall argue that there is not a telling objection here to the Quinean 
approach.
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To see why, we need to take note of two separate points. The first is that 
passing a focused test of the kind envisaged by Maddy does not seem to 
be the only way a scientific hypothesis can come to be scientifically 
confirmed. As Resnik (1997, 20) observes, highly theoretical empirical 
hypotheses such as the conservation of mass/energy are not put to such 
tests. Apparently, however, such hypotheses are confirmed, presumably 
by an accumulation of evidence made available by their use as 
background assumptions to many successful applications. The second 
point is that it is highly implausible to claim that idealized applications 
provide no evidence for any of the assumptions they involve. Scientific 
evidence gathering in some areas of science (e.g. particle physics) is 
conducted primarily through the development of idealized applications; if 
we did not view such applications as capable of delivering evidence for 
scientific hypotheses, it would be difficult to make sense of this activity.
Appealing to the first of these points, the Quinean can reject Maddy’s 
presupposition that the only way a scientific hypothesis can be confirmed 
is by passing a focused scientific test. This already constitutes a telling 
response to her argument for, without this presupposition, the best it can 
establish is that mathematics is not scientifically confirmed by focused 
scientific test. In addition to this, the points taken together allow the 
Quinean to propose that mathematics may be confirmed by accumulated 
evidence emerging from idealized applications, which would undermine 
Maddy’s position even more.
To make this proposal attractive, it helps to have reasons for thinking that 
the mathematical hypotheses of idealized applications should be 
assimilated to empirical hypotheses confirmed by accumulated scientific 
evidence, rather than to idealizing assumptions, which of course are not 
confirmed at all. Recall, then, that Maddy’s argument posits two kinds of 
idealization, those in which we make assumptions that are known to be 
false and those in which we make assumptions the truth of which is 
regarded as being open. When we use assumptions in this way it shows 
that we are making them for purely instrumental purposes. Typically,
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however, these indicators of instrumental use are absent from the 
mathematical assumptions used in idealized applications. The epistemic 
role of the mathematical hypotheses used in idealized applications thus 
appears disanalogous to that of the idealizing assumptions, in typical 
cases.
In contrast, the epistemic role of the mathematical hypotheses appears 
broadly similar to that of the highly theoretical empirical hypotheses we 
mentioned earlier (such as the conservation of mass/energy). For 
example, both tend to function as part of the theoretical background 
applications, neither are required to pass focused tests in order to be 
accepted and both are shielded from revision. It therefore does seem 
plausible to assimilate the mathematical hypotheses of idealized 
applications to empirical hypotheses confirmed by accumulated evidence, 
rather than to idealizing assumptions. So the proposal that mathematics 
can be viewed as being scientifically confirmed by accumulated evidence 
emerging from idealizations appears quite credible.
Given these considerations, Maddy’s argument from idealizations seems 
far from convincing. Its premise that scientific hypotheses can only be 
confirmed by passing a focussed scientific test seems not to be true; in 
fact, some empirical hypotheses appear to be confirmed by accumulated 
evidence, without passing such tests. Moreover, it appears plausible for 
the Quinean to claim that mathematics is scientifically confirmed by 
accumulated evidence emerging from idealized applications, thus drawing 
a comparison between the confirmation of mathematics and the 
confirmation of highly theoretical empirical principles such as the 
conservation of mass/energy. For these reasons, Maddy’s argument from 
idealized applications does not appear to present a convincing objection to
192
the Quinean approach.56
56 We should acknowledge here that it does not seem possible, on the Quinean view, to take all 
idealized applications as providing confirmation for the mathematics they use. For example, it 
seems unwise to view matters this way when mathematically illegitimate numerical methods are 
used to fix otherwise unsuccessful applications, as for instance when renormalisation is used to 
apply continuum mathematics in quantum theory. However, the reason Quineans might be 
cautious with such examples is not that they are idealizations. Rather, it is that the use of 
illegitimate numerical methods makes it difficult to view them as genuine applications of viable 
mathematical theories.
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5.4 Maddy’s objections from mathematical practice
Maddy makes three objections from mathematical practice: (a) that we find 
elementary mathematics obvious (1997, 106-107); (b) that the
justifications mathematicians propose in favour of their claims typically do 
not mention indispensable applications (op. cit., 106) and (c) that 
mathematicians typically do not appeal to applications to address 
questions independent of ZFC (op. cit., 159). In each case, her argument 
is that if mathematics were scientifically confirmed, we would not expect 
mathematical practice to be like this in the relevant respect.
The objection from obviousness was first raised by Charles Parsons:
The empiricist view, even in the subtle and complex form it 
takes in the work of Professor Quine, seems subject to the 
objection that it leaves unaccounted for precisely the 
obviousness of elementary mathematics (and perhaps also 
of logic). C. Parsons (1980, 101)
The problem, as Parsons sees it, is that by treating mathematical claims in 
the same way as the theoretical claims of natural science, it becomes 
necessary to regard obvious claims of elementary mathematics as “bold 
hypotheses, about which a prudent scientist would maintain reserve, 
keeping in mind that experience might not bear them out” (1980, 102). But 
of course, we do not regard elementary mathematical claims like this, so it 
is implausible to suggest that mathematics is scientifically confirmed.
It is true that Quinean realism does not immediately explain the 
obviousness of elementary mathematics, but that this is a problem 
remains unclear. Presumably Parson’s is claiming that the obviousness of 
elementary mathematical claims provides grounds for belief in their truth 
and that this cannot be explained from the Quinean perspective. 
However, the Quinean has two responses. Affirming that the obviousness 
of elementary claims provides grounds for belief in their truth, he can
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argue that this is because each of us has sensory evidence for such 
claims. Simple sums like 2 + 2 =4, for example, can be regarded as over- 
learnt, hence obvious, because of the very large number of confirming 
instances of them that we each experience every day. But then such 
claims are obvious because they are amply confirmed, and so there is no 
difficulty in explaining why obviousness is a ground for belief. 
Alternatively, the Quinean could simply deny that the obviousness of 
elementary mathematics is a ground for belief. There are good examples 
both in mathematics and without of obvious-seeming claims that turned 
out not to be true (the existence of the Russell set, the claim that the earth 
is flat, etc.). Hence it remains unclear that the obviousness of elementary 
mathematics is a ground for belief. For these reasons, the objection from 
obviousness is not effective.
Let us turn then to the second objection from mathematical practice. 
Maddy is quite correct to say that mathematicians typically do not mention 
indispensable applications when trying to justify their claims: what 
mathematics typically demand for justification is proof. However, it is not 
clear that Quinean realism requires a revision of this practice. If proof is to 
be the standard vehicle of mathematical justification, there must be 
justified mathematical claims that are not proved from more basic claims. 
But then how are these axioms justified? Quineans answer that they are 
scientifically confirmed in their indispensable applications. Thus the 
proper focus of Quinean realism is with the justification of the axioms of 
mathematics, and only indirectly with the justification of results derived 
from them, via the mechanism of proof. So the view does not recommend 
supplanting proof from previously established results by appeals to 
indispensability; rather, it supports proof from previously established 
results as an epistemically effective method, by providing justification for 
the unproved assumptions that are necessary for the construction of 
proofs. Once again, then, no telling objection has emerged.
Maddy’s last objection from mathematical practice observes that there are 
mathematical questions whose answers are open in the sense of being
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independent of the axioms of ZFC (they can neither be proved nor 
disproved from them). Some examples are whether there are non- 
measurable I 12 sets, whether there are thin n \  sets and whether every 
free group is a Whitehead group (Maddy (1997, 66-69)). If we are to solve 
questions like these we will have to establish new axioms for set theory 
from which answers can be deduced. But how are we to do this? Quine’s 
approach here is firmly rooted in applications. He thinks we should 
believe whichever axiom candidates are necessary to generate the 
mathematics indispensably required in science, together with axiom 
candidates necessary to streamline this mathematical theory:
So much of mathematics as is wanted for use in empirical 
science is for me on a par with the rest of science.
Transfinite ramifications are on the same footing insofar as 
they come of a simplificatory rounding out, but anything 
further is on a par rather with uninterpreted systems.
Quine (1984, 788)
In contrast, Maddy maintains, the approach exhibited in practice seems to 
have little to do with empirical applications (1997, 159). Set theorists offer 
mathematical considerations in favour of new axiom candidates, noting 
their connections to other axioms and axiom candidates, their effect on 
open and independent questions, their intrinsic plausibility, etc. For 
Maddy, it is already an objection to Quinean realism that the 
methodologies here are different, but worse is to come. Guided by his 
methodology, Quine affirms the axiom of constructibility, V = L (see Quine 
(1992, 94-95)): following the methodology of practice, the set theoretic 
community denies V = L (for a philosophical account of possible reasons 
why see Maddy (1993)). Seemingly, then, Quine’s methodological 
approach disagrees with that of practising set theorists over which new 
axiom candidates should be accepted.
Maddy is surely right that the selection of new axioms is an aspect of 
mathematical practice that philosophical accounts of mathematics must
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address and she is right to argue that this is an area of some significance 
for Quinean realism. However, as with the objections from scientific 
practice that we considered before, the effect of the points raised here is 
not to refute Quinean realism but to raise certain challenges that it must 
address.
Consider the first point, that in practice set theorists work with a 
methodology quite different from the one that would be expected if the 
evidence for mathematical axioms comes from empirical applications. 
This constitutes an objection to Quinean realism only if it is not possible to 
explain why set theorists operate with their methodology even though 
mathematics is ultimately confirmed in applications. But Maddy does not 
provide any such reason. So we are left not with an objection but with a 
challenge: to show how Quinean realism can explain this fact about 
mathematical practice.
The second point, that Quine’s methodology and the methodology of 
practice demand different decisions on prospective axioms, is a little 
different. If we are to side with the set theorists in rejecting V = L, as 
clearly we should, then we will have to explain in what way Quine erred 
when he evaluated V = L as true. Since one possible explanation is that 
Quinean realism is incorrect, the case of V = L does initially threaten this 
position. However, one could equally well criticize Quine’s approach to 
potential axioms instead. Quine may say that we should believe 
indispensable mathematical axioms and those that satisfactorily round 
them out; but we could say that Quine’s application of the “rounding out 
process” is too crude since it delivers as truths axioms that are not 
accepted in practice. Instead of abandoning Quinean realism, therefore, 
we could try to show that there is an available methodology for 
mathematics which leads us to the view that V = L false but which does 
not conflict with the Quinean view that the evidence for mathematical 
claims derives ultimately from empirical applications. Once again, we are 
left not with a solid objection but with a challenge: to find a methodology
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that coheres with Quinean realism and that delivers the right verdict on V = 
L.
It is important to note that Maddy’s line of argument with V = L can be 
imitated whenever we are presented with an axiom whose truth-value is 
settled according to mathematics but that seems not to be required by 
empirical applications (an example is the axiom of inaccessibles, Al). The 
acceptance of such axioms in mathematics seems unreasonable from the 
point of view of Quinean realism, as indispensability considerations do not 
appear to provide reason to accept them. Clearly if this is the situation 
with many mathematical axioms, it will constitute a serious objection to 
Quinean realism. Maddy’s discussion of V = L thus raises a more general 
challenge than that specified in the last paragraph. Let us say that a 
mathematical axiom is dispensable if and only if it has no indispensable 
applications (so that it is either not applied or not indispensably applied). 
Then the challenge can be put as follows: to show that Quinean realism 
can be coherently extended by a methodology delivering confirmation for 
dispensable mathematical axioms in just those cases for which it is 
required.
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5.5 Resnik’s development of Quinean realism
Having considered Maddy’s objections from scientific and mathematical 
practice we find ourselves with no reason to reject Quinean realism. The 
facts of practice do not show that Quinean realism must be abandoned 
because it is intended as a theory of scientific and mathematical evidence, 
not as a description of scientific or mathematical practice. As we have 
seen, however, the facts of practice raise challenges that must be met by 
proponents of the Quinean approach. Quineans must show that there is a 
methodology that reconciles the facts of scientific and mathematical 
practice with the scientific confirmation of mathematics and that provides a 
plausible account of the confirmation of dispensable mathematics, in 
particular axiom candidates such as V = L and Al.
Resnik (1995, 1997) agrees that Quinean realism does not explain the 
facts of scientific and mathematical practice. Nevertheless he thinks the 
idea of grounding mathematical justification in the applications of 
mathematics is a good one and he agrees that it should be pursued by 
appeal to confirmational holism and indispensability. Resnik explains his 
method as follows:
I will show that ‘good sense’, in the form of pragmatic 
rationality, underwrites the special role mathematics has 
come to play in science and bids us to treat it as if it were 
known a priori. (1997, 120)
By appeal to pragmatic rationality, then, Resnik aims to extend the 
framework laid down by Quine, to arrive at a position from which the facts 
of scientific and mathematical practice will be explicable. In this section, 
we will consider the ways in which Resnik extends Quinean realism. In 
the next, we will find out whether these innovations are sufficient to meet 
the challenges we have identified.
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Following Kyburg (1984, 1990), Resnik thinks of scientific practice in terms 
of models, mini-theories of physical situations that include both scientific 
and mathematical principles (Resnik (1997, 121-123)). Scientists gather 
evidence for scientific theories by constructing models and testing them, 
comparing their logical and statistical implications with observational data. 
As Resnik points out, scientific modeling requires taking diverse 
hypotheses for granted; when scientists working within a given discipline 
are constructing and testing their models, they tend to assume fragments 
of theory from other specialties together with methods appropriate to them. 
Models from one specialty will tend to invoke similar assumptions from 
other specialties and this suggests distinguishing amongst scientific 
theories according to the kind of assumptions made in the models used to 
test them. Because the results and methods of some theories are more 
widely applied than others, Resnik claims that this method of 
discrimination leads to a kind of order on scientific theories; the widely 
applied theories are more global in this respect, the others more local (op. 
cit., 125). In this way, scientific practice shows mathematics to be more 
global than physics, which is more global than chemistry, which is more 
global than biology, etc. (foe. cit.).
Hand in hand with this distinction between local and global theories goes 
the idea of local conceptions of evidence. Local conceptions of evidence 
are not something to do just with local theories (as Resnik’s terminology 
might misleadingly suggest). Rather they are special conceptions of 
evidence that apply locally to specific theories, subject-specific ideas of 
what counts as evidence for given propositions within the practice of a 
scientific specialty and what methods it is appropriate to use in testing 
them (op. cit., 126).
To see what Resnik is driving at with this idea, consider the prediction that 
fifty percent of the rabbit population of Wiltshire will suffer from 
myxomatosis. To find out whether this claim were true, we would appeal 
to data about the interaction of rabbit populations in Britain and about the 
geographical spread of myxomatosis, and we would appeal to various
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theories from fields such as vetinary science and mathematics. To do this, 
we would have to make judgments about what data and theory were 
relevant to the evaluative task concerned, judgments we would be 
qualified to make on the basis of our prior experience of dealing with that 
kind of evaluative task. It appears that Resnik's local conceptions of 
evidence are intended to make sense of this kind of activity. Presumably, 
our expertise to make the kind of choices required by these subject 
specific evaluations consists in our sensitivity to local conceptions of 
evidence corresponding to the specific subjects concerned.
In positing local conceptions of evidence, Resnik does not abandon 
confirmational holism (the idea that evidence attaches to all the 
hypotheses necessary to generate a subsequently confirmed prediction), 
nor does he abandon the Quinean idea that questions of evidence are 
ultimately referred to our overall scientific theory. Quite the contrary in 
fact, as there are several ways in which global considerations regulate 
evidence gathering at the local level; local conceptions of evidence are 
overridable by global considerations (op. cit, 100) and they are justified by 
pragmatic judgments as to what best promotes science as a whole (toe. 
cit., see also op. cit., 126)). Pragmatic considerations at the global level 
also serve to shape the local conceptions of evidence operative in 
scientific practice. Specialists may sometimes be tempted to make 
revisions in the more global theories from which they draw hypotheses for 
use in their models. But because such alterations have the potential to 
rule out models in other scientific specialties that perform well, 
considerations of what is good for science as a whole counsel specialists 
to revise their models by revising the hypotheses specific to their own 
specialty before altering hypotheses drawn from more global theories. 
Ultimately this is just good sense, as this way of proceeding minimizes 
disruption to science as a whole (op. cit., 125-126).
Another way Resnik builds on Quinean realism is by introducing a new 
use for indispensability. This is made clear in the following argument:
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(1) In stating its laws and conducting its derivations science 
assumes the existence of many mathematical objects and 
the truth of much mathematics.
(2) These assumptions are indispensable to the practice of 
science; moreover, many of the important conclusions drawn 
from and within science could not be drawn without taking 
mathematical claims to be true
(3) So we are justified in drawing conclusions from and within 
science only if we are justified in taking the mathematics 
used in science to be true.
(4) We are justified in using science to explain and predict.
(5) The only way we know of using science thus involves 
drawing conclusions from and within it.
(6) So, by (3) above, we are justified in taking this 
mathematics to be true. (1997, 46-48)57
The appeal to this argument represents a departure from Quinean realism, 
in which the indispensability of mathematics justifies taking the evidence 
for science as evidence for mathematics. For Resnik, the indispensability
of mathematics also justifies taking the justification we have for doing
science as justification for believing mathematics. In both cases, 
indispensability transfers support from science to mathematics. But in the 
first case, evidence is transferred from one body of theory to another, 
whereas in the second the justification for pursuing one kind of activity is 
transferred to another. Following Resnik, we will call the first of these the 
confirmational approach to indispensability and second the pragmatic 
approach.58
Having reviewed Resnik’s additions to Quinean realism, we can describe 
his account of mathematical knowledge. From the Quinean account it 
inherits the Quinean theory of evidence (the view that evidence is sensory 
evidence, confirmational holism and the evidence warrant principle)
5/ Here the argument (l)-(3 ) is quoted from (1997, 46-47), the continuation (4) -  (6) from (1997, 
48).
58 The terminology is introduced in Resnik (1995).
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together with the scientific indispensability of mathematics. The 
confirmational approach to the indispensability of mathematics is used to 
justify taking the evidence for science as evidence for mathematics, as 
before, but now the pragmatic approach to indispensability is also used, to 
justify taking the justification for doing science as justification for believing 
mathematics. In addition, Resnik proposes an account of the practice of 
the sciences in which there is a distinction between global and local 
scientific theories, with one theory being more global than another if its 
results and methods are more widely applied. Scientific theories have 
local conceptions of evidence corresponding to them, regulated by 
pragmatic considerations concerning what is best for science as a whole. 
Our specialized sciences (physics, chemistry, etc.) are thus portrayed as 
sociologically distinguished theories practiced according to local 
conceptions of evidence the nature of which is determined by global 
considerations and the grounds of good sense.
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5.6 Resnik’s response to the challenges of practice
Having set out Resnik’s account of mathematics, or at least that part of it 
pertaining to the idea that mathematics is scientifically confirmed, we 
return to the challenges of practice. In this section, we will assess whether 
Resnik’s theory adequately explains the facts of scientific and 
mathematical practice and whether it deals successfully with the 
confirmation of dispensable mathematics.
5.6.1 Explaining the facts of scientific practice
The features of scientific practice not explained during the discussion of 
section 5.3 are the practice of taking experiments to bear on individual 
hypotheses and the three points of Maddy’s epistemic disanalogy between 
the scientific treatment of mathematical and physical hypotheses. All of 
these can be adequately explained with the help of Resnik’s account of 
mathematics.
Resnik himself deals with the practice of taking experiments to bear on 
individual hypotheses, during his discussion of the scientific use of 
models. Resnik points out that to investigate the performance of their 
models scientists freely draw upon whatever theoretical resources they 
deem best fit for their purposes, that they idealize their models for reasons 
of simplicity, tractability etc. and that they manipulate the closeness of fit 
between prediction and observation. According to Resnik, this activity is 
all pragmatically justified; it is part and parcel of operating with a local 
theory and a local conception of evidence that are justified on the grounds 
of good sense. Moreoover, Resnik argues that it is on these same 
pragmatic grounds that the success of a model can be taken as evidence 
for one of its hypotheses. It makes good sense to practice science this 
way as this best promotes the development of science as a whole. And in 
particular, the fact that scientists take experiments to bear on individual 
hypotheses does not refute confirmational holism because hypotheses are
204
isolated for experimental testing only by pragmatic grounds, not 
epistemological ones (Resnik (1997, 128-129)).
Turning now to Maddy’s epistemic disanalogy between the scientific 
treatment of mathematical and physical hypotheses, recall that it had three 
aspects: that scientists do not worry about the ontological commitments of 
the mathematics they use; that they do not usually care about physical 
structural assumptions it implies and that they do not take their 
observations to provide evidence for their mathematics. These all make 
sense when we think of our special empirical sciences as local theories 
practiced according to local conception of evidence in accordance with 
pragmatic rationality. Scientists working in a particular field, particle 
physics, say, are interested in the local issues specific to that field, so of 
course they do not worry about the ontological commitments of the 
mathematics they use because these are not included in those local 
issues. They do not worry about the physical structural assumptions 
implied by their mathematics because, for pragmatic reasons, they are 
interested in assessing other hypotheses more closely related to the local 
issues with which they are concerned. Finally, they do not take their 
observations to support the mathematics they use because, for pragmatic 
reasons, they are using those observations to test hypotheses germane to 
their own specialty. As before, it makes good sense to practice science 
like this.
For Resnik, there is a further aspect to the special role mathematics plays 
in science, namely that scientists shield mathematics from revision. 
Resnik argues that we should practice science this way even though 
confirmation is holistic because mathematics is our most global theory (op. 
cit., 125-126).59 This is a good point to make; clearly one should shield 
mathematics from revision because changes to mathematics have 
consequences throughout science. By appeal to his pragmatic approach 
to indispensability, Resnik also suggests that we would always have
59 Resnik does not take logic to be a more global theory because he does not regard logic as a 
theory, see (1997, 125, n.22)).
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pragmatic reasons for believing mathematics and that these would 
counsel us to protect mathematics from revision (op. cit, 124). However, 
since the pragmatic approach to indispensability presupposes that there 
are mathematical objects and that the mathematics used in science is 
true, this gives a reason for shielding mathematics from revision only to 
those with a prior commitment to mathematical realism.
Be that as it may, Resnik is right to think that the global local distinction 
and local conceptions of evidence provide a sufficient basis from which to 
explain the facts of scientific practice. Conceiving of the physical sciences 
as more or less global theories, and of scientists as specialists in their 
fields, operating under the guidance of a local conception of evidence, 
grounds of good sense counsel that experiments be used to test particular 
hypotheses and that mathematics should play a special role insulated from 
the kind of treatment ordinarily meted out to physical hypotheses. In this 
way, Resnik’s account of mathematics provides a methodology that 
reconciles the Quinean approach with the facts of scientific practice.
5.6.2 Explaining the facts of mathematical practice
We return now to the aspect of mathematical practice outstanding from 
our discussion of 5.4, that mathematicians (more specifically, set theorists) 
do not look to applications to help them decide upon new axioms. 
Presumably, it was features of practice such as this that moved Resnik to 
remark that we practice mathematics “as if it were an a priori science” 
(1997, 120). As his view is that mathematics is not an apriori science, this 
impression is of course misleading. How, then, is the appearance of 
apriority to be explained away?
To help with this, Resnik first explains why we should expect mathematical 
standards of evidence to appeal to methods internal to mathematics, 
rather than appealing to the justificatory canons of other theories. Given 
the pragmatic appeal to indispensability, this expectation is said to derive
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from the constraints governing the local conception of mathematical 
evidence:
From this perspective [the perspective of pragmatic 
indispensability] we may encourage mathematicians to 
develop their own standards of evidence, so long as the 
result does not harm science as a whole. Because 
mathematics is our most global science we should expect 
that many mathematical methods and principles will be 
justified by means of considerations neutral between the 
special sciences, and thus often pertaining to mathematics 
alone. (1997, 129)
The argument here is rather short, so it is not obvious why being “our most 
global science” should make us expect that the standards of evidence 
constitutive of the local conception of mathematical evidence should ratify 
mathematical justifications “neutral between the special sciences”. 
Nevertheless, a little reflection shows that we should.
Suppose, first, we were to evaluate given mathematical claims by 
considering only their biological applications. As there is no reason to 
expect that the mathematical needs of other special sciences will be just 
the same as those of biology, using these applications as the main source 
of evidence for mathematics could limit the usefulness of mathematics 
elsewhere in science. This would be damaging to science, so, because 
local conceptions of evidence are required to minimize damage to science, 
we would expect a local conception of mathematical evidence that does 
not accord biological applications a central role in mathematical 
justification.
Next, observe that mathematics is our most global science. For Resnik 
this means that mathematics is presupposed by all the special sciences, 
so clearly the argument we have just made from biological applications 
could be made from the mathematical applications of any special science.
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Thus we can expect a local conception of mathematical evidence that 
does not accord a central role in mathematical justification to the 
mathematical applications of any special science, a local conception that 
is, in this sense, neutral between them. It follows that whatever methods 
become the norm in the local conception of mathematical evidence, they 
must either be internal to mathematics, or drawn from an even more global 
theory. Since there is no more global theory than mathematics, it follows 
that these methods must be internal to mathematics. Thus the constraints 
regulating the local conception of mathematical evidence, that 
mathematics is our most global theory and that we should always aim to 
minimize disruption to science as a whole, lead us to expect a local 
conception of evidence the standards of which are primarily concerned 
with intra-mathematical considerations.
In as much as this should make us expect a local conception of 
mathematical evidence that does not typically appeal to empirical 
considerations, it would certainly make us expect mathematics to be 
practiced “as if it were an apriori science”. To reinforce this expectation, 
Resnik explains how allowing mathematicians to develop the local 
conception of mathematical evidence as they see fit (subject to the 
constraint of not harming science as a whole) would also explain specific 
features of mathematical practice. In the following passage, for example, 
he explains how this approach might have led to the dominant role played 
by proof:
Early mathematicians probably took their experience with 
counting, book-keeping, carpentry and surveying as 
evidence for the rules and principles of arithmetic and 
geometry that they eventually took as unquestionably true.
They began to put more emphasis on deduction after they 
became aware of the difficulties in deciding certain 
mathematical questions by appealing to concrete models, 
which, for example, are notoriously unreliable in deciding 
geometric questions. ... Even today we could (and
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sometimes do) use concrete models to decide certain 
mathematical questions; for example, we might simulate a 
Turing machine on a computer to determine whether it gets 
into a certain state when processing a given input. But the 
advantages of proof to the practice of mathematics are so 
obvious that frowning on experimental approaches has 
served the goals of mathematics better than allowing or 
promoting such approaches. Moreover, proof wins out 
from the perspective of science as a whole. For requiring 
mathematics to prove its results increases its reliability, and 
decreases its susceptibility to experimental refutation.
(1997, 129-130)
The central role of proof in mathematical practice, its function as the 
primary vehicle of mathematical justification, thus emerges on Resnik’s 
view as a sensible reaction to difficulties met within mathematics and also 
as a sensible means of ensuring the usefulness of mathematics in 
applications. And so we see that this key feature of the seeming apriority 
of mathematics is easily explained by Resnik’s methodological theory.
Taking our cue from this example, it is also possible to explain why 
mathematicians do not look to applications to help decide on new axiom 
candidates. Mathematicians are looking for answers to these questions 
from the perspective of the local conception of mathematical evidence, 
which as we have seen will be neutral between the special empirical 
sciences. Mathematicians practice their science this way because this 
approach has proved beneficial for both mathematics and science. That 
they practice their subject like this is thus not an objection to the view that 
mathematics is scientifically confirmed; in fact, it is what we should expect 
if we adopt Resnik’s account of mathematical and scientific method.
We thus conclude that Resnik’s account of mathematics does provide 
sufficient resources to reconcile the facts of mathematical practice with the
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scientific confirmation of mathematics.60 Because of the global nature of 
mathematics, the local conception of mathematical evidence develops in 
such a way that mathematics is practiced as if it were an apriori science. 
However, this is not a true reflection of its nature because the local 
conception of mathematical evidence is justified by reference to the 
system of science as a whole and is overridable by more global 
conceptions. So the evidence for mathematics ultimately derives from its 
applications even though its practice suggests otherwise.
5.6.3 The confirmation of dispensable mathematics
We turn finally to the challenge of accounting for the confirmation of 
dispensable mathematics. To find out whether Resnik’s development of 
Quinean realism meets this challenge we must find out whether it delivers 
confirmation for dispensable axioms in just those cases for which it is 
required, i.e. for those that are accepted in practice.61 Resnik’s theory 
aims to explain the confirmation of such axioms by appeal to the local 
conception of mathematical evidence, the idea presumably being that they 
are to be believed if and only if they have been shown to measure up to 
the standards provided by the local conception. But does measuring up to 
these standards make it more likely that a dispensable axiom is true?
To approach this question it helps to know what Resnik takes our local 
conception of mathematical evidence to be. On the deductive side it is 
said to include proof and calculation (1997, 138). On the non-deductive 
side it is said to include a variety of methods, including: the modelling of 
new structures in previously accepted ones (op. cit., 142); the direct
60 This is not to say that it is all necessary, however, it may be that the principle that we should 
always act to minimize harm to science is alone sufficient to deliver these results. But that need 
not concern us here. We are interested in whether there is a satisfactory extension of Quinean 
realism that can explain the facts of scientific and mathematical practice, not in finding the most 
economical extension possible that allows us to do this.
61 The reader will recall that by dispensable axioms we mean axioms, or axiom candidates, that are 
not indispensably applied, i.e. those that either lack applications or that have only dispensable 
applications.
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verification of elementary geometric and numerical claims by inspection of 
simple physical structures (op. cit, 143); the indirect verification afforded 
by deriving previously established claims from new ones (op. cit., 147- 
148); the testing of new claims by assessment of their (relative) 
consistency (op. cit., 148); the use of computations in non-deductive 
inference from empirical premises (op. cit., Chapter 8, §2). To say that 
such sources constitute a conception of evidence is just to say that if a 
mathematical claim enjoys a measure of support from one, or more, of 
them, then it may be worthy of (a corresponding degree of) belief.
Now, it is not immediately obvious that these should all be considered 
sources of evidence. Why, for example, should the usefulness of a new 
claim in proving previously established results be taken as a reliable guide 
to its truth? Why should facts concerning the (relative) consistency of a 
mathematical claim be taken in this way?62 We are given no reason to 
think they should. However, this need not be a problem for Resnik’s 
position as his view is not that these sources of support are all genuinely 
evidential, in the sense of providing evidence for mathematics in the 
absence of other considerations. Rather his view is that they are 
genuinely evidential when considered as parts of a local conception of 
evidence pragmatically justified by global considerations.
Resnik’s argument that the local conception of mathematical evidence is 
genuinely evidential appears to rely on two strands: (a) his use of the 
pragmatic approach to indispensability to justify the practice of positing 
mathematical objects, truths about mathematical objects and truths linking 
mathematical objects to physical objects (op. cit., 129); (b) his insistence 
that local conceptions of evidence are overridable by global considerations 
(op. cit., 100). Clearly the first of these is intended to provide a foundation 
for the local conception of mathematical evidence, setting up mathematical 
positing as a reliable route to mathematical knowledge, whilst the second
62 These questions are particularly pressing in the present context because, if  legitimate, these 
methods will be of assistance in evaluating the dispensable mathematical claims we are really 
interested in, namely unapplied axiom candidates.
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is intended to act as a check on the ways the local conception of 
mathematical evidence can develop, so as to help ensure its continued 
reliability as it evolves. What we are concerned to find out is whether 
these constraints are sufficient to ensure that the standards constituting 
the local conception of mathematical evidence should be regarded both as 
genuinely evidential and as able to provide confirmation for dispensable 
axiom candidates.
Consider, first, the overridability constraint. One way to understand this 
might be in terms of ratification, as the requirement that local conceptions 
of evidence must deliver verdicts on hypotheses that agree with the 
verdicts delivered by global considerations. If we assume that the global 
considerations in question are genuinely evidential, then this reading of 
the overridability constraint would suffice to ensure that the local 
conception of mathematical evidence is genuinely evidential. However, it 
would do so only at the cost of an adequate account of the confirmation of 
dispensable axioms.
To see why, observe that Resnik’s system provides two kinds of global 
consideration with which to assess whether given mathematical claims 
should be endorsed. The first kind concerns their indispensability, 
delivering a positive verdict if and only if the claims are indispensably used 
in science. Clearly considerations of this kind will not deliver confirmation 
for any dispensable axiom. The second kind of global consideration 
concerns pragmatic arguments about the good of science as a whole. But 
when an axiom is dispensable it either lacks applications or has only 
dispensable applications. In the first case, the axiom is not involved in 
science at all. In the second, the axiom is involved in science but only in 
applications for which there are alternatives that do not use the axiom and 
which are not inferior, scientifically speaking, to those that do. In neither 
case, then, is it clear that the truth of the axiom is required by the good of 
science as a whole. This suggests that global considerations of the kinds
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available in Resnik’s system do not provide conclusive reasons to endorse 
dispensable axioms.63
For this reason^ the current approach to overridability blocks an adequate 
account of the confirmation of dispensable axioms. If we understand the 
overridability constraint in terms of ratification, so that verdicts on 
mathematical claims delivered by the local conception of mathematical 
evidence must agree with the verdicts of global considerations, then the 
local conception of mathematical evidence must agree with global 
considerations on the confirmation of dispensable axioms. If these are not 
confirmed in the light of available global considerations, then they are not 
confirmed on the local conception of mathematical evidence either. So, if 
we are correct that the global considerations available in Resnik’s system 
do not provide confirmation for dispensable axiom candidates, we must 
conclude that such confirmation cannot be had on the local conception of 
mathematical evidence.
To find a new approach to overridability, it helps to reflect on Resnik’s idea 
that decisions about what to believe should respect the good of science as 
a whole. A plausible aspect of this thought is that we should not form 
belief in given principles if this would be to the detriment of science. This 
suggests understanding the overridability constraint to be the requirement 
that disagreements between the local conception of mathematical 
evidence and global considerations tend to be resolved in favour of the 
latter, when the disagreements threaten to harm science as a whole. This 
understanding of the overridability constraint promises a better approach 
to the confirmation of dispensable mathematics because it no longer
63 We should remark here that Resnik’s discussion of V  = L suggests that considerations of what 
might be to the good of the system of science in the future should play a role in evaluating 
dispensable axioms (1997, 146-147). But whilst Resnik is correct to argue that adopting limitative 
axioms like V = L might be detrimental to future science, and whilst he may be correct to say that 
this provides reason not to endorse V = L, it is not clear that considerations of this kind should 
persuade us to endorse ~’(V = L), or, more importantly, non-limitative axioms such as A I that 
assert the existence of certain kinds of mathematical objects. Future science may depend on 
applications of mathematical theories that assume axioms like these. But this does not give a 
reason to endorse these axioms now; it only gives a reason to investigate the consequences of 
taking them as axioms.
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demands that the local conception of mathematical evidence agrees with 
global considerations on all mathematical questions. Agreement would be 
required when global considerations give a clear ruling for or against a 
mathematical claim, i.e. when the claim is indispensable, because in 
cases such as these it would be to the detriment of science as a whole if 
the verdict delivered by the local conception of mathematical evidence 
were allowed to take precedence. Nevertheless, the local conception of 
mathematical evidence would be unconstrained with respect to 
mathematical questions for which global considerations provide no firm 
verdict either way.
However, with this reading of the overridability constraint, it is by no means 
clear that the local conception of mathematical evidence can be viewed as 
genuinely evidential with respect to dispensable axioms. Recall that the 
pragmatic justification of the local conception of mathematical evidence 
had two components, the pragmatic approach to indispensability as a 
means of establishing the reliability of the practice of mathematical 
positing, and the overridability constraint as a means of ensuring 
continued reliability as the local conception of mathematical evidence 
develops. On the current understanding of the overridability constraint, 
the local conception of mathematical evidence is only negatively regulated 
by the perspective of the whole of science: we are not to form belief in any 
mathematics that conflicts with the mathematics indispensably applied in 
science. Whilst this leaves us free to believe whatever dispensable 
axioms there are that do not conflict with indispensably applied 
mathematics, it does not give us any reason to believe them. Ratification 
by the local conception of mathematical evidence thus does not increase 
the likelihood that a dispensable axiom is true unless this is a 
consequence of the fact that the axiom is generated by the method of 
mathematical positing. We can be sure of this in the general case only if 
we possess a general defence of the reliability of this method. So with this 
reading of the overridability constraint, the local conception of 
mathematical evidence is genuinely evidential only if the pragmatic
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approach to indispensability provides a general defence of the reliability of 
mathematical positing.
This is problematic because the pragmatic approach to indispensability 
provides no such a defence. For recall how pragmatic indispensability 
made its appearance:
(1) In stating its laws and conducting its derivations science 
assumes the existence of many mathematical objects and 
the truth of much mathematics.
(2) These assumptions are indispensable to the practice of 
science; moreover, many of the important conclusions drawn 
from and within science could not be drawn without taking 
mathematical claims to be true
(3) So we are justified in drawing conclusions from and within 
science only if we are justified in taking the mathematics 
used in science to be true.
(4) We are justified in using science to explain and predict.
(5) The only way we know of using science thus involves 
drawing conclusions from and within it.
(6) So, by (3) above, we are justified in taking this 
mathematics to be true. (1997, 46-48)
In (6), “this mathematics” is the mathematics of premises (1) and (2), the 
mathematics indispensably used in scientific practice. At best, then, the 
argument provides reason for thinking that we are justified in believing an 
axiom we get by mathematical positing only if it is needed in science. 
Clearly, then, it provides no general defence of the reliability of 
mathematical positing. Thus on the second reading of the overridability 
constraint, the local conception of mathematical evidence appears not to 
be genuinely evidential with respect to verdicts concerning dispensable 
axioms.
These considerations suggest that Resnik’s approach to dispensable 
mathematics does not deliver the goods hoped for. If the overridability
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constraint is taken to be the requirement that the local conception of 
mathematical evidence agrees with global considerations on all verdicts 
concerning mathematical claims, then the local conception may be 
genuinely evidential but it will be constrained not to ratify dispensable 
axioms as true. If, on the other hand, the overridability constraint is taken 
to be the requirement that the local conception agree with the verdicts of 
global considerations for all mathematical claims for which disagreement 
would harm science as a whole, then we have no reason to think that the 
local conception is genuinely evidential with respect to dispensable 
axioms. It is possible there is a reading of the overridability constraint 
somewhere between the readings we have considered, allowing the local 
conception of mathematical evidence greater freedom from global 
considerations than our first reading but not as much freedom as our 
second. If there is, then perhaps it will avoid the difficulties associated 
with the readings we have considered. But Resnik does not provide any 
reason to think that there is such a reading. His account of mathematical 
knowledge thus cannot be said to provide an adequate account of how 
dispensable axioms can be confirmed.
What does this conclusion mean for the argument that mathematics is 
scientifically confirmed? It is certainly a worry. But if standard 
mathematics is indispensably applied it may not constitute a great threat, 
for then we may at least be able to claim that this is scientifically 
confirmed. Against this, however, a significant body of research on the 
foundations of mathematics suggests that applications of standard 
mathematics in science are not typically indispensable. Work done in 
particular by Feferman, Friedman, Takeuti and Simpson shows that the 
mathematical axioms required to prove a great deal of scientifically 
applicable mathematics are considerably weaker than those required to 
derive standard mathematics. On the basis of this research, Feferman 
(1993a) presents a predicative system of mathematics, W, which he 
argues is a sufficient basis for almost all the mathematics required in 
scientific applications. The system W is considerably weaker than ZFC; it 
proves the existence only of those sets that can be produced from the set
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of natural numbers by predicative set-forming operations. W thus lacks 
the (unrestricted) power set axiom, does not prove the existence of the 
real numbers and cannot develop real analysis properly so called (it 
suffices for a predicative version of analysis, but this is not the same). The 
suggestion is that W, or some mathematical theory of comparable 
strength, may provide an adequate mathematical basis for all scientific 
applications.
It is important to realize that the claim being made here is not that there 
are no indispensable applications of impredicative mathematics. 
Feferman himself concedes that some mathematics that cannot be 
represented in systems like W is used indispensably in “a couple of cases 
in some approaches to the foundations of quantum field theory” (1999, 
109). Moreover, there is the interesting example of Kruskal’s Tree 
Theorem, which has applications in computer science, and which has 
been shown by Friedman not to be predicative (Friedman’s result is 
explained in Simpson (1985)).
However, it is not clear that isolated examples such as these are a 
sufficient basis from which to mount a convincing defence of the claim that 
impredicative mathematics is scientifically confirmed. The initial attraction 
of Quinean realism was that it seemed obvious that standard 
mathematics, including impredicative theories like real analysis and full set 
theory, is indispensably applied all over empirical science. Assuming that 
it would be possible to show that this mathematics shares in the scientific 
evidence provided by its indispensable applications, the anticipation was 
that there would be a wealth of evidence in its favour, so that it could not 
reasonably be considered to be unconfirmed. Surprisingly, however, it 
turns out that most scientific applications can be satisfactorily carried out 
using only predicative mathematics. The wealth of evidence anticipated 
for impredicative mathematics thus does not appear so that it still seems 
quite reasonable to think that this mathematics remains unconfirmed. It is 
thus not clear that Quinean realism provides adequate grounds for 
impredicative mathematics including central theories like real analysis and
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impredicative set theory. And if our previous argument is correct, the 
same holds for Resnik’s development of the Quinean view.
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5.7 Conclusion
This chapter addressed the empiricist strategy of arguing that sense 
perceptions of ordinary physical objects constitute evidence for 
mathematical beliefs. We considered Quinean realism, which infers from 
the Quinean theory of evidence and the scientific indispensability of 
standard mathematics that mathematics is scientifically confirmed (section 
5.1). We defended this against Maddy’s objections from scientific and 
mathematical practice, arguing that Quinean realism is intended as an 
account of scientific and mathematical confirmation, not as a 
methodological account o f scientific and mathematical practice (sections
5.3 and 5.4). But we conceded that the objections raised valid concerns 
about the Quinean view, whether it can be extended by a methodological 
theory that satisfactorily explains the facts of practice, and that 
successfully explains the confirmation of dispensable mathematics.
Resnik’s development of Quinean realism promised to address these 
challenges (section 5.5). But although we were impressed by the way 
Resnik’s view dealt with the facts of scientific and mathematical practice 
(sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2), we were not impressed by the way it dealt with 
dispensable mathematics (section 5.6.3). The view posits an overridable 
local conception of mathematical evidence that is ultimately supported by 
the pragmatic approach to indispensability. The hope was that 
dispensable mathematics could be viewed as being confirmed by 
considerations made available by this conception. But against this, we 
argued that considerations from the local conception of mathematical 
evidence would either be constrained not to ratify dispensable 
mathematics as true, or would not be genuinely evidential with respect to 
dispensable mathematics (depending on how the overridability constraint 
is understood). Thus w e concluded that Resnik’s theory does not 
adequately account for the confirmation of dispensable mathematics.
We then argued that this creates a serious difficulty for the view that 
mathematics is scientifically confirmed (section 5.6.3). Appealing to
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research on the foundations of mathematics, in particular to work of 
Feferman, we claimed that the scientific applications of impredicative 
mathematics are usually dispensable. On this basis we argued that it is 
not clear, on either Quinean realism or Resnik’s theory, that the 
indispensable applications of mathematics provide adequate confirmation 
for impredicative mathematics, including important mathematical theories 
like real analysis and (impredicative) set theory.
We are thus left with no reason to maintain that mathematical knowledge 
quite generally may be grounded in empirical applications, no reason to 
think that all of what passes for mathematical knowledge can be known on 
grounds provided by empirical applications. This is a disappointing result 
for the current empiricist approach to what passes for mathematical 
knowledge. Some consolation is available, however, as our discussion 
does not provide any reason to dismiss the idea that scientific applications 
provide adequate support for mathematical theories whose widespread 
indispensability is in doubt.
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Appendix: Sober’s objection to Quinean realism
We mentioned in section 5.2 that Sober (1993) mounts an attack on 
Quinean realism. We have already explained that Sober’s is 
unsuccessful. But in this appendix we describe and discuss Sober’s 
critique in more detail.
A. Sober’s objection
Sober argues that once we have the right view of scientific confirmation, 
his own view, contrastive empiricism, we find that mathematics could not 
be confirmed in its indispensable applications. Contrastive empiricism is 
distinguished by its sophisticated approach to inference to the best 
explanation, which it takes to be a method of reasoning capable of 
delivering justified belief in statements about unobservable objects save 
when the statements are parts of empirically equivalent competing 
explanations. In so doing, contrastive empiricism sustains both the 
empiricist idea that the only grounds for forming belief are empirical 
grounds (an idea that scientific realists typically reject) and the scientific 
realist idea that empirical grounds justify belief in thoughts the content of 
which outstrips possible experience (an idea that empiricists typically 
reject). Thus contrastive empiricism is a compromise between scientific 
realism and empiricism. According to Sober, it shows that mathematics is 
not scientifically confirmed.
Contrastive empiricism has some things in common with Quine’s theory of 
evidence. Both accept the empiricist idea that scientific evidence is 
sensory evidence and both accept the evidence-warrant principle; that in 
normal circumstances what counts by ordinary scientific criteria as 
conclusive evidence for a hypothesis warrants belief in its truth. Where 
they differ is on the distribution of evidence across theory; Quine’s view 
maintains that confirmation is holistic, contrastive empiricism maintains 
that it is not. Why not?
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Contrastive empiricism views the testing of scientific theories as an 
essentially contrastive process. Thus science has decided that our current 
theory of combustion provides a better account than the phlogiston theory 
of why the ashy remains of a fire weigh more than the fuel burnt, science 
has decided that the heliocentric model of our solar system gives a better 
account than the Ptolemaic model of astronomical observations, etc. 
Given this view of theory testing, it does not really make sense to think of 
scientific hypotheses as being confirmed absolutely. Instead we must 
think of hypotheses as being confirmed relative to the hypotheses with 
which they compete as accounts of the observations. This means 
acknowledging that, relative to agreed and accepted background 
assumptions, observations provide differing degrees of evidential support 
to the hypotheses between which they discriminate. Since this is 
inconsistent with confirmational holism, according to which observations 
do not favour individual hypotheses over others, confimational holism has 
to be denied.
Drawing on Edwards (1972), Sober suggests that the differential support 
lent by given observations to different hypotheses should be understood in 
terms of the probabilities the hypotheses confer on the observations (see 
Sober (1993, 38)). Following this idea, he puts forward the Likelihood 
Principle, which states that when the probability conferred on an 
observation by one hypothesis is greater than that conferred on it by 
another, the observation favours the first hypothesis over the second, 
more formally:
O favours hypothesis Hi over another H2 if and only if
P(0/Hi) > P(0/H2).
Contrastive empiricism thus differs from the epistemology of total science 
by rejecting confirmational holism, allowing that different degrees of 
evidential support attach to individual hypotheses and then by explaining
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these differing degrees of evidential support by appeal to the Likelihood 
Principle.
This approach to scientific confirmation implies that confirmation is 
symmetric: a hypothesis can be confirmed by observation if and only if it 
can be disconfirmed by observation. This is because a hypothesis Hi is 
confirmed only if an observation O favours it over another hypothesis H2 . 
By the Likelihood Principle, this happens when P(0/Hi) > P(0/H2). Now 
by the mathematics of probability, PCO/hh) > P(0/H2) if and only if 
P(“*0/H1) < P("iO/H2). S o if we had observed -O  rather than O, we would 
have preferred H2 to Hi on the basis of the Likelihood Principle, so Hi 
would have been disconfirmed. Sober believes that the symmetry of 
confirmation rules out any possibility that indispensable mathematics is 
scientifically confirmed:
If the mathematical statements M  are part of every competing 
hypothesis [if they are indispensable], then, no matter which 
hypothesis comes out best in the light of the observations, M  
will be part of that best hypothesis. M  is not tested by this 
exercise, but is simply a background assumption common to 
the hypotheses under test. Sober (1993, 44)
Soberis objection to Quine’s mathematical epistemology is therefore as 
follows: A hypothesis is an indispensable component of the scientific 
explanation of given observations if it features in all competing 
explanations of those observations. Since to be disconfirmed is to be 
selected against in our choice of explanation, if a hypothesis is 
indispensable, it cannot be disconfirmed. Thus, by the symmetry of 
confirmation, if a hypothesis is indispensable, it cannot be confirmed. This 
holds for indispensable hypotheses whether they be mathematical or not, 
therefore mathematics is not confirmed in its indispensable applications.
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B. Responses to Sober’s objection
Sober’s objecton can be undermined by attacking contrastive empiricism. 
Resnik (1995, 1997) argues that this leaves high-level empirical principles 
without empirical support. Principles such as the conservation of mass- 
energy or the continuity of space-time feature as background hypotheses 
to all our explanations of certain physical phenomena64, so if the account 
of scientific confirmation put forward by contrastive empiricism is correct, 
these principles would lack empirical support, and perhaps even empirical 
content. Resnik cannot bring himself to accept this, so he rejects 
contrastive empiricism. In addition, Heilman (1999) points out that, when 
theories make new predictions about phenomena of which we previously 
had no account, scientists adopt them in the absence of alternatives. For 
example, the theory of relativity makes the right prediction about how 
relativistic mass and total energy are related, something not predicted by 
any prior physics, and this functions as part of our grounds for accepting it. 
But if contrastive empiricism is correct, so that a hypothesis is only ever 
confirmed relative to competing hypotheses, theories should not be 
chosen this way, so again contrastive empiricism must be rejected. 
Finally, Colyvan (1999) has argued that scientists often appeal to factors
other than likelihoods when choosing amongst theories, so that the
approach to theory choice suggested by contrastive empiricism, which 
would rationalize theory choice solely through likelihoods, must be 
rejected.
The last of these points does not seem particularly strong. Colyvan thinks 
that given two theories that perform equally well under empirical testing:
The question of which is the better theory will be decided on
the grounds of simplicity, elegance and so on -  grounds
64 The examples are Resnik’s (1997,120).
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explicitly ruled out by contrastive empiricism. Colyvan (1999, 
325-326)65
However, it is not true that contrastive empiricism rules out choosing 
between theories on these grounds; it makes them subordinate to 
likelihoods, but it does not legislate against them altogether:
I ... don’t object to the idea that the concepts cited -  
simplicity, ad hocness, and explanatoriness -  sometimes 
provide reasons that are pertinent to judging truth values.
What I deny is that they do so in a way that transcends 
the bearing of likelihood. Sober (1993, 43)
Thus the aspects of theory choice mentioned by Colyvan do not provide 
evidence against contrastive empiricism.66
However, the objections due to Resnik and Heilman are quite compelling. 
As contrastive empiricism stands it does not explain how very general 
empirical principles get confirmed, as surely they are. Neither does it 
permit the confirmation of theories that compare favourably with 
observation but have no competition. Sober (1993, 52) suggests that in 
such cases we can think of the theories as being tested against either their 
negations or against competitors constructed out of the theory by making 
adjustments to it.67 However, this is not what scientists do in practice and
65 The competing theories Colyvan is considering at this point are the usual mathematical 
formulation of Newtonian mechanics and Field’s allegedly nominalistic reconstrual (Field (1980)). 
But presumably the point is meant quite generally.
66 Elsewhere Sober discusses the alternatives to science dreamt up by philosophical sceptics, and 
puts forward his view that strictly speaking we have no evidence against them. But he goes on by 
saying, “This is not to deny that human beings look askance at evil demons and their ilk. We do 
assume that they are implausible. ... But I cannot see a rational justification for thinking about the 
world in this way. I cannot see that we have any non-question-begging evidence on this issue.” 
Sober (1990, 129). This suggests that he is sympathetic to pragmatic reasons for preferring one 
theory over another even when these do “transcend likelihoods”. His position would just be that 
these are not evidential reasons for choosing the one over the other.
67 Alternatives of this kind to Einstein’s famous equation E = me2 would be -> (E = me2), E = 2mc2, 
E = me3, etc. That Sober regards these theories as potential competitors to the original theory is at 
least a partial retrenchment, for in his original explanation of contrastive empiricism, he explicitly 
distances himself from the thought that contrasting a theory with its negation constitutes a genuine 
discrimination problem: “I mentioned before that theory testing is a contrastive activity. I f  you
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there seems to be no reason to pretend otherwise unless we have a prior 
commitment to contrastive empiricism. More importantly, if this method is 
effective for scientific hypotheses, then it could equally well be used to 
bring support to bear on the mathematics applied in science. Any non- 
mathematical theory of observable phenomena counts as an alternative to 
mathematical theories of the same phenomena. So do theories that use 
wacky alternatives to standard mathematics. Many of these alternatives 
will be inferior to our mathematical theories as scientific accounts of the 
relevant phenomena. So if the method Sober describes for bringing 
observational evidence to bear on otherwise untested scientific 
hypotheses is acceptable, then mathematical hypotheses can be viewed 
as having been tested in a similar fashion.
However, such gerrymandering of practice is clearly undesirable, unless it 
helps to achieve some otherwise unattainable goal without too great a 
cost. This is not the case here. The underlying point is that if a scientific 
theory performs well enough as an account of a sufficiently broad range of 
observations, it is confirmed even in the absence of a contrasting theory. 
Rather than distort practice by claiming that such theories are tested 
against contrived alternatives, we should conclude that confirmation is not 
essentially a contrastive phenomenon.
Sobers objection to Quinean realism is therefore not convincing. 
However, a variant of it survives. Recall that Sobers objection went as 
follows: A hypothesis is an indispensable component of the scientific 
explanation of given observations if it features in all competing 
explanations of those observations. Since to be discontinued is to be 
selected against in our choice of explanation, if a hypothesis is 
indispensable, it cannot be disconfirmed. Thus, by the symmetry of
want to test a theory T, you must specify a range of alternative theories -  you must say what you 
want to test T against. [New paragraph] There is a trivial reading of this thesis that I do not 
intend. To find out if  T is plausible is simply to find out if  T  is more plausible than not-T. I have 
something more in mind: there are various contrasting alternatives that might be considered. I f  T is 
to be tested against T \ one set of observations may be needed; but if  T is to be tested against T ” , a 
different set of observations may be needed. By varying the contrasting alternatives, we formulate 
genuinely different testing problems.” Sober (1990, 123)
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confirmation, if a hypothesis is indispensable, it cannot be confirmed. This 
holds for indispensable hypotheses whether they be mathematical or not, 
therefore mathematics is not confirmed in its indispensable applications.
For Sober, contrastive empiricism lent support to this argument because it 
implies the symmetry of confirmation, that a hypothesis can be confirmed 
by observation if and only if it can be disconfirmed by observation. 
However, one might believe that confirmation is symmetric without 
believing contrastive empiricism. If this is a reasonable position, then an 
argument like Sobers can be mounted against the Quinean account of 
mathematical knowledge by assuming the symmetry of confirmation 
instead of contrastive empiricism. Call this new objection the argument 
from the symmetry of confirmation.
Colyvan (1999) tries to defend the Quinean view against the new threat:
When a theory is confirmed, the whole theory is confirmed.
When it is disconfirmed, it is rarely the fault of every part of the 
theory, and so the guilty part is to be found and dispensed 
with. It’s analogous to a sensitive computer program. If the 
program delivers the correct results then every part of the 
program is believed to be correct. However, if it is not working 
it is often because of only one small error. The job of the 
computer programmer (in part) is to seek out the faulty part of 
the program and correct it. Colyvan (1999, 329)
By analogy, the job of the scientist, when faced with a theory that delivers 
mistaken predictions, is to identify the part of the theory responsible for the 
mistaken prediction and to find a way of replacing it so the mistaken 
prediction is no longer entailed. Colyvan thinks that this shows there is a 
“partial asymmetry” (/oc. cit.) between confirmation and disconfirmation on 
the holistic view: theories are confirmed as wholes, but disconfirmed in 
pieces. Thus he takes it that the argument from the symmetry of 
confirmation against Quinean realism is unsound.
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However, this is not sufficient to protect the Quinean position from the 
argument from the symmetry of confirmation. It is true that when 
presented with a scientific theory that makes false predictions, we look for 
individual hypotheses to revise so that the predictions are no longer made. 
But to take this as evidence that confirmation is not symmetric is to 
assume that our practice of theory revision is justified by aspects of the 
logic of confirmation, which, given the Quinean approach to confirmation, 
is a mistake. Assuming the Quinean theory of evidence, if a theory T 
predicts P, our observation that -«P disconfirms T as a whole and, as a 
whole, we reject T. Of course this does not mean that we reject every 
individual hypothesis of T. Rather we look to make small changes to 
some parts of T hoping to arrive at a new theory T  which possesses all 
the virtues of T but which does not imply P. But we do this because it is 
sensible to proceed this way, as it is normally harder to produce an 
entirely new theory dealing with given phenomena than it is to make 
improvements in an old one. Thus our practice of theory revision reflects 
good sense in scientific practice, what we might call scientific know-how, 
rather than facts about the logic of confirmation. So from the Quinean 
perspective, this practice does not show that the symmetry of confirmation 
should be denied. Colyvan thus gives no reason to think that the 
symmetry of confirmation is incompatible with the Quinean theory of 
evidence, and therefore no reason to think that the argument from the 
symmetry of confirmation is unsound, on the Quinean view.
There is another difficulty with Colyvan’s response. The variant of Sober’s 
objection that we are considering uses the argument the symmetry of 
confirmation only for an inference between two conditionals (from the 
claim that if a hypothesis is indispensable it is not disconfirmable, to the 
claim that if a hypothesis is indispensable it is not confirmable). But this 
inference remains valid if we assume, instead of the symmetry of 
confirmation, the weaker premise that a theory is confirmable only if it is 
disconfirmable. There is thus a more refined variant of Sober’s objection 
that argues from this weaker claim together with the indispensability of 
mathematics to the conclusion that mathematics is not scientifically
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confirmed. Colyvan’s claim that confirmation is partially symmetric is 
consistent with the premises of this new argument, in particular, with the 
premise that a theory is confirmable only if it is disconfirmable. So for this 
reason, too, Colyvan’s remarks on the symmetry of confirmation are not 
sufficient to sustain the Quinean account of mathematical knowledge.
However, this does not mean there is no defense against the latest variant 
of Sober’s objection. In fact, there is a very clear reason why the new 
attack fails. This most recent argument assumes the conception of 
indispensability involved in Sober’s original argument. According to this 
conception, a portion of mathematics is indispensable to given 
observations if it appears in all the competing scientific accounts of them:
Let us suppose that mathematics is an indispensable part of 
any scientific explanation of the observations we have at hand.
That is, each of the competing hypotheses (Hu H2, ... , Hn) 
embeds a set (M) of mathematical propositions. Sober (1993,
44)
But the understanding of indispensability assumed by Quinean realism is 
different. As we saw in section 5.1.2, a mathematical theory M is 
indispensable in this sense to the scientific explanation of observations O 
if and only if:
There is a theory T involving M such that any theory T  not 
involving M is an inferior to T as a scientific account of O.
Given this conception of indispensability, it is clearly possible for a 
mathematical theory to be indispensable to a scientific theory without 
appearing in all competing explanations of the observations that scientific 
theory is supposed to explain. But if the variant of Sober’s argument we 
are considering is to succeed, this must be impossible, for its very first 
step, which is inherited from Sober’s original argument, is to infer from the 
claim that a mathematical theory is indispensable to the claim that it
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appears in all the competing scientific explanations of the relevant 
observations. On the Quinean understanding of indispensability, 
therefore, the most recent variant of Sober’s objection, and, indeed, the 
original argument, is not valid.
It is worth pointing out that Sober vacillates between something like the 
Quinean conception of indispensability and his own conception of 
indispensability as appearance in all competing alternatives. Sober 
introduces indispensability like this:
How is the idea of "indispensability" connected with the 
Likelihood Principle? When a scientist considers a set of 
competing hypotheses, and one of them says that the 
observations were quite probable, while the other hypotheses 
say that the observations were immensely improbable, it is 
natural to conclude that only the first hypothesis makes the 
observations nonmiraculous. The scientist may be inclined to 
regard the first hypothesis as indispensable. (1993, 38)
A hypothesis that is indispensable in the sense involved in this passage 
clearly need not be a component of all competing explanations of the 
observations; it just needs to be part of the best scientific account we have 
of those observations. Something like the Quinean conception of 
indispensability is in play. As we have seen, however, Sober later prefers 
the conception of indispensability as appearance in all competing 
alternatives later on (see the previous quotation). In fairness, both 
conceptions of indispensability are plausible refinements of the vague idea 
that mathematics is somehow essential to science, at least when the 
underlying view of science is contrastive empiricism. If science aims at 
solving discrimination problems and if the alternatives available to solve 
one problem all incorporate a common nucleus of hypotheses, it is very 
natural to say that those hypotheses are indispensable to the solution of 
that problem. But it is also very natural to say that the indispensability of a
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appears in all the competing scientific explanations of the relevant 
observations. On the Quinean understanding of indispensability, 
therefore, the most recent variant of Sober’s objection, and, indeed, the 
original argument, is not valid.
It is worth pointing out that Sober vacillates between something like the 
Quinean conception of indispensability and his own conception of 
indispensability as appearance in all competing alternatives. Sober 
introduces indispensability like this:
How is the idea of "indispensability" connected with the 
Likelihood Principle? When a scientist considers a set of 
competing hypotheses, and one of them says that the 
observations were quite probable, while the other hypotheses 
say that the observations were immensely improbable, it is 
natural to conclude that only the first hypothesis makes the 
observations nonmiraculous. The scientist may be inclined to 
regard the first hypothesis as indispensable. (1993, 38)
A hypothesis that is indispensable in the sense involved in this passage 
clearly need not be a component of all competing explanations of the 
observations; it just needs to be part of the best scientific account we have 
of those observations. Something like the Quinean conception of 
indispensability is in play. As we have seen, however, Sober later prefers 
the conception of indispensability as appearance in all competing 
alternatives later on (see the previous quotation). In fairness, both 
conceptions of indispensability are plausible refinements of the vague idea 
that mathematics is somehow essential to science, at least when the 
underlying view of science is contrastive empiricism. If science aims at 
solving discrimination problems and if the alternatives available to solve 
one problem all incorporate a common nucleus of hypotheses, it is very 
natural to say that those hypotheses are indispensable to the solution of 
that problem. But it is also very natural to say that the indispensability of a
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hypothesis consists in its appearance in the solution to the problem that 
we actually select.
Be that as it may, this equivocation between notions of indispensability 
totally undermines both Sober’s argument against the Quinean account of 
mathematical knowledge and the variants on that argument that we have 
considered. The variants are not sound when read with respect to the 
relevant, Quinean notion of indispensability. The original argument fails 
for this reason and also because it assumes the mistaken view that 
confirmation is an essentially contrastive phenomenon. Sober thus 
provides no telling objection to the view that mathematics is scientifically 
confirmed.
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6
Fictionalism and nominalization
If correct, the arguments of the previous four chapters considerably 
weaken the credibility of mathematical realism. Chapters 2 and 3 suggest 
that rationalist approaches to mathematics are incapable of providing 
adequate grounds for mathematical knowledge. Chapters 4 and 5 
suggest that empiricist strategies, at least those we have considered, are 
presently of only limited application. We are thus left without a satisfactory 
realist account of what passes for mathematical knowledge.
Our attention thus turns to alternatives to the realist approach. Many 
alternatives to the realist point of view have been suggested in the 
literature. But as we explained in section 1.4, the most promising ones 
that can be developed in accordance with the fundamental assumptions of 
this study are versions of mathematical fictionalism, the view that 
mathematics is, or should be, a form of pretence. The apparent limitations 
of mathematical realism thus raise for us the question of whether 
mathematical fictionalism provides a viable alternative. In this and the 
next chapter we shall address this question.
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6.1 Mathematical fictionalism s
Mathematical fictionalism attempts coherently to combine the Quinean 
criterion of ontological commitment, linguistic realism and rejection of 
mathematical objects (see section 1.4). Its method is to put forward a 
pragmatics for mathematics according to which attitudes taken towards 
mathematical claims are not such as to involve commitment to the 
existence of mathematical objects, even though many mathematical 
claims are true only if mathematical objects exist.
To foster this approach, an analogy is drawn between mathematics and 
literary fiction.68 When we use language to tell a story, and when we 
engage in literary criticism, we frequently make claims that are true only if 
there are fictional objects, Sherlock Holmes, the Jabberwock, etc. 
According to a plausible account of literary fiction, we play along with such 
claims, imagining or pretending them to be true, but do not believe them. 
Our attitudes to such claims thus do not commit us to their truth and so we 
are not committed to the existence of fictional objects.69
Mathematical fictionalism takes this situation as a model for mathematics. 
In doing mathematics, we frequently put forward claims that are true only if 
there are mathematical objects. But the fictionalist maintains that these 
object-committed mathematical claims function, or ought to function, in 
something like the way claims about fictional objects function when they 
are used to tell a story. One thought underlying this point of view is that it
68 Most commentators who have defended this kind of fictionalism make use of an analogy 
between mathematics and literary fiction (see Field (1989a, 3), Wagner (1982,259-260), and 
Balaguer (1996b, 291)). Papineau (1993) does not explicitly mention literary fictions although he 
does take fictionalism to include the view that mathematical claims are accepted “as fictions” (op. 
cit., 176). More recently, Yablo (2001, 2002, 2005) draws a comparison between mathematics and 
figural discourse, but it does no harm at this stage to speak as if  all fictionalist views invoked an 
anlogy with literary fiction.
69 Lamarque and Olsen (1994) develop a detailed account of literary fiction of this kind. Other 
approaches are possible according to which we are committed to the existence of fictional objects. 
For example, Searle (1974) regards fictional objects as creations of the author of the fiction in 
which they appear, whilst Van Inwagen (1977) regards them as posits of literary criticism. The 
kind of view described in the text seems more intuitively appealing than such alternatives, but this 
does not mean it is the best available. Nevertheless, the fictionalist analogy between mathematics 
and literary fiction is to be understood with reference to this approach to literary fiction.
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is possible to think of object-committed mathematical claims as being 
imagined or pretended for the purposes of doing mathematics, rather than 
as being believed. Taking this up, mathematical fictionalism claims either 
that object-committed mathematics is, or that it should be, a form of 
pretence. In either case, belief in mathematical objects is rejected and so 
we are no more obliged to believe in mathematical objects than we are to 
believe in Sherlock Holmes or the Jabberwock.
It is easy to see how this approach is supposed to achieve the fictionalist 
goal. If mathematics is viewed as analogous to literary fiction in the way 
described, mathematical sentences can still be interpreted at face value, 
as demanded by linguistic realism, and belief in the claims they express 
when so interpreted can still be regarded as ontologically committing, as 
demanded by the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. 
Nevertheless, there will be no contradiction in rejecting mathematical 
objects because belief in object-committed mathematics will be rejected. 
In this way, Quinean criterion of ontological commitment and linguistic 
realism will be reconciled with rejection of mathematical objects.
If a satisfactory mathematical fictionalism is to be developed, the analogy 
between mathematics and literary fiction will have to be superseded by a 
detailed explanation of the claim that object-committed mathematics is, or 
should be considered to be, a form of pretence. However, the analogy as 
it stands allows us to explain the central challenge for mathematical 
fictionalism, together with the main strategies for dealing with it. We 
already mentioned these briefly in section 1.4. In the next section, we will 
set them out more fully.
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6.2 The challenge to mathematical fictionalism from applications
It is one hundred miles from Birmingham to London via the M40. If Alice 
leaves Birmingham at 1100 and drives at 60 mph towards London and if 
Bob leaves London at 1100 to drive towards Birmingham at 90 mph, at 
what time of day do they meet? Call this the meeting problem.
Someone who knows basic mathematics and physics is likely to address 
the meeting problem as follows, t hours after 1100, Alice and Bob have 
travelled distances DA and DB, respectively:
Alice Bob
m ▼ i *
0 . . , _  LondonBirmingham Da M4Q Db
When Alice and Bob meet, the total distance they have travelled, that is 
the distance travelled by Alice taken together with the distance travelled by 
Bob, is the distance between London and Birmingham. Letting t be the 
duration in hours of the period elapsed between the start of their journeys 
and their meeting, this implies:
100 = Da + Db
Since distance travelled equals speed times time, and since Alice travels 
at 60 mph, it follows that DA = 60f. Similarly, since Bob travels at 90 mph, 
it follows that DB = 901. So by substitution:
100 = 60f + 90f
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Then a simple calculation shows that t = 2/3. Thus Alice and Bob meet 
after two thirds of an hour, that is at 1140.
This problem could have been addressed empirically. It would have been 
possible to have Alice and Bob make the journeys described so as to 
observe what time they cross. However, this experiment would not have 
been easy to perform; it might have been difficult to proceed at the 
assigned constant speeds, the drivers might have missed each other in 
the traffic, Bob might have been stopped for speeding. Moreover, it would 
have been costly and time-consuming. For the metting problem, then, 
solution by mathematics is preferable to resolution by experiment.
What if we had wanted to find out the age of the universe? How could we 
address this problem? It seems clear that in this case, no experiment is 
possible, the only scientific approach being to apply mathematics. 
Applications of mathematics are not merely desirable for reasons of ease 
and economy, therefore, but necessary: we need to apply mathematics to 
solve problems we have no other way of addressing. In consequence, 
philosophical accounts of mathematics must include a satisfactory 
explanation of applications.
This requirement raises a worry about mathematical fictionalism. More 
familiar forms of fiction do not play the roles mathematics plays in solving 
problems, shoppers do not keep track of their expenditure by reference to 
The Merchant of Venice and biologists tracking changes in Britain’s 
badger population do not appeal to The Wind in the Willows. Thus one 
might suspect that holding mathematics analogous to fiction makes it unfit 
to play the applied roles that in fact it has. If so, the analogy will have to 
be rejected, mathematical fictionalism abandoned.
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6.2.1 How is mathematics used to solve the meeting problem?
s
If mathematical fictionalism blocks the successful application of 
mathematics, then someone who solves the meeting problem in the way 
described above must do something with mathematics that cannot be 
explained from the fictionalist perspective. What might this something be? 
What uses of mathematics must be available if our solution to the meeting 
problem is to be carried out?
To answer this it helps to consider more closely how a problem solver 
might arrive at the solution described above. The conditions of the 
problem together with their knowledge of physics provides them with the 
necessary background:
(1) The distance from Birmingham to London is 100 miles
(2) Alice travels to Birmingham from London at 60 mph
(3) Bob travels to London from Birmingham at 90 mph
(4) d = vt (distance in miles equals velocity in miles per 
hour times time in hours)
(1), (2) and (3) contain information about specific places and the 
movements of two people between them. (4) conveys a theory of motion. 
All this information is mathematically expressed, with references to 
individual numbers appearing in (1), (2), and (3), and mathematical 
concepts of distance in miles, velocity in miles per hour and time in hours 
appearing in (4).
In addition to the right background, the problem solver needs to have an 
insight, realizing that when Alice and Bob meet the sum of the distances 
they have travelled equals the distance between their starting points. This 
insight is partly mathematical and partly physical as it is an insight into the 
correct mathematical description of the physical situation.
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We can reconstruct the way background and insight act together to yield 
the solution to the meeting problem in a succession of stages. The first 
stage is taken up with defining terminology:
(5) Let D = the distance in miles between London and 
Birmingham
(6) Let t = the time in hours that it takes Alice and Bob to 
meet
(7) Let Da and DB be the distance in miles travelled at t by 
Alice and Bob, respectively
The second stage uses this new terminology to construct a solvable 
equation in t. Here the insight, prompted in the solution described above 
by reflection on the diagram, yields:
(8) D = Da + Db
Note that it is not essential to the having of the insight that a diagram be 
used. One could equally well arrive at (8) on the basis of the definitions in 
(5) and (6) and the information given in (2) and (3). The diagram functions 
heuristically in the solution to this problem.
Deduction now takes over from insight and definition. The solver deduces 
from (2), (4), (6) and (7) that:
(9) Da= 60f.
A similar deduction yields:
(10) Db = 90f.
Then from (1), (8), (9) and (10) substitution of equals for equals yields
(11) 100 = 60f + 90f
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In the final stage, calculation takes over to* allow the solution of this 
equation for t, the solver carrying out the following steps in accordance 
with their mathematical knowledge:
(12) 100 = 150f
(13) t=  100/150
(14) f = 2/3
In (14) the value of t is presented in an acceptable form and the solution to 
the problem is almost complete: it takes Alice and Bob two thirds of an 
hour to meet, so they meet at 1140.
This reconstruction of our solution to the meeting problem shows very 
clearly that it uses mathematics in two ways; descriptively, to express 
information about the physical situation in mathematical terms (for 
instance in (1), (2) and (3)), and deductively, as a means of validating 
inferences amongst mathematically expressed claims (for instance to 
validate the inferences between (12) and (13)). The reconstruction also 
shows that the descriptive uses of mathematics are governed by definition 
and insight and that calculation often supplies mathematical premises for 
deduction. Be that as it may, the uses of mathematics that mathematical 
fictionalism must preserve if it is not to block the solution to the meeting 
problem are the descriptive and deductive uses that allow construction of 
the argument set out above.
6.2.2 The challenge from applications
The fictionalist analogy between mathematics and literary fiction raised a 
worry concerning whether mathematics is fit to be applied. By attending to 
specific claims to which mathematical fictionalism is committed and by 
paying attention to the ways mathematics is used in the solution of the 
meeting problem, we can make this worry more precise.
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Mathematical fictionalism rejects mathematical objects. It must therefore 
maintain, on pain of incoherence, that science is not committed to 
mathematical objects. But reference to mathematical objects seems to be 
important to the descriptive use of mathematics in science. How, after all, 
can “100 = Da + Db” express anything about the relative position of Alice 
and Bob t hours after the beginning of their journeys if there is no number 
100? We might expect such a worry to be handled by re-interpreting the 
mathematics used, so that purported reference to mathematical objects is 
eliminated. But since mathematical fictionalism rejects such re­
interpretation, this is not an option. Thus the worry remains that rejecting 
mathematical objects blocks a satisfactory account of mathematical 
description.70
Another central claim of mathematical fictionalism is that the attitudes we 
adopt towards object-committed mathematical claims (claims that are true 
only if there are mathematical objects) need not include belief. However, 
belief in such claims seems to be important to preserving the deductive 
use of mathematics. We want to regard conclusions drawn with the help 
of mathematics as being warranted thereby. But how can we take this 
position if we reject belief in object-committed mathematical claims? How, 
for example, does the sequence of inferences from (12) to (14) help to 
warrant belief that Alice and Bob will meet at 1140 if the deducer does not 
believe that 100 = 150f? How does the law of motion d = vt help with this 
if it is not believed that d = vt? The worry here is that in eschewing belief 
in object-committed mathematical claims, mathematical fictionalism 
eschews the only beliefs that could explain why this solution to the 
meeting problem, and mathematical reasoning more generally, is reliable.
It has also been argued, for example by Liston (1993), that by rejecting 
belief in mathematical objects, mathematical fictionalism threatens the
70 Note that this conclusion holds irrespective o f whether the mathematical fictionalism we have in 
mind affirms that there are no mathematical objects or simply does not maintain that there are 
mathematical objects.
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sdiscoveries made possible in applications.71 If this is to constitute a worry 
distinct from the two we have already mentioned (that rejecting 
mathematical objects might block a satisfactory account of mathematical 
description and that rejection of belief in mathematical objects might block 
a satisfactory account of the reliability of mathematical reasoning) it must 
presumably be taken to concern the cognitive processes required to make 
these discoveries. The worry would be that without belief in mathematical 
objects, some cognitive processes necessary for mathematical 
applications could not be brought to bear on object-committed 
mathematical claims.
However, if we return to the analogy with literary fiction, we find grounds 
for thinking that this will be possible even if object-committed mathematics 
is taken as a form of pretence. Some examples will help to make this 
clear. Someone who reads The Glass Bead Game may infer from it that 
Joseph Knecht felt unfulfilled by his life in Castelia. To do so, they deploy 
whatever cognitive processes are required to draw out the consequences 
of the content of a text. Someone who reads Macbeth may explain that 
Macbeth murdered the king in part because he wanted to satisfy Lady 
Macbeth's desire for power. To do so, they must deploy whatever 
cognitive processes are required to construct explanations of claims given 
in, or implied by, the content of a text. Someone who reads The Lord of 
the Rings will realise that Gollum, being ultimately governed by his desire 
for the ring, will not allow Frodo to destroy it. To do so, they must deploy
71 By appeal to an example of the use of Fourier analysis in the theory of harmonics, Liston argues 
that rejection of belief in mathematics makes it hard to understand (a) how we use mathematics to 
discover new physical beliefs (b) how we use mathematics to justify physical beliefs (c) how we 
use mathematics in explanations (specifically o f facts concerning the reliability of applications) (d) 
how we take advantage of mathematics to give us insight into the physical phenomena dealt with 
in applications (1993,435-441). Our focus in the text on the claim that rejection of belief in 
mathematics threatens the discoveries made in applications may seem to ignore the other points. 
However, it seems reasonable to think of mathematical insights into physical phenomena as a 
special case of the kind of discovery that applications o f mathematics allow us to make, so the 
discussion in the text can be viewed as dealing with both (a) and (d). What Liston calls the 
justificatory use of mathematics appears to be subsumed by what we are calling the deductive use, 
so we have already covered (b). Similarly, the worry concerning the use of mathematics in 
explanations, point (c), appears to be of a piece with our worry about the reliability of 
mathematical reasoning (for if  fictionalism can explain how mathematical reasoning warrants 
beliefs about non-mathematical things, it is hard to see why it should not also be able to account 
for uses of mathematics in explaining beliefs about non-mathematical things).
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whatever cognitive processes are required to make discoveries about the 
content of a text. Note that, in each case, the reader does not believe 
what the relevant text says about the fictional objects it concerns but that 
this does not affect their ability to bring these various cognitive processes 
to bear on the relevant claims.
It is not difficult to think of further examples of this kind in which we would 
be confronted by a reader who wonders about what might happen in a 
given literary fiction, or forms conjectures about what will happen, or 
makes guesses about how events will turn out, etc. Seemingly, then, we 
can reason in a wide variety of different ways with claims about fictional 
objects. This already suggests that comparing mathematics to literary 
fiction need not threaten the cognitive processes required for applications, 
for it suggests that the kind of cognitive processes applied in reasoning 
can be seen to be involved in our understanding and appreciation of 
literary fiction. More importantly, however, such examples raise the 
general point that reasoning operates on thoughts independently of the 
attitudes we bear towards them. The fact that mathematical fictionalism 
eschews belief in object-committed mathematical claims thus does not 
seem a likely obstacle to our being able to reason with such claims in all 
sorts of ways, in particular in the ways required for making discoveries. 
The putative third worry arising from applications, that mathematical 
fictionalism would block a satisfactory cognitive account of mathematical 
discovery, thus does not appear to be a threat.
Nevertheless this leaves us with the two worries identified above, that 
rejecting mathematical objects might block a satisfactory account of 
mathematical description and that rejection of belief in mathematical 
objects might block a satisfactory account of the reliability of mathematical 
reasoning. The uses to which mathematics is put in solving the meeting 
problem can thus be adequately explained from the fictionalist point of 
view if and only if it can show that these worries are unfounded. Despite 
the mathematical simplicity of the meeting problem, it does not seem likely 
that other problems will throw up uses of mathematics that are different in
kind from the ones we have considered. We may thus take the challenge 
to mathematical fictionalism from applications to be as follows: (a) to 
recover the descriptive use of mathematics without invoking the existence 
of mathematical objects; (b) to recover the reliability of mathematical 
reasoning without invoking belief in mathematical objects.
6.2.3 Two strategies for meeting the challenge
The challenges identified above are by no means trivial difficulties. So 
how might they be met? One strategy is to attack the idea that 
mathematical applications are necessary to the successful prosecution of 
science. If it could be shown that we can do without the uses of 
mathematics described above, then it might also be possible to argue that 
tension between these uses of mathematics and claims made by 
mathematical fictionalism are irrelevant. The idea here would be to argue 
that the mathematical theories we actually use in science can be thought 
of as instrumental shortcuts for non-mathematical theories dealing with the 
same phenomena, in such a way that use of the mathematical theories 
could be replaced without loss to science by use of the non-mathematical 
theories. This strategy is developed by Field (1980, 1989a) and Balaguer 
(1996a, 1996b).
A second strategy for fictionalism concedes that mathematical applications 
may be necessary to science, thereby forgoing the claim that we can 
always replace our use of mathematical scientific theories with use of non- 
mathematical theories. Instead, this strategy describes uncontroversial 
examples of pretence playing the kind of roles mathematics has in 
science, using this to argue that mathematics can be applied in these 
ways even if it is a form of pretence. This strategy is developed by Yablo 
(1998, 2001, 2002, 2005) and appealed to by Balaguer (1996b).
In the remainder of this chapter, and in the next, we will consider 
examples of these strategies to see whether it is possible to meet the
challenge to mathematical fictionalism arising from applications. Before 
doing so, it is worth pointing out a further dimension to our investigation. 
The claim that mathematical applications are necessary to science, over 
which these strategies for fictionalism differ, is in effect the thesis of the 
indispensability of mathematics. As we saw in Chapter 5, this is a key 
ingredient of attempts to defend mathematical realism by grounding 
mathematical justification on scientific confirmation. Our investigation into 
whether fictionalism can be defended by arguing that mathematics can be 
eliminated from science will thus give us more information about the 
strengths of that position.
6.3 Field’s programme for the nominalization of science
s
Field (1980, 1989a) defends a version of mathematical fictionalism 
according to which there are no abstract objects. In support of this view, 
he argues that the use of mathematics in science is a useful, but in 
principle eliminable, tool. Field’s programme for the nominalization of 
science is intended to help establish this. The idea is to show (a) that 
each scientific theory that uses mathematics could in principle be replaced 
by a theory that does not use mathematics but (b) that it is nevertheless 
legitimate, from a fictionalist perspective, to make use of mathematical 
derivations in science for the convenience this brings.
Let us first consider how Field aims to establish that the scientific use of 
mathematics could in principle be eliminated from science. The key claim 
here is that mathematics is dispensable. What Field means by this, 
roughly speaking, is that there is a scientifically viable but nominalistically 
acceptable alternative to every scientific theory that uses mathematics. 
More precisely, the thought is that for every scientific theory T of 
phenomena P that uses mathematics, there is a nominalistically 
acceptable theory N that is not inferior to T as a scientific account of P.
In support of this, Field produces what he takes to be nominalistically 
acceptable reformulations of non-trivial scientific theories. He deals in 
particular with Newtonian Gravitional Theory (1980), however the methods 
he illustrates could also be used to reformulate other field theories that 
apply classical mathematics to a flat space-time.72 Field suggests that his 
nominalistic reformulations are preferable to mathematically formulated 
originals because (a) they offer intrinsic rather than extrinsic explanations 
of the same phenomena (op. cit, 43), (b) they minimise arbitrary choices 
in the presentation of our scientific beliefs (op. cit., 45) and (c) they are not 
appreciably more unwieldy to use than the mathematical originals (op. cit, 
90-91). If these claims are correct, they may perhaps establish not just
72 They are due to Krantz et al. (1971).
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that the use of mathematics is eliminable from science, but also that thes
use of mathematics should be eliminated from science (as we should 
always prefer Field’s reformulations to the original theories). However, 
Field does not actually need this stronger claim for his argument that 
mathematics can be viewed as a useful, but in principle, eliminable tool. 
The argument requires only the weaker claim that mathematics is 
dispensable. If this is correct, if non-mathematical scientific accounts are 
always available that are not less good, scientifically speaking, than 
mathematical competitors, then clearly mathematics is in principle 
eliminable from science.
Let us now consider how Field hopes to establish that it is legitimate for a 
fictionalist to use mathematical derivations as support for nominalistic 
conclusions. The central claim here is that mathematical theories are 
conservative over nominalistic theories. Informally, this means that a 
nominalistically acceptable claim follows from a mathematical theory and 
nominalistic theory together only if it follows from the nominalistic theory 
alone. Using symbols:
A mathematical theory M is conservative over a nominalistic 
theory N if S is a consequence of M + N only if it is a 
consequence of N alone, S a sentence of the language of N.
It is important to note that this claim is ambiguous until the underlying 
notion of logical consequence is specified. Recognising this, Field (1984, 
1985b, 1991) develops a modal analysis of logical consequence and 
related notions. We will not consider this analysis just now, for at this 
stage in our discussion, the ambiguous claim of conservativeness is 
nonetheless sufficiently clear for us to appreciate the contribution that 
conservativeness is supposed to make. However, we will return to Field’s 
modal analysis of logical notions in section 6.5.
The intuitive idea behind Field’s appeal to conservativeness is clear. If 
mathematics is conservative, then, given a mathematical theory M and a
246
nominalistic theory N, the joint theory M + N shas the same nominalistic 
consequences as N. So if M + N has any false nominalistic 
consequences, these are also consequences of N. Someone who uses 
mathematics to draw consequences from nominalistic theory will thus be 
no more prone to error than someone who does not, as it will not be 
possible for them to reach any falsehoods that they could not have 
reached without using mathematics.
To see how this is supposed to make it fictionalistically legitimate to use 
mathematical derivations in science, suppose that D is a mathematical 
derivation in M + N of a sentence which expresses a nominalistically 
acceptable claim <|>. Assuming that some of the mathematical premises of 
D express claims that are committed to mathematical objects, a fictionalist 
cannot conclude that <|> on the basis of the deduction expressed by D; this 
deduction is sound only if there are mathematical objects. However, if it is 
assumed that mathematical derivations show that the claims expressed by 
their conclusions are consequences of the theory expressed by their 
premises, a different deduction is available:
(1) D shows that <|> is a consequence of M + N
(2) M + N is conservative over N
(3) Therefore, <|> is a consequence of N
(4) N
(5) Therefore, <|>.
What we have, then, is that formally correct mathematical derivations of 
sentences expressing nominalistic claims correspond to sound meta- 
theoretical deductions of those claims. This is why Field claims that it is 
fictionalistically legitimate to use mathematical derivations to support their 
nominalistic conclusions. He must therefore believe that these meta- 
theoretical deductions are fictionalistically acceptable. If this view is 
correct, then it is fictionalistically legitimate to use mathematical 
derivations to support nominalistic conclusions because formally correct
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mathematical derivations of sentences expressing nominalistic conclusion 
correspond to fictionalistically acceptable and sound arguments for the 
same conclusions.
The final aspect of Field’s position concerns representation theorems 
(1980, 24-29). Given a mathematical and a nominalistic theory, a 
representation theorem proves the existence of a structure-preserving 
mapping from the domain of the nominalistic theory to a substructure of 
the domain of the mathematical theory. Such a theorem establishes a 
correlation between sentences of the mathematical theory and sentences 
of the nominalistic theory that, according to Field, allows us to take 
mathematical sentences as “abstract counterparts” of the correlated 
nominalistic sentences. Presumably he means by this that we can regard 
the former as standing in some way for whatever it is that the latter 
express about the world (Field says that “premises about the concrete can 
be ‘translated into’ abstract counterparts” (op. cit.,, 25)).
In any case, representation theorems are essential if we are to construct 
mathematical derivations of nominalistic conclusions. When a 
representation theorem can be proved, and only when a representation 
theorem can be proved, derivations in the mathematical theory of 
mathematical conclusions can be extended to derivations of the 
nominalistic sentences to which those conclusions are correlated by the 
representation theorem. This provides the main reason why 
representation theorems are important to Field’s position; if there were no 
representation theorems, there would be no mathematical derivations of 
nominalistic conclusions, and thus no possible fictionalist use to be made 
of them. However, representation theorems are also implicated in the 
support Field gives for the claim that mathematics is dispensable In his 
view, representation theorems, or more accurately, the uniqueness 
theorems that accompany them, help to show why intrinsic explanations of 
phenomena are desirable. This is meant to support Field’s suggestion 
that his nominalistic theories are attractive because they provide intrinsic 
explanations of phenomena, which in turn is intended to bolster the claim
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that mathematics is dispensable. A final reason representation theorems 
are important is that the method Field uses to nominalistically reformulate 
mathematically expressed theories involves proving a representation 
theorem in the relevant mathematical theory.
Assuming that Field is correct to say that mathematics could be eliminated 
from science in the manner he describes, we are left with rather obvious 
question: Why should fictionalists not just do without mathematics
altogether, using nominalistic formulations of theories even in the 
everyday practice of science? Field’s answer to this is that it can be 
advantageous to use mathematical derivations to establish nominalistic 
conclusions because they are sometimes more manageable than purely 
nominalistic arguments for the same conclusions.
We will now summarise Field’s position. Field claims that the use of 
mathematics in science is a useful, but in principle eliminable, tool. He 
argues that when a representation theorem can be proved between a 
mathematical and a nominalistic theory, mathematical derivations of 
claims from the nominalistic theory are possible which are sometimes 
more manageable than purely nominalistic arguments for the same 
conclusions. He argues that it is legitimate for a fictionalist to use 
mathematics derivations to support their nominalistic conclusions because 
mathematics is conservative. He argues that mathematics is eliminable 
because it is dispensable. If these arguments are all correct, they present 
a powerful case for viewing the use of mathematical derivations in science 
as an eliminable convenience.
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6.4 Field’s programme and the challenge from applications
In section 6.2 we saw that the applications of mathematics raise the 
following challenges for mathematical fictionalism: (a) to recover the 
descriptive use of mathematics in the absence of mathematical objects; 
(b) to recover the reliability of mathematical reasoning in the absence of 
belief in mathematical objects. What we now want to find out is whether 
Field’s programme provides promising responses to these challenges.
We consider first the descriptive use of mathematics. Field’s remark that 
mathematical claims can be thought of as “abstract counterparts” seems 
relevant to this because it allows us to say that mathematics discharges its 
descriptive function by providing abstract counterparts of nominalistic 
claims. However, Field does not say enough about the abstract 
counterpart relation for a clear understanding of this; he identifies which 
mathematical claims are to be considered the abstract counterparts of 
given nominalistic claims, but he does not explain what it is for a 
mathematical claim to be an abstract counterpart of the other. Despite its 
suggestive nature, therefore, Field’s talk of abstract counterparts does not 
provide a clear response to the challenge of recovering the descriptive 
uses of mathematics.
However, Field does provide a clear response to the challenge of 
recovering the reliability of mathematical reasoning in the absence of 
belief in mathematical objects. Field argues that formally correct 
mathematical derivations with nominalistic conclusions correspond to 
sound, nominalistically acceptable meta-theoretical deductions of the 
same conclusions. As we have seen, the meta-theoretical deductions in 
question have the following form, where D is a formally correct 
mathematical derivation of a sentence expressing a nominalistic 
conclusion <|>:
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(1) D shows that § is a consequence ®f M + N
(2) M + N is conservative over N
(3) Therefore, <|> is a consequence of N
(4) N
(5) Therefore, <|>.
If there really is a deduction of this form corresponding to every formally 
correct mathematical derivation of a nominalistic conclusion, and if these 
deductions really are nominalistically acceptable, then there are 
nominalistically acceptable reasons for belief in nominalistic conclusions 
that can be derived using mathematics. So on these assumptions, it is 
compatible with the rejection of mathematical objects to form belief in 
nominalistic conclusions that are correctly mathematically derived from 
true nominalistic premises. This method will be reliable because it will not 
permit one to form false beliefs. If mathematics is dispensable to science, 
all derivational uses of mathematics in science will conform to this model. 
Thus the reliability of all uses of mathematical reasoning will have been 
explained.
Field’s account of the scientific use of mathematics thus provides a clear 
response to one of the challenges facing mathematical fictionalism, that of 
explaining the reliability of mathematical reasoning in the absence of belief 
in mathematical objects. In what remains of this chapter, we will consider 
whether this response is convincing.
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6.5 Objections to Field’s modal commitments
We noted in section 6.3 that the claim that mathematics is conservative is 
ambiguous until the underlying notion of logical consequence is specified. 
The usual definitions treat logical consequence as either a syntactic or a 
semantic notion. Let F be a formal system in language L, r  a set of 
sentences of L and S a sentence of L. We say that S is a syntactic
consequence in F of r  when S can be derived from r  using the rules of
inference of F. We say that S is a semantic consequence of r  in L 
whenever S is true in all models of r  compatible with the semantics of L. 
As these definitions assume the existence of models and derivations,
respectively, it is questionable whether they are nominalistically
acceptable. For models are usually taken to be sets of some kind, hence 
as abstract objects. And whilst derivations can be treated as concrete 
inscriptions, it can be argued that the definition of syntactic consequence 
promises to be adequate only when they are treated as abstract objects (if 
derivations are treated as concrete inscriptions, then whether a given 
sentence is a syntactic consequence of another depends upon what 
concrete inscriptions exist).
Accordingly, Field (1985b, 1989b, 1991) puts forward an alternative, 
modal account of logical consequence. The account assumes a primitive, 
logical notion of possibility, and says that q is a modal consequence of 
claims p<\, pn if and only if it is not logically possible that _i(pi a ... a pn 
-» q).73 Equivalently, we can say that q is a modal consequence of claims 
Pi, ..., pn if and only if it is not logically possible that pi a ... a pn a -*q. 
With this approach, notions defined in terms of logical consequence such 
as consistency and conservativeness also come to be modally viewed. 
Consequently the claim that mathematics is conservative comes to be
73 When there are infinitely many claims in the set o f premises, this definition requires that the 
underlying logic be compact. Field does not actually call his notion the notion of “modal 
consequence” but using this term will help us not to confuse it with the usual syntactic and 
semantic notions.
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viewed as a modal claim of sorts too. In this section we will consider 
possible reasons for thinking that this approach is objectionable.
6.5.1 Hale and Wright’s objection from insularity
Hale and Wright argue at some length that Field’s approach brings with it 
unsustainable modal commitments (Hale (1987, Chapter 5, Section II); 
Wright (1988); Hale (1990); Hale and Wright (1992; 1994)). In its final 
version, their objection depends on the regulative principle that there are 
no “absolutely insular contingencies”, no conceptually contingent claims 
that both do not explanatorily depend on other conceptually contingent 
claims and do not have other conceptually contingent claims explanatorily 
depending on them (1994, 176). Call this the anti-insularity principle.74 
Hale and Wright argue that Field’s position conflicts with this principle by 
making the claim that there are no mathematical objects both conceptually 
contingent and absolutely insular. For this reason they claim that Field’s 
account of mathematics is unsatisfactory.
It will help our discussion to introduce two abbreviations. We will write “the 
conceptual contingency of mathematical existence” for “the conceptual 
contingency of the claim that there are no mathematical objects” and we 
will write “the absolute insularity of mathematical existence” for “ the 
absolute insularity of the claim that there are no mathematical objects”. 
Using these abbreviations, Hale and Wright’s complaint is that Field’s 
position is committed both to the conceptual contingency and to the 
absolute insularity of mathematical existence, and that this conflicts with 
the anti-insularity principle.
Field’s initial response to this objection (1989, 43), re-iterated later on 
(1993, 291-292), is that it equivocates over the notion of contingency. 
Hale and Wright argue that Field is committed to the conceptual
74 The term is Colyvan’s (2000).
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contingency of mathematical existence, where a claim is conceptually 
contingent if and only if both it and its negation are “not analytic in the 
broadest sense ... i.e. not ‘true just in virtue of its meaning’ “ (Hale and 
Wright (1994, 170, n.4)). But Field argues that he is only committed to the 
logical contingency of mathematical existence (i.e. the logical contingency 
of the claim that there are no mathematical objects), where a claim is 
logically contingent if and only if neither it nor its negation is logically true 
(1989, 43).75
If Field’s view of his position’s commitments is correct, there is a 
satisfactory rejoinder to Hale and Wright’s argument. As Field rightly 
argues, the logical notion of contingency does not appear to be a notion 
for which the possibility of absolutely insular contingencies should be ruled 
out (1993, 291). Given a claim, the fact, if it is a fact, that neither it nor its 
negation is logically true does not give any indication as to whether it 
stands in explanatory relations to other logically contingent claims. So 
there seems to be no reason to think that logically contingent claims 
cannot be absolutely insular. As stated, then, Hale and Wright’s argument 
simply misses the point, making play with the wrong notion of contingency. 
But when reformulated with the right notion of contingency, the anti­
insularity principle, which now reads that there are no absolutely insular 
logical contingencies, does not seem plausible.
Hale and Wright’s argument is thus threatening only if Field’s position is 
committed to the conceptual contingency of mathematical existence. So 
let us assume that this is a commitment of Field’s account of mathematics. 
Under this assumption, Hale and Wright’s charge of a conflict between the 
anti-insularity principle and Field’s account of the nature of mathematical 
objects must be met. One way to do this is to argue against the anti­
insularity principle. In what follows, we will consider this response.76
75 Field (1993) goes on to defend the view that the existence of mathematical objects is 
conceptually contingent. However, he does not grant that his modal approach to logical notions 
commits him to defending this view.
76 This is not the only possible response available. Having assumed that mathematical existence is 
conceptually contingent on Field’s view the other obvious response is to grant the anti-insularity
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Field argues against the anti-insularity principle as follows:
Call something a surdon iff
(A) its existence and state are in no way dependent on the 
existence and state of anything else
(B) the existence and state of nothing else are in any way 
dependent on the existence and state of it.
This certainly seems to be a conceptually consistent concept; 
but (A) and (B) guarantee insularity, so principle (3) [the anti­
insularity principle] immediately guarantees the existence of 
surdons -  indeed, the conceptual necessity of their existence.
Of course, Hale and Wright accept this conclusion, since they 
take numbers to be surdons, but even they should baulk at the 
idea that establishing the existence of mathematical entities is 
as easy as this! Field (1993, 296-297)
Field’s argument is that the anti-insularity principle implies the existence of 
surdons and that there is something absurd about this. So what we have 
here is an attempted reductio of the anti-insularity principle.
Clearly this reductio is convincing only if the existence of surdons really 
does follow from the anti-insularity principle. Field’s reasoning for this 
appears to be the following argument. The definition of surdons makes 
clear both that it is conceptually consistent that there are surdons and that 
it is absolutely insular that there are surdons. From the latter claim it 
follows, via the anti-insularity principle, that it is conceptually necessary or 
conceptually impossible that there are surdons. From the former it follows 
that it is not conceptually impossible that there are surdons. Thus, it is 
conceptually necessary that there are surdons.
principle, which says that there are no absolutely insular conceptual contingencies, but to deny that 
Field account of the nature of mathematical objects is committed to the absolute insularity of 
mathematical existence. Colyvan (2000, 90-91) discusses this response, showing that it is initially 
quite plausible.
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Responding to Field’s attempted reductio, Hald and Wright argue that this 
argument is not persuasive because Field does not establish that it is 
conceptually consistent that there are surdons (1994, §IV). To defend this 
view, they distinguish between the conceptual consistency of a claim and 
its apparent conceptual consistency, arguing that the latter only provides 
defeasible evidence for the former (op. cit., 181-182). Granting that it is 
apparently conceptually consistent that there are surdons, Hale and 
Wright then deny that this establishes its conceptual consistency on the 
grounds that it is also apparently conceptually consistent that there are no 
surdons (loc. cit.). Hale and Wright can thus claim that Field’s attempted 
reductio of the anti-insularity principle rests on an unjustified premise.
This looks to be quite a good response to Field’s attempted reductio; the 
only support Field puts forward for thinking that it is conceptually 
consistent that there are surdons is that the concept of a surdon “seems to 
be a conceptually consistent concept” (see quotation above), so a slide 
from “seeming” or “apparent” conceptual consistency to conceptual 
consistency outright does occur. Nevertheless, MacBride (1999) argues 
that the response is not good. He claims that Hale and Wright’s notion of 
apparent conceptual consistency is the same as Field’s notion of logical 
consistency (op. cit., 445) and therefore not governed by the anti-insularity 
principle (op. cit., 444).77 Seemingly, then, MacBride thinks that Hale and 
Wright’s response to Field’s reductio is unstable, permitting the defender 
of Field’s position to revert to the earlier charge of equivocation over the 
notion of contingency.
However, Hale and Wright’s notion of apparent conceptual consistency 
cannot be identified with Field’s notion of logical consistency. Hale and 
Wright argue that the apparent conceptual consistency neither of the claim 
that there are surdons nor of the claim that there are no surdons provides 
evidence for conceptual consistency. With these claims, they say, “there 
is a stand-off between our two impressions of consistency” (1994, 181-
77 Ot course, it is really the relevant related notion of contingency that is not governed hy the anti­
insularity principle, but MacBride’s simplilication is convenient.
256
182). Hale and Wright also make plain that a claim is apparently 
conceptually consistent if it is “readily intelligible and, as far as one can 
see, coherent” (op. cit., 181). These remarks strongly suggest that 
according to Hale and Wright’s notion of apparent conceptual consistency, 
a claim is apparently conceptually consistency if and only if strikes us as 
being conceptually consistent. Apparent conceptual consistency is 
therefore something phenomenal, not a genuine notion of consistency at 
all. In contrast, Field’s logical notion of consistency, according to which a 
claim is logically consistent if and only if neither it, nor its negation, is 
logically true, is a genuine notion of consistency. Thus the two notions 
cannot be identified.
There is an important lesson to be drawn from this. Having recognised the 
phenomenological character of Hale and Wright’s notion of apparent 
conceptual consistency, one must concede their point that apparent 
conceptual consistency provides only defeasible evidence for conceptual 
consistency; conceptually inconsistent things can presumably sometimes 
seem to be conceptually consistent. Hale and Wright’s response to Field’s 
attempted reductio of the anti-insularity principle thus appears to be 
effective, and so, at this stage, we have no reason to reject the anti­
insularity principle. So far then, the strategy of arguing against the anti­
insularity principle has not produced a satisfactory reply to Hale and 
Wright’s original objection. Nevertheless, as we shall now proceed to 
argue, there is enough doubt over whether the principle should be 
accepted to render Hale and Wright’s objection unconvincing.
To make our case we will change focus slightly. Instead of looking for 
reasons to dismiss Hale and Wright’s anti-insularity principle, we will look 
for reasons to think there is an equally attractive alternative to it. Field 
himself suggests an alternative anti-insularity principle, which states that 
we should not assume the existence of absolutely insular things without 
very good reason (the principle assumes that something is absolutely 
insular if it fulfils the conditions for being a surdon given in the quotation 
above) (1993, 297). Field clearly thinks this principle is preferable to Hale
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and Wright’s because it appears not to be committed to the existence of 
surdons. But from our preceding discussion, we must conclude with Hale 
and Wright that their principle is not committed to surdons either, so we 
cannot accept this view. However, we can claim that Field’s principle is as 
initially plausible as Hale and Wright’s as a way of making more precise 
the intuition underlying their rejection of absolute insularities. And in fact 
this is all we need to establish in order to nullify their objection.78
To see that this is so, note that Hale and Wright do not claim to have 
established the truth of their anti-insularity principle but only to have 
established that it is attractive. Their sole reason for this appears to be 
that it offers a more refined version of “the idea that the realm of 
contingency forms a single integrated system -  a tree-like structure in 
which every node is linked to the others” (1992, 134). This point emerges 
again later when they suggest that denying the principle “jars with an 
exceedingly natural and plausible conception of the realm of contingency 
as forming a single integrated system” (1994, 176). One might very well 
think there is something right in these vague remarks about contingencies 
all hanging together in one big system. But because of their vagueness, it 
seems perfectly justifiable to claim that Field’s anti-insularity principle is as 
attractive a refinement of them as Hale and Wright’s. For all Hale and 
Wright have said, we have no grounds upon which to reject Field’s anti­
insularity principle in favour of their own.
Despite the fact that we have found no firm reason to reject Hale and 
Wright’s anti-insularity principle, therefore, it appears there is a satisfactory 
rejoinder to their objection to Field’s position. Field’s anti-insularity
78 Colyvan (2000, 90) argues that Field’s anti-insularity principle is preferable to Hale and 
Wright’s since it is consistent with contingent nominalism (defined as the view that mathematical 
existence is conceptually contingent and there are no mathematical objects) and contingent 
Platonism (defined as the view that mathematical existence is conceptually contingent and there 
are mathematical objects) whereas Hale and Wright’s is not (being, at least apparently, 
inconsistent with contingent nominalism). I f  this is correct, it provides a satisfactory response to 
Hale and Wright’s objection. However, the fact that the two principles differ in this way provides 
a reason to prefer Field’s principle to Hale and Wright’s only if  it is assumed that that the correct 
anti-insularity principle, whatever it may be, should not influence the decision between contingent 
nominalism and contingent Platonism. But it is hard to see why this assumption should be 
accepted. Certainly Colyvan gives no adequate reason for thinking it should.
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principle seems to enjoy as much support as Hale and Wright’s, so the 
latter cannot be preferred to the former. It is thus not clear that the conflict 
between Hale and Wright’s anti-insularity principle and Field’s (assumed) 
commitment to the conceptual contingency of mathematical existence is 
objectionable. Hale and Wright’s objection to Field’s account of 
mathematics is therefore unconvincing.
6.5.2 Knowledge of the modal conservativeness of mathematics
Field’s appeal to the notion of modal consequence affects the content of 
his claim that mathematics is conservative. Let us say that a mathematical 
theory M is modally conservative over a nominalistic theory N whenever it 
is the case that:
(|) is a modal consequence of M + N only if <j> is a modal 
consequence of N alone, (j> a claim expressible in the 
language of N.
Field’s assumption that mathematics is modally conservative requires, at 
the very least, that whenever N is a nominalistically acceptable 
reformulation of a scientific theory T using mathematical theory M, there 
are nominalistically acceptable grounds for thinking that M is modally 
conservative over N. Let us investigate whether it seems likely that there 
are such grounds.79
Given Field’s remark that “neither I nor anyone else that I know of has a 
great deal to say about the epistemology of modal claims” (1985b, 140), it 
may seem as if he has nothing useful to say about this. But the original
7‘' One reason to think there are no nominalistically acceptable grounds lor the relevant claims of 
modal conservaliveness would be il they involved relcrence to or quanlilication over mathematical 
objects. MacBride (1999) suggests that this could be a difficulty because modal claims are 
ordinarily taken to be claims about possible worlds. However, this is not a telling complaint as the 
notion of possibility Field introduces is primitive, that is, neither delinablc nor explicable in terms 
of more basic notions, and so it cannot be said to be about possible worlds.
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exposition of Field (1980) contains three putative sources of grounds to 
think that mathematics is conservative. Perhaps these might supply 
nominalistically acceptable grounds for belief that mathematics is modally 
conservative.80
Field’s first suggestion is that if mathematics is conservative, that would 
help to explain why the view that mathematics is true in all possible worlds 
and the view that mathematics is apriori have been so popular (op. cit., 12- 
13).81 The idea here seems to be that since these views both imply that 
mathematics is conservative, we can take their popularity as evidence that 
philosophers who incline towards them are dimly sensing that 
mathematics is conservative. But whilst we could perhaps take this 
approach, it surely doubtful that we have to take it, that it provides the 
only, or best, explanation of the popularity of these views. So this does 
not provide a firm reason to think that mathematics is modally 
conservative.
The second suggestion is that we have the same kind of quasi-inductive 
grounds for the conservativeness of mathematics as we do for the 
consistency of mathematics (op. cit., 14). These are supposed to have 
something to do with the fact that we would be very surprised to find that 
mathematics is not conservative, and the fact that we would revise our 
mathematics if we found counter-examples to its conservativeness (op. 
cit., 13). But these points do not establish that mathematics is 
conservative. If we were surprised to find that mathematics is not 
conservative, that would only show that we believe it to be conservative, 
not that we have good grounds for this belief. And the mere fact that we
80 At this early stage it is not the modal conservativeness o f mathematics that is at stake, since 
Field does not introduce this notion until his (1984). Rather, as Field makes clear at (1980, 
Chapter 4, n.30,115), it is the semantic notion that is in play (i.e. conservativeness defined in 
terms of semantic consequence). Nevertheless, we can still ask whether what Field has to say in 
favour of the semantic conservativeness o f mathematics provides nominalistically acceptable 
grounds for belief in its modal conservativeness.
1 In the early work, it is the semantic notion of conservativeness that is at stake. In later work, he 
identifies belief in the semantic conservativeness of mathematics with a modal belief (1985b, 139). 
Still later, the notions are not identified but it is claimed that fictionalists can use mathematics to 
find out about modal consistency (1991, 13).
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would eliminate counter-examples to the modal conservativeness of 
mathematics if we came upon them clearly provides no guarantee that 
mathematics is, as a matter of fact, modally conservative.
The third and last suggestion for grounds for the view that mathematics is 
conservative comes in the form of two alleged proofs of the 
conservativeness of certain mathematical theories (op. cit., 16-19). One of 
these is an argument in model theory, the other an argument in proof 
theory. Obviously, these arguments prove that the theories in question 
are conservative only if theories in which they are carried out are assumed 
to be true. This assumption is not nominalistically acceptable, however, 
as model theory and proof theory are branches of applied set theory. 
Thus, these arguments cannot be taken as nominalistically acceptable 
grounds for the modal conservativeness of mathematics.
At this stage, then, it appears that Field has not produced adequate, 
nominalistically acceptable grounds for belief in the modal 
conservativeness of mathematics. However, Field (1991) argues that it is 
nominalistically acceptable to use model and proof theoretic arguments to 
support modal claims without taking them as genuine proofs. If he is right 
about this, then his model and proof theoretic “proofs” of the 
conservativeness of mathematics may yet provide nominalistically 
acceptable grounds for belief in the modal conservativeness of 
mathematics, just not in the same way that genuine proofs would.
The approach here is of a piece with Field’s general strategy of arguing 
that it is fictionalistically legitimate to use mathematical reasoning to 
establish nominalistically acceptable conclusions. This time, however, his 
more specific claim is that model and proof theoretic reasoning helps to 
construct nominalistically acceptable arguments for modal conclusions. If 
the mathematical reasoning in question is model theoretic, the modal 
argument it will allow us to construct will rely on a premise of the form:
Q  (S d  there is a model of A) id 0 A
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where “S” stands for some “reasonable finitely axiomatised set theory” 
such as NBG (op. cit, 12-13). In our terminology, this says that, if it is a 
modal consequence of set theory that there is a model of A, then A is 
possibly true. If the mathematical reasoning in question is proof theoretic, 
the corresponding modal argument will rely on a premise of the form:
(^2.) D  (S =5 there is a refutation in F of A) id -«0 A.
where “F” stands for one of the usual formalizations of first order logic (op. 
cit, 12). For us, this says that, if it is a modal consequence of set theory 
that there is a refutation of A in first order logic, then A is not possibly true.
Obviously modal arguments from these premises provide grounds to 
believe their conclusions only if there are grounds to believe their 
premises. Field’s main claim concerning the reasons there might be for 
believing (1) and (2) is a comparative one; that such reasons will always 
require weaker assumptions than the reasons that a mathematical realist 
might put forward for belief in certain analogues of (1) and (2). However, 
to justify this Field suggests that a nominalist could argue for (1) and (2) 
from prior knowledge of the modal consistency of set theory, i.e. prior 
knowledge that it is possible for the claims of set theory to be jointly true 
(op. cit., 14-17).82 This raises the question of whether there are 
nominalistically acceptable grounds for belief in the modal consistency of 
set theory.
Without claiming to have a conclusive argument, we will put forward 
considerations to suggest that there are not. It is often said that 
knowledge of what is possibly true is grounded on knowledge of what is 
actually true. So let us consider first whether a nominalist could appeal to 
the actual truth of a theory in order to argue for the possible truth of set 
theory. What we would be looking for here would be a theory T such that
82 In the case of (2), Field actually suggests that prior knowledge o f claims of the form 0 (S a  I), 
where I is an instance of a schema he has previously discussed, would suffice (1991, 16).
However, all such assumptions imply that 0 S.
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the nominalist could know both T and AXT 0 AXs.83 Clearly a nominalist 
cannot appeal to the actual truth of any mathematical theory, so T will 
have to be empirical. However, for AXT -» 0 AXs to be true, T will 
presumably have to entail the existence of a collection of objects exhibiting 
the structure of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. As these would have to 
be concrete objects, it is unclear that the nominalist could have adequate 
grounds for belief in T.
This suggests it may not be possible for a nominalist to ground knowledge 
of the possible truth of set theory on knowledge of the actual truth of some 
other theory. So let us now consider whether knowledge of the possible 
truth of set theory could be grounded on knowledge of the possible truth of 
some other theory. What we would be looking for here would be a theory 
T such that a nominalist could know bother and the conditional 0 AXj 3  0 
AXs. Presumably this conditional, too, could be true only if T entailed the 
existence of a collection of objects exhibiting the structure of the 
cumulative hierarchy of sets. Thus, as it would be useless to appeal to the 
possible truth of a mathematical theory other than set theory, T would 
have to be an empirical theory whose possible truth entailed the possible 
existence of a collection of concrete objects exhibiting the structure of the 
sets.
But on what grounds could the nominalist know the possible truth of such 
a theory T? Appeal to the actual truth of T would take us back to the failed 
first strategy of grounding the possible truth of set theory on knowledge of 
actuality. So other grounds will have to be found. Seemingly the only 
option here is to appeal to conceivability considerations, arguing that our 
ability to imagine or describe possible situations allows us to find out about 
what is possibly true (see, e.g., Yablo (1993)). This position has long 
attracted criticism on the basis that metaphysical conclusions cannot be 
deduced from psychological premises.84 But even prescinding from 
general worries of this kind, it is questionable that conceivability
83 Here “AXT” and “A XS” are the conjunction of the axioms of T and S, respectively.
84 As we saw in section 3.6.1, this objection can be found at least as far back as M ill.
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considerations could support the specific kind of knowledge required here, 
of the possible existence of a concrete instantiation of an infinite 
mathematical structure. As Hale (1996) suggests, such knowledge would 
seemingly have to be based on an ability to describe a situation which is 
both obviously possible and of which we should say that it contained a 
concrete instantiation of the structure in question (op. cit, 139). Given that 
any description would have to be both acceptable to the nominalist and 
finite (given our obvious limitations) it does seem unclear, as Hale goes on 
to argue, that the available descriptions could rule out there being no 
concrete instantiation of the structure in question (op. cit, 145).
We should stress again that these remarks are not intended conclusively 
to show that there are no nominalistically acceptable grounds for belief in 
the modal consistency of set theory. But they do at least suggest that it is 
not clear where such grounds are to be found. Field thus provides no 
reason to think there are nominalistically acceptable grounds for thinking 
that set theory is possibly true. Because of this there seems to be no 
prospect of a satisfactory modal argument for the modal conservativeness 
of mathematics based on model or proof theoretic considerations. Field's 
claim that mathematics is modally conservative thus lacks adequate 
justification.
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6.6 Shapiro’s dilemma ^
Shapiro (1983) thinks that Field should have appealed to the syntactic 
notion of conservativeness in his explanation of the applications of 
mathematics. Moreover, he argues that this choice would have lead to a 
dilemma. If the underlying logic is second-order, then mathematics will not 
be syntactically conservative. But if the underlying logic is first-order, then 
if the mathematics is syntactically conservative it will not be possible to 
prove the representation theorems Field invokes. Since both 
conservativeness and representation theorems are required in Field’s 
account of applications, this means the position is unstable.
To assess this objection, it helps to note that Field eventually settles on a 
background of first order logic. In his original exposition, he prefers 
second-order formulations of scientific theories, arguing that these are 
nominalistically acceptable on the grounds that the second-order variables 
can be interpreted over mereological sums of space-time points (1980, 
Chapter 4). Later, however, Field argues that first-order formulations 
should be preferred on the grounds that logic should not make existential 
claims (1985b, 141). This seems to be the right approach. When the 
formulations are second order, the mereological sums of space-time 
points whose existence is entailed appear as ontological commitments of 
the logic rather than the theories formulated in the logic; but logic should 
not have ontological commitments like this.
To defend Field’s position against Shapiro’s objection it is thus necessary 
to address that part of it which deals with first order logic. Shapiro’s 
central point here is that if mathematics is syntactically conservative the 
representation theorems Field invokes cannot be proved.85 The argument 
for this relies on the Godel’s incompleteness theorems. A somewhat
85 Shapiro in fact argues that Field’s model theoretic proof of the semantic conservativeness of 
mathematics establishes, in the first order context, its syntactic conservativeness as well. He then 
shows that this leads to the difficulty described in the text. However, the force of his objection 
clearly depends only on establishing the conditional that we called the “central point” . For this 
reason we treat syntactic conservativeness as an assumption of Shapiro’s argument.
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simplified version of it runs as follows.86 Assume that mathematics is 
syntactically conservative. Consider a nominalistic formulation N of Peano 
Arithmetic (recall that Field’s space-time contains uncountably many 
concrete points, so that models for the natural numbers are guaranteed). 
Let M be some standard set theory equipped to apply to N in the manner 
described by Field. In this situation, sentences expressing the consistency 
of N in the manner exhibited in the proof of Godel’s theorems, call these 
Godel sentences, may be formulated in both the language of N and the 
language of M. Moreover, if a representation theorem linking M + N to N 
can be proved, then such sentences are all provably equivalent in the 
mathematical theory M + N, regardless of in which language they are 
expressed. Now we know that Godel sentences for N in the language of 
M + N can be proved in M + N, because standard set theory proves the 
consistency of Peano arithmetic. Thus, if M is syntactically conservative 
over N, it follows that Godel sentences for N in the language of N can be 
proved in N. But this is a contradiction, as (an analogue of) Godel’s first 
incompleteness theorem tells us that N does not prove its own 
consistency. As the only way to avoid the contradiction is to deny that the 
relevant representation theorem can be proved, we have that, in the first 
order case, if mathematics is syntactically conservative, the representation 
theorems Field invokes cannot be proved.
How might the defender of Field’s position respond to this argument? 
Observing that the argument assumes the syntactic notion of 
conservativeness, it may seem tempting to argue that Field’s appeal to his 
modal notion of conservativeness renders the argument irrelevant. 
However, this conclusion cannot be sustained. From the realist point of 
view, both the following principles are to be accepted as true:
(i) If <j) is a syntactic consequence of set theory (relative to a 
standard formalization), then <|) is a modal consequence of 
set theory
Xf’ Sec Shapiro (1983, 232) for his version.
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(ii) If <|> is a modal consequence of $et theory, then <(> is a 
semantic consequence of set theory87
If we now assume a background of first order logic, the fact that first order 
logic is both sound and complete shows that the notions of syntactic and 
semantic consequence are co-extensive (assuming a reasonable 
formalization of the logic). But (i) and (ii) indicate that the modal notion 
lies between these two, extensionally speaking. Thus all three notions are 
co-extensive. The fact that Shapiro’s argument about representation 
theorems assumes the syntactic notion of conservativeness thus does not 
mean that his objection can be discarded as irrelevant. For since syntactic 
conservativeness is co-extensive with modal conservativeness, Shapiro’s 
argument can be reformulated with respect to the modal notion without 
any loss of plausibility.88
Shapiro’s argument must therefore be met head on. This raises the 
question of whether Field’s account of mathematical applications can do 
without representation theorems. Clearly they cannot be abandoned 
altogether, as without representation theorems it is not possible to think of 
mathematical sentences as abstract counterparts of nominalistic ones, 
which idea is crucial to explaining the nominalistic usefulness of
87 To see why principle (i) holds suppose that we have deduced in proof theory that <J> is a syntactic 
consequence of set theory. By definition, this implies that there is a derivation of <J> from the 
axioms of set theory. But then there is a derivation of A XS —> <|) that has no premises, where 
“AXS” is the conjunction of the axioms of set theory. The necessitation rule of modal logic thus 
yields (AXs -»  <J>), i.e. 4> is a modal consequence of set theory. So from the perspective of 
mathematical realism, if  <|> is a syntactic consequence of set theory, <J> is a modal consequence of set 
theory..
To see why principle (ii) holds, suppose now that we have somehow established that <f) is 
a modal consequence of set theory, i.e. that (A X S —> <f>). Let M  be a model o f set theory. Since 
( AXs -> <|>) is true, AXs —> <t> is true in all interpretations and so must be true in M. Since M  is a 
model of set theory, the axioms of set theory are all true in M , so <f> must also be true in M. <J> is 
therefore true in all models of set theory, i.e. <|> is a semantic consequence of set theory. So from 
the perspective of mathematical realism, if  <f> is a modal consequence of set theory, <j) is a semantic 
consequence of set theory.
88 For economy we speak here as if  the notions of syntactic, semantic and modal consequence 
relate the same kind of things. This is not really correct, when we say that <|) is a syntactic 
consequence of set theory, “<(>” must be taken for a sentence and “set theory” for a set o f sentences, 
but when we say that <J> is a modal consequence of set theory, “<{)” should be taken for what a 
sentence expresses and “set theory” for what the sentences of set theory collectively express. This 
manner of speaking is not objectionable however, as the main thrust of the argument could be 
expressed more long-windedly without it.
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mathematical reasoning. However, it may be possible to get by with 
representation theorems that do not establish such a close relationship 
between the claims of mathematical and nominalistic theories, in particular 
that do not supply “concrete counterparts” of every mathematical 
sentence. CONpA (the usual Godel sentence for PA) is not applied in 
mathematical science. So if a representation theorem could be proved 
that provided a concrete counterpart for every mathematical sentence 
used in applications but which did not supply a counterpart for CONPA, 
then we could invoke that theorem to explain the nominalistic usefulness 
of mathematical reasoning without contradicting Godel’s theorems. More 
generally, if a representation theorem can be proved that establishes an 
abstract counterpart relation strong enough to justify the use of every 
applied mathematical sentence but not so strong as to demand that 
problematic sentences like CONPA are applied, then Field’s appeal to 
representation theorems would be defensible.
Field (1985b) ponders this idea at some length. He points out that a 
representation theorem can be proved linking the first-order formulation of 
N to a mathematical theory (M + N)’ which does not attribute to space-time 
the structure of a four dimensional Gallilean space defined over the real 
numbers. Rather, it attributes to space-time the structure of a four 
dimensional Gallilean space defined over a field similar to the real 
numbers but for which the least upper bound axiom is restricted to sets of 
reals definable in a specified expansion of the first-order theory of 
quadruples of real numbers, see Field (op. cit., 134, n.10). Field points out 
that (M + N)’ does not imply CONPA. Moreover, he argues that (M + N)’ is 
scientifically preferable to M + N because there is no direct observational 
support for the extra nominalistic content of M + N, as represented by the 
non-mathematical claims that it implies but that (M + N)’ does not. Thus, 
Field concludes, the representation theorem linking (M + N)’ to N is 
sufficient for his needs.
However this response is not convincing. We would have little reason to 
believe (M + N)’ unless M + N were true. Furthermore, Field’s new
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representation theorem does not show th^ usefulness of applying the 
theory of real numbers to N, but only the usefulness of applying the theory 
of an isomorphism class of fields rather like the reals but different from it in 
certain regards. But we use the real numbers in science, not these other 
fields; most scientists probably would not even know what these other 
fields were. Thus, even if Field’s preferred representation theorems do 
establish that it is useful to make use of this other mathematics in carrying 
out nominalistic science, this would leave us without an explanation of the 
usefulness of the mathematics scientists actually use.
This response to Shapiro’s argument thus does not seem convincing. 
Moreover, there appears to be no alternative response. Shapiro’s 
observation that the original representation theorems are not forthcoming 
when the background logic is first order thus presents a telling objection to 
Field’s claim to have established why it is useful to use standard 
mathematics instrumentally in nominalistic science.
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6.7 Objections to Field’s theory of space-titpe
If the representation theorems Field relies upon are to be proved, then 
physical space-time must be very rich. The mappings required by the 
representation theorems will only exist if there are as many space-time 
points as there elements of R4, so there must be uncountably many space­
time points if the theorems are to be proved. Moreover, the mappings 
required will exist only if regions of space-time (mereological sums of 
space-time points) exhibit a similar structure to certain sets of elements of 
R4, so space-time must be endowed with significant mathematical 
structure. Some critics feel that by assuming such a rich space-time Field 
must forfeit his claim to have shown how to nominalize theories of 
mathematical science. For instance, Resnik (1985a) argues that the 
space-time points Field appeals to are no more nominalistically acceptable 
than mathematical objects, whilst Resnik (1985b) argues that a space-time 
with mathematical structure is itself nominalistically unacceptable. In what 
follows, we will consider objections of this kind, focusing on issues 
concerning space-time points.89
Resnik claims against the nominalistic acceptability of space-time points 
that they should be regarded as abstract, or at least, as more like 
paradigmatic mathematical objects, metaphysically speaking, than 
paradigmatic concrete objects.90 To support this he points to disanalogies 
between the ways such objects enter our physical reasoning:
The explanatory, historical and evidential place of space-time 
points in physics is much closer to that of standard 
mathematical objects than it is to that of standard physical 
objects. In contrast to the case of electrons, forces or planets, 
no particular body of observable phenomena led to the
89 Though we should note that Field at least addresses the second point; he argues that on his view 
space-time displays characteristics such as causal efficacy (of space-time regions) that cannot be 
understood as arising from mathematical structure (see, e.g., (1980, op. cit., 31-33)).
90 He also raises an epistemological point, namely, that it is unclear that knowledge of space-time 
points will be more easily accounted for than knowledge o f mathematical objects. However, we 
do not consider this in the text.
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introduction or discovery of space-time^ points. We postulate 
space-time points not to explain how or why something 
happens, but rather to structure or organize happenings.
(1985a, 167)
For Resnik, then, the roles played in physics by space-time points suggest 
metaphysical kinship with mathematical rather than concrete objects. 
Field (1985a) responds to this by arguing that space-time points are to be 
regarded as concrete as by so doing we achieve an adequate account of 
field theories such as classical electromagnetism. Some of what he has to 
say about field theories concerns whether it is possible to construe them 
without reference to space-time points. But note that this, alone, cannot 
show that space-time points are concrete. As Field’s ultimate aim is to 
demonstrate that mathematical objects are dispensable by providing 
nominalistic reformulations of mathematical scientific theories, he cannot 
respond to the objection that space-time points are abstract simply by 
inferring from their indispensability to their concreteness. For this would 
be equivalent to assuming that that which is abstract is dispensable, and 
so would be question-begging.
Field’s view must therefore be that field theories imply claims about space­
time points that indicate that they can be considered to be concrete 
objects, or at least, sufficiently like concrete objects to be unobjectionable 
from a nominalistic perspective. And indeed, this is what he thinks. Field 
believes that on our best understanding of field theories, we are not only 
committed to the existence of space-time points, we are also committed to 
attributing causal properties to them, properties such as electromagnetic 
field intensities and the values of gravitational tensors (1982, 70-72). To 
combat the impression that the objects of which we predicate such 
properties are actually the pieces of matter occupying space-time points, 
he elsewhere stresses (1985a, 181) that we make such attributions to 
space-time points whether they are occupied or not. Thus, in Field’s view, 
it is appropriate to think of space-time points as concrete things (or at 
least, as not on a metaphysical par with mathematical objects).
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It seems clear that if Field is correct about how we ought to understand 
field theories, then he has the resources to meet Resnik's objection. For 
in this case, it is simply not true that space-time points do not play the role 
in explanations of happenings that more familiar concrete objects play. So 
does this mean that space-time points are nominalistically acceptable after 
all? We cannot say. As we are not in a position to decide what is the best 
way of interpreting field theories, we are unable to draw a firm conclusion 
concerning the nature of space-time points.
However, this does not leave us without a firm objection to Field’s use of 
space-time points. The debate between Resnik and Field over the nature 
of space-time concerns whether, if space-time points exist, they should be 
considered nominalistically acceptable. But Field requires not just that this 
conditional be true, but also that its antecedent be fulfilled. That is, he 
requires that space-time points exist. And as we pointed out above, he 
requires that they exist in uncountable multitudes. So where is the 
evidence that they do?
One might expect that it is to come from the very same field theories that 
are supposed to show that space-time points are concrete. However, the 
existence of uncountably many space-time points follows from those 
theories only if they treat space-time as a continuous manifold. And 
although this is assumed in the theories, it appears that the assumption is 
made for instrumental purposes. Thus, in response to the way our 
mathematical description of gravity breaks down at quantum distances, 
Richard Feynman writes:
I believe that the theory that space is continuous is wrong, 
because we get these infinities and other difficulties, and we 
are left with questions on what determines the size of all the 
particles. I rather suspect that the simple ideas of geometry, 
extended down into infinitely small space, are wrong. (1965,
166-167)
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More recently, Chris Isham writes: s
In general terms it is clear that the major interest in quantum 
gravity will always tend to focus on problems like the ‘big bang’ 
and the profound implications of the fundamentally different 
conceptual structures of quantum theory and general relativity.
What is unclear is how much, if anything, will be left of these 
structures at the end of the day. The idea of a spacetime 
‘continuum’ seems particularly vulnerable, and many attempts 
have been made to suggest ways of dispensing with this 
concept at a sub-microscopic level. Some of these (e.g. 
quantum topology) have been mentioned already, but there 
are many others. Perhaps spacetime is really a fractal (a 
mathematical space with a fractional number of dimensions), 
or a lattice, perhaps modelled on a finite number field; or 
perhaps, as in Penrose’s twistor theory, there are no 
spacetime points as such, but rather systems of lines whose 
intersections are equivalent to points in the classical theory but 
which fail to intersect at all when subject to quantum 
fluctuations. (1989, 93)
The difficulties alluded to in these quotations remain with us today; we still 
lack a satisfactory resolution of the tensions between the “fundamentally 
different conceptual structures of quantum theory and general relativity”. 
Whether space-time is continuous, or whether, at the incredibly tiny scales 
at which quantum effects are significant, the assumption of continuity 
cannot be maintained, must therefore be viewed as an open question.
It follows that the assumption of uncountably many space-time points in 
science must itself be instrumental, part of an idealization, a claim made 
for convenience that need not be true. The scientific evidence, it seems, 
does not show that there are uncountably many space-time points. Thus, 
since Field’s method of nominalization depends on the assumption that 
uncountably many space-time points exist, it cannot, given the present 
state of scientific knowledge, be viewed as correct.
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6.8 Conclusion
We will now collect together the conclusions we have reached about 
Field’s programme for the nominalization of science, and assess their 
significance for the prospects of mathematical fictionalism.
We first considered objections to the modal commitments of Field’s theory 
(section 6.5). We dismissed Hale and Wright’s argument that Field’s 
logical notion of possibility should be rejected (section 6.5.1) but argued 
that it is unclear there are nominalistically acceptable grounds for 
knowledge of the modal consistency of standard mathematical theories 
(section 6.5.2). If this is correct, it is not clear what supports the claim that 
mathematics is conservative. We then considered and endorsed 
Shapiro’s argument that, when Field’s programme is pursed against the 
background of first order logic, if mathematics is conservative, the required 
representation theorems cannot be proved (section 6.6). If this is correct, 
then the model of applications Field puts forward cannot be invoked. 
Finally, we considered Resnik’s arguments against the nominalistic 
acceptability of Field’s reformulations of field theories in flat space-time, 
arguing that there is not adequate evidence for the view that there are 
uncountably many concrete space-time points (section 6.7). If this is 
correct, Field’s claim that these theories can be nominalistically 
reformulated cannot be accepted. It thus appears that there are serious 
difficulties with every aspect of Field’s position.
Field’s programme for the nominalization of science thus does not 
reassure us that mathematical fictionalism can meet the challenge from 
applications. We saw that this had two parts: (a) to recover the descriptive 
uses of mathematics in the absence of mathematical objects and (b) to 
recover the reliability of mathematical reasoning in the absence of belief in 
mathematical objects (section 6.2). As we pointed out, Field’s theory did 
not promise to address the first of these but did promise to address the 
second, by arguing that mathematical deductions of nominalistically 
acceptable conclusions correspond to nominalistically acceptable
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deductions of the same conclusions (section 6.4). Given the objections 
recently described, this attempted explanation of the reliability of 
mathematical reasoning cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Our 
discussion of Field’s programme thus leaves us without an adequate 
response to either aspect of the challenge from applications, and leaves 
us with the impression that the fictionalist strategy it represents, that of 
arguing that mathematics can be eliminated from science, is ill conceived.
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7
\
Fictionalism and pretence
The conclusions of the previous chapter suggest that science cannot be 
done without mathematics. Given our assumption of linguistic realism, we 
cannot eliminate mathematics from science by rewriting mathematics. 
Given the failure of Field’s programme, we lack a method for extracting 
mathematics from science by rewriting science. Consequently, it does not 
seem possible for mathematical fictionalism to meet the challenge from 
applications by arguing that mathematics is dispensable.
The question of whether mathematical fictionalism can meet the challenge 
thus becomes the question of whether it can do so without claiming that 
mathematics is dispensable to science. This brings us to the other 
fictionalist strategy we identified for meeting the challenge, namely, to 
argue that the roles mathematics has in science are played in other 
contexts by acknowledged forms of pretence. This does not appear to 
involve a commitment as to whether mathematics is dispensable to 
science. Our question in this chapter is thus whether it is possible, on this 
approach, to provide a satisfactory account of applications.
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7.1 Prescriptive fictionalism
s
Prescriptive fictionalism takes its cue from the analogy between 
mathematics and fiction drawn in section 6.1. When we use language to 
tell a story, and when we engage in literary criticism, we make claims that 
are true only if there are fictional objects. On a plausible account of 
literary fiction, our listeners play along with these claims, imagining or 
pretending them to be true, but not believing them. The analogy maintains 
that mathematics is comparable to literary fiction in this regard. In doing 
mathematics, we put forward claims that are true only if there are 
mathematical objects, we imagine or pretend that these object-committed 
mathematical claims are true, but we do not thereby commit ourselves to 
their truth. Consequently, we are no more obliged to believe in 
mathematical objects than we are to believe in fictional objects.
This analogy could be intended descriptively, as being true to our actual 
use of mathematics, or prescriptively, as an indication of how we ought to 
use mathematics. As the question of how people actually engage with 
mathematics is an empirical one, to be addressed by empirical research, 
the descriptive approach does not seem appropriate for a philosophical 
study of this kind. Accordingly, we will take the prescriptive approach, 
using the analogy to guide construction of a prescriptive conception of 
mathematics as a kind of pretence.
If this approach is to be defensible, the conception of mathematics 
proposed must represent mathematics as an area of enquiry, that is, as a 
discipline in which claims are evaluated relative to prevailing standards. 
Drawing on the analogy between mathematics and literary fiction, we will 
set out a picture of mathematics as an area of enquiry in the next section. 
In the following section we will return to the challenge to fictionalism from 
applications, building from what has gone before to show how 
mathematics, conceived as a kind of pretence, can discharge the roles it 
has in applications.
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7.2 Mathematics as an area of enquiry
s
7.2.1 Acceptance
In an area of enquiry, we evaluate claims relative to certain standards, 
aiming to accept only those claims that satisfy them. The notion of 
acceptance involved here is technical, due to Van Fraassen (1980). It can 
be explained as the state of mind that is to be adopted towards a claim 
governed by standards when it has been shown to meet those standards. 
When introduced this way, there is a substantive question as to what state 
of mind constitutes acceptance relative to the standards of a given area of 
enquiry. If prescriptive fictionalism is to represent mathematics as an area 
of enquiry, it must therefore provide an explanation of what state of mind 
constitutes acceptance of mathematical claims. This state of mind must 
not involve belief in mathematical objects, since otherwise it will not be 
possible to think of mathematics as a kind of pretence.
It may perhaps be thought that prescriptive fictionalism could just state 
that the acceptance of mathematical claims does not require belief in 
mathematical objects, and leave it at that. However, this would not be 
sufficient. What must be shown is that there is a state of mind which, 
when taken as mathematical acceptance, gives the right dispositions to 
utterance but does not involve belief in mathematical objects. Simply 
stating that no belief in mathematical objects is involved does not 
demonstrate that there is such a state of mind, so a positive 
characterisation of what constitutes mathematical acceptance is required.
As we are working towards a conception of mathematics as pretence, it 
may seem appropriate to take acceptance in mathematics to be 
constituted by pretence, i.e. to view the acceptance of a mathematical 
claim p as pretence that p. But this would be inadequate. When the 
notion of acceptance is explained as above, it has a standing character: a 
subject who once accepts that p remains in the state of accepting that p 
unless they suffer a lapse of memory or come to suspect that their
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reasons for accepting p were mistaken or insufficient. In contrast, a
s
subject pretends that p only whilst they act as if they believe that p (whilst 
not believing that p). Since acting as if we believe that p is something we 
do only intermittently, for example, whilst uttering a sentence that 
expresses p, it follows that pretence does not have the requisite standing 
character. Thus acceptance in mathematics cannot be constituted by 
pretence.
Having recognised this, it is natural to wonder whether mathematical 
acceptance could be constituted by dispositions to pretend; this would 
preserve a link between acceptance and pretence whilst invoking states of 
mind with the standing character of beliefs. But it appears that someone 
could be disposed to pretend that p, for a given mathematical claim p, and 
yet not actually accept it, in the relevant sense. A schoolboy intending to 
mislead his classmates over what mathematical claims he accepts might 
be disposed to pretend that p even though he did not himself accept it. An 
actor whose lines are supposed to give the impression that his character 
accepts p would be disposed to pretend that p even though he did not 
himself accept it. So prescriptive fictionalism cannot identify acceptance 
of a mathematical claim p with the disposition to pretend it.
Nevertheless, the idea of shifting to dispositions, or at least to dispositional 
states, is a good one. This becomes clear if we think about what happens 
when we engage with literary fiction. On first reading Hemingway’s novel 
The Old Man and The Sea, one encounters many claims about Santiago 
and his struggle with the fish. Provided one realises one is reading fiction, 
one does not believe these claims and so one does not become prepared 
to make or endorse the statement that they are true. Nevertheless one 
does become prepared to use these claims on certain occasions as if one 
believed them to be true; for example, one becomes prepared to use them 
in order to tell the story of The Old Man and the Sea. The analogy 
between mathematics and literary fiction thus suggests taking 
mathematical acceptance to be a similar state of preparedness, a state of 
being ready to make use of mathematical claims in certain contexts as if
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believing them to be true, whilst not being^ prepared to go so far as to 
assert or endorse that they are true.
This proposal is on the right lines, but it does not adequately characterise 
a potential candidate for mathematical acceptance unless accompanied by 
a specification of the relevant contexts of use. Since it has been germane 
to our discussions for some time now that mathematics has empirical 
applications, the obvious ploy here is to take these as the relevant 
contexts. Accordingly we can propose that, for an object-committed 
mathematical claim p:
A accepts p if and only if (i) A is prepared to use p in 
empirical applications and (ii) A is not prepared to assert or 
endorse the statement that p is true.
Note that to be in this state of mind with respect to a given claim p does 
not require that one believe that p. Note, too, that it has the standing 
character of belief; once having become prepared to act this way with p, 
one will remain so prepared unless one has a lapse of memory or comes 
to believe that one’s original motivation for becoming so prepared was 
faulty or insufficient. It thus satisfies both constraints we have identified 
for candidates for mathematical acceptance.
Let us now consider what it is to reject a mathematical claim. Any 
constitutive account of mathematical acceptance must address this, for 
when we find that a mathematical claim conflicts with the standards 
governing mathematical acceptance, we should reject it. In mathematics, 
at least, we can assume that when a claim may be accepted, its negation 
may be rejected (and vice versa). Accordingly, prescriptive fictionalism 
can simply take rejection of p as being constituted by acceptance of the 
negation of p. Someone rejects p when they are prepared to use not-p, or 
propositions deduced from it, just as if it were true, but are not prepared to 
assert or endorse the statement that not-p is true.
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7.2.2 Standards of acceptability
\
If mathematics is to be viewed as an area of enquiry, the emergence of 
standards governing acceptance must be explained. It can seem as if 
comparisons with literary fiction are of no assistance here. When 
Hemingway wrote The Old Man and the Sea there was no question of his 
making mistakes about Santiago, about what he is like and what 
experiences he has during his struggle with the fish. Legitimate evaluative 
questions here concern literary matters, whether Santiago’s character is 
adequately developed, whether Hemingway’s style contributes in a 
positive way to the effect of the narrative, etc. This makes it seem that 
mathematics, in which acceptance is governed by standards of 
acceptability, is quite unlike literary fiction, which in this case is not.91
However, a contrast can be drawn between telling a new story, as 
Hemingway did when he wrote The Old Man and the Sea, and drawing out 
the consequences of an old one, as we do when we extend the story 
Hemingway wrote. When we draw out consequences of The Old Man and 
the Sea, we cannot say whatever we like about Santiago, rather we must 
say things about him that follow from the literary work; what we say is in 
this sense constrained by a standard of acceptability that it provides.
Taking situations in which we draw out the consequences of old stories as 
our model, we can view the correct acceptance of mathematical claims as 
being constrained by standards provided by mathematical theories. For 
example, we can say that the intermediate value theorem may be correctly 
accepted because it is known to follow from the axioms of real analysis. 
However, this will not indicate that the intermediate value theorem may be 
correctly accepted in any interesting sense unless those axioms may 
themselves be correctly accepted. Clearly, then, this account of the 
acceptability of mathematical claims must be supplemented by a
91 This seems to be one of the reasons for which Resnik distinguishes the positing of mathematical 
objects from the introduction of fictional characters. See Resnik (1997, 188-189).
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description of the conditions under which we are justified in accepting the 
axioms of a mathematical theory.
To address this, it helps to consider allegorical works of literary fiction such 
as Orwell's Animal Farm. These often present, in a metaphorical way, 
facts and opinions about real objects and events. When a work is 
intended to have this function, we can think of its acceptability as being 
constrained by its appropriateness as a means of conveying the relevant 
facts and opinions; the work may be correctly accepted if it constitutes a 
good allegory for the relevant facts and opinions, otherwise not.
This provokes the idea that the acceptability of mathematical theories 
could be made to depend on their utility for certain purposes. As it has 
been germane to our discussions for some time that mathematical 
theories have empirical applications, the obvious ploy here is to appeal to 
these to explain mathematical acceptability. Since we are trying to 
formulate conditions under which the acceptance of a mathematical theory 
is justified, the relevant conditions must presumably concern what is 
known about the mathematical theory in question.
A first suggestion is thus the following:
A mathematical theory M may be correctly accepted if and
only if it is known to have empirical applications.
However, by making the acceptability of M depend on its having empirical 
applications, this proposal ties mathematical acceptability to the vagaries 
of empirical research. This seems to be wrong; we should be able 
correctly to accept mathematical theories even if they are not, as a matter 
of fact, used in empirical studies. It seems better, therefore, to explain 
mathematical acceptability not by reference to the having of empirical 
applications, but rather by reference to the possibility of empirical 
applications. If we say that a mathematical theory is empirically applicable
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if and only if it could have empirical applications, we can follow through 
this idea with the following proposal:
A mathematical theory M may be correctly accepted if and 
only if it is known to be empirically applicable.
But mathematical theories frequently find application in other mathematical 
theories (they allow us to simplify previously accepted mathematics, to 
formulate previously accepted mathematics in fruitful new ways, to unify 
disparate branches of mathematics, etc.). Moreover, a mathematical 
theory could find application in mathematics even if it were not empirically 
applicable, in which case it still ought to be acceptable if the mathematics 
to which it is applicable is acceptable. This may incline us towards the 
following modification:
A mathematical theory M may be correctly accepted if and 
only if it is known to be empirically or mathematically 
applicable.
(understanding M to be mathematically applicable if and only if it could 
have mathematical applications). However, where the previous proposal 
was too restrictive, this proposal is too liberal, for any pure mathematical 
theory could have mathematical applications. Our explanation of 
mathematical acceptability thus stands in need of a more restrictive notion 
of applicability that retains some connection with, but is less restrictive 
than, empirical applicability.
To see how to proceed, it helps to stress that the applicability of M to 
another mathematical theory should contribute to M’s acceptability only if 
the mathematical theory to which it is applicable is itself acceptable. This 
suggests making acceptability depend in the first instance on empirical 
applicability, to produce an initial stage of acceptable mathematical 
theories, but then acknowledging subsequence stages of theories whose
283
acceptability depends on applicability to theories of the preceding stages. 
This can be achieved by recursively defining for mathematical theory M:
(i) M is applicable at level 1 if and only if M is empirically 
applicable
(ii) M is applicable at level n + 1 if and only if M is applicable 
to theories applicable at level n.
We can then propose that:
A mathematical theory M may be correctly accepted if and 
only if it is known to be applicable.
where a theory is applicable just in case it is applicable at some level.
This is very nearly the principle we are looking for, but one final issue must 
be addressed. There are examples of empirically applicable mathematical 
theories that are known to be inconsistent.92 Such theories clearly should 
not be considered mathematically acceptable, but they are ratified as such 
by the present proposal. Similarly, mathematical theories that are known 
to be inconsistent and applicable to other acceptable mathematical 
theories (but which are not empirically applicable) should not be, but are, 
ratified as acceptable. W e can rectify this with the following proposal:
A mathematical theory M may be correctly accepted if and 
only if it is not known to be inconsistent but is known to be 
applicable.
which builds on the previous suggestion by making knowledge of the 
inconsistency of a mathematical theory a defeater of mathematical 
acceptability.
Mathematical theories involving claims about the Dirac delta lunction were used in physics 
prior to the development of the theory of distributions, when it was still said to be a lunction, 
despite having properties that no function could consistently have. See Steiner (1992) lor 
discussion of this example and others.
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Prescriptive fictionalism uses this account of the acceptability of 
mathematical theories to finalise its account of the acceptability of 
mathematical claims. This is given as follows:
A mathematical claim p may be correctly accepted if and 
only if it is known to be an axiom of, or to have been validly 
deduced from, a mathematical theory that is not known to be 
inconsistent but is known to be applicable.
This makes standards of correct acceptance depend on the acceptability 
of mathematical theories together with the rules of inference associated 
with the logical concepts they employ. A mathematical claim p may be 
correctly accepted just in case it is known to be an axiom of, or to follow by 
the relevant rules from, a theory satisfying the given constraints.
It is worth noting that this account of standards of acceptability brings with 
it a degree of relativity. A sentence of the form:
V/7 (n > 1 -> n2 + n > 1)
may be deduced in natural number arithmetic, if “n” is taken as a variable 
for integers, or set theory, if it is taken as a variable for finite ordinals. The 
standards according to which it is appropriate to assess the acceptability 
of the claim expressed thus cannot be determined from the sentence on 
its own but depend also on which mathematical theory is at stake. Since 
it is reasonable to assume that the theory is contextually supplied on 
typical occasions of use, however, this presents no objection to the 
account of acceptability we have described.
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7.2.3 Summary s
The foregoing discussion sets out a view of mathematics as an area of 
enquiry. This view states (a) that someone accepts a mathematical claim 
if and only if they are prepared to rely on it in empirical applications but are 
not prepared to assert or endorse the statement that it is true, and (b) that 
a mathematical claim may be correctly accepted if and only if it is known to 
be an axiom of, or to have been validly deduced from, a mathematical 
theory that is not known to be inconsistent but is known to be applicable. 
Bear in mind that prescriptive fictionalism does not put this forward as a 
description of how we in fact engage with mathematics, but rather as a 
depiction of how we should engage with mathematics.
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7.3 Pretence theoretic pragmatics £md the challenge from
applications
In the previous section we saw how prescriptive fictionalism views 
mathematics as an area of enquiry. In this section, we will see how it 
extends and refines this view, arriving at a conception of mathematics as 
pretence that promises to meet the challenge from applications. The key 
innovation here is to advance a pretence theoretic pragmatics for the uses 
of mathematical language. This theory does not view utterances of object- 
committed mathematical sentences as assertions of contents true only if 
there are mathematical objects. Rather, it views such utterances as 
pretence, as ways of behaving as if such contents were believed, in the 
absence of such belief.93
It will be recalled, from section 6.2, that the challenge from applications is 
(a) to recover the descriptive uses of mathematics in the absence of 
mathematical objects, (b) to recover the reliability of mathematical 
reasoning in the absence of belief in mathematical objects. We will 
explain the pretence theoretic response to each in turn.
7.3.1 Description
To explain how a pretence theoretic pragmatics for the uses of 
mathematical language helps to recover the descriptive role of 
mathematics in science, a distinction must be drawn between two modes 
of utterance. To do this it helps to consider an example of a game of 
make believe.
Suppose Jack and Jill are playing cops and robbers. Jill is speeding down 
a narrow back-street, in flight from the long arm of the law; Jack’s siren is
93 The idea of developing a pretence theoretic pragmatics for mathematical language in order to 
provide a fictionalist account of mathematical applications is due to Yablo, see his (2001, 2002, 
2005).
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wailing madly; his revolver pumps round after round after the escaping 
villain. Or at least, so things seem to Jack and Jill. But actually Jill is 
running down the passage from the kitchen to the lounge pursued by an 
intermittently wailing and banging Jack, whose outstretched hand holds a 
toy pistol. Jack and Jill are playing a game of make-believe.
Playing games of make believe involves imagining and pretending that 
things are in certain ways. When something is to be imagined in a game, 
we say it is true in the game. Following Walton (1990), we can think of 
games of make believe as governed by rules determining what is true in 
the game. Categorical rules lay it down that such and such is true in the 
game, for example, that Jill is a robber. Conditional rules make truth in the 
game depend upon real conditions, for example that Jack-the-cop has 
caught Jill-the-robber if Jack catches Jill. Such rules are very often 
associated with props, real objects the properties of which help to 
determine what is true in the game. In our example, Jack’s toy gun is a 
prop, if it points at Jill’s back, then it is true in the game that Jack-the-cop’s 
gun points at Jill-the-robber’s back. 94 The rules governing games of make 
believe are invoked by their participants, who perform acts designed to 
make things true in the game that make it a fun game to play. Clearly 
linguistic acts can play a part here, in particular, utterances of sentences 
true only if fictional objects exist. This brings us to the distinction between 
modes of utterance alluded to above.
Suppose Jack and Jill continue with their game of cops and robbers when 
they reach the lounge. Things get a bit out of hand and Jill ends up 
injured. Hearing the commotion, Mummy comes in and comforts Jill who 
explains between sobs, “Jack shot at me when I jumped out of the car and 
then he hit me with his gun!” Taken assertively, this is false. But Mummy 
realises that Jill has expressed herself from within the game she had been 
playing with Jack, explaining what has happened by saying things that are
94 We have not followed Walton’s use o f terminology here. He talks of rules as determining what 
is fictionally true, explaining conditional rules as those that make what is fictionally true depend 
upon real conditions and props as generators of fictional truth. We prefer to talk of truth in games 
to avoid any suggestion that the fictional truth about fictional objects might be a species of truth.
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true in the game. Looking around at the sscattered furniture, the guilty 
expression on Jack’s face and the toy gun dangling from his hand, 
Mummy can very easily work out the main facts of the case, in particular, 
that Jack hit his sister with his toy gun.
How does Mummy arrive at this conclusion? Having realised that Jack 
and Jill were playing a game of make believe in which Jack’s toy gun is a 
prop, she understands that the conditional rules associated with it make it 
true in the game that Jack-the-cop hit Jill-the-robber with his gun if Jack hit 
Jill with his toy gun. Assuming that Jill’s utterance “he hit me with his gun!" 
is true in their game, Mummy reads this conditional rule backwards to find 
the condition that makes it true in their game, thereby concluding that Jack 
hit Jill with his toy gun.
Utterances of sentences whose use in games of make believe are 
governed by conditional rules can thus express the obtaining of real 
conditions. Whilst it is implausible to suggest that Jill, in the scenario 
described above, knowingly takes advantage of this in order to report 
Jack’s misdemeanour, there is nothing in principle to stop us from doing 
so. That is, we might deliberately utter such a sentence in order to draw 
attention to the fact that real things are as they must be for it to be true in 
the game. We thus arrive at a distinction between game-directed 
utterances, which are aimed simply at exploring what is true in the game, 
and world-directed utterances, which are aimed at representing real 
conditions in the world. In a game-directed utterance, a participant in the 
game utters a sentence in order to indicate its truth in the game. But in a 
world-directed utterance, the sentence is uttered in order to draw attention 
to the obtaining of the real conditions that make it true in the game. 
Returning to the scenario described above, we can say that Jill’s utterance 
of “Jack hit me with his gun" has associated with it two thoughts (i) Jack- 
the-robber hit Jill-the-cop with his gun and (ii) Jack hit Jill with his toy gun. 
Jill’s utterance puts forward the first thought as being true in the game, 
and the second thought as being true.
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Prescriptive fictionalism takes advantage sof this distinction between 
modes of utterance to explain the descriptive use of object-committed 
mathematical sentences. Mathematics can only be applied when it is 
furnished with bridge principles linking what it says about mathematical 
objects with what is true about the physical phenomena to which it is 
applied. These bridge principles are part and parcel of the applied 
mathematical theory. Thus, prescriptive fictionalism views this theory as 
setting up a standard of acceptability for mathematical sentences 
containing its vocabulary, the bridge principles set up connections 
between how things are in the world and what is true according to the 
theory. When the acceptability of mathematical sentences depends in this 
way on conditions in the world, they can be uttered in the world directed 
mode, i.e. with the intention of drawing attention to the obtaining of those 
conditions. Thus, just as utterances about fictional objects in a game of 
make believe can be used to assert the obtaining of the real conditions 
that make them true in the game, utterances about mathematical objects 
can be used to assert the obtaining of the real conditions that make them 
true according to mathematics. This is how mathematics, conceived as 
pretence, is able to discharge its descriptive role.
7.3.2 Reliability
We turn now to the reliability of mathematical reasoning. Prescriptive 
fictionalism views mathematical argument as a warranting process, i.e. it 
views correct mathematical arguments as warranting belief in the world 
directed contents of their conclusion. But what ensures that correct 
mathematical arguments are reliable with respect to the world directed 
contents of their conclusions?
The answer to this must have something to do with the standards of 
acceptability, as these are what ratify mathematical arguments as correctly 
or incorrectly acceptable. We saw in section 7.1.2 how prescriptive 
fictionalism sees mathematical theories as providing their own standards
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of acceptability. When the theory in question is an applied mathematical 
theory it will involve bridge principles in which both mathematical and 
physical vocabulary appear. Thus bridge principles help to establish the 
standards of mathematics correctness.
In the previous section, we saw how the bridge principles of an applied 
mathematical theory make for world directed utterances of mathematical 
sentences containing their vocabulary. It thus emerges that bridge 
principles play a dual role, not only helping to set up the standards of 
acceptability but also endowing mathematical sentences with world 
directed significance. Given that mathematical theories are invented, 
prescriptive fictionalism can thus clam that their invention is conditioned by 
the requirement that the standards of acceptability they set up are reliable 
in the required sense. A teleological account of the reliability of 
mathematical reasoning thus emerges: correct mathematical arguments 
warrant belief in the world directed interpretations of their conclusions 
because the theories from which they are drawn were invented in order to 
provide means of reasoning which are reliable in this way.
To see how this suggestion recovers the reliability of mathematical 
reasoning, we will consider a simple example from the applied arithmetic 
of finite cardinal numbers. Prescriptive fictionalism will view this theory as 
having been developed in stages, with the developments of each stage 
conditioned by the reliability of the arguments they validate. It is not 
claimed that this is how we actually arrived at applied arithmetic, nor even 
that it presents a plausible hypothesis about how we arrived at applied 
arithmetic; we claim merely that applied arithmetic could have developed 
this way, and that this would have been sufficient for the reliability of 
reasoning with it.
In the first stage, schematic bridge principles such as these introduce 
terms for numbers to help with expressing the results of counts:
There are no Fs - » the number of Fs = 0
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3x 3y  (Fx a Fy a  x ^  y  a  Vz (Fz ->sz = z v  x = y)) 4  the 
number of Fs = 2
Such principles introduce a new predicate “number” together with new 
terms (like “0” and “2”) that have the syntactic function of singular terms. 
In addition to the new sentences with which we express the results of 
counts, such principles allow the formulation of further sentences involving 
the new vocabulary, sentences like “0 is a number” and “3x (x is a 
number)”). These must be accepted as logical consequences of the 
results of counts (expressed in the new way). But since the point of the 
new vocabulary is to give a convenient way of expressing the results of 
counts, the attendant ontological commitments need not be taken 
seriously. Thus numbers first appear as fictions introduced to help 
discharge expressive tasks.
At this stage of its development, applied arithmetic is very limited; we are 
unable to say very much about arithmetical relations and so are unable to 
make extensive use of arithmetical reasoning as a means of thinking 
about the results of counts. In subsequent stages of development, terms 
for relations on numbers are introduced to address this deficiency. This 
creates the opportunity to build reliability into the development of applied 
arithmetic, as the principles laid down to address these requirements 
come in two kinds. The first kind involves arithmetical vocabulary and 
logical vocabulary alone, and provides the foundation of pure theory of 
arithmetic. The second kind makes the acceptability of sentences 
containing the new arithmetical vocabulary depend upon conditions in the 
world, possibly expressed using some of the arithmetical vocabulary that 
has already been introduced. These provide bridge principles by which 
the new pure theory will be applied. Once principles of one kind are fixed 
(at any stage of arithmetic development), principles of the other kind are 
determined which make the applied arithmetical arguments formulable at 
that stage potential means of reasoning. And reliable bridge principles of 
the second kind can be viewed as having been picked from these.
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Let us consider how principles of the two khds governing a new term “+”
might have been introduced to make this happen (again, we do not claim
that this is how individuals acquire a concept of cardinal addition, nor that 
it is a plausible hypothesis about how “+” was introduced). Our experience 
with counting collections of objects, especially collections of objects that 
have been formed from collections we have already counted, would lead 
us to consider the possibility of introducing terms for relations on numbers 
in order to keep track of the changing cardinalities of collections. One 
situation of interest would be that in which we collect together the 
elements of two disjoint collections of things. We would introduce a sign 
“+” for a relation on numbers that we hope to use in applied arithmetical 
arguments about this kind of situation, laying down the bridge principle:
Vx(Hx -» Fx) a  Vx(Gx -> Fx) a  -’BxfGx a  Hx) a  Vx(Fx  -» Gx 
v  Hx) -» The number of Fs = the number of Gs + the 
number of Hs
Together with this, we would stipulate the pure principles
For all n (n +0 = n)
For all n, m (n + m) = (m + n)
For all n, m, (n + m) + r = n + (m + r).
Now suppose we were to round out this pure theory by laying down the 
equations:
0 + 1 = 1  
1 + 1 = 2
2 + 1 = 3
3 + 1 = 4
4 + 1 = 0
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Of course, these are not the equations actually accept, but together 
with the other rules for “+”, they would provide an applied arithmetic which 
allows the formulation of potentially useful arguments about how many 
objects there are in disjoint collections.
However, we would very soon discover that this theory is not reliable. For 
suppose we were presented with a basket of fruit. Having established that 
the number of apples is 4, that the number of pears is 1 and that there are 
no other pieces of fruit, we could argue using the equation “4 + 1 = 0” (and 
other assumptions) that the number of pieces of fruit is 0. Given our 
original stipulation regarding the use of the term “0”, this would express 
that there are no pieces of fruit in the basket. Of course this would be 
inaccurate and so our argument would not lead us to a true conclusion 
about the world. But many other theories of this kind could have been 
stipulated. In particular, we could have written a theory identical save in 
having “4 + 1 = 5” instead of “4 + 1 = 0”. With this theory, our argument 
about the number of pieces of fruit would have accurately described the 
basket with respect to how many pieces of fruit it contains. Thus a pure 
theory of addition can be picked that makes arguments formulated with the 
help of “+” world directedly reliable.
Although simple, this example shows how applied mathematical theories 
can be viewed as having been developed stage by stage, with 
developments in each stage being conditioned by the reliability of the 
arguments they validate as correct. Such an account will view novel 
mathematical theories as having been introduced for application to certain 
kinds of situation. But having introduced mathematical theories in one 
kind of situation, we tend to apply them to a wide variety of other kinds of 
situation. What would explain the reliability of the applied theories in these 
new contexts?
To address this issue it is helpful to consider a situation in which a 
mathematical theory that has successful applications fails to apply. 
Suppose one tried to apply arithmetic to reach the conclusion that the
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population of the UK is proportionately more content that the population of 
France. We would say that this is the casesif the ratio of the number of 
content people living in the UK to the total number of UK residents is 
greater than the corresponding ratio concerning the French population. 
But how do we determine how many residents of the UK or France are 
content? We could start by asking everyone, but not everyone is sure. 
Lots of people would be unable to answer, which would lead to perplexing 
questions such as whether infants are content. So arithmetic cannot be 
satisfactorily applied to this problem.
The difficulty here is that it is not sufficiently determinate which residents of 
the UK (or France) count as content. One condition of the applicability of 
arithmetic to a range of objects is thus that they have determinate identity 
conditions, i.e. that questions of identity and distinctness amongst them 
have determinate answers (note, though, that it is not necessary that we 
be able to decide these questions). This condition can be read off the 
principles by which applied arithmetic is introduced. The principle 
governing use of the term “2”, for example:
3x 3y (Fx a Fy a Vz(Fz -> z  = x v z  = y ) A X * y ) - »
The number of Fs = 2
cannot be used to introduce a sentence expressing the result of a possible 
count of the Fs unless the identity and distinctness of Fs is determinate, 
for in this case it would not be determinate that 3x By (Fx a Fy ^  )*a
Vz(Fz -» z  = x v z  = y ) A X * y ) .
That the sentences of an applied mathematical theory can express facts 
about the objects and processes it was introduced to deal with thus 
depends on certain features of those objects or processes. At each stage 
of its development, the new vocabulary introduced is capable of 
performing its representational function by virtue of the relative stability 
and permanence of the objects or processes in respect of these features.
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Accordingly, prescriptive fictionalism explains the reliability of applied 
mathematical reasoning in contexts for which it was not originally 
developed by appealing to similarities, in respect of these features, 
between the objects or processes addressed in the different contexts. If 
applied arithmetic had originally been developed to help reason about the 
results of counts of apples, for example, its reliability in reasoning about 
the results of counts of pears would be explained on the basis that pears, 
like apples, have sufficiently determinate identity conditions to be counted, 
and that this feature is a stable and permanent enough characteristic of 
them during the timescales determined by our interest.
The similarities explaining why a mathematical theory developed for 
application to one kind of situation applies equally well to another will vary 
with the theory. But this presents no objection to the acceptability of this 
account of reliability. Of the kinds of similarity that can play this part, 
structural similarity deserves a special mention, as it explains why 
mathematical reliability is preserved in a wide variety of the cases in which 
an applied mathematical theory successfully migrates to a new context of 
application. But as the example of applied arithmetic shows, it is not 
always necessary to think of successful migrations in terms of structural 
similarities.
7.3.3 Summary
The challenge from applications demands an account of the descriptive 
uses of mathematics that makes no appeal to mathematical objects. 
Prescriptive fictionalism addresses this by arguing that object-committed 
mathematical sentences can be world directedly uttered. This is possible 
when bridge principles associate the sentence in question with conditions 
in the world, so that the sentence can be uttered to assert the obtaining of 
those conditions. Thus utterances of object-committed mathematical 
sentences, viewed as parts of pretence, can be used to make assertions 
about the real world.
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The challenge from applications also demands an account of the reliability 
of mathematical reasoning in the absencfe of belief in mathematical 
objects. Prescriptive fictionalism addresses this by arguing that the 
invention of mathematical theories can be thought of as having been 
conditioned by reliability, with reliability being built into them at each stage 
of their construction. The question then arises of how a theory invented 
for application to one kind of situation comes to be successfully applied in 
another. To explain this, appeal is made to similarities between the two 
kinds of situation that makes sentences of the mathematical theory a 
useful means of expressing facts about them both.
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7.4 Stanley’s objections to pretence invoking fictionalism
\
Prescriptive fictionalism applies a pretence theoretic pragmatics to 
mathematics, in order to avoid commitment to mathematical objects. 
Clearly this approach could be tried with any area of enquiry in which the 
claims we are disposed to make appear to bring with them problematic 
ontological commitments. It is natural, then, to wonder if there are 
difficulties with the approach in general. Stanley (2001) argues that there 
are. Although his criticisms are targeted at descriptive appeals to 
pretence theoretic pragmatics, all save one carry over to the case of 
prescriptive fictionalism. We are thus obliged to consider them here.95 96
7.4.1 Systematicity and the theory of understanding
Stanley argues that interpretation via pretence is not in general sufficiently 
systematic for an adequate theory of understanding (2001, 6-7). When a 
pretence theoretic pragmatics is applied to an area of discourse, 
sentences convey real world truth conditions via the rules governing the 
pretences in which they have uses. A pretence invoking fictionalism thus 
stands in need of a theory of understanding of real world truth conditions, 
an explanation of how speakers of the language understand the real world
95 Stanley does not use our terminology. Borrowing labels introduced by Burgess and Rosen 
(1997) to mark a contrast between different kind o f nominalism, Stanley distinguishes 
“hermeneutic” from “revolutionary” fictionalism: “Revolutionary fictionalism would involve 
admitting that while the problematic discourse does in fact involve attempted reference to 
nonexistent entities, we ought to use the discourse in such a way that the reference is simply within 
the pretense. The hermeneutic fictionalist, in contrast, reads fictionalism into our actual use of the 
problematic discourse. According to the pretense, and only according to the pretense, there exist 
the objects to which the discourse would commit its users, were no pretense involved.” Stanley 
(2001, 1) This corresponds to the contrast we have drawn between descriptive and prescriptive 
fictionalism.
96 The complaint that can be dismissed for irrelevance is that fictionalist appeals to pretence 
theoretic pragmatics require an objectionable failure of first person authority (see Stanley (2001, 
13-14). Stanley bases this view on the claim that people using the kinds of language for which 
pretence invoking versions of fictionalism might be thought advantageous w ill deny that they are 
pretending when using that language. However, this denial w ill act as a constraint on what we can 
say about the attitudes adopted towards claims made with the language only if  we are trying to 
describe peoples’ actual attitudes to such claims. Prescriptive versions of pretence invoking 
fictionalism do not attempt to do this, so even if  the descriptive approach can only address such 
denials by invoking a non-transparent attitude of pretence, this would have no bearing on 
prescriptive views.
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truth conditions of its sentences. In the cases of interest to fictionalists, 
the language will allow formulation of indefinitely many sentences with real 
world truth conditions. Thus, because of the limited cognitive capacities of 
speakers, it will be necessary to give a systematic account of how real 
world truth conditions are assigned. Stanley gives two important reasons 
for thinking that assignment via pretence lacks the degree of systematicity 
required: that the rules governing particular pretences do not in general 
assign truth conditions in a sufficiently orderly way and that too much non- 
systematic switching between particular pretences is required (op.c/'f., 7).97 
He infers that “if there are apparently literal discourses that involve the 
mechanism of pretense, then no such [systematic] explanation [of the 
assignment of real world truth conditions] appears forthcoming” (op.cit., 7). 
Thus, in Stanley’s view, it is unlikely that pretence invoking versions of 
fictionalism can provide adequate theories of understanding.
If a descriptive appeal to pretence theoretic pragmatics leaves us unable 
to explain how we understand the real world truth conditions of given 
claims, then a corresponding prescriptive appeal leaves us unable to 
explain how we would understand them were we to follow the prescription. 
Thus, this argument threatens not just descriptive but also prescriptive 
versions of pretence invoking fictionalism. As Stanley uses “real world 
truth conditions” for what we have called world directed contents (see his 
account of pretence theoretic interpretation (2001, 3-5)), it follows that 
there is a threat here for prescriptive fictionalism. The argument suggests 
that, as a version of pretence invoking fictionalism, prescriptive fictionalism 
will struggle to provide a plausible account of real world understanding, i.e.
97 Stanley suggests a third point, that pretence theoretic pragmatics is insufficiently systematic for 
a satisfactory theory of understanding because we lack a general theory explaining how truth in a 
pretence depends on what is actually true (i.e. a theory explaining how truth in pretence P depends 
upon truth for variable P) (see the approving quotation from Walton (1990) for this point, Stanley 
(2001, 8)). However, it is hard to see why this should be thought problematic. A descriptive 
version of pretence invoking fictionalism is committed to making sense o f its target area of 
language use by appeal to the mechanism of pretence. It w ill be do so by considering certain kinds 
of pretence. As far as systematicity and understanding are concerned, the relevant constraint is 
that these pretences, and the way they are used, be sufficiently systematic for a satisfactory theory 
of understanding. But these conditions could be fulfilled even i f  we lacked a general theory of the 
dependency of truth in pretence on truth; possession of such a theory might help to show that a 
given pretence theoretic pragmatics is sufficiently systematic for an adequate theory of 
understanding, but it is not a necessary condition for this.
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of the understanding of the real world truth bonditions of object-committed 
mathematical claims.
Let us first address Stanley’s worry that the rules governing particular 
pretences are insufficiently orderly for an adequate theory of 
understanding:
The first [worry about systematicity] is whether or not, within a 
particular pretense, the principles of generation [rules] are 
sufficiently systematic as to account for our ability to grasp the real 
world truth-conditions of all potential sentences that are evaluated 
within that pretense. Linguists and philosophers have long held 
that the type of systematicity required to explain this ability 
requires attribution to language users of a compositional semantic 
theory. But the mechanism of pretense certainly does not respect 
compositional interpretation of the truth-conditions expressed by a 
sentence relative to a context. (2001, 7)
It appears from this that Stanley’s complaint with the rules governing 
particular pretences is that they do not identify the real world truth 
conditions of sentences with the contents they are assigned by the 
standard compositional semantics. However, this cannot quite be what 
Stanley means as he later concedes that there are theories of pragmatics 
that do not assign truth conditions to sentences in the standard 
compositional way (on given occasions of use), but which are sufficiently 
systematic, nevertheless, for an adequate theory of understanding.98 
Stanley explains that these views depart from standard compositional 
interpretation by invoking pragmatically indicated constituents to 
supplement the content indicated by the compositional semantics. In 
contrast, he believes that pretence theoretic versions of fictionalism are 
committed to “rejecting compositional interpretation tout court” (op. cit., 9).
98 He considers in particular the view of Bach (1994), according to which the compositional 
interpretation of some sentences, such as “John is tall”, is supplemented by pragmatically indicated 
constituents, such as a context relative comparison class for tallness, in order to arrive at its truth 
condition on a given use.
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It is this that Stanley finds objectionable, talcing it as a sign that the rules 
governing particular pretences are insufficiently systematic to allow 
satisfactory explanations of real world understanding.
Faced with this, we should ask whether pretence theoretic interpretation 
departs from compositional interpretation so very disruptively to adequate 
accounts of understanding. Reflection on simple examples suggests that 
it does not. We described above (section 7.2) Jack and Jill’s game of 
cops and robbers. One of the rules of this game was that it is true in the 
game that Jack-the-robber hit Jill-the-cop with his gun if Jack really hit Jill 
with his toy gun. We explained how an onlooker could quite easily 
recognise this and take advantage of it to understand Jill’s utterance of 
“Jack hit me with his gun” to mean that Jack hit Jill with his toy gun. Real 
examples in which a particular pretence discharges this kind of function 
abound. So particular pretences can be used to depart in a controlled 
manner from the compositional interpretation of given sentences, such 
that a satisfactory explanation of how the resulting real world truth 
conditions are understood is possible.
Detractors of pretence invoking versions of fictionalism therefore need to 
explain why the pretences invoked cannot be assimilated to these simple 
games of make believe. Stanley tries to give a reason for this after 
considering an example rather like our own (op.cit., 8). He claims that the 
pretence theoretic method of interpretation works in such cases because 
the rules involved are analogical, i.e. because they make the occurrence 
in the game of a certain kind of action depend on the actual occurrence of 
a similar kind action. (The analogy involved in our example is that the 
action of hitting someone with a toy gun is similar to the action of hitting 
someone with a real gun). Moreover, he suggests that in the cases of 
interest to the fictionalist, non-analogical rules will be involved. This would 
entail that, in those cases, a satisfactory theory of real world 
understanding is not possible (op.cit., 9).
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However, the rules governing a particular pretence need not be analogical 
if pretence theoretic interpretation is to be comprehensible. What is 
required is rather that the rules are unambiguous and known by the 
speakers who take communicative advantage of them. Clearly, these 
features can attach as well to non-analogical rules as they can to 
analogical ones. This contrast between analogical and non-analogical 
rules thus gives no reason for thinking that the kinds of pretence required 
by pretence invoking versions of fictionalism should not be assimilated to 
simple games of make believe.
Stanley is undoubtedly right to point out that understanding a language is 
ordinarily taken to require possession of a compositional semantic theory 
for it. As prescriptive fictionalism departs from the standard compositional 
interpretation of object-committed mathematical sentences, it may seem 
that there is tension between the theory and this standard view of what 
linguistic understanding requires. But if there appears to be a conflict 
here, it is because too much is being made of the way pretence theoretic 
interpretation differs from compositional interpretation. Although 
prescriptive fictionalism assigns non-standard (i.e. non-compositional) real 
world truth conditions to object committed mathematical claims, this does 
not mean that it totally disregards their standard compositional semantics 
when it comes to explaining how we understand them. Far from it. The 
suggestion is that our understanding of the real world truth conditions of 
object-committed mathematical sentences is produced by our 
understanding of what they mean according to the standard compositional 
semantics together with our knowledge of the bridge principles linking 
mathematical claims to claims about real things. Together, these allow us 
to comprehend what is required of the world if a mathematical sentence 
whose use is governed bridge principles is to be acceptable. Note, too, 
that bridge principles can be given systematically, as opposed to seriatim. 
For example, defining “3^n F” as “there are at least n Fs” as follows:
(i) 3*1 F iffdf 3x Fx;
302
00  3^ /7 F iffdf 3X-\ . . .  Xp [a-j <i<j<n X j ^  Xj A  ^ \-|<j<p Fx],  n > 1
it is possible to give bridge principles governing terms for numbers as 
follows:
(i) the number of Fs = 0 iffdf Fx;
(ii) the number of Fs = n iffdf 3 *n F a  “ i3 ^ 1 F.
Thus the original problem of explaining how a finite mind can grasp the 
truth conditions of infinitely many sentences can be dealt with even after 
shifting to the pretence theoretic mode of interpretation.
Let us now address Stanley’s second reason for thinking that pretence 
invoking versions of fictionalism are too unsystematic for adequate 
theories of real world understanding:
The literature on pretense analyses suggests that we often switch 
quite rapidly between pretenses in understanding discourses. 
Switching between pretenses amounts to learning a new set of 
rules, the rules governing the new pretense. It is therefore akin to 
acquiring a new lexical item, or coming to grasp a metaphor one 
has never before encountered. These processes are not 
systematic. But our understanding of novel sentences containing 
familiar lexical items that are used literally does not seem to 
involve the same unsystematic processes that are at work in the 
acquisition of new lexical items, or new metaphors. (2001, 7)
This paragraph suggests two lines of thought. One (suggested by the final 
remark) is that because the experience of understanding novel utterances 
is not in general like the experiences of understanding a new metaphor or 
learning a new word (in the areas of interest to fictionalists), it is wrong to 
view the former as comparable to the latter. However, this is quite 
irrelevant to the question of whether pretence theoretic pragmatics is 
sufficiently systematic for adequate theories of real world understanding.
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The other line of thought is that because interesting applications of 
pretence invoking fictionalism require that we switch between many 
different pretences when we understand the relevant discourses, and 
because switching between pretences is an unsystematic process, 
pretence theoretic analysis are too unsystematic for a satisfactory theory 
of understanding. This argument is relevant to our present concern. How 
can prescriptive fictionalism respond to it?
The crucial point to make is that switching between pretences “amounts to 
learning a new set of rules” only when it involves movement to a pretence 
with which we are not already familiar; when we switch between familiar 
pretences, we simply respond to contextual cues to invoke one previously 
known set of rules rather than another. It follows that when we switch 
between familiar pretences, what we do is not comparable to what we do 
when we understand a (brand) new metaphor or learn a new word, as 
Stanley claims. He is thus wrong to claim on the basis of this comparison 
that the process in question is not sufficiently systematic for 
understanding. Admittedly, learning the rules of unfamiliar pretences is 
comparable to these unsystematic processes. But pretence invoking 
versions of fictionalism need only appeal to the acquisition of such rules in 
their explanations of how we first acquire the fictionalistically used 
vocabulary. Since this is a situation in which new words are being learnt, 
the comparison is surely harmless.
For clarity, it may help to explain how prescriptive fictionalism, in particular, 
allows for well disciplined switching between “mathematical pretences”. 
We saw in section 7.2 that pretence theoretic mathematical fictionalism 
takes mathematical theories to set up standards of acceptability by which 
claims made with mathematical sentences are to be assessed. We thus 
“switch between mathematical pretences”, as Stanley might put it, when 
we switch between mathematical theories. The number of mathematical 
theories we apply is actually quite small, so we are not required to think of 
ourselves as switching between very many of them. Furthermore, in 
mathematical applications we typically switch from one familiar
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mathematical theory to another familiar mathematical theory (arithmetic to 
real analysis, say); this is comparable to switching between familiar 
pretences and so not objectionably unsystematic. Finally, contextual cues 
such as the mathematical language used and the claims taken for axioms 
can be taken as indicators of which theory is being applied. There is thus 
nothing here to suggest that the pragmatics of prescriptive fictionalism, by 
demanding switching between “mathematical pretences”, is insufficiently 
systematic for an adequate theory of real world understanding.
Before closing his discussion of systematicity, Stanley mentions two more 
points that he takes to detract from the plausibility of descriptive pretence 
invoking fictionalism. The first is that because the rules governing 
pretences are not systematic, there are no constraints on which real world 
truth conditions might be claimed to be expressed by which uses of 
sentences in pretence (op.cit., 9-10). The second is that descriptive 
versions of pretence invoking fictionalism are simply prescriptive versions 
of fictionalism in disguise (op.cit., 10). However, Stanley’s arguments for 
these points ultimately depend on the alleged reasons considered above 
for thinking pretence theoretic pragmatics too unsystematic for 
understanding (for the connection between these alleged reasons and the 
second point, see Stanley’s discussion of error theories (op.cit., 13)). 
These additional points thus add no weight to Stanley’s prior case against 
pretence invoking fictionalism from considerations of systematicity. 
Having found that case unconvincing, we conclude that it provides no 
reason to dismiss prescriptive fictionalism.
7.4.2 Conflicting evidence from psychology
Another of Stanley’s worries about fictionalism is psychological:
The most straightforward way to understand the hermeneutic 
fictionalist is that the way in which engaging in games of make- 
believe is like engaging in the ontologically controversial discourse
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is that the very same psychological capacity is involved in both 
activities. The fourth worry is that, in any non-explicitly fictional 
discourse of interest to metaphysicians, the thesis that the same 
psychological capacity is involved in engaging in games of make- 
believe and grasping the relevant discourse is likely to be subject 
to empirical refutation. (2001, 14)
The reasoning behind this allegation depends on some psychological facts 
relating to autism. Children with autism tend not to play games of make 
believe, and autistic adults tend not to engage with fiction and find it hard 
to follow figurative language. But autistics do not struggle with the areas 
of discourse for which fictionalist treatments have been suggested. Thus, 
Stanley argues, it seems unlikely that the same psychological abilities 
underlie these disputed areas of discourse, on the one hand, and fiction, 
or make believe, on the other; fictionalist accounts of these areas of 
discourse should thus be rejected for making them depend on the wrong 
psychological base. Call this the argument from psychology.
This argument threatens not just descriptive but also prescriptive versions 
of fictionalism. If some people are competent in a given area of discourse 
but lack a psychological ability which is required to enter into it in the 
manner set out by a descriptive fictionalism, then clearly we should not 
think of their competence in that manner. Assuming that everyone’s 
competence in the area is to be viewed in the same way, it would thus not 
be possible to endorse a prescriptive fictionalism with respect to that are of 
discourse. So if Stanley is right to argue that autistics display just this mix 
of competence and deficiency in the areas of discourse of interest to 
fictionalists, then that would provide reason not to consider them from the 
prescriptive fictionalist perspective.
If the argument from psychology is to provide an objection to pretence 
theoretic mathematical fictionalism, it must be shown that, on that view, 
engagement with mathematics depends on a psychological capacity that 
mathematically competent autistics lack. Do the psychological facts
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Stanley cites establish this? With references to Baron-Cohen, Leslie and 
Frith (1985) and to Leslie (1987), Stanley (2001, 15) argues that autistics 
lack a “theory of mind mechanism”, a mechanism for developing notions 
like belief and pretence. He mentions two reasons for this, that autistics 
tend to fail false-belief tests and that autistic children as a rule do not 
engage in games of make believe. With references to Happe (1994, 
1995), Stanley then points out that autistic adults display a similar lack of 
imaginative activity, finding it hard to see the point of, and to engage with, 
fiction, and finding it hard to understand figurative language. Stanley 
acknowledges that our scientific understanding in this area is by no means 
complete. But on the basis of this research he considers it plausible that 
there is a psychological ability, lacked by autistics, which children must 
possess if they are to play games of make believe and which adults must 
possess if they are to engage with fiction and understand figurative 
language. During the course of his discussion (though without references 
to studies from empirical cognitive studies), Stanley also observes that 
autistic children do not struggle to grasp mathematics, more particularly 
arithmetic. Thus he suggests that pretence theoretic approaches to 
mathematics make engagement with mathematics depend on 
psychological capacities that mathematically competent autistics lack.
Stanley’s reading of this research is plausible, but it is by no means the 
only one available. One response to his argument from psychology is thus 
to put forward, if possible, a reading of this research which does not 
support the conclusion that autistic people lack a psychological capacity 
necessary for engaging with mathematics in the way described 
prescriptive fictionalism. We shall attempt to do this now.
Our first claim is that the autistic failings Stanley mentions with respect to 
acknowledged forms of pretence can be ascribed to lack of a theory of 
mind." In a typical false belief test, one might ask an autistic child into 
which of several boxes a doll thinks a given object has been placed, in a
99 Or failure to deploy such a theory. For brevity we omit this qualification.
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scenario set up so that the doll, considered as a person, would have a 
false belief about this. Clearly lack of a theory of mind would explain 
failure on such tests, as to respond correctly it is necessary to be able to 
think of the doll as a person with beliefs. Childhood games of make 
believe typically involve pretending to be a different kind of person or 
being to the person or being you actually are. Similarly, the literary fictions 
enjoyed by adults typically explore episodes from the lives of fictional 
people. We would thus expect people who lack a theory of mind, and so 
are not capable of thinking about, or imaginatively entering into, the mental 
worlds of others to find it hard to play such games and to develop an 
interest in such fictions. Our understanding of figurative language can 
also be viewed as depending on a theory of mind. When someone says 
something figuratively, our recognition that their remark is intended 
figurally and our interpretation of what it figurally means draws heavily on 
our understanding of the kind of person they are, what beliefs they have, 
what their likes and dislikes are etc. Thus we would expect that people 
who lack a theory of mind would find this kind of language difficult to 
follow.
Our second claim is that, even when viewed as pretence in the manner 
required by prescriptive fictionalism, engagement with mathematics does 
not demand possession of a theory of mind. Mathematical claims do not 
involve concepts such as belief and pretence, and mathematical enquiry is 
not a sociological investigation into the propositional attitudes borne by its 
participants towards given mathematical claims. It thus appears that 
prescriptive fictionalism requires of mathematical enquirers that they 
possess a theory of mind only if possession of such a theory were 
required to act in accordance with its prescriptions. But it does not appear 
that this is required. In section 7.2, we saw that prescriptive fictionalism 
states that our acceptance of object-committed mathematical claims 
should be constituted by a preparedness to rely on them in empirical 
applications, but not to make or endorse the statement that they are true. 
Clearly one could be in this state of preparedness regardless of whether 
one possesses concepts from the theory of mind. In section 7.3, we saw
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that prescriptive fictionalism states that when we utter sentences 
expressing object-committed mathematical claims we should only be 
pretending that those claims are true. But one can pretend that one 
believes a claim, i.e. one can act as if one believes it, without actually 
believing it, whether or not one possesses a theory of mind. It seems, 
then, that someone who lacks a theory of mind is nevertheless able to 
engage with mathematics in the way required by prescriptive fictionalism.
These two claims suggest that the view that prescriptive fictionalism 
makes engagement with mathematics depend on a psychological capacity 
that autistics lack does not follow from the literature on autism to which 
Stanley refers. This research can be viewed as indicating that autistic 
people lack a theory of mind and that they cannot engage in the kinds of 
pretence for which possession of a theory of mind is essential (first claim). 
But we have argued that prescriptive fictionalism does not make 
engagement with mathematics depend on possession of a theory of mind 
(second claim); on this view you do not need to possess concepts like 
belief and pretence in order to enter into “mathematical games of make 
believe” because the content of the games does not depend on such 
concepts and so can be played (non-self-consciously, of course) even by 
those who lack them. Thus Stanley’s argument from psychology does not 
provide an objection to prescriptive fictionalism.
We have argued thus far that the psychological facts about autism Stanley 
cites can be explained from the pretence theoretic perspective. But 
perhaps there is other empirical research on autism that suggests 
otherwise. And if there is not, perhaps such research will be conducted in 
the future. To provide some insurance against these possibilities, we will 
now explore a second line of response to Stanley’s argument from 
psychology.
The suggestion is that autistic mathematical competence be dealt with as 
a special case. The idea here would be that we should view acceptance 
of object-committed mathematical claims in the way described in section
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7.2.1, for people with normal psychological abilities, but as belief, for 
autistics. On the assumption that autistic^ are not able to engage in 
pretence, it could be argued that this would be to view them as responding 
to their mathematical training in the best available way, but as forming the 
wrong attitudes, philosophically speaking, to acceptable mathematical 
contents.
Stanley argues against this kind of view. For him, such views would have 
to claim that autistic acceptance of claims made in the language of the 
discourse is constituted by belief, that normal acceptance of the relevant 
claims is constituted by pretence, but that the two groups are nevertheless 
behaviourally identical as regards their use of the discourse. He objects to 
this position as follows:
Someone who is not aware that a given sentence is used 
figuratively will have a vastly different reaction to its use than 
someone who is so aware. If John says (metaphorically) “Hannah 
is the sun”, and Hannah does not recognize the figurative nature 
of his discourse, she will not behave appropriately in response to 
his utterance. The figurative nature of a discourse has obvious 
repercussions for action. In contrast, if this reply is correct [if 
autistic mathematical acceptance is dealt with in the way 
suggested], the figurative nature of the disputed discourse would 
have not have any clear repercussions for action. Someone who 
does not know that the discourse is figurative may still 
nevertheless be indistinguishable from someone perfectly 
competent in its use. This is a significant disanalogy between 
figurative speech, on the one hand, and any one of the 
ontologically disputed discourses, on the other. (2001, 17)
We may take it that Stanley intends figurative discourse broadly here, to 
cover all uncontroversially indirect discourse. His claim is thus that there 
are no examples of uncontroversially indirect discourse for which belief 
could not be behaviourally distinguished from pretence, i.e. no examples 
of an utterance for which there could not be behavioural evidence to mark
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the difference between a speaker believing in its content and their merely 
pretending that it is true. From this he inters that it is implausible to 
advance pretence invoking versions of fictionalism that are committed to 
there being states of pretence and belief the difference between which 
cannot be made manifest in behaviour.
However, the behavioural reactions available to the non-autistic person 
outrun those available to the autistic person. If someone who quasi- 
asserts an object-committed mathematical claim is heard and understood 
by two people, one autistic, the other not, we can assume that they would 
agree on its acceptability. Thus their patterns of response to the utterance 
would share much in common. However, the normal person would be 
able to discuss the place and status of the mathematical claim in ways that 
the autistic person would not (because of his richer psychological abilities); 
so his pattern of response would be distinct from the autistics. Stanley’s 
claim that the autistic and the non-autistic are behaviourally identical in 
respect of their use of mathematical discourse thus does not seem 
credible.
As a result of this, Stanley provides no reason why we should not think of 
autistic acceptance of object-committed mathematical claims as false 
belief whilst taking normal acceptance of the same claims as pretence. 
Thus, even if the psychological facts ultimately do support his view that 
autistics are incapable of entering into any kind of pretence, the argument 
from psychology would still not refute prescriptive fictionalism. Autistic 
mathematical acceptance of object-committed mathematical claims could 
be treated as a special case, taken not as pretence but as belief.100
l00Stanley puts forward a second point against the possibility of an error theoretic approach to 
defend descriptive fictionalism against his argument from autism. This does not sit well with the 
descriptive outlook, he claims, “For surely the default assumption, when someone believes they 
are not engaged in pretense, is that they are not engaged in pretense.” (2001, 17). It is hard to see 
how this would support his position when the people in question are autistic, however. Given his 
prior assumptions, Stanley could claim that an autistic person lacked belief that they are not 
engaged in a pretence when dealing with mathematics. But he could not claim that they believed 
that they were not engaged in pretence, for this is the kind of self-attribution that lacking a theory 
of mind makes problematic.
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7.4.3 Lack of coherent motivation
s
Stanley’s final worry concerns motivation. In his view, descriptive 
fictionalist appeals to pretence theoretic pragmatics necessarily operate 
with the notion of “the ontological commitments a speaker believes they 
incur when entering into a discourse” (2001, 18). We will call this the 
notion of acknowledged ontological commitments. Stanley claims that this 
notion is uninteresting from an ontological point of view, argues that the 
pretence theoretic pragmatics is a poor instrument for its investigation, and 
concludes that descriptive fictionalism is not well motivated (op.cit., 19- 
21 ).101
As with the previous worries, the worry here transfers over to prescriptive 
versions of fictionalism. Prescriptivists and descriptivists agree that by 
viewing object-committed mathematics as pretence, ontological 
commitment to mathematical objects can be avoided. The descriptivist 
claims further that object-committed mathematics is actually pretence, but 
the notion of ontological commitment in play is introduced at the prior 
stage of agreement. So if descriptivist versions of fictionalism necessarily 
operate with the notion of acknowledged ontological commitments, so do 
prescriptive versions. Stanley’s suggestion thus poses a threat to 
prescriptive fictionalism. This aims to establish that we are not 
ontologically committed to mathematical objects, in the Quinean sense 
according to which one is committed to the kinds of objects that are 
required to make one’s beliefs true. As people can be mistaken about 
what kinds of objects must exist in order for their beliefs to be true, this 
notion differs from the notion of acknowledged ontological commitments. 
So if appeal to pretence theoretic pragmatics necessarily brings the latter 
notion into play, prescriptive fictionalism may be unable to achieve its 
objective.
101 Stanley’s antipathy seems justified; the notion of acknowledged ontological commitments does 
not seem to be a notion of ontological commitment, properly so called, at all.
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Stanley’s suggestion that pretence invoking fictionalism necessarily 
operates with the notion of acknowledged ontological commitments first 
appears in the following passage:
The hermeneutic fictionalist holds that the best semantic theory for 
a discourse may not be a good guide to the ontological 
commitments of the person who uses that discourse. For 
example the best semantic theory for arithmetic commits someone 
who believes what is expressed by “There are several prime 
numbers between one and ten” to the existence of numbers. But, 
according to the hermeneutic fictionalist about arithmetic, a 
nominalist could believe what is expressed by this sentence, 
without thereby being committed to numbers. The hermeneutic 
fictionalist believes that semantic theory does not capture this 
notion of a speaker’s ontological commitments. Hermeneutic 
fictionalism is motivated by the desire to account for the 
ontological commitments the speaker believes she incurs when 
she endorses the truth of an utterance. (2001, 18)
In the first three sentences, Stanley draws attention to two general claims 
that descriptive/hermeneutic fictionalism makes: that the best semantic 
theory for a collection of sentences is not always a reliable guide to the 
ontological commitments exhibited in standard uses of the sentences; that 
belief in the content expressed by a sentence on a given use is not always 
belief in the content expressed by the sentence according to our best 
semantic theory. Whilst these are fundamental principles of any form of 
fictionalism, they leave undecided just which notion of ontological 
commitments is in play. So when Stanley refers in the penultimate 
sentence to “this notion of a speaker’s ontological commitments”, he has 
not established that this must be taken for the notion of acknowledged 
ontological commitments. This passage thus contains no argument that, 
by appealing to pretence, one necessarily deals with acknowledged 
ontological commitments. In fact, the two general claims make perfect 
fictionalist sense when the Quinean notion of ontological commitment is 
assumed.
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Perhaps Stanley’s argument that pretence invoking fictionalism 
necessarily deals with acknowledged ontological commitments appears in 
the next paragraph:
Here is the idea. Suppose the best semantic theory for a 
discourse entails that endorsing the truth of a certain utterance
commits one to some objects the existence of which some
speakers who would endorse the truth of the utterance repudiate.
In such a case, the speakers are simply pretending that the
objects in question exist, in order to express something
ontologically innocent. For example, a nominalist who utters “The 
number of apostles is twelve” is only pretending that there are 
numbers, in order to express that there are twelve apostles. 
Similarly, one might think (cf. Melia (1995)) that someone who 
utters “The average star has 2.3 planets” is only pretending that 
there is an average-star-thing, which can have properties like 
having 2.3 planets. Upon reflection, a speaker would reject the 
actual existence of these entities to which the best semantics 
appears to commit her. (2001 ,18-19)
Stanley is correct to say that it is significant for pretence invoking versions 
of fictionalism that a speaker “would reject the actual existence of these 
entities to which the best semantics appears to commit her”. But he is 
wrong to suggest that the fact that such disavowals are significant shows 
that the notion of acknowledged ontological commitments is in play. The 
Quinean notion of ontological commitment applies primarily to theories 
(more precisely, regimented theories). Pretence invoking fictionalists can 
thus take disavowals such as those indicated (rejections of the actual 
existence of the relevant kind of objects) as evidence that the speakers do 
not believe the theories that are ontologically committed, under the 
Quinean notion, to the kind of object in question. This would be quite 
consistent with the speakers activity in putting forward sentences 
expressing claims that are true only if objects of that kind exist, for on the 
pretence invoking approach, this activity is a kind of pretence, and 
therefore does not involve belief in the contents in question.
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Outside the passages quoted above, Stanley gives no suggestion as to 
why pretence invoking versions of fictiohalism necessarily address 
acknowledged ontological commitments. It thus seems that he lacks a 
satisfactory argument for this view. Because of this, and because our 
discussion suggests that the Quinean notion of ontological commitment 
sits perfectly well with the pretence theoretic perspective, we see no 
reason to believe that a pretence invoking fictionalism cannot operate with 
the Quinean notion. Stanley’s complaints about the notion of 
acknowledged ontological commitments thus provide no grounds for the 
dismissal of prescriptive fictionalism.
7.4.4 Summary
In the preceding sections we discussed difficulties Stanley alleges for 
versions of fictionalism that make use of pretence theoretic pragmatics. 
We argued that his grounds for thinking that pretence theoretic pragmatics 
are insufficiently systematic to make for a satisfactory theory of 
understanding are unconvincing in the case of prescriptive fictionalism. 
We argued that his claim that psychological facts relating to autism block 
pretence invoking theories was too vague to constitute a convincing 
objection and that prescriptive fictionalism can deal with those facts in 
satisfactory ways. Finally, we argued that his claim that pretence invoking 
fictionalism necessarily addresses the notion of acknowledged ontological 
commitments is not well supported, so that there was no reason not to 
take prescriptive fictionalism as addressing the Quinean notion of 
ontological commitment, as intended. For these reasons, we claim that 
Stanley’s critique of pretence invoking versions of fictionalism does not 
provide grounds upon which to reject prescriptive fictionalism.
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7.5 Burgess’s objections to mathematical fictionalism
\
Having found responses to Stanley’s complaints about pretence invoking 
fictionalism, our confidence in prescriptive fictionalism grows. However, 
one might still wonder whether there are considerations specific to 
mathematics that show that the pretence theoretic approach is not 
appropriate there. Burgess (2004) thinks there are. Distinguishing 
between hermeneutic and revolutionary forms of fictionalism, he argues 
that neither is adequate to mathematics and concludes that mathematical 
fictionalism should be rejected.
Burgess’s argument against hermeneutic fictionalism is that it incurs an 
unsatisfied obligation to provide evidence that mathematicians intend their 
mathematical utterances non-literally, i.e. as parts of a mathematical 
fiction, not as expressions of mathematical beliefs. Whatever the merits of 
this claim, it clearly does not threaten prescriptive fictionalism, for this does 
entail the defining characteristic of hermeneutic fictionalism, that 
mathematicians themselves understand their talk to be a kind fiction (op. 
cit., 23). However, the complaint Burgess directs at revolutionary 
fictionalism cannot be so easily dismissed. Although not explicitly defined, 
revolutionary fictionalism appears to be the view that mathematicians 
should understand mathematics as a form of fiction, that they should 
intend their mathematical claims to be taken as fictions. This view is 
sufficiently similar to prescriptive fictionalism, which claims that 
mathematics should be taken as a kind of pretence, that any objection to 
the former might well provide an objection to the latter. We are thus 
obliged to consider what Burgess has to say against revolutionary 
fictionalism, to find out if this is the case.
Burgess first claims that revolutionary fictionalism is sometimes argued for 
by appeal to Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems. To reconstruct such an 
argument he makes two assumptions: that Godel’s theorems show that 
some mathematical questions will never be decided (op.cit., 29), and that 
the propensity to throw up undecidable questions distinguishes
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mathematics from other seemingly scientific pursuits (loc. cit.). From
s
these premises, Burgess thinks one can infer revolutionary fictionalism if 
one also assumes that the propensity to throw up undecidable questions 
distinguishes fact from fiction. One is thus left with a choice between 
accepting this assumption and concluding that mathematics is in error 
about what mathematical objects there are, or rejecting it and resisting this 
conclusion. Burgess leaves us in no doubt about which option he finds the 
more attractive. Given the histories of philosophy and science, he 
considers it far more likely that philosophy is in error with this criterion for 
distinguishing fact from fiction than that mathematics is in error regarding 
what mathematical objects there are. And he thinks this contains a 
general lesson:
One argument against revolutionary fictionalism is thus just that, 
given the historical record, on simple inductive grounds it seems 
extremely unlikely that philosophy can do better than mathematics 
in determining what mathematical entities exist, or what 
mathematical theorems are true, and much more likely that for the 
(n + 1 )st time, philosophy has got the nature of truth and existence 
wrong. (2004, 30)
Thus Burgess finds revolutionary fictionalism implausible.
Do these considerations provide an objection to prescriptive fictionalism? 
To answer this, it is important to realise that Burgess is not just targeting 
fictionalist views that appeal to mathematical incompleteness for 
support.102 Rather, he is taking aim at views that recommend wholesale 
revisions in our attitudes to mathematical theories for philosophical 
reasons to do with truth and existence. His objection is that the histories
102 I f  he were, there would be an easy rejoinder since pretence theoretic mathematical fictionalism 
does not involve such an appeal. It is worth mentioning that although fictionalist views in the 
literature often appeal to considerations of incompleteness, only Wagner (1982) makes his case 
depend solely on considerations o f incompleteness, and he limits his fictionalism to the natural 
numbers. Other defenders of fictionalist accounts o f mathematics (such as Yablo (2001, 2002, 
2005), Balaguer (1996b)) appeal to other factors as well. The consensus, which is surely correct, 
seems to be that the incompleteness o f mathematics can support a wide-ranging fictionalism only 
as part o f a more expansive case.
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of science and philosophy suggest that such views are wrong. This is a 
pessimistic induction about a certain kind of error theory of mathematics.
However, prescriptive fictionalism is not an error theory of the relevant 
kind, since it does not propose criteria for truth and existence and then use 
these to deduce that mathematics should be viewed as fiction. So even if 
the historical record shows that philosophical theories that do this are 
mistaken, this would not give a reason to reject prescriptive fictionalism.
It may perhaps be responded that this reply places too much weight on the 
kind of support Burgess considers for revolutionary fictionalism and not 
enough on the fact that it is an error theory. But if it is the error theoretic 
aspect of revolutionary fictionalism that is the more important, we need to 
pay attention to what Burgess says about it. He makes clear that he 
considers revolutionary fictionalism to be an error theory intended to 
provide “corrections” to mathematics (op.cit., 30). This is why he thinks it 
involves the odious assumption that “philosophy can do better than 
mathematics in determining what mathematical entities exist, or what 
mathematical theorems are true” (see quotation above). Now prescriptive 
fictionalism does entail that we should not believe what mathematics says 
about mathematical objects, so to the extent that mathematicians believe 
object-committed mathematics, prescriptive fictionalism does consider 
them to be in error. However, this feature of the theory is not 
objectionable.
The reason for this has to do with the contrast between acceptance and 
belief (see section 7.1). Having separated these we must be careful to 
separate mathematical issues, such as which mathematical claims are 
acceptable according to the prevailing standards, and philosophical 
issues, such as which attitudes it is appropriate to take to mathematical 
claims ratified by the standards. Even with this division of issues, 
prescriptive fictionalism implies that mathematicians are in error if they 
form belief in the object-committed mathematical claims they judge to be 
correct according to the prevailing standards. However, prescriptive
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fictionalism does not make any demands as to which mathematical claimss
should be accepted, so this is a point about the right attitudes to adopt to 
the results of mathematical practice, not an assault on that practice and its 
results. It is thus unfair to depict prescriptive fictionalism as an 
objectionable philosophical “correction” to the results of mathematical 
practice, so even if Burgess’s pessimistic induction shows that such 
corrections are problematic, this does not provide an objection to 
prescriptive fictionalism.
Burgess directs one further, general complaint at fictionalist accounts of 
mathematics. We generally assume that it would make no difference to 
the way things seem to us whether mathematical objects exist or not. To 
this extent, the question whether mathematical objects really exist lacks 
empirical significance. In contrast, we acknowledge that it would make a 
great deal of difference to how things seem to us if typical literary fictions 
were true. Thus the question whether creatures of literary fiction really 
exist is empirically significant. For these reasons, Burgess considers the 
analogy between mathematics and fiction inappropriate (op.cit, 35).
Burgess presents this line of thought as a “supplement” (op.cit, 30) to the 
pessimistic induction we discussed above. This suggests it is targeted at 
revolutionary fictionalism since that was the target of the pessimistic 
induction. However, the conclusion he draws is not restricted to this kind 
of fictionalism:
I think that in view of this radical difference between mathematics 
and novels, fables, or other literary genres, the slogan 
‘mathematics is a fiction’ not very appropriate, and the comparison 
of mathematics to fiction not very apt. (2004, 35)
Thus it appears that we have here a general attack on mathematical 
fictionalism of all stripes.
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One point to make in response to this complaint concerns the role of the 
fictionalist analogy between mathematics and literary fiction. When this is 
heuristic rather than justificatory, when the analogy is used to help explain 
the fictionalist position in question, not as a premise in an argument for it, 
there is no need to demand that mathematics be like literary fiction in 
every respect. Instead, a much looser analogy can be posited, according 
to which mathematics shares certain key characteristics with various 
different kinds of literary fiction. Such an analogy can be compared to the 
republican’s claim that the Royal family live lives of soap opera. This says 
that members of the Royal family behave in ways quite often seen in soap 
operas such as Coronation Street, etc., not that their every idiosyncracy is 
exhibited by some character from a soap opera.
Prescriptive fictionalism invokes an analogy between mathematics and 
literary fiction for heuristic purposes only, so it can make do with a loose 
analogy of this kind. Clearly such an analogy allows the possibility of 
differences between mathematics and literary fiction. Thus Burgess may 
be correct to claim that lack of empirical significance for the question of 
whether there really are mathematical objects distinguishes between 
mathematics and literary fiction. But this does not entail that we must 
abandon the loose analogy between mathematics and fiction put forward 
by prescriptive fictionalism.
Another point to make in response to Burgess’s complaint is that, if it is a 
fact that the real existence of mathematical objects lacks empirical 
significance, this can be explained perfectly well from the fictionalist 
perspective. But prescriptive fictionalism can assume that mathematical 
objects, if they exist at all, are abstract in something like the customary 
sense of lacking spatial and temporal properties. As such, they would be 
empirically undetectable even if they were to exist, and so the question of 
their real existence would lack empirical significance. So for this reason, 
too, it seems that Burgess’s complaint provides no grounds for giving up 
the pretence theoretic analogy between mathematics and literary fiction.
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Our discussion of Burgess’s criticisms of mathematical fictionalism is now
s
complete. We dismissed his objection to hermeneutic fictionalism on the 
grounds that it is not relevant to prescriptive fictionalism. We argued that 
the pessimistic induction against revolutionary fictionalism is not 
persuasive and that prescriptive fictionalism does not objectionably impute 
error to mathematicians who believe in object-committed mathematics. 
Finally, we argued that lack of empirical significance for the question of 
whether mathematical objects really exist does not undermine the loose 
analogy required by, and can be explained from the perspective of, 
prescriptive fictionalism. On these grounds we conclude that Burgess’s 
objections to mathematical fictionalism do not constitute grounds to reject 
prescriptive fictionalism.
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7.6 Consistency ^
In the preceding sections we discussed objections to fictionalism due to 
Stanley and Burgess. We argued that these are unsuccessful against 
prescriptive fictionalism. However, a further worry must be addressed.
Prescriptive fictionalism presupposes that we lack a satisfactory account of 
knowledge of object-committed mathematics but that it is desirable to use 
this in empirical applications. For this reason, it faces the epistemological 
problem of explaining how we can apply such mathematics without 
illegitimately presupposing that it is known. As we have seen, prescriptive 
fictionalism addresses this difficulty by proposing that we engage with 
object-committed mathematics as a useful form of pretence. In so doing, it 
aims to solve an epistemological problem by appeal to a version of 
mathematical instrumentalism. Prescriptive fictionalism is thus 
comparable to the views of Hilbert (1925, 1927) and Field (1980, 1989a).
To see why this leads to a worry about prescriptive fictionalism, we need 
to note two connections between the instrumentalist theories of Hilbert and 
Field. The first is that they both require that the consistency of the 
instrumentally viewed mathematics be established (in fact, as we saw in 
chapter 6, Field requires that the conservativeness of instrumentally 
viewed mathematics be established, but conservativeness can be 
regarded as a strong form of consistency). Call this the consistency 
condition. The second is that they both depend on epistemological 
presuppositions that render doubtful that this condition can be met. On 
the one hand, Hilbert thought that only finitary methods are immune to the 
threat of paradox, and thus required a finitary proof of the consistency of 
non-finitary mathematics (which was to be viewed instrumentally).103 But 
most critics now believe that Godel’s second theorem (theorem XI of his 
(1931)) shows that a finitary proof of the consistency of non-finitary
103 For our purposes, it does not matter precisely what the distinction between finitary and non- 
finitary mathematics is, just that Hilbert took much important mathematics to be non-flonitary. 
See Tait (1981) for statement of what is now the prevailing account.
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mathematics is not possible. On the oth^r hand, Field thinks that only 
nominalistically acceptable evidence is legitimate, and thus requires a 
nominalistically acceptable demonstration that mathematical science is 
conservative over nominalistic science. But, as we saw in Chapter 6, it is 
controversial that there are nominalistically acceptable grounds for this.
The worry to which these observations give rise is that since prescriptive 
fictionalism and the views of Hilbert and Field are all of basically the same 
kind, since they all aim to make epistemological mileage out of 
mathematical instrumentalism, they may also share between them these 
further connection we have noted between the views of Hilbert and Field. 
If this is the case, then prescriptive fictionalism will be committed to 
establishing the consistency of object-committed mathematics (from the 
first connection) though its epistemological presuppositions will render 
doubtful that this can be achieved (from the second). This would mean it 
is objectionably unstable.
In this section, we will address whether this worry can be met. Clearly 
prescriptive fictionalism could try to meet it either by providing grounds for 
the consistency of object-committed mathematics or by arguing that it is 
not obliged to do so. Consider, then, where one might search for grounds 
for the consistency of a given mathematical theory M. As consistency is 
usually understood to be a mathematical notion (defined in model theory 
or proof theory) one might look to mathematics, hoping for a proof of the 
consistency of M in some other mathematical theory. Such a proof is 
called a relative consistency proof. Alternatively, one might propose a 
novel, non-mathematical notion of consistency in the hope of finding non- 
mathematical grounds for the consistency of M.
We considered an example of this last approach in chapter 6, where we 
discussed Field’s modal notion of consistency (and other meta-logical 
notions). We argued that it is unclear there are nominalistically acceptable 
grounds for knowledge of the modal consistency of mathematics (section 
6.5.2). Since this explanation of consistency seems to be the only serious
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alternative to mathematical explanations, thi^ conclusion leaves us with no 
promising way of showing that there are non-mathematical grounds for the 
consistency of M. It thus does not seem a good idea for prescriptive 
fictionalism to appeal to such grounds in order to satisfy the consistency 
condition.
This suggests that if prescriptive fictionalism is to provide grounds for the 
consistency of object-committed mathematics, it must do so by appeal to a 
relative consistency proof. Such an appeal would demand treating the 
mathematical theory in which the proof is carried out as known. Taking 
this line would necessarily restrict the scope of prescriptive fictionalism, as 
the object-committed mathematical claims associated with the 
mathematics of the proof could no longer be regarded as pretence. 
However, this is not entirely ruled out by the conclusions of previous 
chapters. The possibility thus emerges of a two tier account rather like 
Hilbert’s, in which some, comparatively elementary, mathematics would be 
dealt with from the realist perspective, more advanced mathematics would 
be treated as pretence, and this would be backed up by a proof of the 
consistency of the latter in the former.
The two options prescriptive fictionalism has to respond to the threat 
posed by the consistency condition are thus as follows: (a) to argue that 
relative consistency proofs are available to support versions of prescriptive 
fictionalism that are limited in scope but nevertheless worthwhile (b) to 
argue that prescriptive fictionalism is not committed to satisfying the 
consistency condition. We will consider each in turn.
7.6.1 Relative consistency proofs
If prescriptive fictionalism is usefully to establish the consistency of object- 
committed mathematics by appeal to a relative consistency proof, the 
mathematics in which the proof is carried out must be epistemologically 
more secure than the mathematics whose consistency is proved. One
324
reason for this demand is that the discussions of previous chapters permit 
prescriptive fictionalism to assume knowledge only of comparatively weak 
mathematics, arithmetic, for instance, and not of comparatively stronger 
theories, like real analysis and set theory. But another reason for this 
demand is independent of the presuppositions of prescriptive fictionalism: 
unless the theory in which the consistency proof is carried out is 
epistemologically more secure than the theory whose consistency is 
proved, there will be no epistemological advantage to construing the latter 
as pretence. Our question should thus be the following: What are the 
prospects of proving the consistency of mathematical theories used in 
science in mathematical theories that are epistemologically more secure?
7.6.1.1 Relative proofs of model theoretic consistency
Let us first consider this question in connection with the model theoretic 
notion of consistency. To prove that a mathematical theory is model 
theoretically consistent one has to prove that it has a model. Informally, 
this means proving that there exists a set of objects exhibiting the 
structure described by the theory. To prove the model theoretic 
consistency of Peano arithmetic, for example, one would have to prove the 
existence of a set of objects exhibiting the structure of an co-sequence. 
This would involve proving the existence of a countably infinite set and so 
would require assumption of a set theory in which the usual axiom of 
infinity can be proved. The model theoretic consistency of PA can thus be 
established only by assumption of the truth of a theory at least as 
ontologically loaded as PA itself. What about a proof of the consistency of 
real analysis? Presumably we would not want to foreclose the possibility 
of second order formulations of the theory, so we would have to be able to 
establish the existence of uncountable models. This would require 
assumption of the truth of a set theory in which the existence of 
uncountable sets could be proved. Thus we would have to assume the 
truth of a set theory at least as ontologically loaded as real analysis. In
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general, then, it appears that proofs of model theoretic consistency would 
not be of use to the kind of view under consideration. They would have to 
assume knowledge of mathematical theories as ontologically loaded as 
the mathematical theories that are to be regarded from the pretence 
theoretic point of view. It is hard to see how such knowledge could be 
more secure than knowledge of the theories that is to be construed as 
pretence.
Research on mathematical theories formulated in paraconsistent logic 
suggests that there are relative consistency proofs for which this condition 
is not necessary. Meyer (1976) establishes the existence of a finite model 
for a formalisation of PA in the relevant logic RQ.104 Priest (1991, 1994) 
establishes the existence of finite models for a formalisation of PA in the 
logic of paradox LP. However, it seems that these results cannot be 
adduced to help overcome the current difficulty. To begin with, 
prescriptive fictionalism is committed to a classical reading of the logical 
vocabulary of mathematical claims because this is presupposed by a 
Tarskian approach to the semantics of mathematical language, the 
correctness of which is itself assumed by linguistic realism (see section
1.1). In addition, the proofs of Meyer and Priest address the absolute 
consistency of PA; they show that there is a sentence in the language of 
PA such that it is not the case that both it and its negation are true in the 
finite model described. But what prescriptive fictionalism requires is a 
proof of the full model theoretic consistency of PA, i.e. that it is not the 
case that there is a sentence in the language of PA such that both it and 
its negation are true in the model described; it can be proved that Meyer’s 
and Priest’s formalisations of PA are not consistent in this sense.105 
Finally, to suggest that the mathematics used in science is based on a 
paraconsistent logic of some sort is highly controversial. Paraconsistent 
logics tolerate inconsistency by allowing the proofs of some sentences to
104 See also Meyer and Mortensen (1984).
105 Brady (2006) proves the consistency, in this sense, o f a paraconsistent formulation of set 
theory. However, Brady’s proof assumes the model theoretic consistency of a classical analogue 
of this theory (op. cit., 255). It is thus hard to see what value there would be in appealing to this 
proof in order to justify a pretence theoretic approach to the paraconsistent theory.
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stand together with proofs of their negations. But standard mathematical 
theories do not tolerate inconsistency, as the history of mathematics 
shows.106 For these reasons, it is not plausible to suggest that prescriptive 
fictionalism can satisfy the consistency condition by appeal to relative 
proofs of consistency carried out in paraconsistent mathematics.
7.6.1.2 Relative proofs of proof theoretic consistency
Our question was whether prescriptive fictionalism can establish the 
consistency of the mathematics it views as pretence by appeal to a 
relative consistency proof. Let us now consider this in connection with the 
proof theoretic notion of consistency. According to a popular line of 
thought, Godel’s second theorem shows that the proof theoretic 
consistency of standard mathematical theories cannot be proved in the 
theories themselves, that there is no possibility, for example, of real 
analysis proving its own consistency, or of set theory proving its own 
consistency. If the theorem does establish this, it suggests that appeal to 
relative proofs of the proof theoretic consistency of the mathematics used 
in science will not help prescriptive fictionalism. For if the consistency of a 
mathematical theory M cannot be proved in itself, it seems unlikely that a 
proof of its consistency will be forthcoming in a mathematical theory that is 
epistemologically more manageable than M.
The first question to address here is whether Godel’s result (hereafter “the 
second theorem”) shows that standard mathematical theories do not prove 
their own proof theoretic consistency (hereafter “consistency”). The 
second theorem is concerned with formal systems containing primitive 
recursive arithmetic (PRA) that satisfy certain conditions. These are 
assumptions about formal systems that hold for the systems that Hilbert
106 Friedman and Meyer (1992) provide another reason for preferring a classical formulation of 
arithmetic to Meyer’s paraconsistent formalisation; that the former proves interesting arithmetic 
claims that the latter does not prove. As these claims are true in finite models of the sort Meyer 
described for his formulation o f arithmetic, that formulation is less deductively powerful than we 
would like.
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and others had In mind during their proof theoretic investigations; they are 
used in Bemays’s full proof of Godel’s second theorem.107 Let F be a 
formal system containing PRA and satisfying these conditions. By the 
method of Godel numbering, sentences of F can be constructed that 
express claims made in the proof theory of F, in particular, that F is 
consistent. The second theorem picks one of these sentences, CONf, 
and states the following:
If F is consistent, CONf is not derivable in F.
This is a generalization about a certain kind of formal system. It is not the 
same as the claim that standard mathematical theories cannot prove their 
own consistency. So how does one argue from the former to the latter?
To answer this we will consider how the argument runs for the case of set 
theory (a standard theory such as ZFC). Assume that set theory is 
consistent and let S be an adequate formalization of set theory. With such 
a formalization, the consistency of S is stated as follows:
VxVyVz"*(x is a derivation in S of z a  y is a derivation of the negation of z)
Picking a system of Godel numbering, this claim is expressed by a 
sentence of S, CONs. S certainly contains PRA, so assuming that S 
satisfies the derivability conditions, we can apply the second theorem to 
establish that there is no derivation in S of CONs. Note that given any 
system of Godel numbering, and any properly formulated sentence <|> 
about the syntax of S, there is a unique sentence in the language of S 
there expresses <|> via that numbering; CONs is thus the only sentence of S 
that expresses the consistency of S in canonical form relative to the 
chosen numbering. There are other sentences of S which express the
107 It is customary to speak of Godel’s having proved the second theorem. But to the extent that it 
provides no formulation o f the derivability conditions, his (1931) only contains a sketch of the 
proof,. According to Giaquinto (2002, 258, n.4), Bemays later provided a full proof in Hilbert and 
Bemays (1939).
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consistency of S, but these are all formally equivalent to CONs. So the 
fact that CONs cannot be derived in S shows that the consistency of S 
cannot be derived in S (relative to the system of numbering chosen). In 
other words, S does not prove its own consistency. To complete the 
argument we now generalise over adequate formalizations to arrive at our 
conclusion. This requires a final assumption, that all adequate 
formalizations of set theory satisfy the conditions necessary for the proof 
of Godel’s theorems. Making this assumption, we can deduce, from the 
claim that S does not prove its own consistency, that set theory does not 
prove its own consistency.
An argument like this could be run for any mathematical theory containing 
PRA, so the argument suggests that Godel’s second theorem shows that 
standard mathematical theories do not prove their own consistency. 
There is, however, a serious challenge to the argument which should be 
mentioned, to take issue with the assumption that all adequate 
formalisations of set theory satisfy the derivability conditions. In this 
regard, Detlefsen (1986) argues on the basis of methods of formalization 
first described by Rosser (1936) that there may be ways of formalising 
standard mathematical theories so that the conditions required by the 
second theorem do not obtain. Let T be a formalisation of a theory using 
the usual methods of formalisation. To obtain a Rosser formalisation R, it 
is assumed that Ts proofs have been enumerated so that derivability in R 
can be defined in terms of derivability in T with an added consistency 
condition: x is a derivation in R of y if and only x is a derivation in T of y 
and y is not inconsistent with the conclusions of any derivation z prior to x 
in the enumeration. Thus we have not only that the second theorem does 
not apply to Rosser formalized theories, but also that such theories are 
guaranteed to be consistent. Another kind of formalization for which this 
situation obtains is described by Feferman (1960). To obtain a Feferman 
formalization of T, an enumeration of the axioms of T is assumed and 
derivability in F is defined in a manner parallel to derivability in T. 
However, axiomhood is defined in such a way as to build consistency into
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F: x is an axiom in F if and only if x is an axiom in T and x is consistent 
with every axiom in T that precedes x in the Enumeration.
However, it does not seem likely that the unusual methods of formalisation 
suggested by Feferman and Rosser could be used to escape the force of 
the argument from the second theorem. For this would require that we 
have clear, independent reasons for preferring them to the usual methods. 
But there do not seem to be such reasons. In fact, the clear and 
independent reasons available here seem to favour the usual methods, 
for, as Giaquinto (2002) observes, neither Feferman’s nor Rosser’s 
method leads to adequate formalizations of mathematical theories. In 
Feferman-style formalisations the question whether a given formal object 
is a derivation is not effectively decidable (op.cit, 187). In Rosser-style 
formalizations the structural assumptions governing proof differ from those 
of ordinary mathematical practice, in particular, the cut rule fails for them 
(op.cit, 188).108 It is thus not plausible to claim that formal systems 
arrived at by these methods represent mathematical deductive practice 
more faithfully than systems arrived at by the usual methods.
What this shows is that, given the methods of formalisation available at 
present, it is not possible to avoid the second theorem by appeal to 
unusual formal systems. So for the time being, the answer to our question 
whether the second theorem shows that standard mathematical theories 
do not prove their own consistency is that it does. The question we must 
now address is what significance this has for the project under 
consideration here, the project of defending a pretence theoretic approach 
to the mathematics used in science by proving its consistency in 
epistemologically more manageable mathematical theories.
The result is a major blow. Set theory is both used in science and 
contains all other standard mathematical theories by translation. It is
108 This is the rule allowing one to take previously established theorems as premises in proofs. 
Note that, without it, proofs would always have to take axioms as premises, and so would become 
unmanageably long.
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therefore not possible to step outside such a theory to establish its 
consistency on proofs that it does not contain. Thus pretence theoretic 
fictionalism cannot defend a pretence theoretic approach to set theory by 
appeal to a relative consistency proof in epistemologically weaker 
mathematics, for there seem to be no such proofs.
This is a bad result for prescriptive fictionalism, and it is already enough to 
suggest that the project of defending it by appeal to relative proofs of proof 
theoretic consistency is not a good one. Perhaps, though, the pretence 
theoretic approach might still be applied to mathematical theories less 
extensive than set theory, like arithmetic or real analysis. These theories 
do not contain or translate all standard mathematical methods, so the 
possibility of relative proofs of consistency for these theories that are 
useful to the project is not ruled out by the argument from the second 
theorem.
Without claiming to have a knockdown argument against this possibility, it 
does seem reasonable to maintain that various developments in proof 
theory suggest that it, too, will be foreclosed. It is difficult to approach this 
issue because the conditions under which one theory is epistemologically 
more secure than another are unclear. But let us assume that a 
mathematical theory is epistemologically more secure than another only if 
it is not as proof theoretically strong. Proof theoretic strength is itself an 
imprecise concept. But when it is made more precise, one finds that 
formal theories can be thought of as being ranked according to proof 
theoretic strength, such that theories lower down the ranking do not prove 
the consistency of theories higher up.
Two themes in proof theory suggest this way of thinking. Gentzen (1936) 
proved that the consistency of PRA could be established in PRA combined 
with the principle of transfinite induction up to eo. This result gave birth to 
the field of ordinal analysis, one of the main branches of proof theory, in 
which the proof theoretic strength of a formal system is measured by its
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ordinal number, that being the least ordinal, a, such that transfinite
\
induction up to a suffices for a proof of the consistency of the system. 
This leads naturally to thinking of formal systems as ranked according to 
proof theoretic strength, such that formal system Fi appears at a later 
stage than formal system F2 if and only if the ordinal of F1 is greater than 
the ordinal of F2.
The second theme in proof theory that suggests this approach concerns 
the results on proof theoretic reducibility described in Feferman (1993b). 
F1 is proof theoretically reducible to F2 relative to a recursively enumerable 
class of formulas that they both contain (which includes at least PRA) if F2 
proves every sentence from the shared class which is proved in F1 and if 
F2 proves that this is the case.109 Feferman discusses many examples of 
interesting proof theoretic reductions. However, for us the important point 
is that not every formalised mathematical theory is proof theoretically 
reducible to every other. As was the case with ordinal analysis, the 
established results on proof theoretic reduction body suggest thinking of 
formal systems as ranked according to proof theoretic strength; this time 
we can think of formal system F1 as being higher in rank than a formal 
system F2 to which it can be proof theoretically compared if and only if F2 
is proof theoretically reducible to F1 .
These avenues of research in proof theory do not reveal one unique 
method of arranging formal systems in terms of proof theoretic strength, 
preferable to all others. Rather it makes clear that we have various 
precise notions of proof theoretic strength according to which we might 
make such arrangements. But the expectation to which these results give 
rise is that however one refines the notion of proof theoretic strength, one 
will always find that the consistency of a formal mathematical theory can 
only be proved in a formal mathematical theory that is proof theoretically 
stronger. Given our assumption that in mathematics proof theoretic 
strength is a guide to the epistemological security of a theory, the current
109 For a more formal definition o f proof theoretic reducibility, see Feferman (1993b, 6).
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proposal for prescriptive fictionalism requires consistency proofs in 
theories that are proof theoretically weaker than those whose consistency 
is to be proved. It thus looks implausible even for mathematical theories 
of moderate extensiveness, such as PA or real analysis.
These remarks are somewhat impressionistic and we must stress again 
that we do not claim to have to have shown that it is impossible for 
prescriptive fictionalism to ground knowledge of the consistency of the 
mathematics used in science on relative consistency proofs. But we do 
claim to have raised very serious doubt about whether this is possible. 
We claim that Godel’s second theorem does show that standard 
mathematical theories do not prove their own consistency. We claim that 
this shows that prescriptive fictionalism cannot establish the consistency of 
very extensive mathematical theories like set theory on relative proofs of 
proof theoretic consistency. And we claim that further research in proof 
theory suggests that this approach will not work for less extensive 
mathematical theories either. On these grounds, we conclude that the 
thought that prescriptive fictionalism can satisfy the consistency condition 
by appeal to relative proofs of proof theoretic consistency is not plausible.
This conclusion should now be placed alongside the conclusion of the 
previous section, that the consistency condition cannot be met by appeal 
to relative proofs of proof theoretic consistency. It should also be placed 
alongside the conclusion of section 6.5.2, which, as we argued above, 
suggests that there are not adequate non-mathematical grounds for 
knowledge of the consistency of the mathematical theories used in 
science. Collectively, these results suggest that pretence theoretic 
fictionalism cannot satisfy the consistency condition. So if prescriptive 
fictionalism is successfully to deal with the condition, it must do so in some 
other way.
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7.6.2 Rejecting the consistency condition
s
In the previous section we argued that prescriptive fictionalism cannot 
usefully establish knowledge of the consistency of mathematics on relative 
consistency proofs. In Chapter 6, we argued that it is not clear there are 
non-mathematical grounds for such knowledge. If these arguments are 
correct, they leave us with no reason to be confident that pretence 
theoretic fictionalism can meet the consistency condition. So unless it can 
be argued that prescriptive fictionalism is not obliged to meet the 
condition, we will have to conclude that it is not a plausible view. We 
should thus address the question of whether prescriptive fictionalism is 
obliged to establish the consistency of the mathematics it treats as 
pretence.
The suggestion that prescriptive fictionalism might have to satisfy the 
consistency condition comes from its comparison to the views of Hilbert 
and Field. But the comparison only raises the possibility that prescriptive 
fictionalism requires satisfaction of the consistency condition, it does not 
establish that this is the case. It is therefore a good idea to find out what 
made Hilbert and Field demand satisfaction of the consistency condition, 
to see if their grounds provide reason to impose the same requirement on 
prescriptive fictionalism. We will first consider Hilbert’s reasons for 
imposing the consistency constraint.
Hilbert distinguished between finitary and non-finitary mathematical 
claims. For our discussion, the nature of the distinction is not important. 
But it will aid exposition to use the terms as labels for the mathematical 
claims Hilbert construed instrumentally (non-finitary claims) and the 
mathematical claims he construed non-instrumentally (finitary claims). For 
reasons we need not go into here, finitary claims do not obey certain 
logical principles whose use is common in mathematical deductive 
practice (such as the law of excluded middle). If mathematics were to 
avail itself only of finitary claims it would thus have to abandon use of
334
some of its most important logical methods. Hilbert was not prepared to 
allow this. But how could the use of these logical methods be justified?
Let us remember that we are mathematicians and as such 
have already often found ourselves in a similar predicament, 
and let us recall how the method of ideal elements, that 
creation of genius, then allowed us to find an escape. I 
presented some shining examples of the use of this method at 
the beginning of my lecture. Just as /' = V-1 was introduced so 
that the laws of algebra, those, for example, concerning the 
existence and number of the roots of an equation, could be 
preserved in their simplest form, just as ideal factors were 
introduced so that the simple laws of divisibility could be 
maintained even for algebraic integers (for example, we 
introduce an ideal common divisor for the numbers 2 and 1 +
V-5, while an actual one does not exist), so we must here 
adjoin the ideal propositions to the finitary ones in order to 
maintain the formally simple rules of ordinary Aristotelian logic.
(1925, 379)
Here the “ideal propositions” can be taken to be the non-finitary claims.110 
What the passage shows is that, on Hilbert’s view, the introduction and 
use of non-finitary statements is to be thought of as an application in proof 
theory of the method of ideal elements. This is taken to be a method of 
mathematics whose use is exhibited in familiar and important episodes in 
the history of mathematics.
The reason Hilbert explicitly gives for imposing the consistency condition 
on his version of instrumentalism is connected to this use of the method of 
ideal elements:
110 In fact, Hilbert regarded even some finitary claims as ideal elements introduced to make a 
simple logic available: “Besides these elementary propositions [numerical equalities etc.], which 
are of an entirely unproblematic character, we encountered finitary propositions of problematic 
character, for example, those that were not decomposable [into partial propositions].” (1925,
380). The reason for this is that the range of applicability of the usual rules of classical logic (the 
rules whose use Hilbert wanted to preserve) is not given precisely by the epistemological 
distinction between finitary and non-finitary statements. However, on our use of the terms it is 
perfectly acceptable to take the ideal statements as the non-finitary statements.
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To be sure, one condition, a single but indispensable one, is 
always attached to the use of the method of ideal elements, 
and that is the proof of consistency; for, extension by the 
addition of ideal elements is legitimate only if no contradiction 
is thereby brought about in the old, narrower domain, that is, if 
the relations that result for the old objects whenever the ideal 
objects are eliminated are valid in the old domain. (1927, 471)
It thus appears that Hilbert is arguing as follows: applications of the 
method of ideal elements must be backed up by proofs of the consistency 
of the ideal elements introduced, non-finitary claims can be thought of as 
having been introduced as ideal elements via this method; thus it must be 
proved that they constitute a consistent body of claims.
Does this argument provide reason to demand a consistency proof of the 
mathematics pretence theoretic fictionalism construes as pretence? 
Clearly it does not. Prescriptive fictionalism does not seek to justify the 
introduction and use of object-committed mathematical claims as an 
application of the method of ideal elements, or, indeed, as an application 
of any other mathematical method. Rather it proposes that object- 
committed mathematical claims are introduced as elements of pretence 
designed to help express and manipulate information about non- 
mathematical phenomena. So even if the use of the method of ideal 
elements must be supported, in each instance of use, with a proof of the 
consistency of the ideal statements introduced, this does not provide 
reason for imposing the consistency condition on prescriptive fictionalism.
However, considerations relevant to the method of ideal elements were 
not Hilbert’s only reasons for demanding satisfaction of the consistency 
condition. Another arose from the aim of his project:
With this new way of providing a foundation for mathematics, 
which we may appropriately call a proof theory, I pursue a 
significant goal, for I should like to eliminate once and for all
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the questions regarding the foundations of mathematics, in the
s
form in which they are now posed, by turning every 
mathematical proposition into a formula that can be correctly 
exhibited and strictly derived, thus recasting mathematical 
definitions and inferences in such a way that they are 
unshakeable and yet provide an adequate picture of the whole 
science. I believe that I can attain this goal completely with my 
proof theory, even if a great deal of work must still be done 
before it is fully developed. (1927, 464)
For Hilbert, the main question for the foundations of mathematics was how 
we could be confident of using the methods of classical mathematics 
without fear of paradox. He could not accept that the lot of mathematics 
was to lurch from one foundational crisis to another, as had already 
happened as mathematicians had successfully dealt with contradictions in 
analysis only for contradictions to appear again in set theory. To stop this 
from happening Hilbert resolved to establish beyond doubt and in advance 
that the methods of classical mathematics would not lead to paradox. His 
method was to formalize those methods and then to prove the consistency 
of the formal system in which they were formalized. So a further reason 
Hilbert required a consistency proof for non-finitary mathematics was that 
he wanted to banish all fears of paradox from the use of classical 
mathematics.
Prescriptive fictionalism, however, has a more modest aim. It seeks to 
establish a satisfactory philosophical account of what passes for 
mathematical knowledge consistent with the basic assumptions of this 
study and the criticisms of realist views set out in previous chapters of this 
study. It does not seek to guarantee the future certainty of mathematical 
reasoning. Therefore prescriptive fictionalism is not required to satisfy the 
consistency condition as a means to achieving this more ambitious aim. 
This, of course, does not mean that it can ignore the question of the 
reliability in applications of the mathematics it construes as pretence, as 
Hilbert could not ignore the question of why non-finitary mathematical
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reasoning was reliable in finitary mathematics. But we have already said 
how prescriptive fictionalism responds to this.
Let us now turn to the reasons for which Field’s position is committed to 
satisfaction of the consistency condition. As we explained above, the 
consistency condition for Field’s view derives from the more stringent 
conservativeness condition, the demand that the conservativeness of 
mathematical over nominalistic science be established. What we must 
find out is therefore whether the reasons for which the conservativeness 
condition must be met by Field’s view lead to reasons for which the 
consistency condition must be met by prescriptive fictionalism.
We saw in Chapter 6 that Field’s instrumentalism uses the dispensability 
of mathematics to science and the conservativeness of mathematics over 
nominalistic science to establish the reliability of mathematical reasoning. 
Here is a simplified reminder of how this was supposed to go. Let P be 
one of our mathematical scientific theories. Then by the dispensability and 
conservativeness claims there is a nominalistic theory N and a 
mathematical theory M such that M is conservative over N and N + M (the 
conjunction of N and M) has the same nominalistically expressed 
consequences as P. Let <|> be a nominalistically expressed claim for which 
there is a mathematical argument in P. Since P and N + M have the same 
nominalistically expressed consequences as P, <|> is a nominalistically 
expressed consequence of N + M. Then, since M is conservative over N, 
<|> is a nominalistically expressed consequence of N alone. Thus the 
mathematical arguments available in P do not allow us to draw 
conclusions we could not have drawn without mathematics; so the use of 
mathematics in P is reliable.
This argument for the reliability of mathematical reasoning is not sound 
unless mathematical science is conservative over nominalistic science. 
This is why Field’s position is committed to meeting the conservativeness 
condition (as mathematical science is conservative over nominalistic
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science only if mathematics is consistent)^ If this is to lead to a reason 
why prescriptive fictionalism must meet the consistency condition, then 
prescriptive fictionalism must rely on a similar argument for which the 
consistency of mathematics is a premise. But it does not. Prescriptive 
fictionalism does not presuppose either that mathematics is dispensable to 
science, or that mathematical science is conservative over nominalistic 
science. So it does not rely on this argument to establish the reliability of 
mathematical reasoning. Moreover, it does not rely on a similar argument 
in which the consistency of mathematics is a premise. As we explained 
above, prescriptive fictionalism proposes a teleological explanation of the 
reliability of mathematical reasoning. On this view, the standards of 
correct mathematical acceptance are themselves thought of as products of 
a kind of evolutionary testing; if the standards ratify as correct the 
acceptance of world directedly misleading claims, they will be modified 
when this comes to light so that it is no longer the case. Conclusions with 
world directed content that have been shown to be correct according to 
the standards of correct acceptance are thus reliable because they have 
been ratified by standards selected in this way. Clearly, the claim that 
mathematics is consistent is not a premise of this argument.
It would appear, then, that the reasons for which Hilbert’s and Field’s 
views are committed to satisfying the consistency condition do not show 
that it must also be satisfied by prescriptive fictionalism. However, we 
cannot conclude that this commitment does not arise unless we are also 
sure that none of the claims made by prescriptive fictionalism presuppose 
the consistency of object-committed mathematics. There are, perhaps, 
two reasons for thinking that such a commitment does arise.
The first putative reason is that prescriptive fictionalism attributes to 
considerations of consistency an important role in its conception of 
mathematics as an area of enquiry. One might say that it views the 
production of consistent mathematics as a goal of mathematical enquiry. 
Doesn’t this show that it is necessary to establish the consistency of 
object-committed mathematics, as the consistency condition requires? It
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does not. Whilst it is a goal of mathematics to produce consistent
s
mathematics, consistency considerations enter the standards of correct 
acceptance only in the sense that when some mathematics is known to be 
inconsistent it cannot be correctly accepted. If we aim to accept only 
those mathematical claims that may be correctly accepted we will thus 
resolve to reject mathematics in which inconsistencies are discovered. 
However, this does not commit one to showing that a piece of 
mathematics is consistent before one can correctly accept it. So this does 
not give reason to think that the consistency condition must be met.
The second putative reason for thinking that a commitment to satisfaction 
of the consistency condition arises from the claims of prescriptive 
fictionalism has to do with rationality. Prescriptive fictionalism maintains 
that we should believe in the world directed content of sentences that have 
been shown to follow from mathematical theory. Suppose, then, that S is 
an object-committed mathematical claim with world directed content. Then 
if both S and -’S are consequences of correct mathematical theory, we 
should believe the world directed contents of them both. But these 
contents will be contradictory. Since it is never rational to form 
contradictory beliefs, prescriptive fictionalism must therefore show that this 
situation does not arise. Thus, it might be argued, prescriptive fictionalism 
must establish that the mathematical theories used in applications are 
consistent.
However the argument contains a mistake. Prescriptive fictionalism does 
indeed claim that we should believe in the world directed content of 
sentences that are shown to follow from acceptable mathematics. But it 
also claims that if a mathematical theory is shown to be inconsistent, it is 
to be amended so that the proof of at least one of the inconsistent 
sentences is no longer considered to be correct. In the situation described 
in which both S and -,S are shown to follow from a mathematical theory, 
this very fact establishes that the theory from which they are derived is not 
acceptable. Thus it is not necessary to rule out the possibility of this 
situation arising by establishing the consistency of the mathematical
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theories used in science: if t^iconsistenoy emerges, we are required to 
reject the theory, not to form contradictory beliefs.
A dialectical approach to the consistency of mathematics emerges from 
this response, according to which the claim that mathematics is consistent 
is an assumption of mathematical practice. On this approach, we do not, 
strictly speaking, know that the mathematics used in science is consistent. 
Rather we assume that it is consistent. If we find that it is not, we revise 
the mathematics so that the arguments we know about that terminate with 
inconsistent claims are blocked, taking care to revise in ways that we feel 
are not likely to lead to new inconsistencies. We then assume that the 
revised mathematics is consistent.111 Our undertakings never to accept a 
piece of mathematics known to be inconsistent, and always to revise 
inconsistencies away, are what license the assumption of consistency. So 
on this dialectical approach, the assumption that mathematics is 
consistent does not need the support of grounds adequate to its being 
known.
One last concern might be that prescriptive fictionalism cannot even 
assume the consistency of mathematics, since to do so would commit it to 
the existence of mathematical objects such as models or proofs. 
However, it may be possible to deal with this by appealing to the modal 
notion of consistency we discussed in section 6.5 (Field’s notion), 
according to which a theory is consistent when it is possible that its basic 
principles are jointly true. In section 6.5, we argued that it is not clear 
there are nominalistically acceptable grounds for knowledge of the modal 
consistency of mathematics, but clearly this does not stop us from 
appealing to a modal notion of consistency in order to assume that 
mathematics is consistent. This problem can thus be overcome by appeal 
to Field’s modal notion of consistency, provided that notion is meaningful.
111 O f course the fact o f human error means that there are inconsistencies in mathematics as it is 
practised. But the assumption o f consistency concerns an idealised version o f mathematics, 
purged of human error.
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It thus appears that the consistency condition can be dealt with by 
prescriptive fictionalism. Hilbert’s and Field’s reasons for thinking that 
knowledge of the consistency of mathematics must be established do not 
apply, and it does not seem that this is required by anything prescriptive 
fictionalism says. The fact that we apparently lack adequate non- 
mathematical grounds for knowledge of the consistency of mathematics 
thus does not present a difficulty for prescriptive fictionalism as it can 
appeal to the modal notion of consistency and take advantage of the 
dialectic approach to consistency recently described. Accordingly, 
prescriptive fictionalism takes the modal consistency of mathematics as a 
defeasible assumption of mathematical practice.
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7.7 Conclusion
s
This chapter addressed the question of whether mathematical fictionalism 
can meet the challenge from applications without assuming that 
mathematics is dispensable to science, by arguing that the roles 
mathematics has in science are played in other contexts by acknowledged 
forms of pretence. The point of introducing prescriptive fictionalism was 
that it promised to do just that.
Prescriptive fictionalism puts forward a conception of mathematics as an 
area of enquiry in which the acceptance of mathematical claims is treated 
differently from the way it would be treated on realist approaches. This 
conception states that A accepts an object-committed mathematical claim 
p if and only if (a) A is prepared to use p in empirical applications and (b) A 
is not prepared to assert or endorse the statement that p is true (section 
7.2.1). It states that a mathematical claim may be correctly accepted if 
and only if it is known to be an axiom of, or to have been validly deduced 
from, a mathematical theory that is not known to be inconsistent but is 
known to be applicable (section 7.2.2). This conception of mathematics as 
an area of enquiry is intended prescriptively, as an account of how we 
ought to engage with object-committed mathematical claims.
Prescriptive fictionalism also proposes a (prescriptive) account of the 
pragmatics of mathematical language. According to this account, 
sentences expressing object-committed mathematical claims should be 
used as if they were believed to be true but in the absence of such belief 
(section 7.3). Prescriptive fictionalism thus arrives at a conception of 
mathematics as a form of pretence. It then argues that, from the 
perspective of this conception: (a) the descriptive uses in science of 
object-committed mathematical sentences can be viewed as world- 
directed utterances of propositions that are not committed to mathematical 
objects (section 7.3.1); (b) the reliability of mathematical reasoning in 
science can be viewed as a consequence of the fact that the standards of 
correct mathematical acceptance evolve under the constraint of
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applicability (section 7.3.2). In this way, the challenge from applications is 
met. N
After setting out prescriptive fictionalism, we considered possible 
objections to it. But having considered Stanley’s objections to pretence 
invoking versions of fictionalism (section 7.4), Burgess’s objections to 
fictionalist approaches to mathematics (section 7.5) and the possibility that 
prescriptive fictionalism might bear objectionable commitments to the 
consistency of mathematics (section 7.6), we have found no reason to 
dismiss it.
Prescriptive fictionalism thus appears to meet the challenge from 
applications and is strong enough to withstand sustained criticism. This 
does not mean that there is nothing wrong with the view, nor does it 
demonstrate that we should adopt it forthwith. But it gives sufficient 
grounds for a cautious optimism regarding its future prospects. The 
possibility thus remains open of a fictionalist response to the challenge 
from applications that argues that the roles mathematics has in science 
can be played by pretence.
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8 s
Conclusion
We have now reached the end of the programme of study set out in our 
introduction. Let us take stock of the conclusions we have reached, to 
assess their significance and to indicate directions for future research.
345
8.1 Summary
\
The question with which we began was that of how we should conceive of 
what passes for mathematical knowledge (“apparent mathematical 
knowledge”). We made two basic assumptions (section 1.1 and section
1.2). Linguistic realism states that:
(i) mathematical language should be treated classically and 
referentially,
(ii) mathematical language should be taken at face value 
when used rigorously to express mature mathematical 
theories.
The amended Quinean criterion of ontological commitment states that:
A theory is committed to the instantiation of all and only 
those kinds of thing, to instances of which its bound 
variables must be capable of referring if it is to be true.
We argued that there are two plausible approaches to apparent 
mathematical knowledge within these constraints. Mathematical realism 
states that there are independently existing mathematical objects and 
treats apparent mathematical knowledge as knowledge of such things 
(section 1.3). Mathematical fictionalism rejects belief in mathematics, 
stating that mathematics is, of should be, a form of pretence (section 1.4). 
Each approach faces its epistemological challenge: mathematical realism 
must make plausible that we are, or could be, in possession of adequate 
grounds for belief in mathematical knowledge; mathematical fictionalism 
must convince us that the roles mathematics has in empirical applications 
can be performed by pretence.
The project we set ourselves was to find out if these challenges can be 
met (section 1.5). Chapters 1 and 2 dealt with rationalist approaches to 
mathematical knowledge, which claim that mathematical knowledge is
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supported by grounds provided by the s intellect, independent of the 
evidence sense perception. Chapters 3 and 4 dealt with empiricist 
approaches fo mathematical knowledge, according to which its ultimate 
grounds are provided by sense perception. Chapters 6 and 7 addressed 
fictionalist strategies for meeting the challenge from applications. In each 
chapter we described and assessed the chances of success for a 
particular strategy for meeting one of the challenges. Here is a summary 
of the main arguments made.
Chapter 2
This dealt with the rationalist strategy of arguing that mathematics is 
analytic, i.e. knowable on grounds provided by conceptual analysis. We 
considered first the Neo-Fregeanism of Wright and Hale (section 2.3). 
Following Boolos, we argued against the analyticity of Frege Arithmetic, 
the second order classical theory in which Hume’s Principle is the only 
non-logical axiom, on the grounds that it proves the existence of cardinal 
numbers whose existence conflicts with ZF (section 2.4). We claimed that 
this shows that Hume’s Principle is not true, hence not analytic, and that 
the conflict with set theory is incompatible with the Neo-Fregean 
programme for mathematics in general. We then considered Tennant’s 
free logic alternative to Frege Arithmetic (section 2.5). We argued that the 
rule of O-introduction and the ratchet principle upon which it is based are 
neither stipulatively valid nor formulable from conceptual analysis, and 
thus not analytic, because they bear ontological commitments (section
2.6). Finally, we considered Rumfitt’s attempted resuscitation of Tennant’s 
approach by appeal to the general necessary and sufficient conditions for 
cardinal existence allegedly given by his principle C (section 2.7). As with 
the ratchet principle and O-introduction, we argued that its ontological 
commitments ruled against the analyticity of principle C. Moreover, we 
argued that the fact that principle C does not allow non-well-orderable sets 
to have cardinal numbers suggests that it is neither formulable from 
conceptual analysis of the notion of cardinal number nor stipulatively true.
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Chapter 3 \
This addressed the rationalist strategy of arguing that mathematics can be 
known on grounds provided by a faculty of intuition. We considered first 
the possibility of positing a faculty of mathematical intuition, issuing in 
intuitions of mathematical objects. Taking Godel’s account of set theoretic 
knowledge as an example of this approach (section 3.2), we argued that 
Godel’s remarks on mathematical intuition are too sketchy to provide us 
with a clear understanding of how we are supposed to intuit sets (section
3.3). Next we considered the possibility of positing a faculty of rational 
intuition, issuing in intuitions that things are thus and so with mathematical 
objects. We considered Katz’s account of knowledge in the formal 
sciences as an example of this approach (section 3.5), but argued that, 
because Katz fails to provide any explanation of the nature and 
constitution of rational intuition, he provides no convincing reason to think 
that we possess such a faculty (section 3.6). Thereafter we argued that 
our central point against Katz’s position, that the cognitive sciences do not 
provide anything like a constitutive account of what the faculty of intuition 
might be like, applies quite generally to any account of mathematical 
knowledge that appeals to a faculty of intuition, regardless of the kind of 
intuition involved (section 3.7). We concluded that this strategy does not 
promise a satisfactory realist theory according to which mathematical 
knowledge is ultimately secured on the deliverances of intuition.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 assessed the empiricist strategy of arguing that mathematical 
knowledge is ultimately supported by sense perception of mathematical 
objects. We considered Maddy’s account of set theoretic knowledge as 
an example of this approach (section 4.2). We defended her theory of 
perception as a collection of sufficient conditions for perception of objects 
as instances of given kinds (section 4.3.1) and defended her claim that 
sets are perceivable against objections from Balaguer (section 4.6) and 
Chihara (section 4.7). But taking our cue from some of Chihara’s 
observations, we rejected Maddy’s set theoretic empiricism, on the 
grounds that its claim that sets of physical objects are located in space
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and time conflicts conceptually with the axjoms of set theory (section 4.8). 
Moreover, we argued that this conclusion threatens any view that, like 
Maddy’s, takes mathematical objects to be on a metaphysical and 
epistemological par with ordinary physical objects like chairs and tables 
(section 4.9). However, we did not claim that it necessarily provides 
reason to reject views that assimilate the nature and knowledge of 
mathematical objects to that of properties of ordinary physical objects, like 
redness. Accordingly our conclusion was that the empiricist strategy of 
arguing that mathematical knowledge can be grounded on sense 
perception could not succeed on Maddy’s approach, but may yet succeed 
on this other approach.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 examined the empiricist strategy of arguing that sense 
perceptions of ordinary physical objects provide evidence for mathematical 
beliefs. We considered first Quinean realism, which argues that because 
standard mathematics is indispensable to science it is confirmed by 
scientific evidence (section 5.1). Defending this against Maddy’s 
objections from scientific and mathematical practice (section 5.3 and 
section 5.4), we conceded that they raise valid concerns about the 
Quinean view; first, whether it can be extended by a methodological theory 
that satisfactorily explains the facts of practice and, second, whether it can 
successfully explain the confirmation of dispensable mathematics. We 
considered Resnik’s development of Quinean realism because it promised 
to meet these concerns (section 5.5). We were impressed by the way it 
explained the facts of practice (sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2). However, we 
argued that considerations from Resnik’s local conception of mathematical 
evidence would either be constrained not to ratify dispensable 
mathematics as true, or would not be genuinely evidential with respect to 
dispensable mathematics, and concluded that Resnik’s view does not 
deliver scientific confirmation for dispensable mathematics (section 5.6.3). 
Consequently, we argued by appeal to results from the foundations of 
mathematics that it is unclear that either Quinean realism or Resnik’s view 
provides adequate grounds for knowledge of impredicative mathematics,
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including central mathematical theories like real analysis and impredicative 
set theory (section 5.6.3). We concluded that we do not have good reason 
to think that mathematical knowledge quite generally is confirmed by 
scientific evidence, but conceded that this approach may satisfactorily 
account for knowledge of mathematics that has widespread indispensable 
applications (section 5.7).
Chapter 6
This chapter addressed the fictionalist strategy of arguing that 
mathematics is a convenient but in principle unnecessary instrument in 
empirical applications. We took Field’s programme for the nominalization 
of science as an example of this approach (section 6.3). We dismissed 
Hale and Wright’s objection that Field’s logical notion of possibility should 
be rejected (section 6.5.1) but argued that it is unclear there are 
nominalistically acceptable grounds for knowledge of the modal 
consistency of standard mathematical theories (section 6.5.2). We then 
defended Shapiro’s argument that, when Field’s programme is pursued 
against the background of first order logic, if mathematics is conservative, 
the representation theorems Field requires cannot be proved (section 6.6). 
We also considered Resnik’s objections to the nominalistic acceptability of 
Field’s reformulations of field theories in flat space-time, arguing that there 
is not adequate evidence for the assumption that there are uncountably 
many concrete space-time points (section 6.7). Observing that these 
points show there are serious difficulties with every aspect of Field’s 
position, we concluded that the prospects are not good for fictionalist 
accounts of mathematics based on the view that mathematics can be 
eliminated from science (section 6.8).
Chapter 7
Chapter 7 evaluated the fictionalist strategy of arguing that the roles 
mathematics has in empirical applications can be played by acknowledged 
forms of pretence. After setting out prescriptive fictionalism (section 7.1), 
we argued that it can satisfactorily address the challenge to fictionalism 
applications by putting forward a conception of mathematics as pretence.
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Our argument was that, from the perspective of this conception: (a) the 
descriptive role of object-committed mathematical sentences in empirical 
applications can be viewed as world-directed utterances that are not 
committed to mathematical objects (section 7.3.1); (b) the reliability of 
mathematical reasoning can be viewed as a consequence of the fact that 
the standards of correct mathematical acceptance evolve under the 
constraint of applicability (section 7.3.2). Despite considering Stanley’s 
critique of pretence invoking versions of fictionalism (section 7.4), 
Burgess’s objections to fictionalist approaches to mathematics (section
7.5) and the possibility that prescriptive fictionalism might bear 
objectionable commitments to the consistency of mathematics (section
7.6), we found no reason to dismiss it. As these results suggest that 
prescriptive fictionalism adequately meets the challenge from applications, 
we concluded that there are grounds for cautious optimism regarding its 
future prospects (section 7.7).
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8.2 Discussion
N
Of what significance are these conclusions for our original question of how 
we should conceive of apparent mathematical knowledge? To answer this 
we will first describe the consequences they have for our main questions, 
those concerning whether the epistemological challenges facing 
mathematical realism and mathematical fictionalism can be met. Then, 
before closing, we will describe the bearing our results have on some 
other areas of concern to the epistemology of mathematics and point out 
some emerging questions for future consideration.
8.2.1 The epistemological challenges to realism and fictionalism
The epistemological challenge to mathematical realism was that it make 
plausible that we are, or could be, in possession of adequate grounds for 
what passes for mathematical knowledge. Our results show that there is 
no plausible rationalist response to this challenge. They suggest that two 
out of the three empiricist approaches available are unsatisfactory but they 
provide no support for thinking that the third will succeed. The third 
strategy hopes to account for mathematical knowledge by adopting some 
version of the view that mathematical objects are on a metaphysical and 
epistemological par with properties of ordinary physical objects. We must 
therefore draw the following conclusion: it is possible that a satisfactory 
response to the epistemological challenge to realism may be got from this 
strategy, but no other approach is adequate.
The epistemological challenge to mathematical fictionalism was that it 
make plausible that the roles apparent mathematical knowledge has in 
empirical applications can be performed by pretence. Our results suggest 
that it is possible, and to a certain extent plausible, that prescriptive 
fictionalism adequately meets this challenge. So we may tentatively 
conclude that the epistemological challenge to mathematical fictionalism 
can be met.
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8.2.2 Some consequences for other areas of interest
s
It is interesting to note some consequences our results have for disputes 
in the epistemology of mathematics going beyond whether the 
epistemological challenges to realism and fictionalism can be met. One 
such dispute concerns whether we possess apriori knowledge of 
mathematical objects, knowledge that does not depend on the grounds of 
sense experience for its ultimate justification. Having dismissed all but 
one empiricist approach to the challenge to mathematical realism, we can 
conclude that we do not possess such knowledge.
Another dispute of interest concerns whether knowledge of abstract 
objects is possible. Having conceded that Quinean realism may provide 
an adequate account of knowledge of claims about mathematical objects 
that have widespread indispensable applications, we have some reason to 
think that the indispensability to science of a claim about abstract objects 
may in certain cases be sufficient ground upon which to claim that it is 
known. We can thus reject the view that knowledge of abstract objects is 
not possible.
A third area of interest concerns whether it is possible to explain the 
applicability of mathematics. From the perspective of prescriptive 
fictionalism, this can be viewed as a consequence of the fact that 
mathematics is designed to be applicable, with standards of correct 
acceptance that evolve under the constraint of applicability. Since 
prescriptive fictionalism is the best account of mathematics we have 
considered, we can tentatively conclude that it is possible to explain the 
applicability of mathematics.
Our investigations also throw up further questions to address: Is a
satisfactory response to the epistemological challenge to mathematical 
realism to be had by treating knowledge of mathematical objects as on a 
par with properties of physical objects? To what extent may we appeal to 
pretence theoretic pragmatics in other areas like mathematics, where
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apparent ontological commitments lead to epistemological difficulties? 
What are our ultimate grounds for theS logical knowledge involved 
mathematics?
Such questions leave us with plenty to be going on with. But since our 
concern has been with finding out whether the epistemological challenges 
to realism and fictionalism can be met, it is worth pointing out a line of 
enquiry that may attractively integrate the conclusions we have reached 
on those issues. A presupposition of our discussions has been that it is 
desirable to find an account of the object-committed fragment of what 
passes for mathematical knowledge either from the point of view of realism 
or from that of fictionalism. But if we abandon this presupposition, the 
possibility arises of a mixed view that takes advantage of both 
perspectives. Some of our conclusions help to sketch the rough outline of 
such a view. We have suggested that Quinean realism may provide an 
adequate account of mathematics with widespread indispensable 
applications, that predicative mathematics is indispensable to science and 
that prescriptive fictionalism is an adequate version of mathematical 
fictionalism. One naturally wonders, then, whether it might be possible to 
regard predicative object-committed mathematics from the point of view of 
Quinean realism and impredicative object-committed mathematics from 
the point of view of prescriptive fictionalism. This is not to say, of course, 
that a mixed view of this kind will withstand philosophical examination. But 
it seems to be an appealing possibility, and interesting enough to merit 
further investigatation.
8.2.3 Close
Giving up the editorial “we”, I’ll end with an autobiographical note. When I 
began work on this study, I had a hunch that a realist approach to 
mathematics could be sustained quite generally. It was going to be a 
“pluralist Platonism” taking advantage of several realist strategies for 
accounting for knowledge of mathematical objects and resisting any urge
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to take knowledge of set theory as an epistemological foundation. The 
more I thought about this, however, the less likely it seemed that 
mathematical realism could be sustained in full generality; one by one, the 
various realist strategies fell short of requirements. Having initially not 
considered the fictionalist approach, I was thus forced to examine it in 
more detail and was surprised to find myself impressed with its 
credentials. Indeed, for a while I expected to defend fictionalism as a 
general account of what passes for knowledge of mathematical objects. 
Now as it happens, I have in my discussion of prescriptive fictionalism 
defended the possibility of such a view, but this might be another staging 
post on my journey and not its final destination. Just where that will be, I 
cannot with any certainty predict. Let the arguments lead the way.
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